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ABSTRACT 
Steele, Walter R. “A Theological Dialogue with and Evaluation of Erik H. Erikson’s 
Theory of Identity Development in Light of Pauline Baptismal Theology in Romans and Some 
Implications for Pastoral Care” Ph.D. diss., Concordia Seminary, 2017. 304pp. 
The Issue of identity and identity development, or actualization, is both a psychological 
and a theological issue. Among psychologists who have been concerned with identity, the name 
of Erik H. Erikson is at the forefront. His psychosocial theory has been appropriated by several 
people in the field of pastoral care, yet his theory has not been adequately subjected to a robust 
and thorough theological critique based on solid exegesis. This dissertation provides such a 
critique by using a revised-correlational dialogue between Erikson’s and Eriksonian theory and 
Paul’s baptismal theology of identity drawn principally from Romans. 
The dissertation first describes Erikson’s theory and a major adaptation of his theory by 
James Marcia and his associates. It then explores Romans to determine Paul’s understanding of 
identity and the actualization of a Christian identity by means of baptism. A revised correlation 
dialogue next reveals that Erikson’s theory must not be applied to the conferral or imputation of 
identity, which is given as a gift and received by faith. However, his theory is helpful in two 
ways. First, it is useful in describing the deleterious effects of mistrusting God and building 
identity on the foundation of rebellious autonomy. In this case, both the syntonic and dystonic 
elements can be viewed as antithetical to the Christian life. On the other hand, if identity is first 
based upon trust in God and the gospel of the free gift of righteousness in Christ, and autonomy 
is understood in terms of self-control and individuation, his theory can be properly used in the 
pastoral care work of assisting Christians in actualizing that identity in the various stages of life. 
The final chapter provides trajectories for further study and presents an initial proposal for using 
the Rite of Holy Baptism in pastoral care. 
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PREFACE 
Over sixty years ago, in 1950, Erik Homburger Erikson presented his initial Life Cycle 
Theory in Childhood and Society. By the next decade he was well known, even winning a 
Pulitzer Prize in nonfiction for Gandhi’s Truth in 1970. The term, “Identity Crisis,” comes from 
the popularization of his theory in Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968). 
His life cycle theory was incorporated into the pastoral care theology of Lutheran practical 
theologian Donald Capps in his courses at Princeton Theological Seminary; however, it does not 
appear as though it has been given significant attention within The Lutheran Church—Missouri 
Synod’s seminaries’ curricula. Any discussion of human lifespan development must take into 
account the work of Erikson and that of those who have built upon his theory and modified it 
over time. It is the conviction of this dissertation, and will be shown in the proof of its thesis, that 
the use of Erikson’s theory of identity actualization in pastoral care is theologically defensible. 
His theory with appropriate modifications can enrich and support the work of pastoral care, 
especially in reference to the realm of the actualization of a Christian’s baptismal identity. 
First, any theological discussion or critique of such a theory must understand the 
fundamental presuppositions of his theory. Second, any examination of this theory must consider 
how it might need to be revised in light of Christian theology. In this dissertation, “Erikson’s 
theory” will refer to his work specifically. “Eriksonian” will be the term for those which have 
Erikson’s work as their foundation. 
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GLOSSARY 
A Sense of Autonomy. A sense of autonomy is an introspective experience of being a person 
who is separate, unique, and individuated from another; that is, of being oneself. This 
begins at approximately 18 months from birth, during the time when toilet training is also 
beginning. A sense of autonomy is externally observable by actions which illustrate 
strength of will and willfulness, such as a struggle against the parents.1  
 
Basic Strengths and Basic Weaknesses. Each of the eight stages in Erikson’s theory is resolved 
when the person achieves what Erikson calls “a basic sense of” two dialectical qualities, 
for example, a sense of basic trust and a sense of basic mistrust. Erikson is often 
erroneously understood to present these two as a positive and a negative. On the contrary, 
the so-called negative is necessary for living in the world.2 As an example, basic mistrust 
is a good quality if mistrust is placed (so to speak) in that which is untrustworthy. When 
the resolution of each stage is successfully achieved the product is a “basic strength” of 
character. As an example, in Stage I (Trust vs. Mistrust) the adaptive strength is “hope.” 
Hope results when trust must endure periods in which mistrust in the provider could be 
devastating. Hope gives the person a reason to endure.3 
 
Crisis. The idea of a crisis being instrumental at each developmental stage is indispensable for 
Erikson. “Each successive stage and crisis has a special relation to one of the basic 
elements of society, and this for the simple reason that the human life cycle and man’s 
institutions have evolved together.”4 It is essential for understanding Erikson to 
understand that the social, historical setting of a person’s life is integral to that person’s 
development, just as important as any genetic factors that are in play. A crisis occurs 
when the social setting of the person intersects with that person’s learned strengths, 
which are no longer adequate to negotiate the new situation. In Erikson, a crisis is not an 
evil. It is a necessity for social adaptation and maturation. “Erikson actually regarded 
these crises less as battles and more as dialectical tensions.”5 
 
                                                 
1
 See Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1963), 251–54. “Will” and 
“willfulness” is “the sense that one will find his or her own identity rather than have to submit to choices imposed by 
authority figures.” Alan S. Waterman, “Developmental Perspectives on Identity Formation: From Adolescence to 
Adulthood,” in Ego Identity: A Handbook for Psychosocial Research, ed. J.E. Marcia, et al (New York: Springer, 
1993), 49. 
2
 Erikson presents the dialectic in his various charts of epigenetic development in terms of X vs. Y (e.g.: 
Basic Trust vs. Basic Mistrust); however, his intention is not to say that the first quality is the good one and the 
second one is an evil. In a description of his chart and the terms he uses, he states: “The vs stands for ‘versus,’ and 
yet also, in light of their complementarity, for something like ‘vice versa.’ ” The Life Cycle Completed, ext. ed. 
(New York: Norton, 1997), 55. Erikson is dealing with human life as it is, not as it was in Eden or will be in the 
eschaton for believers in Christ. 
3
 See Erikson Childhood and Society, 247–51. 
4
 Erikson Childhood and Society, 250. 
5
 Stephen A. Mitchell and Margaret J. Black, Freud and Beyond: A History of Modern Psychoanalytic 
Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 148. 
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Epigenetic Principle (of Maturation). Erikson borrowed this term from Freud, who, in turn, 
had borrowed it from embryology. In physical development, “each organ has its time of 
origin. This time factor is important as the place of origin.”6 In a similar way, the 
psychosocial development of a person also follows a set sequence, during which, at each 
step, the potential psychosocial characteristic emerges as a fully developed quality. It 
may become stunted or regress in some way after emerging, but it will not be missing. 
However, if it fails to emerge when it should, it produces a “defective person.”7 Such a 
failure to emerge is highly detrimental to psychosocial development, just as the failure of 
a physical organ to develop in utero will also prohibit it ever from emerging.8 
 
Identity Crisis. Erikson writes: “‘Identity’ and ‘identity crisis’ have in popular and scientific 
usage become terms which alternately circumscribe something so large and so seemingly 
self-evident that to demand a definition would almost seem petty, while at other times 
they designate something so narrow for purposes of measurement that the over-all 
meaning is lost, and it could just as well be called something else.”9 Erikson recollects 
first using the term when he was treating war veterans at Mt. Zion Veterans’ 
Rehabilitation Center during the Second World War. “Most of our patients, so we 
concluded at that time, had neither been ‘shell-shocked’ nor become malingerers, but had 
through the exigencies of war lost a sense of personal sameness and historical 
continuity.”10 Subsequently, he and others noted the same loss in severely conflicted 
youth. What the servicemen and these youth had in common was their age bracket. 
“Thus, we have learned to ascribe a normative ‘identity crisis’ to the age of adolescence 
and young adulthood.”11 
 
Ego Identity. Ego identity is that sense of self which includes both a sense of personal sameness 
and of historical continuity, even as one changes and matures over time. Ego identity is 
“derived from the psychosocial crises of childhood in light of the ideological climate of 
youth.”12 It tests, selects, and integrates the self-images derived from these crises. It is not 
wholly a conscious sense of identity. It is a partially unconscious organizing agency, 
which is formed by the forces of somatic, psychic, and social influences. Self-identity 
emerges from experiences in which changing roles and social relationships are 
successfully reintegrated into one’s sense of continuity over time. Identity formation, 
thus, can be said to have a self-aspect and an ego aspect.13 
 
                                                 
6
 Erikson, Childhood and Society, 65. 
7
 Erikson, Childhood and Society, 66. 
8
 Erikson writes in much greater detail about epigenetic development in “Problems of Infancy and Early 
Childhood,” in A Way of Looking at Things: Selected Papers 1930–1980, ed. Stephen Schlein (New York: Norton, 
1987), 547–68. 
9
 Erik Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (New York: Norton, 1968), 15. 
10
 Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, 17. 
11
 Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, 17. 
12
 Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, 210. 
13
 Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, 211. 
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Maladaptation/ Malignancy. Erik and Joan Erikson use these terms to describe an exaggeration 
of a virtue, or character strength, “amounting to a pathology”14 For example, the virtue 
developed after successful negotiation of Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion) is 
fidelity. The maladaptive manifestation of fidelity is fanaticism. The maladaptive 
response to the crisis is repudiation. 
 
Revised Correlational Approach. A revised correlational approach is a conversational 
approach between two distinct disciplines, such as psychology and theology, in which 
mutual understanding is sought, so that each discipline might be enriched by the 
interaction between the two. 
 
                                                 
14
 Joan Erikson, Wisdom and the Senses: The Way of Creativity (New York: Norton, 1988), 114. 
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
SCOPE OF THE DISSERTATION 
The Thesis 
“Who am I?” This question stands at the center of human inquiry in our time.1 The question 
is asked by children, especially those who have been adopted.2 It is asked by adolescents and 
emerging adults.3 It is a major factor for military veterans, especially combat veterans suffering 
from post-traumatic stress injury.4 It is asked by older adults as they enter retirement and no 
longer find identity in their occupation.5 “Identity is an understanding of who you are.”6 
The issue of identity and identity formation, however, is not merely a psychological issue; 
it has a theological foundation. As will be demonstrated in chapter 3 of this dissertation, for the 
Christian the foundational source of identity is his baptism into Christ Jesus, by means of which 
                                                 
1
 “Survival, anticipation, and responsibility seem to depend on identity and seem to reveal what makes 
questions about identity so morally and practically important, not to mention emotionally uncomfortable.” Maura 
Tumulty, “How Philosophers Think about Persons, Personal Identity, and the Self,” in Personal Identity and 
Fractured Selves¸ ed. Debra J.H. Mathews, Hilary Bok, and Peter V. Rabins (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 2009), 23. 
2
 “For many adopted persons, the question of identity is interwoven with specific questions about one’s 
lineage, such as ‘Who are my biological parents’ ‘Where was I born?’ ‘What were my earliest days like?’ and ‘What 
is my genetic heritage?’ . . . Adoptive identity addresses these questions: ‘Who am I as an adopted person?’ and 
‘What does being adopted mean to me, and how does it fit into my understanding of my self, relationships, family, 
and culture?’” Harold D. Grotevant and Lynn Von Korff, “Adoptive Identity,” in Handbook of Identity Theory and 
Research, ed. Seth j. Schwartz, Koen Luyckx, and Vivian Vignoles, (New York: Springer, 2011), 2:585–86. See 
also Betty J. Lifton, Journey of the Adopted Self: A Quest for Wholeness (New York: Basic Books, 1994). 
3
 “Identity formation takes place in every phase of the life span, but has particular poignancy in emerging 
adulthood.” David P. Setran and Chris A. Kiesling, Spiritual Formation in Emerging Adulthood (Grand Rapids: 
Baker, 2013), 79. 
4
 As an example, see the case study, “A Combat Crisis in a Marine,” Erikson, Childhood and Society, 38–47. 
5
 “Thus we see how the giving up of work has an interfering influence on the human ego.” Heije Faber, 
Striking Sails, trans. Kenneth R. Mitchell (Nashville: Abingdon, 1984), 75. 
6
 Stephen M. Saunders, A Christian Guide to Mental Illness: Recognizing Mental Illness in the Church and 
School (Milwaukee: Northwestern, 2016), 1:238. 
2 
God confers upon the Christian the identity of being one who is righteous before him.7 Baptism 
results in a change of status. As Paul writes in Romans 6, it kills and makes alive. It also 
transfers the baptized person from the kingdom of darkness into the kingdom of God. “Through 
Baptism God enters deeply into human life; a separation between life before and the life after 
takes place.”8 Nonetheless, for all that baptism bestows, it is not often used in the pastoral care 
task of Christian identity actualization. Specifically, Christians are often told, “Live out your 
baptism.” Yet, what this means and how it is to be applied in the context of their daily lives is not 
very clear. Furthermore, how the actualization of Christian baptismal identity is to be expressed 
in the various stages on life’s way is also a topic not addressed in any great detail. The task of 
outlining the pragmatics of pastoral care in terms of identity actualization is, nonetheless, not 
within the scope of this dissertation. A more fundamental task must first be accomplished. That 
task is to engage the issues of identity actualization theologically. 
It is the thesis of this dissertation that the utilization of Erikson’s developmental theory, 
which theory has found its way into many books on pastoral care, is theologically defensible 
within certain limits. It will be shown that the theory can be used in pastoral care in two specific 
and seemingly contradictory areas when dealing with Christian identity. First, Erikson’s theory, 
when viewed through the lens of Paul’s theology of baptism in Romans, and especially in the 
preparatory work Paul does in Romans 1–5, can be used in pastoral care to describe and illustrate 
the effects, or fruits, of original sin, which has its source in mistrust (lack of trust or faith) in 
God, and that this leads to a false identity built on the foundation of narcissistic autonomy and 
the resultant work of self-justification. 
                                                 
7
 “Being in Baptism is equivalent to being in Christ.” David P. Scaer, Baptism Confessional Lutheran 
Dogmatics 11 (St. Louis: The Luther Academy, 1999), 1. 
8
 Edmund Schlink, The Doctrine of Baptism, trans. Herbert J. A. Bouman (St. Louis: Concordia, 1972), 46. 
See also Jonathan D. Trigg, Baptism in the Theology of Martin Luther (Boston, MA: Brill, 2001), 166–73. 
3 
The second part of the thesis is that Erikson’s theory can be utilized faithfully in assisting 
in the pastoral care work of identity actualization, if, and only if, the concept of identity 
construction or development is excluded from the basic foundation of Christian identity, which 
identity is conferred by means of baptism and based upon the finished work of Christ in his death 
and resurrection. In order to establish this final caveat, the dissertation, while noting the apparent 
similarity between Paul and Erikson, that is, that trust (faith) is foundational to identity, will 
demonstrate that the foundation of Christian identity is conferred by God in baptism. The 
Christian’s foundational identity is in the righteousness of faith given in the gospel. 
Therefore, this dissertation will demonstrate that, examined through the lens of a biblical 
foundation of baptism, drawn principally from Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, supplemented by 
First Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, and Colossians, Erikson’s theory of identity 
development can legitimately be utilized in the pastoral care work of Christian identity 
actualization with the following caveats. First, it can be used to describe the effects and fruits of 
original sin. Second, it can be used to assist a Christian to learn how to express, or actualize, his 
or her conferred identity, which is given baptism. Third, any concept of development must be 
avoided when speaking about the Christian’s conferred, imputed, alien identity in Christ. This 
will be demonstrated in chapter 4, as Erikson’s theory, presented in chapter 2, is correlated with 
Paul’s baptismal theology in chapter 3.9 After the above thesis is defended, some implications of 
the findings of this dissertation will be presented in chapter 5. While that chapter will only begin 
to discover possibilities, its goal is to encourage further work in the future. 
                                                 
9
 The scope of this dissertation will be limited to the area of Eriksonian developmental psychology. 
Increasingly, brain research is revealing the interconnection between psychological and biological aspects of human 
development. A recent publication which gives a general survey of this research is Allen Nauss, Implications of 
Brain Research for the Church (Minneapolis: Kirk House, 2013. Such research may well bolster Erikson’s 
contention that identity development has not only psychological and social aspects, but is strongly influenced by the 
somatic.  
4 
The Current Status of the Question 
To limit Erikson to the discipline of psychology or psychoanalytic thought is really to 
misunderstand the monumental change his theory has had on the social sciences and on 
psychology of religion. True, he was trained as a psychoanalyst. However, Erikson’s theory 
builds upon and yet expands the scope of both Sigmund Freud and Anna Freud, of whom he was 
an analysand.10 Partially due to the influence of Anna Freud, who shifted her emphasis from the 
study of the “id” (das Es) to that of the “ego” (das Ich),11 Erikson began to question the 
“nineteenth century physicalism” of the Freuds, and eventually even Ms. Freud’s mechanistic 
description of defense mechanisms.12 He expanded the view of human psychological 
development so that it included three key elements: the somatic (physical being), the 
psychological; and the social.13 While this thinking is common today, his innovation was 
courageous as it brought him into conflict with Anna Freud, who thought of his work as a 
                                                 
10
 While Erikson was undergoing psychoanalysis with Anna Freud, she was writing Das Ich und die 
Abwehrmechanismen (The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense) which she published in 1936. Lawrence Friedman, 
in his authoritative biography of Erikson, writes: “Anna Freud ran several seminars while serving actively as a 
training analyst. Erik found her published lectures on the technique of child analysis to be ‘the only safe technical 
statement’ on the subject. . . . Erik therefore regarded his contact with Anna Freud at the core of his analytic 
training.” Lawrence J. Friedman, Identity’s Architect: A Biography of Erik H. Erikson (New York: Scribner, 1999), 
75. 
11
 See Kit Welchman, Erik Erikson: His Life, Work, and Significance (Philadelphia: Open University, 2000), 
49. 
12
 See Friedman, Identity’s Architect, 88. 
13
 Erikson is normally labelled a “Neo-Freudian,” since a significant percentage of his work departs from the 
intrapsychic emphasis of Sigmund and Anna Freud. See Ludy T. Benjamin, Jr., A Brief History of Modern 
Psychology (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007), 127–32. Much as did Erikson, Heinz Hartmann also understood 
that a sharp divide between the physiological and the psychological cannot be legitimately maintained. “We reject 
the customary form of this question: What is biological and what is psychological in the developmental process? We 
ask instead: What part is congenital, what maturational, and what environmentally determined? What physiological 
and what psychological changes take place in it? Our psychological method encompasses more than just the 
processes of mental development. Precisely because the psychological is a part of the biological, under certain 
conditions our method shed light on physiological developments, particularly on those pertaining to instinctual 
drives. We can trace the course of these developments, using psychological phenomena as their indicator or 
symptom.” Heinz Hartmann, Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation (1937), trans. David Rapaport (New 
York: International Universities Press, 1958), 34–35. 
5 
repudiation of the work of her father.14 One cannot truly accuse her of a false estimation of the 
trajectory of Erikson’s work. As an example, for her father the sublimation of the instincts (or 
drives of the id) was culturally necessary, but resulted in neuroses in the individual who had to 
suppress his id-impulses. The German psychiatrist and psychoanalysis Stavros Mentzos writes: 
“Es ist frawürdig, ob alle Formen kulurell wertvoller Tätigkeiten aus einer Sublimierung 
entstehen.” Then, referencing Erikson’s Identity: Youth and Crisis, as well as Winnicott and 
Matussek, he continues, “Die neuere Kreatitäsforschung auch psychoanalytischer Autoren geht 
eine ähnliche Richtung.”15 
The heightened concern about personal identity is a modern phenomenon. Erikson, in 
Young Man Luther (1958), sought to connect young man Martin’s life crises with the battle 
between identity confusion and the acquisition of a sense of self. It is highly unlikely that Luther 
would have been conscious of such a struggle.16 His Weltanschauung was quite different. 
Nevertheless, Erikson’s work opened the door to the psychoanalytic study of history, even of 
biblical characters. 
Erikson, of course, did not work in a vacuum. He was an heir of centuries of Western 
intellectual thought. Jerrold Seigel remarks: 
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Since the time of Descartes and Locke (and less explicitly before, as we shall see), 
the basis of selfhood in Western culture has been sought primarily along or within 
three dimensions, ones that are familiar and should be easily recognizable to anyone. 
We call them the bodily or material, the relational, and the reflexive dimensions of 
self. The first involves the physical, corporeal existence of individuals, the things 
about our nature that make us palpable creatures driven by needs urges, and 
inclinations, and that give us particular constitutions or temperaments, making us for 
instance more or less energetic, lethargic, passionate, or apathetic. Our selves on this 
level, including whatever consciousness we have of them, are housed in our bodies, 
and are shaped by the body’s needs. The second, relational, dimension arises from 
social and cultural interaction, the common connections and involvements that give 
us collective identities and shared orientations and values, making us people able to 
use a specific language or idiom and marking us with its particular style of 
description, categorization, and expression. In this perspective our selves are what our 
relations with society and with others shape or allow us to be. The third dimension, 
that of reflexivity . . . derives from the human capacity to make both the world and 
our own existence objects of our active regard, to turn a kind of mirror not only on 
the phenomena in the world, including our own bodies and our social relations, but on 
our consciousness too, putting ourselves at a distance from our own being so as to 
examine, judge, and sometimes regulate or revise it.17 
These three dimensions are evident in Erikson’s thought. His contribution has been to take 
the extended period of adolescence, which has become quite long in modern times, and assign to 
it, especially and in particular, the work of identity formation—a formation which, while still 
open to some manipulation in later years, is essentially formed during this timeframe. Seigel has 
noted that “Erikson argued that the problem of human identity becomes especially acute during 
adolescence, when individuals experience powerful bodily and mental transformations, making it 
difficult to achieve a stable sense of continuity, both of themselves over time, and between what 
any individual is for her or himself and what she or he is for others.”18 This instability is at the 
core of the “identity crisis.”19 However, as Seigel notes elsewhere, Erikson teaches that the work 
of developing individual identity begins in infancy when the child starts to differentiate himself 
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from “the other,” developing first a basic sense of trust and a basic sense of mistrust, and then a 
sense of personal autonomy.20 
Erikson’s emphasis on the importance of a sense of identity and the dimensions of its 
development is supported by the research of Pierre Tapp, Sylie Espardes-Pistre, and Florence 
Sordes-Ader. They report seven important dimensions: La continuité; l’unité ou la cohérence; la 
diversité et les territoires identitaires; la séparation, l’autonomie et l’affirmation; l’originalité; 
l’action et la production d’œuvres; la valorisation ou positivité de soi.21 
Erikson has also been credited with broadening the theoretical orientation of 
psychoanalysis. Before him little attention was paid to the positive aspects of the cultural or 
social milieu. For Freud, the Super-Ego (das Über-Ich), while necessary for social life, was the 
chief contributor to neuroses. Erikson understood the social forces as playing a more positive 
role in the development of personal identity. His work has also been incorporated into such 
diverse fields as cultural anthropology, social work, and psycho-biography. Nonetheless, Stephen 
Mitchell and Margaret Black make the following assessment. 
Erikson’s legacy offers one of the most interesting ironies of contemporary 
psychoanalytic thought. In terms of both the popular culture and related disciplines 
like history and anthropology, Erikson has been among the most widely read and 
influential of psychoanalytic authors, yet within the psychoanalytic literature itself he 
is rarely acknowledged. Erikson always saw his own contributions as simply adding 
dimensions to existing Freudian thought. Yet Freudian analytic authors had a hard 
time bridging their traditional emphasis on the intrapsychic instinctual conflict with 
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Erikson’s rich sense of the complex relationships between the individual and the 
surrounding culture. In this sense, Erikson was ahead of his time.22 
He contributed to this expansion of Freudian theory by pointing not only to his own clinical work 
but also to Freud himself, especially Freud’s Die Traumdeutung.23 Erikson averred that Freud 
made a major systematic break with this past when he wrote Die Traumdeutung. Erikson’s 
argument has been attacked as false by Harry Guntrip, who argues that Erikson misunderstood 
Freud.24 This, along with Anna Freud’s evaluation of Erikson’s writings, may partially account 
for Erikson’s lack of status among many psychoanalytic theorists. Edward Shapiro and Gerard 
Fromm write: 
Erikson made significant contributions to a broad range of disciplines, but the 
application of his theories to clinical practice has not received proper recognition. 
Although considered among the group of ego psychologists that transformed 
psychoanalytic theory in the 1950s and 1960s, Erikson's emphasis on how the 
individual is inextricably bound to sociocultural and historical forces has broad and 
largely underdeveloped clinical significance. David Rapaport described Erikson's 
work as the culmination of ego psychology, the first psychoanalytic theory of the 
person's relationship to social reality with which the ego is always engaged. Rapaport 
noted, “[Erikson's] concept of mutuality specifies that the crucial coordination is 
between the developing individual and his human (social) environment.” This 
concept extends clinical work beyond the boundaries of the individual and opens it to 
larger scrutiny. From his clinical study of patients, Erikson recognized how the 
pathology and recovery of patients are linked to how they engage and are engaged by 
their world.25 
Nevertheless, Erikson has not been ignored by other writers in the field. In 1978, Daniel J. 
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Levinson built upon Erikson’s work in The Seasons of a Man’s Life.26 Gail Sheehy’s book 
Passages,27 published two years prior, was actually built upon the research reported in the 
former. Sheehy updated her work in 1995 with New Passages: Mapping Your Life across Time.28 
Carol Gilligan29 and Joan Borysenko30 have been among the voices that have engaged Erikson 
critically, charging that his theory is overly androcentric. Borysenko postulates a significant 
difference between adolescent girls and boys in their respective stages of affective development. 
Boys, as they enter late adolescence, which is the beginning of Stage V (Identity vs. Identity 
Diffusion) for Erikson, begin to negotiate the balance between intimacy and isolation. Girls, 
according to Borysenko, have already worked through this stage in earlier years. They have 
mastered intimacy. For them the task is not to lose themselves but to develop their own sense of 
personal identity apart from others. In other words, Stages V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion) and 
VI (Intimacy vs. Isolation) are switched for each sex.31 This critique, among others, will be 
addressed in Chapter 2 because there is merit to the concern. 
Erikson’s work continues to be referenced in books on psychotherapy and psychological 
theory. Jane Kroger argues that Erikson gives us “the organizing framework” for viewing human 
lifespan development over the changing stages of life.32 It is especially at the points of crises in 
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life that significant personal changes occur.33 One of the strengths of Erikson’s perspective is 
uniting of the psychological with the social environment. “Ego identity requires knowing who 
you are and how you fit into society.”34 Henry Maier presents three dimensions for viewing 
development: cognitive; affective; behavioral. He presents Jean Piaget’s cognitive theory, 
Erikson’s affective theory, and Robert R. Sears’s behavioral theory. In Three Theories of Child 
Development, he discusses each theory and then attempts to demonstrate how each theory 
coordinates with the other two and can be integrated into an Affect-Behavioral-Cognitive model. 
While his endeavor is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is important to note that it is 
Erikson’s model that he uses and not someone else’s. In addition, Erikson’s theory of identity 
development is cited repeatedly in Handbook of Identity Theory and Research.35 His theory is 
also dealt with extensively in both volumes of The Handbook of Life-Span Development.36 These 
scholars, among others, consider Erikson from a secular perspective. The foregoing demonstrates 
the weight given to his thought, and gives insight into the seriousness with which his work is still 
given consideration.  
Jack O. Balswick, Pamela Ebstyne King, and Kevin Reimer present a theological 
perspective in The Reciprocating Self,37 by utilizing Erikson in their theological study of human 
development. Their book considers issues which go beyond the scope of this dissertation, such as 
questions of physicalism, dualism and trichotomism in theological anthropology, and how these 
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affect the way one considers lifespan development. Using Erikson’s schema, they consider each 
stage from the viewpoints of social science research and theology. Of concern to these scholars is 
the lack of a guiding teleology in existing developmental theory. In The Reciprocating Self, they 
take notice of a philosophical shift in the foundation of theological anthropology. The shift is 
from the Aristotelian concept of substance to the concept of relationality in Trinitarian theology. 
The self, as they describe it, is a reciprocating entity engaging “fully in relationships with 
another in all its particularity.”38 Therefore, for them, the imago dei is a relational term. It is 
relationality that determines identity. One is who one is based on one’s relation to others, and to 
“the Other,” as well as to one’s own self. Rather than the imago dei being in some sense a 
substantial likeness (such as spirit) or an ethical quality (such as holiness39), it is a reflection of 
the perichoretic relationship between the divine persons of the Holy Trinity. 
Theirs is a theology of relationality drawing from the works of men such as Karl Barth, 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Stanley Grenz, and John Zizoulis. However, they do not attempt to build an 
exegetical foundation for the development of human teleology, which they describe as God’s 
intention for human identity development as becoming “particular beings in relationship with the 
divine and the human other.”40 An exegetical foundation for Christian identity development 
based on Paul’s baptismal theology would significantly bolster their argument.41 
Donald Capps integrated Erikson’s framework into many of his writings and courses. His 
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writings, however, have been aimed at appropriating Erikson into pastoral care work rather than 
rigorously critiquing the foundations. Thus, while his books have been helpful to many, they also 
would have been bolstered by a more robust dialogue between Erikson and exegetical theology. 
The same holds true for Gary R. Collin’s guide for Christian counseling.42 Siang-Yang Tan,43 
Mark R. McMinn and Clark D. Campbell,44 Robert C. Fuller,45 Matthew Linn, Sheila Fabricant, 
and Dennis Linn,46 and Stanton L. Jones and Richard E. Butman47 all reference Erikson’s theory, 
use it to describe human development, yet also fail to give it a substantial theological critique.48 
While Erikson continues to be referenced in the area of lifespan development, little from a 
Christian perspective, and virtually nothing from a Lutheran perspective, has been done to 
determine the theological validity of his theory or, having approved some or all of his theory, to 
discover how an Eriksonian perspective might enrich a robust pastoral theology of identity. 
Pastoral theology that is not based upon a solid theological foundation will likely run counter to 
the gospel and hurt people spiritually in the long run. Therefore, this dissertation seeks to provide 
a theological critique of Erikson’s theory in light of Pauline baptismal theology. This will be 
accomplished by grounding this theological critique in solid exegesis, and demonstrating how 
Erikson’s theory of identity development, with some corrections and adjustments, can assist the 
work of pastoral care in terms of Christian identity actualization. The “Methodological 
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Procedures” section below outlines the systematic process to be followed to demonstrate this 
thesis. 
The Dissertation in the Context of Current Scholarship 
Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod (LCMS) pastoral theology has tended in recent years to 
shy away from integrating findings of secular psychology into the framework of pastoral care. 
The discussion for the Missouri Synod begins with C. F. W. Walther’s Pastoraltheologie49 (First 
Edition: 1872) which predates the rise of psychotherapy in pastoral theology. It is not possible to 
know for certain what Walther’s attitude toward the discipline would have been. Certainly he 
would have rejected the reductive physicalism that undergirds Freud’s psychoanalytic theory. 
However, he did teach that pastoral care involves more than merely preaching to people. 
“Pastoraltheologie ist der von Gott verliehene (θεόδοτος), durch gewisse hilfsmittel erlangte 
(acquisitus) prakische habitus der Seele, vermöge dessen ein Kirchendiener befähigt ist, alle 
Verrichtungen vie ihm als solchen zukommen”50 These words indicate that Walther appreciated 
that other disciplines are to be incorporated into the practice of soul care. 
J. H. C. Fritz, perhaps following the suggestion of Walther that auxiliary means are 
appropriate in pastoral theology, wrote about the cure of souls in Pastoral Theology (1932). He 
states that a general theological anthropology is not sufficient. “A pastor . . . must also know how 
to diagnose and treat the peculiar spiritual conditions of an individual soul.”51 While the sinful 
heart is the root cause of all problems within people, there are secondary causes which manifest 
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sin in particular ways. These include: heredity; psychosomatic influences; fixed habits; various 
temperaments; hysteria in women; and the “twenty-two large groups and types of mental 
diseases” listed by the American Psychiatric Association in his day. He does add this caveat: “Of 
course a modern psychiatrist who denies the fact that sin is the source of all evil in the world, and 
especially also of demoniac possession, should not be consulted,”52 thereby acknowledging the 
challenge faced by any practical theologian who desires to attempt some integration between 
psychology and theology.53 Concern with identity development, at least as it concerns people 
today, does not appear to have been a concern at this point in the history of Lutheran pastoral 
care. 
Concordia Publishing House published What, Then, Is Man? A Symposium of Theology, 
Psychology, and Psychiatry54 in 1958. This is a serious attempt at a revised correlational dialogue 
between the disciplines. The first edition of Erikson’s Childhood and Society had appeared eight 
years before. The second edition would see the light of day three years later. Although What, 
Then, is Man? does not reference Erikson, concerns about the philosophical presuppositions of 
psychologists are raised. What, Then, Is Man? lists three areas of concern: determinism, 
materialistic monism, and intersubjective confirmability. The authors aver that determinism 
undergirds the teaching of Sigmund Freud. Since Erikson was trained as a Freudian 
psychoanalyst, if their assertion is true, the degree to which his schema exhibits determinism 
must be investigated. Materialistic monism, otherwise known as “Reductive Physicalism” avers 
that there are no supernatural forces at work. This provides an atheistic framework within 
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psychology. Erikson, especially under his wife’s influence, was not antagonistic to a form of 
Protestant Christianity and was influenced by his mother (a Jew who read and introduced her son 
to Kierkegaard).  
Part of the appeal of Erikson for pastoral care and counseling is his positive attitude toward 
Christianity. Hettie Zock comments on Erikson’s relation to Christian religion. 
Having summed up the more formal characteristics of Erikson’s concept of religion, 
with regard to content, it can be said to rely heavily on the Christian religion. As we 
have regularly seen up to now, Erikson frequently draws his psychological 
terminology from the Christian religion. The motto of the immortal identity ‘die and 
become’ as well as the golden rule have a Christian character. Furthermore, it is no 
coincidence that it is mostly Christian religious figures in whom Erikson has found a 
strong sense of I: Jesus, Luther, Kierkegaard, and Thomas Jefferson. Besides there is 
the Jew Einstein, who grew up in a Christian milieu, and the Hindu Gandhi, who was 
deeply influenced by the sermon on the mount. Moreover, Erikson points—rightly or 
wrongly—to the similarities between satyagrapha and Jesus’ teachings. It is true that 
Erikson never says that the representation of the meeting with an Ultimate Other is 
the exclusive property of the Christian tradition. However, it can be rightfully argued 
that Christian tradition is in some way normative for Erikson.55 
Zock’s evaluation of Erikson’s positive attitude towards Christianity is corroborated by Walter 
Capps. 
Erik Erikson contributed toward increased understanding of religion by providing 
documentation and illustration of how individuals construct worldviews. Admittedly, 
this sounds simplistic, but there is a particular point to be made. Sigmund Freud 
himself explored the relationship between psyche and culture in such well-known 
studies as Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), Moses and Monotheism (1939), 
and The Future of an Illusion (1927), and elsewhere, while many writers and 
theoreticians, influenced by Freud, pushed the psyche-and-culture tandem even 
further in their analyses of the manner in which Western culture is a product of 
collective neurosis or psychoses or of failed exchanges within psychological reality. 
But, to my knowledge, no one prior to Erik Erikson had undertaken to explain these 
matters in specific individual and historical terms.56 
The third concern of What, Then, Is Man? is intersubjective confirmability, which restricts 
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“discourse to propositions that can be confirmed or disconfirmed… by appeal to empirical 
evidence which we can all obtain at will.”57 While this is sound science, it does preclude any 
influence upon the subject matter by religious texts, thereby prohibiting meaningful dialogue.58 
As texts are examined, these three presuppositions will require serious consideration. Rick Marrs 
states that the in-depth scholarship of this work “had a formative influence on many non-LCMS 
evangelicals who expanded the Christian counseling and psychology movement in the 1970s.”59 
Yet it appears to be been buried in obscurity among many Missouri Synod Lutherans. 
The Pastor at Work is a collaborative work, published by Concordia Publishing House in 
1960.
60
 Chapter 13, “Pastoral Care of the Sick,” by Edward J. Mahnke and Chapter 17, “The 
Pastor and the Burdened Soul,” by Edwin A. Nerger both reference secular and pastoral 
psychology texts in their chapter bibliographies. Thus it appears that from at least the 1930s 
through the 1960s, The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod attempted in some manner to 
integrate the field of psychotherapy with that of pastoral care. Nevertheless, the concept of 
identity development is not a central theme in The Pastor at Work. 
The 1990 edition of Pastoral Theology, edited by Norbert H. Mueller and George Kraus, 
has a dearth of information related to such integration. The events of the late 1960s and 1970s in 
the LCMS, especially concerns about the effects of modernism on theology, might account for 
this. Nevertheless, such an investigation is also outside the scope of this dissertation. 
In 1994, Concordia Publishing House published Pastoral Care under the Cross by Richard 
                                                 
57
 Meehl, What, Then, Is Man? 85. 
58
 For a recent discussion of the intersection between Christian theology and science, see “In Christ All 
Things Hold Together: The Intersection of Science and Christian Theology.” A Report of the Commission on 
Theology and Church Relations (CTCR) of The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod. St. Louis, February 2015. A 
fuller discussion of this dialogue, including this CTCR document, see Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
59
 Rick Marrs, “Christian Counseling: The Past Generation and the State of the Field,” Concordia Journal 40, 
no. 1 (2014): 31. 
60
 William H. Eifert, The Pastor at Work (St. Louis: Concordia, 1960). 
17 
C. Eyer.61 In chapter 5, “Crossing the Years: The Elderly,” Eyer makes extensive use of 
Erikson’s developmental schema and writes about identity development. However, this book, as 
is true for many others, does not attempt to critique Erikson from a theological perspective or 
explore in depth its connection to baptism. Eyer’s use of Erikson is pragmatic and functional. 
In 2007, Concordia Publishing House released Lutheran Service Book Pastoral Care 
Companion.62 In the Introduction, the commission members distinguish between “ordinary 
pastoral care” and “extraordinary pastoral care.” They state: “While recognizing the place of 
extraordinary forms of pastoral care, the agenda attends to the ordinary.”63 However, the agenda, 
while acknowledging the existence of “extraordinary pastoral care” appears quickly to dismiss it. 
The agenda states: “The wise pastor will know when others must be summoned to care for 
physical or psychological maladies. … [The] pastor will devote himself to spiritual care—the 
care of the soul.”64 This statement could, and has been, understood to mean that pastoral care in 
The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod has a very narrow focus and that pastors ought to 
eschew pastoral counseling. The narrowly focused goal of pastoral care, as stated in the Lutheran 
Service Book Pastoral Care Companion, is “nothing less than the faith confessed in the 
conclusion of the Apostles’ Creed: ‘I believe in the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of the 
body, and the life everlasting.’ ”65 Not only is it “nothing less than,” some LCMS pastors clearly 
understand it to be nothing more than this.66 Such a narrowed description of pastoral care is not 
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thick enough for real parish practice. Parishioners more often avail themselves of their pastor for 
“extraordinary pastoral care” more than they do for confession and absolution. They look to him 
and other church workers for advice and perspective in a multitude of lifecycle crises, including 
the question, “Who am I?” 
In The Genius of Luther’s Theology, Robert Kolb and Charles Arand write, “Every age 
brings with it a predominant set of beliefs about what it means to be human and how to live out 
that humanity. Each configuration of the human being also brings with it an analysis of the 
ailments that beset human life along with a proposal of a set of cures that are needed.”67 These 
two sentences state both the reality and the challenge of this dissertation’s endeavor. The Greeks 
used philosophy. Ancient Israel used Torah and wisdom literature. Ever since the Enlightenment, 
science has been looked to as the predominant and determinative source of knowledge. The issue 
with scientific explanations is not with science proper; it is rather scientism. “Scientism is a 
philosophical handmaiden of materialism. While materialism is a metaphysical claim (about 
what exists), scientism is an epistemological claim (about what we can know). In its strong form, 
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scientism asserts that materialistic science is the only means of knowing what is real.”68 
Nonetheless, scientism should not be a reason for Christians to jettison science.69 Nor should this 
be a reason not to seek a mutual understanding of the human condition. An honest, productive, 
mutually beneficial dialogue with the social sciences can be of immense value to pastoral 
theology and possibly also to systematics and exegetical theology as well. A model for the 
interaction between theology and science is found in “In Christ All Things Hold Together: The 
Intersection of Science and Christian Theology,” a report of the Commission on Theology and 
Church Relations of The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod.70 
The social sciences seek to describe the human condition in language appropriate to the 
various sub-disciplines within its purview. Theology also is concerned with the human condition, 
prelapsarian, lapsarian, regenerated, and after the Parousia. The theological study of the human 
being is known as ‘theological anthropology’.71 An honest dialogue must first allow each 
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discipline to speak with its own vocabulary and grammar, within its appropriate sphere. The 
terminology and meaning of those words must next be translated in such a way that true 
communication can occur. (Of course, the saying “taduttore, traditore” reminds us that a one-
for-one exchange of ideas is limited by the semantic domain of each language.) This dissertation 
presents Erikson’s theory (chapter two), Paul’s baptismal theology drawn principally from his 
Epistle to the Romans (chapter three), and then notes points of convergence and divergence, 
before evaluating Eriksonian theory in light of Paul’s teaching, in chapter 4. This work must first 
be done before any attempt is made to determine the implications for the task of pastoral care in 
identity actualization, some of which will be explored in chapter 5. 
Mutual dialogue must take seriously each discipline. This means that Erikson’s theory of 
identity development must be given a fair hearing. He must be allowed to speak. Our first task is 
to achieve understanding. Without this, no worthwhile critique or evaluation is possible. Points 
of convergence and divergence must be discerned. Areas where one discipline supplements the 
other are to be explored and mined for what they are worth. Finally, before any conclusion can 
be arrived at, a hierarchy of authority must be established and clearly presented. Herein, a 
theological anthropology drawn from the Scriptures and the Lutheran Confessions will used as 
the control and arbiter between disputes.  
Although few LCMS theologians have made significant use of Erikson, and when they 
have done so they have not provided a solid theological foundation for such appropriation, 
outside of LCMS circles the Lutheran (ELCA) practical theologian Donald Capps made 
extensive use of Erikson’s model.72 However, like Eyer of the Lutheran Church—Missouri 
Synod, he never critiqued it from either a biblical or theological perspective. Similarly, LeRoy 
                                                                                                                                                             
1–10. 
72
 Donald Capps, Life Cycle Theory and Pastoral Care (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1983), serves as an example. 
21 
Aden73 follows Erikson’s model without critique. This dissertation provides such a critique by 
means of exegetical work on Paul’s baptismal theology and a dialogue between both disciplines. 
In reality, Eyer’s, Capps’s and Aden’s appropriations belong under the heading of the Reception 
History of Erikson in practical theology. They are not true dialogues; neither are they critiques. 
This dissertation recognizes a void that exists in Lutheran practical theology in engaging 
Erikson biblically and theologically. It critiques Erikson’s theory of identity development using a 
Lutheran Confessional approach.74 It also examines Erikson’s model, in a faithful and disciplined 
manner, in relation to Paul’s theology of baptism, and brings Paul and Erikson into theological 
dialogue. The goal is to describe identity development in a manner that does justice to both 
theology and Eriksonian theory, so that further work based upon this examination might be done 
with confidence in its theological validity. The goal will be met in chapter 4. Finally, three 
preliminary implications will be presented in the final chapter, to stimulate future work. 
The Methodological Procedure to Be Employed 
Two principle approaches characterize all research and interaction between the disciplines. 
In the realm of biblical and theological inquiry a Lutheran Confessional approach will be in 
operation throughout. James Voelz briefly describes such an approach. 
First, Christ must remain at the center of the picture as the touchstone for the 
whole. . . . Second, all of the passages of the Scriptures (a) must hang together 
exegetically as a whole (the principle of coherence), that is, all the passages must be 
able to be accounted for and must relate to one another in a matrix; and (b) must be 
exegetically defensible within their own Scriptural contexts (the principle of 
integrity), that is, all the texts must be able to be matrixed without compromising the 
integrity of any individual passage under discussion. Furthermore, these principles 
are related to one another. We might liken their relationship to a constellation that 
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consist of a binary star system (= coherence-integrity principles) that orbits around a 
third main sequence star (= Christological principle).75 
One significant strength of this approach, among others, is that it will serve as a referee as the 
attempt to glean psychological identity development data from the exegetical and theological 
tasks.  
A revised correlational dialogue between theology and Eriksonian theory will characterize 
the methodology of this dissertation. An extremely helpful resource for carrying out the task in 
the practical theology arena of theology and culture76 is Gordon Lynch’s Understanding 
Theology and Popular Culture.77 It is his contention that theologians should study culture for at 
least four reasons. Culture can be studied to understand how it shapes religious belief and 
activities among a population. It can be studied to investigate how culture serves religious 
functions. It can be viewed in such a way so as better to approach the missiological task Christ 
has given to the church. Finally, as Lynch explains, cultural texts and practices can serve “as a 
medium for theological reflection.”78 This fourth approach is the major emphasis of this 
dissertation. 
Beyond these four main approaches, or reasons for studying the intersection of theology 
and culture, four conversational approaches exist. What Lynch calls an “applicationist approach” 
subjects culture “to a critique on the basis of fixed theological beliefs and values. . . A basic 
assumption of this approach is that it is possible to identify core theological truths from a 
particular source (e.g., the Bible or Church tradition) and then apply these critically to the beliefs 
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and values of popular culture.”79 While a Lutheran Confessional approach certainly has fixed 
core truths which cannot be compromised, a weakness to this approach, especially if it is 
uninformed by other approaches, is a failure truly to investigate the cultural artifact on its own 
merits and for its own ability to convey elements of truth, value, and purpose. It generally 
prohibits meaningful engagement with the culture, including the sciences. In this conversational 
approach, communication is unidirectional—theology to culture. 
A second conversational approach is labeled “correlational.” This approach characterizes 
the work of Paul Tillich.80 This approach is characterized by “correlating the questions raised by 
contemporary culture with answers revealed through religious tradition.”81 This approach 
appears to provide a safety net for theology. Culture is studied so as to understand its questions 
and failings. Theology comes and provides the solution. However, hidden within this approach is 
the assumption that theology has answers to all questions raised within culture and that culture 
has no ability to challenge theology to think deeply about both prior assumptions, the impact of 
the cultural milieu on theology, or even to ask theology whether such formulations are right or 
wrong.  
A revised correlational approach “envisions a more complex conversation involving 
questions and answers from both culture and tradition.”82 This approach acknowledges the 
unique contribution each field of inquiry brings to the table as the human condition is discussed, 
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debated, and described. Below, in the description of the focus of the research in chapter 4, five 
views of the way theology and psychology do or do not interact is discussed in greater detail. 
There is an intimate connection between these various views and the conversational approaches 
now being described. The revised correlational approach takes the position that such dialogue is 
a two-way street. This does not, however, require the findings to be of equal weight. As already 
stated above, a Lutheran Confessional approach will be the arbiter between any irreconcilable 
differences. There is plenty of room for mutual edification between the two fields of inquiry as 
they interact in dialogue. Nevertheless, when psychology contradicts biblical theology, it is time 
for it to defer to the higher authority. 
A fourth conversational approach is that of “praxis.” Lynch states that this approach very 
much characterizes the modus operandi of liberation theology. It is committed “to critiquing 
religious and cultural beliefs and practices on the basis of their ability to promote liberation and 
well-being.”83 This approach, while it claims to treat each discipline as equal partners, looks to 
the results of religious and cultural beliefs and practices and judges them on humanistic terms. 
While practical theology is concerned about the lives of people, this approach will not 
characterize the conversational approach of this dissertation, since the primary goal is to 
theologically evaluate Erikson’s theory in light of Pauline baptismal theology. 
Details of the research methodology for each step along the way are presented in the 
subsections below.  
Focus of Chapter Two: Erikson’s Developmental Theory 
The research methods to be employed are literature review and exegetical study. The 
literature review will include several biographies on the life and work of Erikson and journal 
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articles within which he provides autobiographical material. The main focus will be on his books 
and journal articles which explicate his theory. Both sources are necessary in order to ascertain 
the influence of his life story on the development of his Life Cycle theory and on the corpus of 
his writings.84 Furthermore, in order to understand the ontogenesis of his thought processes, 
appropriate writings of Sigmund Freud, Anna Freud, and Joan Erikson will be explored. 
Following a general overview of Erikson’s developmental theory, which will orient the 
dissertation within his overall scheme of development, the dissertation will focus tightly on his 
theory of identity development. Three factors will be explored in this chapter, as well as provide 
the overall structure for examining both Erikson’s theory and Paul’s baptismal theology. These 
three factors are the somatic, the psychological, and the social dimensions of identity 
development. 
Identity development, according to Erikson, while the chief affective work of adolescence, 
begins in infancy and extends even to life’s end. Therefore, the stages that precede adolescence 
and those that follow must be considered in this study. François Marty states: “Pour Erikson, il y 
aurait continuité de l’enfance à l’âge adulte dans les processus en jeu concernant l’identité et 
l‘identification, la société jouant un role capital dans mesure où elle permettrait à l’adolescent 
d’intégrer les exigences sociales en franchissant différentes étapes structurantes pour son 
evolution.”85 The concept of the development of identity runs throughout his theory, even though 
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the stage to which it is principally applied is, in his writings, that of adolescence.86 Therefore, 
without consideration of the other stages and their connection to identity development a true 
understanding of his theory of identity would not be possible. 
Focus of Chapter Three (First Task): Pauline Baptismal Theology 
Textual research will first include exegetical study of relevant texts, focusing primarily on 
Paul’s Epistle to the Romans. In order to supplement and shed light upon this study of Romans, 
pertinent texts within the Pauline corpus, especially statements related to baptism in First 
Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, and Colossians will be included.  
Romans 7 includes an extensive autobiographical section. Paul’s use of “I” and the struggle 
of the “I” with sin, and the commission of sins that is not understood by the “I,” points to the 
importance of clearly understanding one’s true self, one’s true identity as a Christian “in Christ.” 
The exegetical work on Romans begins with a survey of the identity-related issues which are 
found in Romans 1–5.87 Identity, before and after faith in Christ, will be examined. Next, a close 
examination of Romans 6 provides the foundation for baptismal identity before entering Romans 
7, in which the struggle for true identity is vividly described. This leads to Romans 8, in which 
identity remains an important concern. Romans 9–11 assist in the discussion of the relationship 
between ethnic identity and Christian identity. The remaining chapters of Romans provide 
examples of how baptismal identity is expressed in the ethical life.88 
It is hardly possible to understand the complexity of Paul’s anthropology or his baptismal 
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theology without including consideration of Paul’s use of the creation accounts in Genesis89 and 
of the wisdom literature of the Old Testament.90 Nevertheless, due to space requirements these 
will be appropriately examined only as they are suggested by the Pauline texts under study. 
Secondary sources which deal with Paul’s anthropology and his theology of baptism as 
necessary will be included in the research and discussion so as to develop a thick description of 
biblical anthropology, which can inform the study of the development of identity. 
Focus of Chapter Three (Second Task): Christian Identity in Paul’s Baptismal Theology 
This area of research, which will narrow the focus to Paul’s teaching concerning Christian 
identity, may begin to cause some readers concerns about any psychologizing of Paul’s writings 
and of the apostle himself. Yet without the research contained in this section the thesis cannot be 
proved. This section explores scholarly research into Paul’s anthropological terms, psychological 
aspects of his theology, and his understanding the structure of the human being. A somewhat 
dated study by W. David Stacey91 explores the Greek, Hebrew, and Pauline views of man. 
Despite its date, his study of the terms soul, spirit, flesh, body, heart, mind, conscience, and “the 
inward man” is a good starting point. Robert Jewett’s study of Paul’s anthropology in relation to 
conflict settings92 brings to light many terms that otherwise might be passed by without thought. 
Gerd Theissen draws our attention to the interface between Pauline anthropology and 
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psychological theory. Theissen acknowledges that psychological exegesis can be poor exegesis. 
He states: 
Every exegete has learned that psychological exegesis is poor exegesis. It interpolates 
between the lines things that no one can know. It inserts modern categories into 
ancient texts. Because of its interest in personal problems behind the text, it does not 
let the text come to speech. Above all, however, it relativizes the text’s theological 
claim through appeal to factors that are all too human. The lengthy catalogue of the 
sins of psychological exegesis is imposing; the rejection of any combination of 
psychology and exegesis is often presented with such disarming obviousness that it is 
almost an offense against good manners.93 
Why then attempt it? This dissertation is not a work of psychological exegesis. The 
purpose of researching Pauline baptismal theology is to ascertain what it is that Paul taught. The 
purpose of investigating the ways in which this informs the development of a Christian’s identity 
is to see what data is available for a dialogue between Erikson’s theory and Christian theology. 
Theissen’s limited goal is not to exegete the texts psychologically. Rather it is “to interpret texts 
as expression and occurrence of human experience and behavior.”94 Again, this is the importance 
of Romans chapter seven. 
Focus of Chapter Four: A Revised Correlational Dialogue between Chapter Two and Chapter 
Three Findings 
Space and the purpose of this dissertation preclude a survey of the history of the 
interrelation between theology and psychology. Excellent resources for such study include A 
History of the Cure of Souls,95 Pastoral Care in Historical Perspective,96 and A History of 
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Pastoral Care in America.97 In addition to these surveys, the classic critique of the 
psychologizing of theology is Philip Rieff’s The Triumph of the Therapeutic.98 His critique of the 
increased importance of psychology and psychotherapy in Western culture includes the charge 
that “psychological man takes on the attitude of a scientist, with himself as the ultimate object of 
his science.”99 Rieff traces this back to Freud’s attitude toward religion. According to Rieff, 
Freud deconstructed religion and turned it into a neurotic condition.100 The methodology of this 
study, while focusing on human identity development, seeks to be theologically informed in such 
a way that the Christocentricity of Christian theology remains the foundation of the entire 
endeavor. 
A description of the revised correlational approach has been provided above. In order to 
facilitate the revised correlational dialogue, preliminary work on both Erikson and Paul is 
necessary. Erikson’s theory is researched in detail. This is the work of chapter 2. Next, Paul’s 
theology of baptism and the development of Christian baptismal identity is studied. This occurs 
in chapter 3. Having produced data from these two divergent fields of inquiry, a method of 
correlation must be used which finds points of convergence. Without these points of 
convergence, no conversation is possible. Tools from qualitative research will be used, especially 
qualitative research coding, including “In Vivo,” “Magnitude,” “Process,” and “Axial” coding. 
“In Vivo Coding” assigns labels to sections of transcripts, which describe the subject being 
discussed. In doing so attempts are made to stick as closely to the actual wording of the source 
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material.
101
 “Magnitude Codes” are assigned to “In Vivo Codes” to determine the frequency of 
occurrence and the amplitude of their importance.
102
 “Process Codes” are assigned in order to 
explore conceptual realities generated by the data. Process Coding involves turning previous 
coding, especially “In Vivo Codes,” into gerunds in order to highlight actions. Second cycle 
coding follows this initial work, correlating codes from the first cycle into larger sets using 
“Pattern Coding,”103 for meaningful correlative analysis. Pattern Coding investigates and seeks 
to identity emergent themes. As part of Pattern Coding, Axial Coding reassembles data into the 
manageable and relevant categories suggested by the data.
104
 Further details on these coding 
methods are presented in chapter 4. 
Correlating the two fields of theology and psychology is a matter of debate today among 
both theologians and psychologists. Therefore, a review of five divergent views will next be 
presented to illustrate the ways in which Christians understand and approach the interaction 
between theology and psychology in general. This is essential because the way in which one 
views the relationship between theology and psychology affects whether one will accept or reject 
the methodology used in this dissertation.  
Eric L. Johnson is the editor of Psychology and Christianity: Five Views,105 which is a fully 
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updated and revised version of an earlier work which featured only four views.106 Two of the 
views presented will be dispatched somewhat quickly. These two views are called “A Levels-of-
Explanation View” and “A Biblical Counseling View.” The former is presented by David G. 
Myers and the latter by David Powlison. These are considered together here because of the 
common characteristic of not allowing a dialogue between the two. The Biblical Counseling 
View, which was popularized by Jay Adams,107 holds to the position that psychology is 
irredeemably secular and antithetical to a Christian understanding of what it is to be a human 
being. The “Levels-of-Explanation” view acknowledges the value of both a theological and a 
psychological explanation of human health and human malady, yet allows no real dialogue 
between these disciplines. Each discipline provides its own vantage point, uses its own 
terminology, and has its own theater of operation. Each asks and answers different questions. 
While the Biblical Counseling perspective privileges Scripture and the Levels-of-Explanation 
takes psychology as well as theology seriously as distinct disciplines, neither by itself will equip 
one to conduct the work required in the realm of theology and culture, and thereby be of use in 
the endeavor of this dissertation. 
Between these two polar opposites are the Integrationist View and the Christian 
Psychology View. The integrationist view “is more open to modern psychology than biblical 
counseling, yet is generally more sympathetic to its critique than the levels-of-explanation 
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approach.”108 The integrationist view is represented by the Journal of Psychology and Theology, 
published by the Rosemead School of Psychology at Biola University and by the Journal of 
Psychology and Christianity, published by the Christian Association for Psychological Studies. 
Two important publications that are in the mainstream of this approach are Psychology and 
Christianity Integration: Seminal Works that Shaped the Movement109 and Integrative 
Approaches to Psychology and Christianity.110 The view of these publications is characterized by 
a revised correlational conversational approach.  
Mark McMinn and Clark Campbell state that integrative work in psychology and 
psychotherapy “is integrative in two dimensions: theologically and theoretically.”111 By 
theological integration, they mean that a biblically and theologically defensible description of 
persons is foundational. This description must take into account the biblical teaching that human 
beings are God’s creation, that God created man in his image (the imago dei), that man is a fallen 
creature who is corrupted in body, mind, and soul, and that Christ has redeemed humanity 
providing the only grounds for true and lasting hope. Thus the Christocentric dimension is 
primary and gives the proper worldview and orientation for integration of theology and 
psychology.112 The theoretical dimension refers to “the general trend in psychotherapy literature 
to find value in various theoretical approaches.”113 McMinn and Campbell point to the multitude 
of theoretical approaches in psychology, which can be utilized under theology as the control and 
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arbiter. Their formula for integration does not center on one school of psychological or 
psychotherapeutic theory.114 This dissertation profits from this perspective and from the 
following one. 
The fourth position is called the “Christian Psychology View.” This is the position taken by 
Eric Johnson, as well as by Robert Roberts and P. J. Watson in Psychology and Christianity: 
Five Views. In many ways this view is a step away from the integrationist and toward the biblical 
counseling position. The aim of those espousing this viewpoint is to create a new discipline of 
psychology that is distinctly Christian.115 At the heart of this endeavor is the drive to make 
Scripture and the Christian tradition of “soul care” the major source of this new psychology. 
Johnson does not want to jettison psychological research. Rather he urges a prioritization of 
texts. This prioritization privileges the Scriptures. “The Bible is the Christian’s arch-text.”116 
Classic texts on Christian pastoral care are also high on his list. Other texts, especially secular 
texts, “need to be read with a hermeneutic of both trust and suspicion”117 because of the 
sinfulness of the researchers and authors—a sinful common to all people. Rather than calling the 
task “integration,” Johnson prefers to refer to it as “translation.”118 
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Much of what Johnson recommends characterizes this dissertation. The first task is the 
achieving of comprehension. The secular text “must be read in order to understand as best as 
possible the meaning of the text according to the author.”119 The second task is to evaluate the 
writing on its own merits. Is the research honest and truly scientific? What presuppositions are at 
work? To what degree does naturalism and reductive physicalism affect the finding? This is all 
part of evaluating the worth of the text. The third task is what Johnson means be “translation.”120 
Are there words used in psychology that can be translated into words used in theology? To what 
degree are the semantic domains overlapping? Can the secular text be incorporated into “a 
Christian disciplinary matrix”?121 The penultimate task, as described by Johnson, is 
“transposition.” He also refers to this as “sublimation.” By transposition or sublimation Johnson 
has in mind a hierarchy of orders in the makeup of human persons. For this he draws heavily 
upon Kierkegaard.122 A human being is comprised of the following four strata, listed in ascending 
order: biological; psychological; ethical; spiritual. All four are God’s creation and ought to be 
under his lordship. By making this distinction, Johnson wants to combat the inroads 
philosophical materialism (reductive physicalism) can have on a Christian psychology.  
The final product for which Johnson is striving is a fully Christian psychology, which 
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generates its own texts “written in a Christian dialect, using all available discursive/conceptual 
resources (particularly the canon and Christian classics) as explicitly as possible, but second, it 
will demonstrate some degree of the enrichment of its discourse, as a result of its incorporated 
material derived from the second dialect community.”123 Such a goal is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. Yet this dissertation is designed to contribute a Christian evaluation of this “second 
dialect” from Erikson and to allow Erikson to ask the church how baptismal identity is developed 
and expressed through the various stages of the lifespan. 
A brief mention of the fifth view, “Transformational Psychology,” is in order.124 It is the 
contention of John H. Coe and Todd Hall in Psychology in the Spirit, that a “human person is an 
embodied spirit (a ‘soul’) whose nature has numerous bodily, affective, cognitive, volitional, and 
gender capacities.”125 A close reading of this text reveals a tendency to downplay the importance 
of the biological dimension of human existence. This evaluation is bolstered by the prescriptions 
offered in the book which border on mysticism. In some ways this approach is a version of 
Christian psychology.126 In other ways, its rejection of nearly all secular psychological research 
places it close to the biblical counseling view. This approach will not play any major role in this 
dissertation.127 
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A strict revised correlational conversation between two disciplines of equal authority 
would privilege neither. However, as already stated, this is not the case for a theologically proper 
and faithful conversation between theology and culture. Therefore, a more detailed description of 
the conversation method to be used herein is appropriate. The methodology of this chapter will 
be to bring into dialogue the findings of chapter 2 (Erikson) and chapter 3 (Paul). This will 
require some translation of terminology and a search for areas of convergence and divergence.  
One might argue that because Erikson self-identified himself as a Freudian, and that Freud 
was an avowed atheist, all psychoanalytic thought that comes from a Freudian orientation ought 
to be rejected. However, this would be akin to rejecting all scientific discoveries based upon the 
metaphysical presuppositions of the researcher. Emma Pierce writes: 
The fact that Freud did not believe in any god or any spiritual dimension did not 
negate the grains of wheat in his bag of theoretical chaff. Many who did not share his 
atheistic belief system are nonetheless unable to deny the possibility of an 
unconscious dimension: deep, abiding drives and instincts that may indeed control a 
human being, bringing about attitudes and behaviours that are at best inexplicable, at 
worst detrimental and destructive. 128 
Erikson has much more to offer than a few kernels of wheat in a sack of chaff. His psychology 
can, with some adjustments, be compatible with Paul’s baptismal theology as it applies to the 
actualization of Christian identity. 
Erikson’s theory of identity development will be allowed to ask questions of Paul’s 
theology and vice versa. Each will be allowed to speak to the other and to question the findings 
of the other with one overarching caveat. When there are truly contradicting conclusions, 
theology will be privileged. Ultimately the goal is to translate Erikson in such a way that he can 
be a dialogue partner in a discussion of baptismal identity actualization in the context of pastoral 
                                                 
128
 Emma Pierce, Suicide or Adoration: A Theology of Mental Health (Broadmeadow, UK: P. E. Pierce, 
2014), 298. 
37 
care. The format chosen for this portion of the revised correlational approach is a fictitious 
dialogue between Erikson and “a practical theologian.” James Fowler used this approach in 
Stages of Faith.129 Erikson was involved in a series of moderated discussions with Huey P. 
Newton, cofounder of the Black Panthers, in February and in April of 1971. This dialogue, 
although far afield from the purpose of this dissertation, will provide interesting dialogue 
unavailable in Erikson’s books. As much as possible, actual quotes and dialogue from Erikson 
will be used in order to remain faithful to his intent, as he queries theology’s findings. 
Focus of Chapter Five: Implications for Pastoral Care 
Practical theology is multifaceted. John Fritz includes catechetics, liturgics, homiletics, and 
pastoral theology under the term “practical theology.”130 This chapter will limit itself to three 
broad implications of the thesis of this dissertation for pastoral care, in reference to Christian 
identity. The developmental stages and their connection to this aspect of identity development 
will be brought into focus. The purpose is to demonstrate that the findings of this dissertation are 
not merely of academic importance. They reach beyond the theoretical into the actual work of 
pastors in their congregations. It will be demonstrated how a modified version of Erikson’s 
theory might assist the pastor as he appropriates this information for the work of pastoral care of 
God’s people. 
The connection between Erikson and pastoral care work has been frequently noted. In their 
critique of therapeutic models such as Erikson’s, Jones and Butman comment that while they 
have areas of caution—as one should with any appropriation of secular psychology—models 
such as Erikson’s have much to offer the Christian pastor. 
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The psychodynamic psychotherapies are among the broadest, most comprehensive 
systems in use today. In moving beyond Freud’s narrow commitment to a 
biologically rooted, “scientific” theory, contemporary psychodynamic theorists have 
developed a system that does not present many of the problems to the committed 
Christian psychotherapist that classical analysis does. . . . These models are relational 
in nature, balance a cautious optimism with a deep appreciation of our capacity for 
self-deception and have a substantial (though secondary in emphasis) understanding 
of our rational capacities as humans. The values embedded in the model are broadly 
compatible with Christian values, though of course there is not a perfect match. . . . 
We think it fitting that this is one of the models that many Christian therapists are 
embracing; it holds much promise as a possible foundation for future elaboration of a 
thoroughly Christian understanding of human personality.131  
Robert Richter, a rostered minister of the LCMS, has relied heavily on Erikson for geriatric 
ministry among military veterans.132 Much of Richter’s research supports Joan Erikson’s 
contention that “in encounters between the syntonic and dystonic, the dystonic elements win out 
as time goes on; despair is ‘in attendance.’”133 The despair that accompanies extreme old age 
comes from the realization that time is too short to undo, redo, or otherwise make up for lost 
opportunities. You are who you have made yourself to be and there appears to be no reparation. 
It is to this point that Richter has addressed his ministry, seeking to help Christians understand 
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their true identity in Christ and to find hope in him, that despite their failures they are to be free 
from shame and guilt under the umbrella of the gift of righteousness in Christ. 
James W. Fowler credits Erikson, among a few others, with providing him with the concept 
of stages for his theory of the development and maturing of faith over the lifespan.134 He states 
that Erikson’s theory provides him “the background” for his own scheme.135 This is clear in a 
case study he presents titled, “Mary’s Pilgrimage.”136 Various crises, at significant points in the 
woman’s lifespan were catalysts for the formation of her sense of identity, which ultimately 
resulted in her identity as a Christian. 
The Roman Catholic scholars Matthew Linn, Sheila Fabricant, and Dennis Linn coauthored 
Healing the Eight Stages of Life.137 They unabashedly appropriate Erikson’s model and apply it 
to spiritual care. Despite their Roman Catholic seminary training, they make no connection 
between the stages of development and identity formation through baptism. 
The practical theologian who has made the most of Erikson’s theory is Donald Capps. In 
The Depleted Self, he notes a change that has occurred in Western culture. While once people felt 
anxiety due to a sense of guilt, today people feel deep anxiety without a sense of guilt. Erikson 
addresses this as an existential state, which is connected to a sense of deep shame. This shame 
may be unconscious, or preconscious, yet it is the result of being stripped naked.138 This 
depletion of self recoils as a defense mechanism into narcissism. Such a view retains the 
theological concept of sin, and describes it in a similar way as does Genesis 3.  
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Capps also builds on Erikson’s first developmental stage when he avers that what sets 
pastoral work apart from the other “helping professions” is hope. Pastors are agents of hope.139 
Similarly, in Life Cycle and Pastoral Care, he uses Erikson’s stages as a guide to the pastor’s 
work.140 It is Capps’s contention that a prevalent characteristic, specifically among males, in 
Western society is melancholia. This is to be distinguished from clinical depression, although the 
two are related in many ways. In Men and Their Religion he argues that the melancholy self is 
formed in males in early childhood. He avers that “melancholia is primarily a condition that men 
experience, due primarily to the boy’s separation from his mother.”141 This melancholia is then 
integrated into men’s sense of identity. Capps has developed this in greater detail in Men, 
Religion, and Melancholia. In this book he notes the prevailing melancholia that characterized 
William James, Rudolf Otto, and Erikson. Of special interest are his comments concerning 
Erikson. Capps believes that Erikson’s study of the life of Luther was “ostensibly Erikson’s case 
study of Luther [as] mythic.” Erikson was not trying to write a biography.142 In fact, for Capps, 
Young Man Luther has more to say about Erikson’s own sense of identity than it does about 
Luther’s. He writes: “I suggest that the most important reflection of Erikson’s own self-image in 
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Young Man Luther is precisely the mother–son theme that lies, shadowlike, behind the 
melodramatic story of father and son.”143 
As Capps constantly attested, Erikson clearly speaks to pastoral care. Especially in Toys 
and Reasons, Erikson has much to say about the ritualization of human life. He closely ties ritual 
to the first five stages of development, showing their relevance for ritual, and I will argue, for 
ritual’s relevance for pastoral care and counseling.144 Again, Donald Capps: 
Other psychoanalytic theorists developed concepts of repeated behaviors applicable 
to religious ritual, while Erikson applied his developmental theory. Moreover, though 
Freudian in general orientation, his studies of the rituals of Native Americans (1963), 
his theoretical essays on ritual (1966, 1977), and his discussions of ritual and political 
leadership (1968, 1969, 1977) add up to a major reformulation of the traditional 
psychoanalytic view of religious ritual.145 
This aspect of Erikson’s work has not had sufficient attention. The importance of ritual, 
especially in regards to the experiential acquisition of a Christian identity, needs greater 
scholarly attention. Erikson finds ritualization in the mundane aspects of life as well as in the 
obvious places, such as baptisms, bar-mitzvahs, weddings, and funerals. These are tied to the 
various developmental stages. He argues that the ritual element of adolescence, which is the 
stage most connected to the work of identity formation, centers on “the solidarity of conviction,” 
when a basic sense of identity emerges, which remains relatively constant through the remainder 
of life.146 Considerable space in the final chapter of this dissertation is devoted to viewing the 
baptismal rites of The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod in light of Erikson’s theory of 
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ritualization in order to provide a way of viewing them in light of the task of providing pastoral 
care to God’s people in actualizing the identity conferred upon them in baptism. While the ritual 
elements are certainly subservient to God’s action by means of his word, this final section of the 
dissertation will focus on how the ritual can be used to underline and illustrate what God has 
done and is doing by means of his word in baptism. 
Outcomes Anticipated 
This dissertation will demonstrate the validity of the thesis that the use of Erikson’s theory 
of identity development is theologically defensible when the theory is excluded from the concept 
of the Christian’s conferred identity. If the conferred (or imputed) identity of being righteous by 
faith is thought of as a “foreclosed identity,” Erikson’s language might be acceptable. However, 
his theory is too intertwined with the idea of development to justify using his theory in reference 
to the Christian’s real or imputed identity. However, and likely contrary to Erikson’s intent, his 
theory can be used to describe and outline the effects of original sin, especially in light of 
mistrust of God and his word and the resulting autonomy. In view of this, the syntonic as well as 
the dystonic elements of this theory describe the result of a lack of trust in God as one places 
trust in self. Beyond this, if the Christian’s sense of identity is built upon the conferred, imputed 
identity, given in baptism, Erikson’s theory will be demonstrated to be of use in pastoral care. 
Specifically, the ways in which identity is actualized at the various stages in life can be useful to 
the pastor as he cares for God’s people. 
Confessional Lutherans have been largely absent in the meetings of conservative Christian 
organizations concerned with pastoral care. For example, the Winter 2014 issue of the Journal of 
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Psychology and Christianity147 presents various ways theological traditions are integrating 
theology and psychology. Missing in that journal issue is any Lutheran view. Similarly, at both 
the 2014, 2015, and 2016 meetings of the Evangelical Theological Society in San Diego, 
California; Atlanta, Georgia; and San Antonio, Texas, respectively, only one Lutheran 
theologian was present for the “Theology for Pastoral Care” working group. A Lutheran voice 
needs to be present Lutherans are to fulfill our responsibilities to the Una Sancta by clearly 
articulating the pure doctrine of Scripture. This dissertation seeks to provide a uniquely Lutheran 
perspective in evaluating, critiquing and dialoging with an Eriksonian developmental model, so 
as to provide a biblically, psychologically, and scientifically informed foundation for the pastoral 
care work of identity actualization. It will provide justification for constructive dialogue with 
Eriksonian developmental theory and with Erikson’s description of identity development in 
practical theology by showing significant points of convergence in Paul’s baptismal theology. It 
will also show areas of important disagreement. 
From this foundation, the dissertation in chapter 5, will give examples of how an 
Eriksonian perspective can enrich pastoral care, by providing important information on the 
developmental stage of the counselee. It also has important implications for the use of baptismal 
rites as tools for pastoral counseling on the subject of the development of a Christian identity, 
building on the practice and significance of baptism within the Christian community.  
Effective, faithful pastoral care148 requires knowledge of the developmental stage of the 
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counselee. One hardly counsels a preadolescent the same as one would an octogenarian. This is 
not solely because of a person’s cognitive development. Equally important is the level of 
affective development, including one’s sense of identity. In Identity: Youth and Crisis, Erikson 
writes about the epigenesis of identity.149 Although his theory avers that “not until adolescence 
does the individual develop the prerequisites in physiological growth, mental maturation, and 
social responsibility to experience and pass through the crisis of identity,”150 nevertheless, each of 
the previous stages plays an integral role of preparing for successful navigation of this crisis, and 
contributes to it.  
A person’s basic sense of identity is essentially developed as he negotiates the crises of 
Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion). Nevertheless, as he navigates the challenges of Stage 
VI (Intimacy vs, Isolation), the pressures of caring for others in Stage VII (Generativity vs. 
Stagnation), and then faces the existential reality of impending death in Stage VIII (Integrity vs. 
                                                                                                                                                             
may find it useful to make a distinction between pastoral care, pastoral counseling, and pastoral psychotherapy. Of 
the three terms, pastoral care is the broadest in scope. It refers to the church’s overall ministries of healing, 
sustaining, guiding, and reconciling people to God and to one another. . . . Pastoral Counseling. This is a more 
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Despair and Disgust), this basic sense of identity continues to be modified throughout life.151 
Understanding that a preadolescent is not yet at the stage for a full-blown crisis of identity, but 
that he or she is, for instance, at Stage III (The Play Stage) and is experimenting with various 
roles, can assist the task of pastoral care and counseling by the realization, for example, that the 
child is anticipating possible future roles and needs space to play these things out. At the same 
time, issues of guilt over play-acting secret fantasies might prove to be a rich opportunity to 
teach the child about legitimate and illegitimate guilt.152 This, as Erikson states, “is the 
ontological cornerstone of morality.”153 On the other hand, while an octogenarian may feel the 
need the pastor to support her sense that she has cared well for others and that she has been a 
good and faithful servant, it is of ultimate importance that she hear that God’s word, which 
declares her righteous, has made bot her and her works pleasing to God, even though she may 
see her own failings. 
Stage VIII (Integrity vs. Despair and Disgust) in Erikson’s theory suffers from an 
inadequate teleology. The fear of the loss of self and identity due to the disintegrating effects of 
death needs more than Erikson’s assurance of growth in wisdom and knowledge one has done 
well by others. It is here that the connection between baptism and death and resurrection lifts 
Erikson’s theory beyond the earthly. Still, the full realization of the disintegrating power of death 
which can lead to despair is outlined by Erikson more fully than many others describe it. Many 
of the elderly certainly know they have not done all things well, and, even more importantly, that 
they have left many things undone which ought to have been done. Here, linking the imputed 
identity given in baptism with the righteousness of faith and distinguishing it from the imperfect 
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development of this identity in one’s experiential life (which points to the imperfection, and the 
relativity, of civic righteousness) incorporates Erikson’s final stage issues of integrity, wisdom, 
despair, and disdain into a coherent approach to pastoral care of the elderly. 
This dissertation will not directly argue the sacramental dimensions of baptism.154 Rather, 
the goal is to outline ways in which the Rite of Holy Baptism (the ritual) can support the work of 
pastoral care as it intersects with the actualization of Christian identity. Identity, understood in an 
Eriksonian perspective, includes the somatic, the psychological, and the social. Although his 
study is primarily about Luther’s rhetoric, Neil Leroux writes about the important link between 
content and rhetorical action. 
An author fashions (inventio) a work in which an audience can participate not only 
through the information presented, but also through the forms into which the 
information is organized. Information can bring satisfaction through its newness, but 
form has the capability repeatedly to satisfy because of its power to elicit our 
recognition of its rightness or fittingness. Furthermore, this rightness—our 
cooperation with and ability to apprehend, appreciate, and participate in form 
(whether by agreeing with it, rejoicing at it, mourning over it, being terrified by it, 
etc.—is the work’s psychology, the explanation behind its function. What makes 
audience identification happen is usually not information, but form, “the creation of 
an appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite. 
Therefore, to dichotomize form and content—making content primary, form merely 
something later selected (as shape, container, or format)—is misguided. Rather than 
being irrelevant or in opposition to content, form and content are inseparable; form 
becomes part of, is the “body” of, the (dis- or pre-embodied) content.155 
This has important implications for inclusion of the baptismal liturgy in pastoral care in the 
experiential life of the Christian, as the pastoral caregiver seeks to describe, and to assist in 
shaping, a true and faithful actualized expression of Christian identity grounded in the person’s 
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baptism.156 Albrecht Peters, comments on Luther’s teaching on baptism in his catechisms. 
Baptism is to give shape to and to provide a framework for our entire Christian life, 
as a unique event that takes place but once and that is not to be repeated, meaning that 
a Christian life is nothing other than a daily baptism, started at a particular time but 
reentered into constantly. Though the term signification is itself open to 
misunderstanding, the eschatologically effective power of Baptism was front and 
center in the interpretations of Baptism that were crafted in 1519 and 1520. . . . 
Everything in the Small Catechism concentrates on the well-known phrase about how 
the old man is drowned daily and how the new man rises again each day.157 
This dissertation encourages fuller use of the baptismal rite in pastoral care. Thus, the 
connection between the drowning of the old man and the casting off of one’s false identity and 
the confession of one’s negative identity and the emerging of the new man, the Christian identity 
given in baptism, will be demonstrated. That which is given as a gift is appropriated in one’s life 
experience, by means of the crises one experiences. This emphasis on the important of crises will 
be shown to be very close to the Lutheran concept of the life of the Christian being that of a 
theologus crucis (theologian of the cross). 
Erikson is helpful because he tightly ties ritualization to the stages of development, 
especially in the social aspects of the psychosocial and particularly in the first five stages of 
development. This is important when one considers how his insights might inform pastoral care 
as the pastoral caregiver points out the social (ecclesial) significance of baptism, a baptism into a 
new family.158 This new family is part of one’s new baptismal identity in Christ. 
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Since the dynamics of baptism include a person’s body159 (the somatic), his soul (the 
psychic), and his social status (ecclesial relationships) how might orders of baptism be used in 
counseling so as to reinforce these dimensions of the sacrament? How has the tendency, only 
recently beginning to be overcome, to reduce the liturgical action to a few words and some water 
worked against the development of Christian identity? An exhaustive study of baptismal liturgies 
throughout church history is a task for another study. This dissertation will focus on the use of 
the baptismal rites in use in the LCMS. They will be shown to be extremely useful, albeit 
underutilized, resources which can effectively assist in the task of developing a sense of 
Christian identity in the setting of pastoral care. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ERIK H. ERIKSON’S DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY AND THE CENTRALITY OF 
EGO IDENTITY 
An Overview of Erikson’s Developmental Theory 
Erikson’s developmental theory is a theory of psychosocial development, with an emphasis 
on affective development. This emphasis is in contrast with the cognitive development theory of 
Jean Piaget1 and the behavioral development theory of Robert Sears.2 Nevertheless, Erikson 
shares with Piaget and Sears, the assumption that development proceeds according to a set 
narrative. 
The assumption underlying the three dimensions of development as postulated by 
Piaget, Erikson, and Sears is that the action of development progresses as a unity-in-
continuity. Development (1) evolves within an orderly and continuous progression 
and (2) unfolds through well-established successive phases (or stages). What emerges 
in behavior, affect, or thought at one phase becomes transformed into something akin 
to, but also different from, what existed earlier. The processes unfold as an oscillating 
movement which is both differentiating and integrating. Such a developmental 
implies increasingly complex levels of organization.3 
Although scholars such as Henry Maier classify Erikson’s theory as affective development, 
Erikson does not limit his theory to a simple definition of what is commonly thought of as “being 
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emotional.” Michael F. Mascolo and Kurt W. Fischer state: “Current theory and research 
underscore the idea that emotion plays a central role in selecting, amplifying, and organizing 
attention, consciousness, thinking, and action.” They also report that “it is helpful to think of 
emotional states with reference to three broad classes of components.”4 These include motive-
relevant appraisals, a core somatic experience, and motor expressions and motor-active 
tendencies. Essentially, cognitive activities and behaviors are heavily influenced by the affective 
state of the individual.  
Erikson’s theory is also not simply a psychological theory. The clinical and developmental 
psychologist James Marcia and Ruthellen Josselson state: “Erikson’s theory covers the entire life 
span and details expectable psychosocial crises and outcomes at different periods of life. It 
affords a way of locating people in their developmental trajectory and understanding their 
‘symptoms’ or life difficulties as reflecting blockages in their growth.”5 Erikson intertwines the 
somatic, the psychological, and the social into a unified theory of development. These three 
important factors merge to form, among other developmental characteristics, a person’s sense of 
identity. Jane Kroger, of University of Tromsø, Norway, an expert in developmental psychology, 
remarks: 
Ego identity is shaped by three interacting elements: one’s biological characteristics; 
one’s own unique psychological needs, interests, and defenses; and the cultural 
milieu in which one resides. Physiological characteristics such as an individual’s 
gender, physical appearance, physical capabilities, and limitations provide one with a 
sense of “bodily self.” As one ages, physical features and capabilities will change and 
healthy identity adaptation requires altering one’s sense of identity in accordance 
with differing physical changes. Psychological elements of identity include one’s 
unique feelings, interests, needs, and defenses, which give one a sense of I that 
remains the same across time and circumstance. One’s social and cultural milieus 
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provide opportunities for expression as well as recognition of biological and 
psychological needs and interests. For Erikson, optimal identity development 
involves finding social roles and niches within the larger community that provide a 
good “fit” for one’s biological and psychological capabilities and interest.6 
However, the cultural milieu is not simply the place where the person lives out an identity. 
It has a very strong impact of the development of identity, and how that identity can or cannot be 
expressed. In point of fact, the cultural and historical setting into which a person is born and 
within which she lives contributes to her sense of social identity. S. Alexander Haslem, Stephen 
D. Reicher, and Michael J. Platrow state: 
At a personal level, social identities are immensely important to individual group 
members. They give us a sense of place in the world: who we are, what we should do, 
and how we relate to others. Identities also give us a sense of connection to those who 
share our sense of self (i.e., other in-group members), and the group itself is typically 
a source of belongingness and pride.7 
Additionally, the society, or cultural milieu, sets the boundaries for organizing group identity, 
historical setting, cultural norms, and language, which itself determines ways in which self can 
be publicly expressed.8 
The first and foundational factor in development is the somatic stages of human 
development. In each stage of physical development, the person acquires new physical traits and 
abilities which are determined both by genetics and by the epigenetically determined growth of 
the human organism.9  
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Erikson’s psychosocial developmental theory is epigenetic, suggesting a synchrony 
between individual growth and social expectations. At each of eight chronological 
periods in the life span, there are physical changes to which one’s social environment 
responds with particular expectations and supports in the form of cultural practices 
and institutions. It is assumed that the resolution of psychosocial stages will be 
positive given “an average expectable environment.” . . . For example, at school age, 
when the child is physically, mentally, and emotionally capable, she is expected to 
begin to learn the technology of their culture (e.g., in literate societies, reading, 
writing, number skills, etc.), and this learning process is supported by the social 
provision of elementary schools. . . . Each of the stages of ego growth furnishes a 
necessary contribution to the resolution of the succeeding stage.10 
The second factor is the sociocultural milieu in which the person is immersed. As discussed 
above, this factor brings into the discussion the specific historical, social, and relational reality 
within which the person lives.11 Essential to understanding Erikson is his hypothesis that all 
expressions of the ego are governed and restricted by genetic, epigenetic, and societal factors. 
The third factor is the unique psychological makeup of the person. While the psychological 
component is influenced by somatic and social factors, each person also has unique 
psychological ways of processing, integrating, and rejecting the other forces. These three—the 
somatic, the social, and the psychological—come together and interact to form a person’s sense 
of ego identity. This chapter examines each of these three individually in terms of a general 
overview of Erikson’s developmental theory. Following this overview, the manner in which 
these three factors influence ego identity development is considered in greater depth. Challenges 
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to and adaptation of Erikson’s theory are then investigated. Finally, a synthesized description is 
presented. 
Erikson’s Theory in Relation to Somatic Existence 
The foundational work which introduced Erikson and his theory to the public is Childhood 
and Society (1950). A slightly revised edition appeared in 1963. In the 1985 publication, he 
added afterthoughts to the work. The Freudian substrate which underlies his thinking can be 
clearly discerned in Childhood and Society. In 1968 Erikson described Freud’s contribution to 
Erikson’s own theory. 
My psycho-social conception of the life cycle was originally based on Freud’s 
clinical breakthrough into the early stages of life, in which he found the origin of 
neurotic disturbance. I developed some of what I learned, asking: if we know what 
can go wrong in each stage, can we say what should have gone and can go right?12 
In Childhood and Society, he utilizes Freud’s developmental stages (oral, anal, phallic, 
latency, and genital) as he discusses the development of the child from birth to adolescence. For 
Freud, the stages are understood as psychosexual. By this he meant that various areas or zones of 
the body became, according to a set epigenetic pattern, sites for the fixation of the libido.13 
Erikson continued to work within Freud’s line of thought, even as he expanded the 
developmental stages into adulthood and included the social elements as integral to healthy, and 
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not merely unhealthy, development. Concerning one of the pillars of Freudian orthodoxy, he 
writes: 
Libido, then, is that sexual energy with which zones other than the genital are 
endowed in childhood and which enhances with specific pleasures such vital 
functions as the intake of food, the regulation of the bowels, and the motion of the 
limbs. Only after a certain schedule of such pregenital uses of libido is successfully 
resolved does the child’s sexuality graduate to a shortlived infantile genitality, which 
must immediately become “latent,” transformed, and deflected. For the genital 
machinery is still immature; and the first objects of immature sexual desire are 
forever barred by universal incest taboos.14 
In Freudian theory, the id (das Es) operates according to the pleasure principle.15 The first 
erogenous zone is the mouth, by means of which the infant receives gratification at the mother’s 
breast. The second is the anal zone, as the child learns to expel and retain the feces. The third is 
the phallic (and for the female the vaginal) area, as the child learns to enjoy the pleasures of 
genital stimulation. The fourth stage is the latency period, which allows for negotiation of non-
libidinous activity, before the fifth and final psychosexual stage, when pleasure is once again 
centered in the genitals, but is now expressed in a more mature and mutually beneficial manner 
with one’s partner.  
These erogenous zones are not only sites of pleasure. They are also zones of potential 
frustration. The mother’s breast may not appear “on demand.” The child, as he or she teethes, 
must learn not to bite the nipple. Toilet training is a period of extreme frustration. The bowels do 
not always cooperate. And the phallic stage, with the discovery of the pleasure of genital 
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stimulation, is often met with parental displeasure. For Freud, the societal strictures which 
restrict the pleasure principle become the source of basic neurosis. This oppressive force from 
the outside becomes internalized as the superego (das Über-Ich).16  
Freud’s psychosexual theory stops at the genital stage. Erikson’s psychosocial theory 
continues throughout the human life span.17 His theory also has a far more positive tone. For 
instance, in Stage II (Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt) of his theory, the dystonic pair of shame 
and doubt are not seen as wholly negative. He writes: “I, therefore, offer as (for example) 
Autonomy versus Shame and Doubt with the assumption that no human being can exist among 
others without learning to be ashamed or to doubt, but that the ratio of development should be in 
favor of a sense of autonomy.”18 Despite his respect for Freud, Erikson chided him for insisting 
that his theory was fully informed by science, and that he was able to be objective and to dismiss 
the implications of his own societal strictures upon his thinking. Erikson thought that Freud’s 
theory was concerned only with looking backward to the time of infancy and childhood, and did 
not look forward to a lifetime of developmental changes. 
Freud confessed only to a scientific world view, but he could not avoid the attitudes 
(often in contradiction to his personal values) that were part of his times. The original 
data of psychoanalysis, for example, were minor reconstructions of “pathogenic” 
events in early childhood. They supported an orientation which—in analogy to 
teleology—could be called originology, i.e., a systematic attempt to derive complex 
meanings from vague beginnings and obscure causes. The result was often an implicit 
fatalism, although counteracted by strenuously “positive” orientations. Any theory 
embracing both life history and case history, however, must find a balance between 
the “backward” view of the genetic reconstruction and the “forward” formulation of 
progressive differentiation in growth and development; between the “downward” 
view of into the depth of the unconscious and the “upward” awareness of compelling 
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social experience; and between the “inward” exploration of inner reality and the 
“outward” attention to historical actuality. 
Erikson did not have the advantage of the knowledge of the human genome and other 
scientific advancements. Neither was the discipline of neuroscience very developed at that time. 
Most of what was known about human brain development was discerned by clinical observation 
of living patients. Technology at that time was unable to examine the brains of living human 
beings, having advanced only slightly since the early days of Freud’s work in neurology.19 More 
information was available about the development of other human organs. Therefore, Erikson’s 
work was founded upon his observations of actual children in the clinical setting as well as 
watching his own children mature, rather than on scientific medical research. 
Erikson divided Freud’s oral stage into two sub-stages. During the first part of the oral 
stage, the infant has little control over her movements. She can suck on the nipple when the 
breast is brought to her, but she cannot actively seek it. As she develops, she increasingly can do 
more to find the nipple and receive the milk. This first part of Freud’s oral stage Erikson refers to 
as being “incorporative.” The second part of this stage is inaugurated by the emergence of the 
teeth. The child now attempts to incorporate the nipple by biting. The mother rejects this 
behavior. Her rejection and the resulting frustration of the child are illustrative of the interplay 
between the physical, the social, and the psychological aspects of human existence. 
Freud’s anal stage is that stage during which the child gains physical stage over the bowels. 
To this stage are assigned two aspects: the eliminative and the retentive. This physiological 
development requires mastery of the anal sphincter. “Muscular maturation sets the stage for 
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experimentation with two simultaneous sets of social modalities: holding on and letting go.”20 
Additionally, large muscle coordination allows the child to be “on the make,” crawling and then 
walking wherever he desires to go.21 The increasing ability to gain control over the body and its 
functions is accompanied by a growing sense of autonomy.  
In Erikson’s Stage III (Initiative vs. Guilt), which is coterminous with the phallic stage in 
Freud, one observes an increase in initiative. The child now can more freely go where she 
desires, because of vastly increased locomotor and mental abilities.22 Freud shocked the culture 
of his day by reporting on childhood sexual excitation of the genitals during this developmental 
period.23 Erikson concurred with Freud on this description. 
Psychoanalysis verifies in daily work the simple conclusion that boys attach their first 
genital affection to the maternal adults who have otherwise given comfort to their 
bodies and that they develop their first sexual rivalry against the persons who are the 
genital owners of those maternal persons.24 
Erikson, however, while retaining Freud’s concept of the Oedipal Complex, viewed it more 
as a helpful mythology. By the time he wrote Gandhi’s Truth, in 1969, his increasing interest in 
the latter stages of life resulted in his describing the complex as being more like a part of a larger 
“Generational Complex,” Simply to look back to the earlier stages of life was not, for him, a 
thick enough mythology.25 
Erikson’s Stage III (Industry vs. Inferiority) parallels Freud’s latency stage, covering the 
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school age in the western world until adolescence. Fine motor skills develop so that “the child 
becomes ready to handle the utensils, the tools, and the weapons used by the big people,” so that 
he might be able actually to “bring a productive situation to completion.” 26 This permits the 
child to do more than simply play and roleplay. She can now begin actually to do some of the 
work of adults so that she might begin to think through the things that are possible when 
adulthood begins. 
Erikson’s Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion) is aligned with Freud’s final stage, the 
genital stage.27 This is the stage which forms the fulcrum for the discussion of identity 
development in this dissertation.  
With the establishment of a good initial relationship to the world of skills and tools, 
and with the advent of puberty, childhood proper comes to an end. Youth begins. But 
in puberty and adolescence all sameness and continuities relied upon earlier are more 
or less questioned again, because of the rapidity of body growth which equals that of 
early childhood and because of the new addition of genital maturity.28 
The psychological and social effects of these monumental changes are discussed below. 
What is significant as far as physical development is concerned is that the youth is now endowed 
with the ability to father or give birth to another child, is showing the physical traits of adulthood 
while still psychologically unprepared for parenthood, and is viewed by society as little more 
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than a child. 
Stages VI (Intimacy vs. Isolation) and VII (Generativity vs. Stagnation) in Erikson’s model 
cover the period of adulthood, except for “old age.” Erikson has little to say about the physical 
changes. It is more in Stage VIII (Integrity vs. Despair and Disgust), when the body begins 
clearly to show signs of deterioration, that the growing physical weakness, the lessening of 
mental acuity, and other physical factors once more become significant enough to strongly affect 
one’s sense of identity. Ego integrity can disintegrate as bodily integrity declines.29 
Physical changes that can be externally observed are perhaps not the most important for 
development. Neurologist and professor at the Institute of Child Development, University of 
Minnesota, Philip David Zelazo, along with Wendy Lee, write the following concerning the 
human brain’s constant metamorphosis.  
New technologies have allowed scientists unprecedented opportunities to observe the 
developing (including the late adult) brain in vivo, and although more work is needed 
to understand the limitations of the views afforded by different techniques, as well as 
how these views interrelate, our understanding of brain development has increased 
enormously in recent years. As this brief review reveals, brain development is a 
lifelong phenomenon characterized by considerable regional specificity, and also by a 
series of overlapping, dynamic processes that yield both progressive events, such as 
increases in white matter, and regressive events, such as decreases in gray matter. 
Regressive events are prominent in childhood and early adolescence, but also in the 
late adult years. . . One region of the brain that undergoes especially noteworthy 
changes across the lifespan—during childhood, adolescence, and normal late adult 
development—is the prefrontal cortex.30 
Therefore, the somatic influence of cognitive and affective functioning is tied closely to the 
physical condition of the brain as well as the entirety of the physical organism. Much of this was 
only available to Erikson intuitively, rather than by documented research. However, such 
research is not contradictory to either Erikson’s or Freud’s conjectures. 
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Erikson’s Theory in Relation to Social Existence 
Since Erikson’s theory is that of psychosocial development, the influence of a person’s 
communal or social existence, which includes family, peers, societal restraint and expectation, as 
well as the historical setting with its ideologies, is important at each developmental stage in the 
life cycle. The intergenerational interactions are also essential elements of the social dimension 
of his theory. Henry Maier describes the social aspects of human existence from the Stage V 
(Identity vs. Role Diffusion) perspective. 
The individual slowly moves into society as a unit and as a member of a unit in his or 
her own right. Individuals create and continue to establish their communal 
membership. They abandoned a stark dependency on family two phases ago; they 
now require full status alongside peers in the society. The youth’s gradual growth and 
transformation make sense to others, and others begin to make sense to the youth.31 
Communal interaction is part of normal, healthy human life. All stages prior to adolescence 
require it for the child to survive and thrive. Communal interaction, even if it is restricted to one 
particular other person, is what typifies Stage VI (Intimacy vs. Isolation) and is necessary for 
generativity (Stage VI: Generativity vs. Stagnation) to occur. The disintegration of communal 
life, with the death of others dear to the person, is an aspect of what makes navigating the final 
stage of life so difficult. 
Erikson identifies social institutions which, at each stage of development, form and support 
this development. These are treated under the heading of ritualization. For Erikson, ritualization 
is not reserved for formal, public ceremonies and situations. He is concerned with the 
ritualization of everyday life, that which happens in the home, in school, and in everyday life. 
That ritualization occurs in everyday life points to the importance of the family and the 
intergenerational interrelations that underpin Erikson’s theory. This cannot be overstated. Life is 
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normally lived intergenerationally.32 Erikson does not look at a person in isolation from the 
interpersonal interactions and relationships experienced, many of which are ritualized in the 
context of a social group. In any given family, the infant (Stage I: Trust vs. Mistrust) interacts 
with the parent (Stage VII: Generativity vs. Stagnation), who may at the same time be 
negotiating the intimacy issues of Stage VI (Intimacy vs. Isolation) with the spouse, and be 
dealing with other children in the other stages. He states: “The cogwheeling of stages of 
childhood and adulthood are, as we can see in conclusion, truly a system of generation and 
regeneration—for into this system flow, and from this system emerge, those social attitudes to 
which institutions and traditions of society attempt to give unity and permanence.”33 
The sociality aspects of Erikson’s work are considered important among many of those 
who those who study ritual and ritualization formally. Catherine Bell states: 
Ethnological and biogenetic approaches to ritual often invoke the psychological 
theories of Erik Erikson (1902–1990) and Jean Piaget (1896–1980) concerning 
physical and social maturation. Erikson, in particular, addressed the “ontogeny” or 
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development of ritualization in stages of maturation within the human life cycle. He 
defined ritualization as a type of consensual interplay between two or more persons 
that is repeated in recurring contexts and has adaptive value for those involved. His 
central example of such behavior is the peculiar greeting ceremony that unfolds 
between a mother and her baby in the morning. Their interaction is both highly 
individual and stereotypical, he argued; each does things that arouse predictable 
responses in the other and that are important for both physical and emotional reasons. 
Erikson concluded that human ritualization is grounded in such proverbial infantile 
experiences, although it culminates in the elaborate ceremonies of public life.34 
While Erikson makes connections to religious rituals, his concern is for the mundane rituals 
of life in general. He claims, “Ritualization at its best, that is, in a viable cultural setting, 
represents a creative formalization which helps to avoid both impulsive excess and compulsive 
self-restriction, both social anomie and moralistic coercion.”35 He then outlines seven 
accomplishments of ritualization. First, it “elevates the satisfaction of immediate needs . . . into 
the context of a communal actuality.”36 Second, ritual also “sanctions a way of doing simple and 
daily things.” It develops habits which are socially permissible or even expected. Third, it 
includes and excludes. Those whom it excludes are outsiders. Those who know the ritual are 
insiders. This results in a fourth effect, that is, the formation of a distinct community who share a 
common vision and sense of reality. The fifth aspect of ritualization is that it is comprised of 
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stages. One is incorporated by stages until one has reached the full goal of the ritualization 
process. The sixth is the accomplishment of discriminating between “good behavior and 
shameful or guilty acts.” Finally, ritual “provides the psychosocial foundation for the gradual 
development of an independent identity to be sealed in adolescence by various rituals of 
‘confirmation’— a ‘second birth.’—which will integrate all childhood identifications in a world 
view and belief system while marking as ideologically foreign all those wishes and images which 
have become undesirable and evil and are remindful of other, ‘lower’ species of men.”37  
Erikson assigns a ritualization process to each stage of development from infancy through 
adolescence. In the stages thereafter he is less clear. The ritual connected with infancy (Stage I) 
is “the numinous,” which is founded upon the mutual recognition of child and mother by face 
and by name.38 The mother looks closely at the infant and calls the child by name. The mother 
calls herself “mother,” or “mommy,” or some such name. Although such interactions appear to 
be playful and familiar, they also become formalized; that is, ritualized. The child after a time 
begins to make the association between self as an actor and the mother as a distinct actor. This 
forms the foundation for recognizing a distinction between self and other.  
The second stage in ritualization is one which Erikson called “the judicious.” The child at 
this stage learns to distinguish between right and wrong, clean and unclean.39 An external 
standard of acceptable behavior is imposed. Failure to comply results in shaming, aimed at 
teaching the child to distinguish between the two. This is Freud’s “anal stage,” where potty-
training teaches that the material defecated is dirty, unclean, and socially unacceptable. This is 
also the stage Freud assigns for the beginnings of the development of the super-ego, the part of 
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oneself “standing watch over the rest of ourselves and confronting us with detestable self-
images.”40 Thus, law and order and the accompanying judicious element of ritualization come 
into play as the parental figures enforce the standards regularly from the outside. 
Stage III in ritualization is aligned with the play stage. The dramatic element now comes 
into play. Erikson’s research led him to see that in the play stage children use various objects to 
construct a plot, much as playwrights do when they build a storyline with conflicts that are then 
resolved. Children create narratives at this stage of life which “relive, correct, and recreate past 
experiences, and anticipate future roles and events” in life.41  
Childhood play, in experimenting with self-images and images of otherness, is most 
representative of what psychoanalysis calls the ego-ideal—that part of ourselves 
which we can look up to, at least insofar as we can imagine ourselves as ideal actors 
in an ideal plot, with appropriate punishment and exclusion of those who do not make 
the grade. Thus we experiment with and, in a visionary sense, get ready for a 
hierarchy of ideal and evil roles which, of course, go beyond that which daily life 
could permit is to engage in.42 
Erikson does not understand this stage as replacing the previous two; rather, it joins with 
them and relies upon them. Thus, each stage builds upon the previous ones, even as it anticipates 
the ones to follow.43 
“School age adds another element of ritualization—that of methodical performance. 
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Without this, the elements mentioned so far would lack a binding discipline.”44 Erikson refers to 
this as the formal stage in ritualization. The nature of schooling increases the social influence on 
the imagination, excluding certain roles and expecting others. Certain behaviors tolerated earlier 
are now censured. The number of possible socially acceptable identities are reduced. 
As the child enters adolescence, the work of identity development becomes a major, if not 
the major, task.  
The work role which we begin to envisage for ourselves at the end of childhood is, 
under favorable conditions, the most reassuring role of all, just because it confirms us 
in skills and permits us to recognize ourselves in visible works. But the unrest of 
puberty and the necessity to leave childhood behind, and the unrest of the times, 
combine to produce a variety of conflicting self-images, just at the age when we must 
envisage ourselves not only as worker, but also as mate, parent, and citizen and may 
feel that we ourselves are being sacrificed to technical perfection and the streamlining 
of roles.45 
Erikson states that what is needed at this juncture is some solidarity of conviction, some 
ideology to which to cling and from out of which to make sense of life. The ritualization of this 
period, therefore, can be expressed “by simple distain, by moral repudiation, fanatic rebellion, or 
warfare.”46 Other times the ritualization of this period can be expressed in fanatical obeisance to 
a radical ideology or supreme leader. Erikson recalls: 
This I attempted to outline in my book on young Luther’s personal and universal 
crisis. The matter can be traced through the revolutionary periods of more recent 
history, until we see in our time totalitarian methods of involving new generations 
ideologically in staged state rituals combining the numinous (the Leader’s face) and 
the judicial (loud condemnations in unison of “criminals”), the dramatic (parades, 
dances, and assemblies) and the precise in performance (military precision, mass 
sports) on a large scale. These attempt to provide for a whole generation of young 
individuals an ideological commitment encompassing perpetual change, and, in fact, 
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making traditional (in the sense of pre-revolutionary) values part of a decidedly 
negative identity.47 
This assumption of a contrary identity is often ritualized in spontaneous rites of passage 
designed by the adolescents themselves.48 
Erikson has much less to say about ritualization in the adult stages of life. He states that all 
adult rituals have the preceding five elements; that is, the numinous, the judicious, the dramatic, 
the formal, and the ideological. The aspect of ritual in the adult stages is “ritual sanction.” 49 The 
marriage ritual, normally performed in Stage VI (Intimacy vs. Isolation) grants ritual sanction to 
enter into a committed relationship. In Stage VII (Generativity vs. Stagnation) ritual action is 
characterized by teaching, leading, directing, and sanctioning society’s rituals. Erikson bemoans 
the ritualization in Stage VIII (Integrity vs. Despair and Disgust), which is the ritual of 
mandatory retirement. He sees it contributing to the prevalence of despair and disgust in one’s 
latter years.50 Western society denigrates old age and therefore losses out on the wisdom that can 
come from a life lived in integrity.51  
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Erikson’s Theory in Relation to Psychological Existence 
The physical processes of maturation and the social pressures and influences, both outlined 
above, interplay with the psychological structure of the mind. These three come together to 
produce the balance or, if pathological, the imbalance of the dialectical traits of each successive 
stage of ego development, along with the psychological ego strengths developed by means of the 
crises of each stage. It bears repeating that, for Erikson, the ego is not equal to the psychological. 
The ego is a construct of the somatic, the social, and the psychological factors of an individual. It 
is the self, comprised of the aforementioned three elements. In this way, Erikson’s conception of 
the ego builds upon and yet departs from that of Freud. As argued earlier, Freud bound the id 
tightly to the bodily urges and understood the superego as the internalization of the societal 
pressures which resist the id. The ego is the not-completely-conscious battleground that makes 
use of defense mechanisms. Erikson almost makes peace between the belligerents. The three 
elements of human existence—the somatic, the social, and the psychological makeup of the 
individual—combine to produce one’s ego, which continues to grow and be influenced by these 
three factors throughout one’s lifespan. 
Erikson made a major move away from Freudian orthodoxy when he shifted the chief focus 
of his theory from the id to the ego. Even though Anna Freud argued that psychoanalysis was 
indeed concerned with the ego and that it was more than mere depth psychology, Erikson’s move 
was far more definitive. In Das Ich und die Abwehrmechanismen (1962) Anna Freud wrote 
Eine Wendung der Arbeitsrichtung in den Schriften Freuds, von Massenpsychologie 
und Ic-Analyse und Jenseits des Lustprinzips angefangen, hat dann die Beschäftigung 
mit dem Ich von dem Odium des Unanalytiscchen befreit und das Interesse für die 
Ich-Instanzen ausdrücklich in den Mittelpunkt der Aufmerksamkeit gerückt. Sether 
lässt das Arbeitsprogramm der analytischen Furschung sich sicher nicht mehr mit 
dem Namen Tiefenpsychologie decken. Wir definieren gewöhnlich: Aufgabe der 
Analyse ist die möglichst weitgenhende Kenntnis aller drei Instanzen, aus denen wir 
uns die psychische Persönlichkeit zusammengesetz denken, die Kenntnis ihrer 
Beziehungen untereinander und zur Aussenwelt. Das bedeutet auf das Ich bezogen: 
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seine Inhalte, seine Ausdehnung, seine Funktionen und die Geschichte seiner 
Abhängigkeiten von Aussenwelt, Es und Über-ich. Auf das Es bezogen, heisst es: die 
Beschreibung der Triebe, also der Es-Inhalte und das Verfogen der 
Triebumwandlungen. 52 
Erikson went even further away from concern about the id. Catarina Kinnvall writes: 
“Erikson’s move away from a Freudian preoccupation with the unconscious to the conscious is 
useful.”53 However, Erikson was not saying that his development theory ignored the subliminal. 
Kroger notes that, for Erikson, “identity is partly conscious but also partly unconscious in 
form.”54 This is true not only for identity but for all the characteristics of ego development over 
the lifespan.  
A major aspect of Erikson’s theory is that it does not restrict itself simply to the 
psychological makeup of a person. Erikson acknowledges the importance of the things that are 
biologically inherited. He also takes seriously the familial, social, and historical milieu in which 
the person matures. Erikson presents us with “new insights into the biological, psychological, 
and social properties”55 of human existence. Beyond these, he views psychological development 
not being built solely upon a few momentous decisions in life. The existential psychotherapist, 
Irvin Yalom concurs, stating: 
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An individual’s character structure is not the result of a single momentous decision 
that can be traced and erased, but instead is constituted by a lifetime of innumerable 
choices made and alternatives relinquished. Although the child has, of course, no 
awareness of adult characterological options, nonetheless the child always has a 
modicum of ability to affirm or reject what is presented to him or her, to submit or 
rebel, to identify positively or, as Erik Erikson has taught us, to form a negative 
identification with certain role models.56 
Thus, the psychological development of a person is not to be restricted to a few events in 
infancy and early childhood, as Freud proposed, but to the interplay and interaction between 
innumerable individual decisions influenced by the social setting in which development occurs.  
Identity Development in Erikson’s Theory 
The focus of this dissertation is on Christian identity and how it is conferred and actualized. 
While focusing strictly on identity conferment and identity actualization may appear to be an 
artificial narrowing of Erikson’s theory, the development of identity is the central concern in his 
work.57 Doubtless, one could study each of the various stages of affective development and make 
that the fulcrum for research. Because each of Erikson’s stages of development are interrelated, 
the psychosocial aspects of each stage contribute to, interact with, and result from the others. As 
is demonstrated in the section which follow, in Erikson’s theory, each of the first four stages 
contribute necessary material for the development of identity. Similarly, the three subsequent 
stages require the successful negotiation of Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion) in order 
themselves to be successfully navigated. Nevertheless, identity development is inextricably 
bound up with any study of Erikson and his theory. It is not an overstatement to declare that all 
writers and researchers who reference him or write about him consider identity development the 
centerpiece of his life and work. 
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Identity was not merely an academic concern for Erikson. It had significant personal 
dimensions. Erik was born to Karla Salomonsen, née Abrahamsen of unknown paternity, June 
15, 1902.58 She had previously been married to Valdemar Isidor Salomonsen in 1898, although 
Lawrence J. Friedman reports that “it did not last a night and was probably unconsummated. It is 
not possible that Salomonsen was Erik’s father, as he had absconded to Mexico or the United 
States.59 In 1904, on Erik’s third birthday, Karla married Theodor Homburger. They took Erik on 
their honeymoon with them. Erik, who at this time received “Homburger” as his surname, 
experienced Homburger as a caring father-figure, but always doubted his identity.60 He finally 
became fully aware that he was a stepson, but could never track down his biological father. After 
moving to the United States, when applying for naturalization with the U.S. District Court in 
1938, he (reportedly at the suggestion of his eldest son Kai) changed his name to Erik 
Homburger Erikson. Much conjecture surrounds this decision. Some have thought it involved a 
repudiation of Judaism, others of the Old World, and others think it was a rejection of his 
stepfather. The latter is not likely as he kept Homburger as his middle name. Others have 
interpreted this move as Erik being his own father, in a symbolic sense, “Erik, Erik’s son.”61 This 
last explanation finds evidence in his statement, “I made myself Erik’s son. It is better to be your 
own originator.”62 Whatever the motive, Erikson’s work revolves around the key concept of 
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personal identity. For Erikson, the development of identity includes the same three areas listed 
above: somatic; social; psychological. All three come together to form ego identity.63  
What is meant by the term “identity”? It is more than that of which one is consciously 
aware. “Identity is partly conscious but also partly unconscious in form, as it provides that vital 
continuity for human existence.”64 In its subjective aspect, it is “the awareness of the fact that 
there is a selfsameness and continuity to the ego’s synthesizing methods and that these methods 
are effective in safeguarding the sameness and continuity of one’s meaning for others.”65 Erikson 
first used the term when describing his psychoanalysis of World War II veterans. Along with 
other combat veterans, he describes his treatment of a Navy corpsman (whom he calls “a medical 
soldier) who served with the Marines. The symptoms he describes would likely be explained as 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder today. Erikson observed that this man, as well as others, was in a 
state of constant anxiety. He felt attacked. Loud noises would startle him and cause heart 
palpitations, waves of fever heat, and headaches. “What was sick in these men, then, was their 
screening system, that ability not to pay attention to a thousand stimuli which we perceive at any 
given moment but which we are able to ignore for the sake of whatever we are concentrating 
on.”66 Erikson pondered what had happened to them. In some cases one could postulate physical 
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damage to nerves, but not in all. What was the deeper issue? He writes:  
What impressed me most was the loss in these men of a sense of identity. They knew 
who they were; they had a personal identity. But it was as if, subjectively, their lives 
no longer hung together—and never would again. There was a central disturbance of 
what I started to call ego identity. At this point it is enough to say that this sense of 
identity provides the ability to experience one’s self as something which has 
continuity and sameness, and to act accordingly. In many cases there was at the 
decisive time in the history of the breakdown a seemingly innocent item such as a 
gun in our medical soldier’s unwilling hands: a symbol of evil, which endangered the 
principles by which the individual had attempted to safeguard personal integrity and 
social status in his life at home. Likewise, the anxiety often broke out with sudden 
thought, I should now be at home, painting the roof, or paying that bill, or seeing this 
boss or calling on that girl; and the despairing feeling that all of this which should 
have been never will be.67 
Furthermore, for Erikson, a distinction exists between identity formation and identity 
construction. Identity formation is a wider term which includes conferred identity as well as an 
identity which is consciously constructed. Marcia remarks: 
Identity is, as Erikson says, the result of ‘the silent doings of ego synthesis. . . . The 
formation of an identity is different, however, from the construction of an identity. In 
experimental terms, one becomes progressively aware of one’s basic characteristics 
and one’s position in the world. For example, one becomes gradually to realize that 
one is separate from one’s mother, the child of one’s own parents, the possessor of 
specific skills and needs, a pupil in a particular school, a member of certain social and 
religious groups, the citizen of a specific country. This list describes a given or 
conferred identity, of whose elements an individual becomes progressively aware. In 
contrast, identity begins to be constructed when the individual begins to make 
decisions about who to be, with which group to affiliate, what beliefs to adopt, what 
interpersonal values to espouse, and what occupational direction to pursue. Most, 
though not all, individuals “have” an identity in the original Eriksonian sense. Only 
some, however, have a self-constructed identity that is based upon superimposition of 
a decision-making process on the given or conferred identity.68 
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For Erikson, developing “a sense of identity” is more than having one conferred. Erikson 
writes: 
Young people must become whole people in their own right, and this during a 
developmental stages characterized by a diversity of changes in physical growth, 
genital maturation, and social awareness. The wholeness to be achieved at this stage I 
have called a sense of inner identity. The young person, in order to experience 
wholeness, must feel a progressive continuity between that which he has come to be 
during the long years of childhood and that which he promises to become in the 
anticipated future; between that which he conceives himself to be and that which he 
perceives others to see in him and to expect of him. Individually speaking, identity 
includes, but is more than, the sum of all the successive identifications of those earlier 
years when the child wanted to be, and often was forced to become, like the people he 
depended on.69 
Jane Kroger points out the importance of a sense of continuity with oneself and a sense of 
personal sameness in ego integrity. “Despite changes in interpersonal relationships, social roles, 
and contexts, an attained sense of identity enables one to experience a continued sense of self 
and role commitments across time and place.”70 Identity has not merely a psychological 
dimension. It is an amalgamation and product of interaction between somatic, social, and 
psychological factors.71 Erikson’s insistence on psychosocial development points to the 
intersection and interaction between what can be called personal identity and group identity. All 
people live within some sociocultural system. It is “the learning the effective steps toward a 
tangible collective future, that is developing into a defined ego within a social reality,” that was 
Erikson’s aim.72 
The conscious feeling of having a personal identity is based on two simultaneous 
observations: the immediate perception of one’s selfsameness and continuity in time; 
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and the simultaneous perception of the fact that others recognize one’s sameness and 
continuity. What I propose to call ego identity concerns more than the mere fact of 
existence, as conveyed by personal identity; it is the ego quality of this existence. . . . 
Ego Identity, then, in its subjective aspect, is the awareness of the fact that there is a 
selfsameness and continuity to the ego’s synthesizing methods and that these methods 
are effective in safeguarding the sameness and continuity of one’s meaning for 
others.73 
Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion) in Erikson’s theory has as its crucial role identity 
formation. A careful reading of Erikson, especially in Identity: Youth and Crisis and in 
Childhood and Society, shows that the central concern for Erikson, throughout his writings, is the 
issue of identity.74 Identity, therefore, has its beginning in the very first stage of life and 
continues to be a factor throughout the life cycle. 
While the attainment of ego identity provides a person with a sense of continuity and 
sameness, this does not mean that it is a static achievement. “A further property of identity to 
Erikson is its evolving nature. For Erikson, the identity established at the end of adolescence 
provides some foundation for entry into adult life. However, identity continues to evolve 
throughout adulthood.”75 In fact, for Erikson, identity development has its embryotic 
development in the first four stages of development. The first stages provide the foundation for 
ego identity achievement, even as that identity continues to evolve over the course of one’s 
lifespan. 
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Erikson describes three major steps by which the ego grows as it matures. The first step is 
that of introjection, the primitive incorporation of the image of another. This step of introjection 
is connected with the first few stages of development. Therefore, the most basic experience 
which begins to form the ego is that “between the mothering adult(s) and the mothered child.”76 
This relationship forms the foundation for ego and ego identity development. “Only the 
experience of such initial mutuality provides a safe pole of self-feeling from which the child can 
reach out for the other pole: his first love ‘objects.’”77  
The second step of ego development depends on the identifications which the child makes 
with those who provide roles to be emulated. This requires positive interactions with these 
people, who are trustworthy and provide a safe place for such role playing. The connection to the 
social aspects of this time in life point especially to that of the play stage.78 However, Erikson 
argues that the school age can provide such opportunities if, and only if, the school is structured 
so as to allow for meaningful play, experimentation, and investigation.79 
The third step Erikson describes is that of identity formation. At this point the usefulness of 
identification fades and the adolescent begins a process of “selective repudiation and mutual 
assimilation of childhood identifications” and begins to shape them into his or her unique sense 
of self, that is, of one’s own unique ego identity.80  
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The final identity, then, as fixed at the end of adolescence, is superordinated to any 
single identification with individuals of the past: it includes all significant 
identifications, but it also alters them in order to make a unique and reasonably 
coherent whole of them.81 
Erikson writes of “reasonably coherent whole,” thereby acknowledging that the 
development of a sense of ego identity is never complete or perfect. There are factors from all 
the preceding stages which hinder the development of a truly integral sense of identity. 
In Identity: Youth and Crisis, Erikson presents case histories of the lives of George Bernard 
Shaw and of William James.82 He notes that “the autobiographies of extraordinary (and 
extraordinarily self-perceptive) individuals are one source of insight into the development of 
identity.”83 Both men, according to Erikson, endured a prolonged adolescence. Erikson states that 
Freud’s psychosexual libido theory “offers no adequate account” for this phenomenon.84 He 
notes that extended adolescence should be viewed as a psychosocial moratorium. Inadequate 
negotiation of the earlier stages of ego development forestall the work of ego identity 
development. Erikson describes what he means by a moratorium and its purposes: 
By psychosocial moratorium, then, we mean a delay of adult commitments, and yet it 
is not only a delay. It is a period that is characterized by a selective permissiveness on 
the part of society and of provocative playfulness on the part of youth, and yet it also 
often leads to deep, if often transitory, commitment on the part of youth, and ends in 
a more or less ceremonial confirmation of commitment on the part of society. Such 
moratoria show highly individual variations, which are especially pronounced in very 
gifted people (gifted for better or for worse), and there are, of course, institutional 
variations linked with the ways of life of cultures and subcultures.85 
Erikson lists factors which contribute to the delay of identity achievement, or in some 
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extreme cases the failure to reach such an achievement at all.86 Failure to achieve an adequate 
balance between trust and mistrust, and between autonomy and shame and doubt, can result in 
confusion over one’s developmental stage. “The young person may feel simultaneously very 
young, and in fact babylike, and old beyond rejuvenation.”87 The diffusion of initiative and of 
industry, with the result of an overwhelming sense of worthlessness and inferiority, interferes 
with the part of identity development that involves vocation. This loss of a sense of identity, 
Erikson contends, can cause the young person to choose a “negative identity,” which is 
comprised of scorn and hostility “toward the roles offered as proper and desirable in one’s family 
or immediate community.”88 In the most severe cases, the negative identity can be delusional.89 
On the whole, however, our patients’ conflicts find expression in a more subtle way 
than the abrogation of personal identity. They chose instead a negative identity, i.e., 
an identity perversely based on all those identifications and roles which, at critical 
stages of development, had been presented to them as most undesirable or dangerous 
and yet also most real.90 
As the forgoing research demonstrates, it is nearly impossible to untangle the social and the 
psychological elements in Erikson’s theory, nor should one seek to do so. They are inextricably 
bound together and tied to the epigenesis of a person’s somatic development. Nevertheless, it is 
important to understand the impact of each factor on ego identity development. Therefore, the 
subsections which follow view the whole from the perspectives of the somatic, the social and the 
psychological dimensions of human life. 
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Erikson’s Identity Development Theory in Relation to Somatic Existence 
Physical factors are at work at each stage of development which impact and interact with 
person’s sense of identity. Erikson’s contention that adolescence is the most important stage for 
identity formation can only be evaluated by considering the physical aspects of nascent identity 
development in the earlier stages and comparing them with the physical changes of puberty and 
adolescence. The changes that come after adolescence are less monumental, at least until the 
final stage as the body begins to deteriorate in a noticeable manner. 
Erikson begins his stages of development at birth. Since his is a theory of psychosocial 
development, this makes sense. He does not venture into the physical aspects of human in-utero 
development. Rather, the first aspect of human development with which he is concerned is the 
encounter that “occurs when the newborn, now deprived of his symbiosis with the mother’s 
body, is put to the breast.”91 This is Stage I (Trust vs. Mistrust). The focus of the interaction 
between the child and the outside world is that of the child’s sucking mouth and the mother’s 
lactating breast. “At this point he lives through and loves with his mouth.”92 By means of the 
mouth the child incorporates the outside world into himself. Erikson notes that this incorporative 
action is accompanied by other modes which will become more fully developed and dominant in 
later stages. In order safely to consume the milk, the child must also develop the ability to spit up 
milk that chokes as well as to evacuate the bladder and bowels (the eliminative mode) and to 
close the lips so as to keep and swallow the milk (the retentive mode). The child also learns to 
stick out the tongue, the early expression of the intrusive mode.93 The effective ability to 
incorporate is heightened with the emergence of the teeth and the urge to bite. This event is often 
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the first highly negative experience between the child and her mother. Erikson has little to say 
about the physical contributions to ego identity development at this stage. Much more will be 
said in the sections below which discuss the social and psychological dimensions. 
Stage II (Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt) in development begins with the desire of the 
parents and the ability of the child to control the bowels.94 Stage III (Initiative vs. Guilt) brings 
with it locomotion. Erikson implies that the ability to control the bowels in Stage II comes before 
locomotion. However, this is not always, and likely not usually, the case. Most children have 
developed the ability to crawl and even to walk before they have mastered control of the 
bowels.95 Along with this locomotive ability comes the awareness of the genitals as erogenous 
zones. This is an integral part of Freudian psychosexual theory, from which Erikson does not 
depart. However, the emphasis is, for Erikson, more on the intrusive impulses of this age, which 
are facilitated by the ability to move under the child’s own power. “The ambulatory stage and 
that of infantile genitality add to the inventory of basic social modalities that of ‘making,’ first in 
the sense of ‘being on the make.’ There is no stronger word for it.”96 Because the child can 
ambulate on her own, she is able to play with others, this increasing her social circle and that of 
the influences of society upon her. Stage II (Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt) and Stage III 
(Initiative vs. Guilt) physical development contribute to ego identity development by 
strengthening the body for future roles with which the person will experiment. 
The next stage in physical development is tied to the school age (Stage IV: Industry vs. 
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Inferiority). The child’s motor skills as well as brain development now permit him to handle and 
use the technology, “the utensils, the tools, and the weapons used by big people.”97 This physical 
ability to handle the technology of the culture is increased with practice, preparing the child to 
exit childhood and enter adolescence. The contribution to identity made at this stage is the 
physical ability to make things, to create actual objects in the real world, whether physical or 
intellectual. 
Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion) arrives with all the convulsive impulses that 
accompany the advent of puberty. In puberty, “all the sameness and continuities relied on earlier 
are more or less questioned again, because of a rapidity of body growth which equals that of 
early childhood and because of the new addition of genital maturity.”98 Since, for Erikson, a 
“sense of identity means a sense of being at one with oneself as one grows and develops,”99 such 
drastic bodily changes significantly impact and challenge any earlier sense of selfhood.  
When does puberty begin? Puberty is not a single process or stage with specific 
beginning and end points, but rather a continuum of changes that evolve gradually 
over the course of adolescence. This slow process eventually results in mature 
reproductive capacity, the development of secondary sex characteristics, and the 
assumption of adult height and body proportions.100 
Puberty actually begins prior to any external manifestations of its processes. Therefore, 
puberty-proper may actually begin in the previous stage. However, it is the outward physical 
changes which are recognized by society as signs of entry into adolescence. These changes are 
most significant to the youth as adolescence begins. “By mid-adolescence, most, if not all, teens 
can begin to take their biology for granted. The average mid-adolescent boy or girl will have 
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nearly attained his or her full adult height.”101 By late adolescence, few observable changes can 
be discerned. “The body has now grown to its full adult proportions. The youth is now at what 
likely will be his or her healthiest and body image, the sense of bodily self,102 is more or less 
fixed by what this time in the life cycle has produced.103 
The time from entrance into developmental adulthood and death is a slow and then more 
accelerated path of physical decline. In its early stages it is hardly noticeable. Women may notice 
bodily changes brought on by pregnancy. Both sexes deal with decreasing muscle mass, graying 
and loss of hair, and longer recovery times after accidents and illnesses. It is largely due to the 
body image, the sense of one’s bodily self, compared to that of adolescence that effects ones’ 
later sense of bodily ego identity.104 
Erikson’s Identity Development Theory in Relation to Social Existence 
Erikson’s theory of psychosocial development lays great stress of the social factors in ego 
identity development. The social part of psychosocial development is multifaceted. The familial 
structure into which the child is born and within which he develops is the first societal setting a 
person encounters. The implications of this include the multigenerational aspects of life. The 
child enters a family at Stage I (Trust vs. Mistrust) to parents somewhere in the range of Stages 
V–VII, surrounded, perhaps, by siblings and other family members in Stages II–V, and 
grandparents in Stages VII and VIII. All these factors are important. However, according to 
Erikson, the single most important relationship in Stage I (Trust vs. Mistrust) is the one between 
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the mother and the child being mothered. How this relationship develops will determine how the 
child develops a sense of trust and mistrust and, optimally, the ego strength of hope. Concerning 
this relationship between mother and child, Erikson writes: 
The simplest and the earliest modality is to get, not in the sense of “go and get” but in 
that of receiving and accepting what is given. This is easy when it works and yet any 
disturbance shows how complicated the process really is. The groping and unstable 
newborn’s organism learns this modality only as he learns to regulate his readiness to 
“get” with the methods of a mother who, in turn, will permit him to co-ordinate his 
means of getting as she develops and co-ordinates her means of giving. But in thus 
getting what is given, and in learning to get somebody to do for him what he wishes 
to have done, the baby also develops the necessary groundwork “to get to be” the 
giver—that is, to identity with her and eventually to become a giving person.105 
Additionally, the child is born into a specific historical moment. One’s psychosocial 
identity is shaped by the cultural affirmations and cultural taboos of one’s time and place.106 
While one’s Sitz im Leben continues to shape identity throughout life, it also affects the models 
of acceptable parenting utilized by the parents. A third factor is the ritualization of everyday life, 
which provides the script for social interaction. This is the main thrust of Erikson’s book Toys 
and Reasons, which will be referenced repeatedly. This third factor is of great importance to the 
thesis of this dissertation. As this study progresses into the trajectories of the findings presented, 
the ritual aspects, which contribute to an experience of a sense of Christian identity development, 
will be prominently featured and shown to be quite important. 
As has been described above, the first essential social interaction a person has in life is that 
of the relationship between the mothering person and the mothered child.107 While the physical 
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interaction is centered on the breast of the mother and the mouth of the child, the social 
interaction takes place between the faces of the two. Concerning the physical interaction, Erikson 
writes: 
The first demonstration of social trust in the baby is the ease of his feeding, the depth 
of his sleep, the relaxation of his bowels. The experience of mutual regulation of his 
increasingly receptive capacities with the maternal techniques of provision gradually 
helps him to balance the discomfort caused by the immaturity of homeostasis with 
which he is born. . . . Forms of comfort, and the people associated with them, become 
as familiar as the gnawing discomfort of his bowels. The infant’s first social 
achievement, then, is his willingness to let the mother out of sight without undue 
anxiety or rage, because she has become an inner certainty as well as an outer 
predictability. Such consistency, continuity, and sameness of experience provide a 
rudimentary sense of ego identity which depends, I think, on the recognition that 
there is an inner population of remembered and anticipated sensations and images 
which are firmly correlated with the outer population of familiar and predictable 
things and people.108 
The child, in other words, learns a sense of basic trust, rather than constantly feeling 
distrustful, because, as the crisis of maternal absence is negotiated, the child learns that she will 
indeed return. This sense of basic trust is crucial, according to Erikson, as the foundation on 
which identity is to be built. He continues: “This forms the basis in the child for a sense of 
identity which will later combine a sense of being ‘all right,’ of being oneself, and of becoming 
what other people trust one will become.”109 
Erikson links this emerging trust in the child with the societal institution of organized 
religion,110 which is connected to the everyday ritual of the numinous relation between mother 
and child, in the mutual recognition of one another as other and yet as one who is near. It is 
Erikson’s contention that the “ontological source” of ritual is based on the numinous element.111 
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“The numinous assures us of separateness transcended and yet also a distinctiveness confirmed, 
and thus of the very basis of a sense of ‘I,’ renewed (as it feels) by the mutual recognition of all 
‘I’s joined in a shared faith in one all-embracing ‘I Am.’”112 Erikson’s theory is based on the idea 
that the foundation of human existence is trust. This trust in the ones who are trustworthy is also 
tempered by mistrust of that which is untrustworthy. A child learns to trust by having “reliable 
parental responses to such things as hunger, discomfort, and fright.”113 The challenge of the crisis 
of trust versus mistrust is to persevere in trust in order to develop the capacity for hope, which is 
the ego strength, or virtue, which overcomes mistrust when satisfaction of desire is delayed. 
Erikson links this ego strength of hope to two contributions which this stage makes to 
identity formation, namely, “time perspective” and “time diffusion.” These terms refer to the 
critical importance of developing a workable sense of identity before one enters adulthood.114 A 
prolonged childhood, in the sense of being childish, precludes meaningful identity development 
and thereby results in regression rather than growth.115 Erikson creatively links the issue of a 
proper sense of time perspective to the ego strength of hope, which grows out of the dialectic 
between trust and mistrust. Hope is linked to satisfaction deferred. This deferment contributes to 
a sense of time because the one who hopes must wait for time to pass before satisfaction occurs. 
The person who does not develop hope lives only in the now and here, without the sense that 
with time needs may be met by the one who can be trusted. Erikson states: 
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Hope is the inner strength which emerges unbroken from early familiarity and 
mutuality and which provides for man a sense (or a promise) of a personal and 
universal continuum. It is grounded and fortified in the first stages of life, and 
subsequently nourished, as it were, by all those ritualizations and rituals which 
combat a sense of abandonment and hopelessness and promise instead a mutuality of 
recognition, face to face, all through life—until “we shall know even as we also are 
known.”116 
The developmental issues of Stage II (Autonomy vs Shame and Doubt) are aimed at 
increasing the child’s sense of being a separate self. It is in this sense that Erikson uses the term 
“autonomy.”117 The social aspects of this stage include “the guerilla warfare of unequal wills” 
between the child and the parents.118 Erikson makes an important observation about the historico-
cultural milieu in which the child is reared. He notes that in “primitive cultures” parents are less 
concerned with curbing the child’s will. In agrarian cultures, children are treated as animals 
which must be broken and trained. The more developed cultures, which focus on the technology 
of machinery, treat childrearing analogously. “Thus the child becomes a machine which must be 
set and tuned even before it was an animal which must be broken.”119 By extension, in a 
computer culture, it would follow that children become entities to be programmed and 
reprogrammed. 
This tug-of-war between the child’s will and that of the parent is ritualized in what Erikson 
calls “the judicious,” or “the word and the law.”120 The child’s sense of autonomy, of being a 
                                                 
116
 Erik H. Erikson, “The Ontology of Ritualization in Man,” in Schlein, Looking at Things, 579. 
117
 When Erikson uses the word, “autonomy,” he is not using it in a theological or absolutist manner. What he 
attempts to convey is that which pervades the conscious self and the unconscious. A sense of something is a way of 
introspectively experiencing oneself, and outwardly behaving, as that something. Thus a sense of autonomy is an 
introspective experience of being a person who is separate, unique, and individuated from another. This begins at 
approximately 18 months from birth, during the time when toilet training is also beginning. A sense of autonomy is 
externally observable by actions which illustrate strength of will and willfulness. Erikson, Childhood and Society, 
251–54. 
118
 Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, 107. 
119
 Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, 107–8. 
120
 Erikson, Toys and Reasons, 92. 
86 
separate being, is opposed by the limits set by the parents. Therefore, the child begins to doubt 
her autonomy and, when disciplined, begins to experience a sense of shame. In Freudian 
terminology, the child’s superego is beginning to form and impact the child’s mental and 
emotional life.121 The child is now gaining the ability to discriminate between what is socially 
good and what is socially bad,122 gaining a sense of the knowledge of good and of evil.123 
This stage of development contributes to the development of ego identity by creating the 
superego, which will internally critique and guide future identity roleplays. It will also create a 
source for the possible emergence of a negative sense—the rebel self which sets itself counter to 
the societal and familial will. Furthermore, the person begins to become a divided self, one who 
harbors secret aspects of the self, those that are unacceptable to family and society, which will be 
internalized, even if never publicly displayed.124 
Stage III (Initiative vs. Guilt), the stage when vigorous play begins, is supported by three 
developments, which also bring with them the crisis of this stage. First, in play, the child learns 
to move around more vigorously and freely, establishing the possibility for nearly infinite goals 
of what he might become. Second, the child’s developing language develops to the point where 
he can hear, understand, and ask a multitude of questions. Third, the development of locomotion 
and language combine to “expand his imagination to so many roles that he cannot avoid 
frightening himself with what he himself has dreamed and thought up.”125 Nonetheless, from this 
stage the child develops a sense of initiative, which is counterbalanced by a sense of guilt. 
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Erikson’s inclusion of guilt at this stage likely is influenced by the Freudian underpinnings of his 
training. This is the phallic stage in Freud’s psychosexual scheme. It is the time of the emergence 
of the Oedipal Conflict. Erikson writes of the child’s “anticipatory rivalry,” of “futile attempts at 
demarcating a sphere of unquestioned privilege… of a favored position with one of the 
parents.”126 As a therapist working with children, he noted that children’s play at this stage often 
includes “the usurpation and ambitious impersonation of victorious self-images and the killing 
off of weak and evil ‘others.’”127 Since such actions in real life are forbidden, the child develops 
an inner sense of guilt over these desires. The play in which the child is involves provides a 
socially acceptable avenue for the expression of such desires. Nevertheless, the desires are 
understood to be unacceptable, if they are carried out in actuality. 
This child’s play is, in terms of ritualization, the dramatic. The dramatic allows the child to 
“create with available objects a coherent plot with conflicting turns and some form of 
resolution.”128 In this manner, the child can relive, correct, and recreate past experiences and 
explore possible future roles. Such exploration is necessary for the development of ego identity. 
It is helpful at this point to remember that identity is a multifaceted concept. A person’s identity 
is not monolithic. Rather, ego identity, in addition to including the physical, the social, and the 
psychological, also is found in the various roles one plays in life. Vocation, religious beliefs and 
affiliations, political ideologies, gender-role attitudes, and beliefs about how sexual desire is to 
be expressed are all part of identity, as well as hobbies, friendships, and other interpersonal 
relationships.129 The dramatic element in ritualization allows the child to imaginatively explore a 
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plethora of roles in numerous imagined settings. 
Much of the freedom of childhood becomes restricted as the child enters Stage IV (Industry 
vs. Inferiority), in which comes the experience of formal schooling. With formal schooling 
comes the corresponding fourth stage of ritualization, which Erikson names “the formal.” By this 
he means “methodological performance,” or the binding discipline which “holds them into a 
minute sequence of competent acts and an over-all quality of craftsmanship and perfection.”130 
The “formal” takes the earlier elements, namely the numinous, the judicious, and the dramatic, 
and gives them definite structure. The “formal” gives socially acceptable shape and permanence 
to them, making them more truly ritual in the manner that that term is normally meant. 
Alongside this understanding of “the formal,” Erikson also understands this stage to 
include the actual “forming” of things. The child now is able to craft things, be they objects or 
intellectual concepts.131 In order to do this, at least in American culture, the child is met by two 
seemingly opposing forces.  
Two poles in American grammar school education may serve to illustrate the 
contribution of the school age to the problem of identity. There is the traditional of 
extreme of making early school life an extension of grim adulthood by emphasizing 
self-restraint and a strict sense of duty in doing what one is told to do as opposed to 
the modern extreme of making it an extension of the natural tendency in childhood to 
find out by playing, to learn what one must do by doing what one likes to do. The 
first trend, if carried to the extreme, exploits a tendency on the part of the preschool 
and grammar school child to become entirely dependent on prescribed duties. He this 
may learn much that is absolutely necessary and he may develop an unshakeable 
sense of duty. But he may never unlearn an unnecessary and costly self-restraint with 
which he may later make his own life and other people’s lives miserable, and in fact 
spoil, in turn, his own children’s natural desire to learn and to work. The second 
trend, when carried to an extreme, leads not only to the well-known popular objection 
that children do not learn anything any more (sic) but also to such feelings in children 
as those expressed in the by now famous question of the metropolitan child: 
“Teacher, must we do today what we want to do?” 
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By this second extreme, he indicates that without some kind of restraint, the child will 
become disenchanted with the constant pursuit of his own pleasures and will seek some kind of 
structure for his imaginative, creative mind; he will seek some form, something to put order to 
the disorder of the unfettered dramatic, judicious, and numinous. Identity ultimately requires 
some structure to it if it is going to be of use in life, in love, and in work, 
Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion), which corresponds with adolescence, is the stage 
in which the essential parts of a person’s identity are brought together into a cohesive whole, 
which will be carried out, for the most part, throughout the rest of one’s life. The social aspect of 
this for ego identity is found in the ritualization element of ideology and in the social interaction 
with one’s peer group. The peer group has become of greater importance for identity 
development, for good and for ill, because of the lengthening of the time between childhood and 
adulthood.132 As Erikson considers the development of ego identity in this stage, he looks back at 
the factors that coalesce in adolescence. The earliest stage contributes the importance of trust in 
oneself and in others as the foundation for building a sense of identity. The second stage 
contributes the necessary sense of autonomy and of will which is necessary for a person to be “a 
free agent,” able to make the required choices as to one’s future sense of self.133 The earlier play 
stage (Stage III: Initiative vs. Guilt) provides the adolescent with the imagination to consider the 
possibilities as to what he might become. Finally, the school age (Stage IV: Industry vs. 
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Inferiority) gives form to the earlier stages and begins to shape the areas of faith, of vocation and 
of technological and economic pursuit which figure in to one’s ultimate adult identity.134 
In terms of ritualization, the social institution that contributes to and guards identity is 
ideology.135 Ideology is the “solidarity of conviction” which ties together the previous 
ritualizations. If one thinks of ritual as story, ideology is the moral or point of the story. It is the 
reason for the drama and other story elements. In ritualization, ideology gives a person a 
“coherence of idea and ideals.”136 Therefore the rites of adolescence, whether passed on by the 
society or crafted by the adolescents within their own peer groups, are aimed at confirming, 
inducting, and graduating them toward adulthood.137 
Adolescent ritualization does not always reflect the ideology of the adult world. In fact, the 
self-generated ones most often do not. In many cases these rituals are designed to be expressions 
of negative identities, identities that run counter to values of the adult world and to the values of 
the childhood they have just left behind.138 While such rituals and ideologies may be distressing 
to their elders, they are a necessary vehicle for the person to work out his or her own unique 
identity. This is necessary in order for ego identity to escape the trap of being merely the sum 
total of all the childhood identifications which have been internalized to date.139 
James Marcia provides a way of putting ego identity statuses into helpful categories. These 
categories reflect Erikson’s theory, but organize them in a more systematic manner. Identity can 
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be understood to be in four statuses. One status is Identity Diffusion.140 A diffused identity is 
uncommitted and often not explored. A second status is that of Identity Foreclosure. A person 
whose sense of identity is foreclosed is committed to a given identity, to an identity given to or 
forced upon him by others, be they family, religious institution, or society.141 A third type of 
identity status is that of a Moratorium. During a moratorium, a person is not committed to a 
given identity and yet is exploring possible identities. Moratoria are extremely important. While 
a person with a diffused identity and a person in a moratorium are alike in that they have not 
achieved a sense of identity, the important difference is that the person in a moratorium is testing 
in the midst of a crisis of identity formation. He is in the process of exploring alternatives. The 
person who has a diffused identity usually is not in any such explorative experience. 
Furthermore, a person in a moratorium may have a degree of commitment of some of the identity 
concepts he is exploring. A person whose identity is diffused has no such commitment. The 
fourth identity status is Identity Achievement.142 A person who has achieved a sense of identity 
both knows what that identity is and is committed to it. 
Adolescence is a time of a nearly violent reassessment and reworking of what the person 
thought was his identity. Pre-adolescent identity is usually what Marcia labels a foreclosed 
identity. Now it must be tested, reexamined, reshaped, resisted, discarded, reformed, or made 
one’s own. The movement to diffusion is healthy, but only if the person does not get stuck 
there.143 The actual ego identity work of adolescence is in moving to the moratorium status.144 
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During the moratorium the adolescent can set aside her bestowed, foreclosed identity and rework 
the issues of the previous life stages to achieve what might even prove to be a new creative 
expression of self. It is this work that incorporates the ritual element of ideology. 
In order not to become cynically or apathetically lost, young people must somehow 
be able to convince themselves that those who succeed in their anticipated adult 
world thereby shoulder the obligation of being best. For it is through their ideology 
that social systems enter into the fiber of the next generation and attempt to absorb 
into their lifeblood the rejuvenative power of youth. Adolescence is thus a vital 
regenerator in the process of social evolution, for youth can offer its loyalties and 
energies both to the conservation of that which continues to feel true and to the 
revolutionary correction of that which has lost its regenerative significance.145 
This moratorium, if properly utilized to weigh the worthiness of the old ways and to consider the 
need for societal upheaval and the rejection of socially acceptable identities is aimed at coming 
to a sense of ego identity achievement. 
The next stage of ego development is the one which involves the dialectic of intimacy and 
isolation. As Erikson describes the following stages, he remarks:  
We will take a look beyond the identity crisis. The words “beyond identity,” of 
course, could be understood in two ways, both essential for the problem. They could 
mean that there is more to man’s core than identity, that there is in each individual an 
“I,” an observing center of awareness and of volition, which can transcend and must 
survive the psychosocial identity. . . . “Beyond identity” means life after adolescence 
and the uses of identity and, indeed, the return of some forms of identity crisis in the 
later stages of the life cycle.146 
These few words must not be passed by too soon. First, they imply that the concept of “ego 
identity” and of “the ego” (the “I”) are distinct, even though they are interrelated. Each person is 
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a self, is an “I,” an ego. Erikson’s concern as he describes the identity crisis, and, as he also 
states, later identity crises, is with the development of a sense of identity. The ego, which exists 
in the now and here, develops a sense of who and what it is. But it, the ego, exists whether it 
achieves a sense of identity or not.147 
Furthermore, while the work of adolescence includes the development of a sense of ego 
identity, such an identity, even if achieved, is subject to further adjustments and changes. This 
becomes clear when one considers the implications of intimate relationships in Stage VI 
(Intimacy vs. Isolation), in the work of procreation and parenting in Stage VII (Generativity vs. 
Stagnation), and in the issues of extreme old age in Stage VIII (Integrity vs. Despair and 
Disgust). 
According to Erikson, “a state of acute identity confusion usually becomes manifest at a 
time when the young individual finds himself exposed to a combination of experiences which 
demand his simultaneous commitment to physical intimacy (not by any means always overly 
sexual), to decisive occupational choice, to energetic competition, and to psychosocial self-
definition.”148 Capps, writing about the ego diffusion that occurred in the mathematician John 
Nash, states: “The fact that these experiences involve other persons makes the demand for 
commitment virtually inevitable.”149 This time in the life cycle normally coincides with entry into 
young adulthood which, in addition to being the time of beginning one’s vocation, is the stage 
Erikson links with readiness to enter into meaningful intimate relationships, both romantic and 
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otherwise.150 
Erikson has much less to say about the ritualization of these later stages. As mentioned 
above, the marriage rite grants social approval to enter into the intimacy of marriage. Passing on 
societies rituals and retirements ceremonies are about all he has to say about the ritualization of 
the last two stages. Other rituals do exist, which Erikson ignores. Those who enter the military 
live a life of ritualization. Enlistment rites, graduation from basic training, the awarding of 
insignia and medals, changes-of-command, and other formal ceremonies are designed to 
strengthen one’s sense of identity as a warrior, to build unit cohesion, and to pass on the 
traditions and the ideology of the service. Police officers and firefighters live in a similar milieu. 
Religious clerics are ordained and each change of congregation normally brings with it the ritual 
of the Rite of Installation that is designed to reinforce the commitment to the teachings of the 
church and to care of the congregation. Despite all these rituals, the lack of meaningful rites of 
retirement (or for reintegration into civilian or lay status) is in need of further study. 
Erikson’s Identity Development Theory in Relation to Psychological Existence 
As discussed above, Erikson’s theory makes a distinction between the ego and the 
psychological aspects of life. The ego has physical, social, and psychological components, which 
all contribute to the unique ego of each person. Nevertheless, it is not easy to keep these distinct 
factors separate, and this is especially so when attempting to discuss the psychological.  
The psychoanalytic meaning of ego designates it as an inner psychic regulator which 
organizes experience and guards such organization both against the untimely impact 
of drives and the undue pressure of an overweening conscience. Actually, ego is an 
age-old term which in scholastics stood for the unity of body and soul, and in 
philosophy in general of the permanency of conscious experience. Psychoanalysis, of 
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course, has not concerned itself with matters of the soul and has assigned to 
consciousness a limited role in mental life by demonstrating that man’s thoughts and 
acts are co-determined by unconscious motives which, upon analysis, prove him to be 
worse and better than he thinks he is. But this also means that his motives as well as 
his feelings, thoughts, and acts, often “hang together” much better than he could (or 
should) be conscious of. The ego in psychoanalysis, then, is analogous to what was in 
philosophy in earlier usage: a selective, integrating, coherent and persistent agency to 
personal formation.151 
If the ego is that agency within a person which selects, integrates, and causes to cohere and 
form the person, then separating the ego from the psychological begins to look impossible. 
Nevertheless, there are psychological aspects of the ego which can be studied apart from the 
physical and social factors presented previously. 
The psychological aspects of the ego, or “the human mind,” can only be studied by 
engaging the partnership between the observed mind and the mind of another observing it.152 The 
observer, by which Erikson means the analyst, in deep discussion with the observed person (the 
analyzand) observes the defense mechanisms which are in operation within his patient in order to 
bring to the surface the unconscious psychological aspects of the ego.  
For the young child, it is the social interaction between the child and the mother, and later 
also of that with the father and siblings, which form and cause changes in the child’s 
psychological makeup.153 The outside influence of the parents and other adults, especially in 
Stages II through IV, create defense mechanisms within the child’s psyche as he deals with the 
aggressive drive and the sexual drive. Erikson states his agreement with Freud that civilization 
had too long refused to deal with the reality of the sexual drive in human nature. Instead, it had 
been hidden, so that people “beat a hasty retreat behind romanticism and religionism, into 
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secrecy, ridicule and lechery.”154 But whereas Freud thought “the interpretation of dreams is the 
royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious,”155 Erikson found it to be in the observation of a 
child’s play. It is in the self-forgetfulness of play, he insists, that a child displays his unconscious 
ego desires.156 Trained observers can see from a few play contacts what unconscious issues the 
child is trying to work out in her play.157 
The ego, according to Erikson, is the regulator of the process that integrates the sense of 
one’s physical, bodily self with that of one’s sense of social self,158 and develops, in the process, 
assuming all is going well, the adaptive ego strengths necessary for an optimal sense if identity, 
which will allow one to love (to experience intimacy) and to work (to be generative).159 The crisis 
of Stage I, which finds a balance between trust and mistrust, develops the psychological adaptive 
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strength of hope. Hope permits the person to endure deprivation for a time, without losing the 
sense of trust that the needs will ultimately be met.160 The Stage II crisis of autonomy versus 
shame and doubt, if successfully negotiated, develops the adaptive strength of will, or 
willfulness, which is “tamed primarily by self-control,” so that the person learns the limits 
beyond which he cannot go.161 The work of Stage III, which brings into tension initiative and 
guilt works out the adaptive strength of purpose. “Childhood play, in experimenting with self-
images and images of otherness, is most representative of what psychoanalysis calls the ego-
ideal—that part of ourselves which we can look up to, at least insofar as we can imagine 
ourselves as ideal actors in an ideal plot, with appropriate punishment and exclusion of those 
who do not make the grade.”162Stage IV (Industry vs. Inferiority) provides the strength of 
competence, with the confidence which gives a person certainty that one can find oneself and 
one’s way in life.163 Hope, a controlled will, a sense of purpose, and confident competence are 
the psychological foundation for entering into Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion), during 
which time one will explore a sense of identity, which lead one to an ideology to which one can 
cling and upon which one can pledge fidelity.164 This strength of fidelity to an ideology, to a 
worldview or belief system, become, in turn the foundation for the virtues of love (in Stage VI), 
care (in Stage VII) and wisdom (in Stage VIII). Without the achievement of a sense of identity, 
with its attendant ideology to which one pledges faithfulness, one is ill-prepared to enter into 
intimacy with another and to care for others as one takes on the responsibilities of generativity. 
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Furthermore, without a string sense of identity, and commitment to something firm and 
significant, the physical and mental degradation which comes at the end of life will cause one to 
be overly despairing and disgusted as life draws to a close. 
Identity Development: Ego Identity Status Approach 
Erikson’s theory includes the concepts of ego identity achievement, identity diffusion 
(especially as he first reported it in 1950), adolescent moratorium, and identity achievement. His 
writings also imply that early role identifications, if not challenged and reworked, get in the way 
of an achieved identity. These four aspects of identity development have been central to the work 
of James Marcia, David R. Matteson, Sally L. Archer, and Jacob L. Orlofsky.  
The ego identity status approach was originally developed for work with late adolescents. 
However, its application has been broadened in both research and practice to include work with 
mid-adolescents and adults.165 The most striking development of Erikson’s theory made by these 
researchers has been the expansion from Erikson’s bipolar perspective of syntonic-dystonic to 
four-fold model of diffusion-foreclosure-moratorium-achievement. Each of these is consider in 
this revised Eriksonian model to be an identity status.166 
Marcia presents this revision in such a way that he maintains the Freudian structure of the 
id, the ego, and the superego. The id is that part of the unconscious which provides a person with 
the imperative, the urge to do what it wants. The superego, on the other hand, provides the 
person with the judgmental processes, which restrict and condemn many of the id’s drives. The 
ego stands between the two as the executive, deciding between the two what will be done. In 
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Marcia’s revision, even more so than in Erikson, as the ego grows in maturity and strength of 
identity the “ties to the superego figures of childhood are loosened as they are replaced by new 
ego ideals.” Thus the go increases in its ability to control the drives of the id. 167  
Marcia also presents phenomenological aspects in the formation of ego identity. He makes 
a distinction between a “conferred identity” and a “constructed identity.” “Most, though not all, 
individuals ‘have’ an identity in the original Eriksonian sense. Only some, however, have a self-
constructed identity that is based upon superimposition of a decision-making process on the 
given or conferred identity.”168 That is, according to Marcia, most people live their lives with a 
sense of identity which has not been examines, challenges, and made one’s own. They have 
either a foreclosed identity or a diffused identity. Either way they likely have not and will not 
examine their identity and work through it.  
To summarize, identity is experienced as a core or center that gives meaning and 
significance to one’s world. This core may be conferred (given by one’s childhood 
caretakers) or constructed (built by oneself out of conferred elements). This with 
conferred identities experience their future as the fulfillment of their expectations; 
those who have constructed identities experience their futures as the creation of self-
relevant forms.169 
Identity Statuses 
Four identity statuses have been identified: Foreclosure; Diffusion; Moratorium; 
Achievement. A person whose identity is foreclosed is one whose commitment to the conferred 
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identity is firm and whose openness to an exploration of alternatives is absent. A person whose 
identity is diffused is one who may be, but often is not, open to some exploration of alternatives, 
and whose commitment to his identity is absent. A person in an identity moratorium status is in 
the process of exploring alternative identities and has not yet committed strongly to one. He may 
take on an identity for a while to see if it fits, and then may go on to other options. Any 
commitment during this status is vague at best. The fourth status is identity achievement. Such a 
person is committed to an identity, which has been self-constructed over a period of moratorium 
during which alternatives were explored.170 
Marcia also reports that research he and others have done aligns identity statuses with three 
general personality characteristics. Foreclosures score high on measures of authoritarianism and 
stereotypical thinking. “They show preference for a strong leader over a democratic process, 
obedience over social protest, and the ‘pseudo-speciation’ described by Erikson.”171 People in a 
moratorium status, and some diffusions, show marked levels of anxiety. This ought not to be 
surprising, as they are not in a settled state in regards to their identity. Males in a high identity 
achievement status and foreclosure females exhibit high levels of self-esteem. This would seem 
to support the challenge to Erikson that male and females mature in identity in the same way. For 
the females, the evidence suggests that their desire to affiliate (intimacy) might be a cause for 
feeling good about themselves when the group with which they affiliate confers identity upon 
them.  
Antecedent Conditions 
Several conditions must exist before a person can enter into the process of significant 
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constructive identity development. “As adolescence begins, a person is likely to be in either the 
Foreclosure or the Identity Diffusion status.”172 The person with a foreclosed identity normally 
has had a close relationship with her parents. She follows family traditions and accepts family 
values with little to no questioning. In this way, the parents’ identity is transferred to the child’s 
sense of identity. This parallels the findings discussed above, that children in foreclosure tend 
toward stereotypical thinking and are attracted to authoritarian figures. On the opposite end of 
the spectrum, those with a diffused identity tend to have parents with permissive, neglecting, or 
rejecting parenting techniques.173 The parents, thereby, do not provide the child with a clear 
picture of expectations or of roles. Waterman reports that there is no clear evidence for the effect 
of “a democratic parenting style,” but he postulates that such a style would tend to help children 
transition more easily into the identity moratorium status.174 
Movement into the moratorium status does not simply happen. In accordance with 
Erikson’s theory, a crisis is necessary to cause such a shift in status. A crisis can be initiated in a 
variety of ways. It might come by a severe change in academic performance. It might be a crisis 
of religious faith. It might be the death of a parent. It might be exposure to goals and beliefs the 
child has never come in contact with before. Any number of crises may be the trigger that causes 
the shift in status. “The greater the exposure to new possibilities, the more likely it is that a 
person will reevaluate his or her original commitments.”175 
The significance of successful negotiation of previous developmental stages contributes 
greatly to a person’s ability to move through the moratorium status and achieve a level of ego 
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identity that is functional. 
A sense of basic trust may be experienced as confidence that answers to identity 
questions can be found. A sense of autonomy contributes to a feeling that one can 
find his or her own identity rather than have to submit to choices imposed by 
authority figures. A sense of initiative leads both to more total activity and more 
varied activity in the search for a meaningful identity. Finally, a sense of industry 
underlies confidence in one’s ability to follow through on whatever commitments are 
established. In contrast, negative outcomes on the components of the earlier stages 
are likely to be associated with pessimism about the outcome of an identity search.176 
In addition, Waterman notes a factor which correlates well with Erikson’s stress on the social 
factors of psychosocial development. “The success of adult models in a person’s family and 
community should influence the outcome of an identity crisis.”177 When an adolescent in 
moratorium status strives to achieve an identity, that presence in his or her life of adults who 
have succeeded in the venture gives hope that a similar outcome will be experience in the life of 
the adolescent. On the other hand, if the adults around the youth have not been successful in this 
in their own lives, the youth is more likely to become frustrated and enter into a diffused or 
foreclosed status. 
Consequent Conditions 
Identity achievement is not a onetime accomplishment. Entry into a committed 
relationship, such as marriage, changes the dynamics in a person’s life as they negotiate what 
this new sense of self-as-one-with another means for personal identity. The well-known “midlife 
crisis” for men, parenthood for both sexes, menopause for women, and other changes in life also 
create crises which call for reworking a sense of identity. The final years of life, in extreme old 
ago, which has been discussed above, especially force one to reevaluate one’s identity. Identity 
achieved is not static. There is a cycling between achievement and moratorium and back to 
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achievement that continues throughout one’s lifespan. 
Identity Development Patterns 
This cycling between the various statuses has been labeled the MAMA cycle. The acronym 
MAMA indicates the cycle or oscillation between an identity in moratorium to identity 
achievement, to moratorium and then to achievement.178 It is understood by Marcia and 
Waterman to be a positive and useful cycle, since obsolete or harmful identities are laid aside as 
new ones are attempted. The concept of the MAMA cycle proposes that “progressive (optimal) 
identity development throughout the adult years is likely to be characterized by repeated phases 
of commitment and later reassessments.”179 The disequilibrium brought about by crises 
throughout life contribute to the need for such reassessment.180 Waterman, however, does not 
write merely of the MAMA cycle. He presents a model of subsequent patterns for changes in 
identity status. 
A person in identity diffusion may, with the advent of a crisis, remain diffused or move 
either to a foreclosed or to a moratorium status. Foreclosure would provide a seemingly safe 
refuge, but would not be optimal. The goal is to move to the moratorium status, so that 
alternatives can be explored. 
A person in a foreclosed status might, when faced with a crisis, move to diffusion, stay in 
foreclosure in which is seeming safety because it is the identity given by family or society, or 
move to moratorium status, in order to explore new possibilities. The movement from 
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foreclosure to moratorium would occur, Waterman claims, if the earlier commitments to the 
conferred identity no longer work. 
A person in moratorium, Waterman reports, moves to one of two statuses. Either he will 
fall back to diffusion or he will achieve a new working identity. It appears from Waterman’s 
research that having been in a moratorium precludes the possibility of moving back to 
foreclosure. The foreclosed conferred identity hold no appeal, since it has previous shone itself to 
be insufficient to be practical in life.  
An important aspect of his theory is the assertion that a person with an achieved identity, 
when faced with a crisis, will either find his identity sufficient to meet the challenge, or he will 
reenter a moratorium to reconstruct a new or modified identity, or he will fall back into diffusion. 
This falling back into diffusion is not necessarily a bad thing if the achieved identity is so 
dysfunctional as to be useless. The move to moratorium occurs when the achieved identity needs 
some degree of reconstruction or refinement.181 
Waterman avers that this model is not theoretical but descriptive of the data. He states that 
there are virtually no exceptions to these shifts in status. “The basic hypothesis of identity 
development may now be phrased: Movement from adolescence to adulthood involves a 
preponderance of changes in identity status, which can be characterized as progressive 
developmental shifts.”182 
Challenges to and Adaptations of Erikson’s Theory 
Erikson’s theory is focused on affective development over time. Henry Maier’s study in 
Three Theories of Child Development maps out the similarities and differences between 
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Erikson’s affective theory, Piaget’s cognitive theory, and Sears’s behavior theory. Erikson 
references Piaget in some of his later writings. Meier attempts to bring the three into a coherent 
whole. This dissertation does not critique the lack of the cognitive and behavioral, except as it 
impacts Erikson’s argument or as it influences ego identity development. Meier notes three main 
areas of divergence from Freud in Erikson. First, it is the ego rather than the id with which 
Erikson is primarily concerned. This is not a repudiation of Freud so much as a change in 
emphasis. Second, Erikson breaks new ground by giving the social matrix a greater and more 
positive place in his theory. Erikson replaces the classical child-mother-father triad with a more 
complex social matrix, including siblings, playmates, schoolmates, and peers. The peers come 
into play with Erikson because he makes Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion) as important as 
Stage I (Trust vs. Mistrust). The third divergence is the change from a negative view of the social 
influences to a much more optimistic vision of its effects. Rather than thinking of crises as 
catastrophic events, Erikson views them as events conducive to growth.183 This shift may be 
accounted for by considering that Freud was a physician. As such, he built his theory on his 
observations of people in need of therapy. Erikson, on the other hand, especially early in his 
career, was involved in educational theory. He observed children at play. His interest was not 
primarily in those who were troubled, but in those who were developing normally. While still in 
Vienna, working at Dorothy Burlingham’s school under the supervision of Anna Freud, Erikson 
investigated the use of psychoanalysis in the future of education. The hope was to provide 
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teachers with the necessary theory and tools better to teach youth.184 
A foundational critique of Erikson’s theory, as well as any theories which posit a set, 
determinative developmental progression, is that his theory does not take into account the 
plasticity of epigenetic development. Gary Greenberg and Ty Partridge argue that biology is not 
the fundamental and guiding force that drives development. 
A relational, holistic position takes a dramatically different perspective on the 
relations between biology, evolution, and psychological development. From this 
perspective, development is an active system of processes superordinate to biology 
and evolution. Thus, it is not that the gene or evolution explains development, but 
that the developmental system explains the functioning of both the gene and 
evolution. From this perspective, it is the developmental system that integrates 
biological functions into coordinated patterns that support behavior. It is the process 
of development that shapes biological organization and provides the temporal context 
for biology-behavior-ecology interrelations. So the question really becomes, how 
does development shape biology and the relation of genes and neurons with 
behavioral outcomes in a given environmental context?185 
What can be asked of the way in which the developmental system shapes behavior can also 
be asked of the way the developmental system shapes affective development as well? 
Morris Eagle states that “the relationship between motives and affects is bidirectional.”186 
Motives drive behavior; therefore, affects are the primary motivator of behaviors.
187
 Thus, at 
least the behaviors of persons would be coordinated with, if not subordinate to, the affects. While 
even Freud did not go so far as to say that affect enslaves cognitive functions, except in the 
psychotic person, he did state that the area of cognition least affected by affects is that of 
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perception. Other areas of cognition, in addition to suffering from human miscalculations, can be 
clouded by the drives (id motivations) within a person. In other words, one can often understand 
a thing to be what one wishes it to be.
188
 
It is well known that Anna Freud rejected the direction of Erikson’s work because she 
understood it to be a repudiation of that of her father.189 Aside from rejection by Anna Freud, 
Erikson has had other critics. Some have criticized him for not addressing the artificially 
extended period of adolescence in Western society.190 He has also been chided for being overly 
optimistic, especially in writing about developmental crises as though they all were, to use J. R. 
R. Tolkien’s word, “eucatosphrophes.”191 His theory has also been criticized for being 
androcentric, and ignoring the differences between males and females in their affective 
development.192  
Paul Roazen’s treatment of Erikson’s theory is a well-balanced critique, which 
acknowledges both the power of Erikson’s ideas as well as what he considers to be the 
limitations. He notes that Erikson, like Freud, thought of the ego as essentially a part of the 
unconscious; but, departing from Freud, emphasized the ego’s unifying function.193 Likewise, 
Erikson agrees with Anna Freud on the ego’s creation and use of defense mechanisms, but 
differs with her in wanting to understand these, not merely as being negative, but as being 
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adaptive strengths.194 Roazen does not think these departures from Freudian orthodoxy are 
wrong. However, he does fault Erikson for often being ambiguous. He especially thinks that 
Erikson’s use of the words “a sense of” is overused. He notes Erikson’s proclivity to use this 
word when writing, for example, of “a sense of identity,” “a sense of continuity,” and “a sense of 
leeway.”195 Roazen’s chief objection to this term is that it fails to pin down whether or not this 
“sense of” is a “false sense of” or whether it corresponds to something real. On the other hand, 
Roazen thinks that Erikson’s overall positive attitude may well provide “a fresh perspective on 
how we conceive of life.”196 While Roazen appreciates Erikson’s positive view of developmental 
crises, he wonders whether Erikson might be idealizing “youth’s disharmonies” and missing 
what is pathological in adolescent development.197 He believes that Erikson tried too hard to 
escape Freud’s “biologism and in the process missed the dangers inherent in his subjectivistic 
approach.”198 He also extends this critique by questioning whether Erikson thought enough about 
his own life history and the influence it had on the way he viewed development. He accuses 
Erikson of romanticizing his own life story, turning it into a mythology.199 
This “remythifying” of Erikson’s life story appears to be the backbone of Sue Erikson 
Bloland’s autobiography. In this book Erikson’s daughter essentially repudiates his theory and 
explains why she has embraced “interpersonal psychoanalytics,” which is based on the work of 
Harry Stack Sullivan, who rejected Freud’s “drive theory” and emphasized the interpersonal, 
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social interactions. This emphasis moves away from the psychosocial perspective of her father, 
which Bloland accuses of merely being a relabeling of Freud’s psychosexual theory, with the 
addition of a slight emphasis on the social as having a positive role to play.200 
Joan Borysenko’s adaptation and critique of Erikson appears, at first glance, to take his 
androcentrism to task. She places greater emphasis on the sense of a girl’s bodily self, which 
while not a direct challenge to Erikson, emphasizes the difference between how males and 
females view the importance of the body for identity.201 This contributes to the greater prevalence 
of eating disorders among females. Her main challenge to Erikson is the assertion of the 
Eriksonian life cycle that identity comes before intimacy. Borysenko understands intimate 
relationships to be a “major focus of girl’s development since infancy.”202 This question is also 
taken up by David R. Matteson, who agrees that “Erikson’s theory of adolescent identity is 
deeply challenged by the data comparing male and female identity development.”203  
Matteson, after working with the data, has a more nuanced approach. It appears that 
females do achieve relationship intimacy earlier than their male counterparts; intimacy does not 
appear to require identity achievement first. However, women who enter into intimacy prior to 
achieving at least some sense of identity often become enmeshed with the other person to their 
own detriment. Having said that, a refinement of Eriksonian theory is in order. “One must 
develop a sense of stable self from which to give and receive intimately and still take care of 
oneself.”204 In summary, Matteson’s findings correlate with those of Gilligan and Borysenko in 
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this way: the concepts of identity and intimacy are to be understood differently as they are 
experienced by each sex. This finding, however, does not seem all that different than Erikson’s 
own finding that women experience a life differently than do men. This is one of the main points 
in chapter 7 of Identity: Youth and Crisis.205 
A major supportive adaptation of Erikson’s model is presented by his wife, Joan Erikson, 
in the beginning and concluding sections of The Life Cycle Completed: Extended Edition. Joan 
Erikson adds a Ninth Stage, which addresses the issues of extreme old age. The relation between 
this new stage and Erikson’s original scheme is one of reversal. 
Even the best cared-for bodies begin to weaken and do not function as they once did. 
In spite of every effort to maintain strength and control, the body continues to lose its 
autonomy. Despair, which haunts the eighth stage, is a close companion in the ninth, 
because it is almost impossible to know what emergencies and loses of physical 
ability are imminent. As independence and control are challenged, self-esteem and 
confidence weaken. Hope and trust, which once provided firm support, are no longer 
the sturdy props of former days. To face down despair with faith and appropriate 
humility is perhaps the wisest choice.206 
She then presented her husband’s theoretical structure of the eight stages, with the dystonic 
first in order to emphasize its new importance and potency. 
Summary of the Findings 
Erikson presents a schema of normal ego development, which includes the key stages of 
infancy and adolescence as times of rapid growth and change. Erikson’s unique contribution has 
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been to place ego development, including the experiential development of a sense of identity 
within the human life span and to call it a life cycle.207 By labeling it a cycle, he allows for the 
interpenetration of the crises of each stage of development to influence all the others. This 
creates a dynamic which can be useful in pastoral care and counseling because certain crises are 
not the sole property of a given age. Not only can unfinished business, so to speak, but ongoing 
challenges to each stage can be addressed on a continuum of care. 
Erikson’s theory, especially as further developed by Marcia and Waterman, provides the 
language to discuss statuses of identity and of changes in the status. Additionally, it opens the 
door to discuss the multifaceted aspects of identity. Vocational, religious, political, sexual (often 
now erroneously labeled “gender”), and sexual expression aspects of life are areas of identity 
which may be in differing statuses at the same time. This preserves the richness of human 
experience and allows for a thick description of a person’s current experience of identity. A 
person may be settled on his religious convictions, and so have achieved ideological identity in it 
with the accompanying strength of fidelity, and yet still be in a moratorium as to his vocation.  
An area to be explored in the dialogue between Erikson’s theory and that of Paul’s 
description of Christian identity in and through baptism is the seeming tension between the 
conferred identity (imputed or given, which would appear to be a foreclosed identity) and an 
achieved or actualized identity, reached by means of the unconscious work of ego synthesis. 
Erikson’s theory leans more toward identity actualization as being socially influenced and yet 
without any objective teleology. A person achieves a sense of ego identity which works for that 
person in the social context in which she lives.  
A further issue remains which no writer appears to address. Erikson calls the dystonic 
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element of Stage III “guilt.” He assigns the elements of shame and doubt to Stage II. Yet Stage II 
is the stage at which the child’s will comes up against the “law and order” societal element. That 
shame and doubt occur at this stage do appear to be reactions to restriction upon the will, why is 
guilt for doing that which is “unlawful” not also part of this stage? The likely answer is that 
Stage III (Initiative vs. Guilt) in Erikson is the phallic stage in Freud, the stage during which the 
“Oedipus Complex appears in boys (and the Electra Complex in girls) during which supposedly 
the boy, if he had his way would rape his mother and murder his father. The result of this 
complex is guilt for desiring the death of the parent. It may well be that a sense of guilt begins in 
Stage II and comes to a head in Stage III. 
Erikson’s theory on the ritualization of life offers promise for a dialogue about the use of 
the ritual elements of the baptismal liturgy, and of baptism in general, in the work of pastoral 
care and counseling with Christians whose sense of identity does not reflect the realities given to 
them in the sacrament. This will be the work of chapter 4. But first Pauls’ baptismal theology 
and the process of Christian identity formation, especially as it is expressed in his Letter to the 
Romans, must be explored. That is the work of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PAULINE BAPTISMAL THEOLOGY AND THE EXPERIENTIAL PROCESS OF 
CHRISTIAN IDENTITY FORMATION 
A definitive systematic theology of baptism is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Rather, 
the focus of this chapter is primarily an exegetical study of significant passages in Romans, with 
supplemental passages from First Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, and Colossians, in order to 
describe the unique contribution of Paul’s teaching to the doctrine of baptism to the topic of 
Christian identity. An a priori assumption is that the Lutheran Confessions give a true and 
accurate exposition and exhibition of the Bible’s teaching on baptism. The primary aim is to 
draw from these Pauline epistles the significance of baptism for Christian identity, both as it is 
conferred (imputed) and as it is actualized (experienced).1 
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 Throughout this section the terms “real” and “reality” will be used for the identity which is conferred 
(imputed). It is the Christian’s identity in terms of that which has been given in baptism. It is the Christian’s identity 
coram deo.The terms “actual” and “actualized” refer to the Christian’s identity as it is worked in and worked out in 
day-to-day living. It is the Christian’s identity as he experiences it and as it is expressed coram mundo. The 
Christian’s real identity is an immediate result of justification by faith. The Christian’s actualized identity, while 
grounded in justification and flowing from it, is more closely connected to sanctification. This distinction between 
the “real” and the “actual” is the same as Dietrich Bonhoeffer uses in Sanctorum Communio. “Describing the 
situation in which sin remains in the daily life of the members of the church-community and yet has already been 
eliminated, he states: “Es lebt in der sanctorum communio die peccatorum communio weiter. Die adamitsche 
Menschheit ist aktualiter noch da, wenn auch realitär überwunden.” (The existence of the peccatorum communion 
[community of sinners] remains in the sanctorum communion [community of saints]. The Adamic humanity is, in 
actuality, still there, albeit in reality it has been overcome.) Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio: Eine 
dogmatiche Untersuchung zur Soziologie der Kirche (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 2005), 144. As the old Adam 
remains a present actuality within the Christian community, even though it has been overcome in reality, so the real 
identity of Christians, while true as a gift given by God, is in the process of being actualized on a daily basis. The 
actual identity of the Christian is only truly known by God, and yet in experienced to a degree by the Christian. The 
real identity is only received and known by faith, so long as the believer remain in the world. This distinction 
between the real and the actual will be important in the discussion between Pauline baptismal theology and Erikson 
begins later in this dissertation. The distinction between the real and the actual is found in the dialectic between the 
ontological and the existential. Kierkegaard makes this point: “There are three existence-spheres: the esthetic, the 
ethical, the religious. The metaphysical is abstraction, the there is no human being who exists metaphysically. The 
metaphysical, the ontological, is [er], but it does not exist [er ikke til], for when it exists it does so in the esthetic, in 
the ethical, in the religious, and when it is, it is the abstraction from, or, a prius [something prior to] the esthetic, the 
ethical, the religious.” Kierkegaard, Stages on Life’s Way, 476. Kierkegaard’s concern is for the actual, existential 
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Pauline Baptismal Theology 
Paul wrote, “Christ did not send me to baptize” (1 Cor. 1:17). Nonetheless, Paul regularly 
extols baptism. Baptism is overtly mentioned in Rom. 6:1–11; 1 Cor. 1:10–31; 10:1–5; 12:12–
20; 15:29; Gal. 3:27–29; Eph. 4:1–6; Col. 2:6–15. It is clearly implied, as well, in Eph. 5:26. 
Baptism is not limited, however, to the specific verses in which the word “baptism” is found. 
Paul speaks of the Corinthians being “washed” in 1 Cor. 6:11. It is argued in the sections which 
follow that baptism shapes the entire structure of Paul’s theology in Romans 6–8.2 It also informs 
Romans 12–15.  
By means of baptism, the baptized is fused into Christ’s death. He is buried into Christ’s 
death so that the Christian might “walk in newness of life” (Rom. 6:4). Since the believer is 
united with Christ by means of baptism in the “likeness of his death,” the Christian will also be 
united with Christ is the “likeness of his resurrection” (Rom. 6:5). Christ’s resurrection means 
that death no longer has dominion over him; therefore, because of the Christian’s union with 
Christ, the Christian is also no longer under the dominion of death. For this reason, the baptized 
is to account it to be true that he is dead to sin and alive to God in Christ Jesus (Rom. 6:11). 
From this flows the ethical implications of daily dying to sin and being raised to newness of life 
in Christ Jesus (ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ). The ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ phrase points back to the Adam–Christ 
dyad in Romans 5. This dyad is also reflected in 1 Corinthians 15, where Paul specifically 
contrasts life ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ with death ἐν τῷ Ἀδάμ (15:22). 
                                                                                                                                                             
life people live. This life is lived in the three listed spheres. The imputed identity given in baptism is a theological 
truth, which will only be fully experienced in the eschaton by those justified by faith in the present. The 
actualization of this identity in the existential present is always partial, is subject to variations and vagrancies, and is 
expressed in the esthetic, ethical, and religious “existence-spheres of life. The “religious existence-sphere” should 
not be understood to be the same as the theological, or ontological, reality. The religious, rather, when meant in a 
positive sense refers to the Christians sense of faith, or sense of basic trust. It is therefore not the same as saving 
faith (or trust) which is a gift of God (Eph. 2:9). 
2
 While the cognates for baptism do not appear in Romans 8, the term ἐν Χριστῷ predominates the discussion 
of the new life in Christ. 
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A concept Paul develops, which grows out of the death, burial, and resurrection motif in 
Romans 6, is that of deliverance from being a slave under sin. This slavery is much more than 
mere obedience. In chapters 6 and 7 slavery is a matter of identity. “The master decides the 
identity of the slave. This understanding of human beings as serving sin, as if they were 
possessed by it, also explains why Paul uses violent language,”3 such as putting to death. Death 
frees a slave from a master. And a new identity comes by being given to a new master, who 
determines an identity for the slave anew. For Paul, the old master is sin. Sin is killed by 
baptism. The new master is Christ. He gives the baptized a new identity. What is amazing is that 
this new identity includes being a child of God (Rom. 8:12–17). 
In Ephesians, Paul uses a synonym for baptism, namely, λουτρόν, washing or cleansing 
(5:26). Similarly, in 1 Cor. 6:11 he speaks of the Christian being washed (ἀπολούω), which is 
linked to sanctification (being made holy) and justification (being declared or made righteous). 
Thus Paul connects baptism to the central salvific motif of his theology of justification by faith. 
The unrighteousness which excludes one from the kingdom of God (1 Cor. 6:9–10), is washed 
away by means of baptism and replaced by the gift of righteousness and holiness “in the name of 
the Lord Jesus and by the Spirit of our God.”4 
Returning to Romans 5, Paul states that justification by faith (5:1) gives the recipient hope 
which sustains the believer through trials, because, verse 5, ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκκέχυται ἐν ταῖς 
καρδίαις ἡμῶν διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου τοῦ δοθέντος ἡμῖν (the love of God has been poured out in our 
hearts through the Holy Spirit, the one given to us). It would appear that this “pouring out” ought 
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not be considered apart from the giving of the Spirit through baptism. The ceremonial washing 
Paul knew as a Pharisee was accomplished by the pouring of water over the vessels to be 
cleansed (Mark 7:1–4). Paul clearly connects baptism and washing in Tit. 3:5–7, in which he 
links washing with regeneration, renewal by the Holy Spirit, justification, and becoming heirs, 
which is a term he connects to adoption as sons in Romans 8. 
This connection Paul makes between baptism and the Holy Spirit is important for 
understanding the flow of Romans 6–8. This linking of the Spirit with baptism is also found in 1 
Cor. 12:13 (ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι ἡμεῖς πάντες εἰς ἑν σῶμα ἐβαπτίσθημεν) in that “in one Spirit we all 
have been baptized into one body.” Thus Paul indicates the corporate, or social, dynamic of 
baptism. 
In Rom. 8:12–17, Paul refers to Christians as adopted sons, as those who have “received 
the Spirit of adoption as sons” (ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα υἱοθεσίας) so that they are now “children of God” 
(τέκνα θεοῦ) who now have God as their Abba, their Father (αββα ὁ πατήρ). Similarly, in Gal. 
3:7, Paul links baptism with sonship, which new relationship relativizes and overcomes ethnic 
divisions.5 “When Paul states that ‘there is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor 
female,’ he strikes at three of the major barrier-forming divisions in human society.”6 While Paul 
is not obliterating the distinctions between the groups, and while he recognizes that such social 
differences exist, the barriers that prohibit fellowship are broken down. They are broken down 
because, by means of God’s action in and through baptism, a higher-level identity now exists. 
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That identity is “being clothed with Christ” and “being Abraham’s seed” (Gal. 3:26–29). This 
points back to Romans 4, in which Abraham, the man of faith, is father of all those who are 
justified by faith. 
Paul’s discussion of the pre-circumcision faith of the righteous-by-faith Abraham (Rom. 
4:11) is significant in relation to the one and only reference in the New Testament which links 
circumcision and baptism. In Col. 2:11–12, Paul “explicitly identifies Baptism as a divine action 
that is the circumcision of Christ.’”7 Just as circumcision was the identifying mark of the Israelite 
male in the flesh, so now baptism, which includes water applied to the physical body, is the 
identifying mark of all Christians, irrespective of ethnicity or sex. Baptism is the divine action 
which confers upon each Christian his or her identity. It is no longer restricted to those who are 
males. The bodies of both sexes receive this sign.8 
In summary, baptism is an important aspect of Pauline theology. It is a means of grace by 
which God “calls, gathers, enlightens, and makes holy”9 the Christian and the entire Christian 
church. By means of baptism God kills the old man and raises the new. By it he imparts the Holy 
Spirit, who regenerates the believer and makes the baptized to be a child of God and a member 
of God’s family. As these terms imply, baptism has immense implications for the reality of 
Christian identity as a gift given and for the actualization of Christian identity. This is fleshed out 
in greater detail in the sections of this chapter which follow. It will be demonstrated that by 
means of baptism a specific identity is conferred and that by living out the implications of 
baptism, a sense of Christian identity is actualized in the life of the believer. By means of 
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baptism God creates a new physical, social, and psychological reality. Furthermore, baptism is 
the means by which a new physical, social, and psychological actuality comes into being, and is 
experienced in the Christian’s daily life. 
Pauline Baptismal Theology in Romans 
Paul’s baptismal theology in Romans has immense importance for the entire Letter to the 
Romans. Arguably, the locus de baptismo in Romans is chapter 6. However, the union of the 
Christian with Christ and the Christian’s death to sin and resurrection to a new identity runs 
throughout the letter. Nevertheless, certain themes in Romans 6 must be established before one 
can work backwards and forwards and demonstrate baptism’s importance. It must be shown that 
key aspects of Paul’s baptismal theology in Romans 6 are linked with important theological 
concepts presented earlier in the letter. 
In Rom. 6:1–11 Paul states: 
What then shall we say? Are we to continue in sin in order that undeserved favor may 
increase? Never! We, the ones who died to sin, how could we yet live in it? Do you 
not know that as many of us as have been baptized into Christ Jesus (ἐβαπτίσθημεν εἰς 
Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν) have been baptized into his death (εἰς τὸν θάνατον)? We were co-
buried in him through baptism into death in order that just as Christ has been raised 
from the dead through the glory of the Father, in this way also you should walk in 
newness of life (ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς). For since, we having been united (grown 
together) with him in the likeness of his death, rather also we will be in the likeness 
of his resurrection, knowing this, that our old man (ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος) has 
been co-crucified in order that the body of sin (τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας) may be made 
ineffective so that we no longer might be enslaved (τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς) to sin, 
for the dead person has been declared righteous from (δεδικαίωται ἀπό) sin. And since 
we have died with Christ, we believe that we also will co-live with/in him, knowing 
that Christ, being raised from the dead, can no longer die, death no longer has 
lordship [κυριεύει] over him; for that he died, he died to sin once, but the life which 
he lives he lives to God. In this way also you—you are to account yourselves to be 
dead to sin, but alive to God in Christ Jesus (ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ).10 
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 Τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν; ἐπιμένωμεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ἵνα ἡ χάρις πλεονάσῃ; μὴ γένοιτο. οἵτινες ἀπεθάνομεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, 
πῶς ἔτι ζήσομεν ἐν αὐτῇ; ἢ ἀγνοεῖτε ὅτι, ὅσοι ἐβαπτίσθημεν εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν, εἰς τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ ἐβαπτίσθημεν; 
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In this passage, several key words are highlighted. Baptism is “into Christ Jesus” (εἰς Χριστὸν 
Ἰησοῦν), which “supports the image of baptismal immersion.”11 It also is paralleled by the εἰς τὸν 
θάνατον (into death) which follows, indicating a movement from a form of “life” into a new 
status of being dead, that is in this instance, being dead to sin. This movement now places the 
baptized person into Christ so that he is now in Christ Jesus (ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ). The phrase, ἐν 
Χριστῷ, not only refers to the divine action which takes place in baptism by which the baptized is 
now united with, and is in, Christ; it also indicates that the baptized person is seen by God as in 
Christ.12 Therefore, the baptized is no longer accounted by God as a sinner, but as one who is 
righteous in Christ.13 
In Rom. 6:1–11, Paul also makes a distinction between the καινότητι ζωῆς in which the 
baptized now lives and ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος. Paul stops short, here, of labeling the baptized 
person as being ὁ παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος; instead, he indicates that the παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος is something 
which, in some way, comprises what the baptized person possesses within himself. The παλαιὸς 
                                                                                                                                                             
συνετάφημεν οὖν αὐτῷ διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος εἰς τὸν θάνατον, ἵνα ὥσπερ ἠγέρθη Χριστὸς ἐκ νεκρῶν διὰ τῆς δόξης τοῦ 
πατρός, οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς περιπατήσωμεν. εἰ γὰρ σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου 
αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἐσόμεθα τοῦτο γινώσκοντες ὅτι ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος συνεσταυρώθη, ἵνα 
καταργηθῇ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ὁ γὰρ ἀποθανὼν δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς 
ἁμαρτίας. εἰ δὲ ἀπεθάνομεν σὺν Χριστῷ, πιστεύομεν ὅτι καὶ συζήσομεν αὐτῷ, εἰδότες ὅτι Χριστὸς ἐγερθεὶς ἐκ νεκρῶν 
οὐκέτι ἀποθνῄσκει, θάνατος αὐτοῦ οὐκέτι κυριεύει. ὃ γὰρ ἀπέθανεν, τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἀπέθανεν ἐφάπαξ· ὃ δὲ ζῇ, ζῇ τῷ θεῷ. 
οὕτως καὶ ὑμεῖς λογίζεσθε ἑαυτοὺς εἶναι νεκροὺς μὲν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ζῶντας δὲ τῷ θεῷ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. (Rom. 6:1–11) 
11
 Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 444. 
12
 “They died to sin in God’s sight when Christ dies on the cross for them. This is a matter of God’s decision. 
His decision to take their sins upon Himself in the person of His dear Son may be said to be tantamount to a decision 
to see them as having died in Christ’s death.” C. E. B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the 
Epistle to the Romans, International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975), 1:299. 
13
 “We said that God’s decision to take our sins upon Himself in the person of His dear Son was tantamount 
to a decision to see us as having died in Christ’s death. It was also a decision to see Christ’s risen life as our true 
life—in other words, to see us as living in Him. Paul’s ἐν Χριστῷ has to do with God’s decision as our gracious 
Judge to see us, not as we are in ourselves, but ‘in Him’.” Cranfield, Romans, 1:316. Cranfield rejects a sacramental 
realism in Romans 6. Nevertheless, his understanding that the ἐν Χριστῷ phrase points back to Paul’s argument in 
the preceding chapters of his letter that Christians are declared righteous before God, are seen by him in Christ, 
supports the argument that Paul is not moving on to utterly new territory in chapter 6. 
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ἄνθρωπος is ours, but is now “co-crucified in order that the body of sin (τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας) 
may be made ineffective.” The παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος had a body (τὸ σῶμα) which was ruled by sin 
(ἁμαρτία). That body of sin (τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας) has been “made ineffective,” so that the 
Christian is no longer a slave to sin. Martin Franzmann states: 
The life that follows upon our death in Baptism is a life of a new kind. Since our old 
criminal self, the self native to us as sons of Adam, has been condemned and 
executed, our “sinful body” has been destroyed (v. 6). This manner of speaking about 
the body is strange to us. To understand Paul’s language here we must recall that 
Paul, and the men of the Bible generally, look upon the body as an essential part of a 
man’s self, as the expressive instrument of man’s will. They can therefore speak of 
the one part of the body particularly involved in an action as representing the whole 
person. Jesus’ command to pluck out the offending eye and to cut off the offending 
hand is a familiar example of this mode of thought and speech (Matt. 5:29–30). . . . 
The “sinful body” is, then, the body as expressive of our old self and its will—the 
throat breathing forth corruption like an open grave, the deceiving tongue, the mouth 
full of curses and bitterness, the feet swift to shed blood, the eyes that will not look 
upon the fearful majesty of God (3:13–18).14 
Franzmann connects Paul’s language of the body as τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας with the catena of 
condemnation in Rom. 3:9–18. Although one may speak of the human person in such a way as to 
distinguish between the bodily, the social, and the psychological, theologically these are simply 
ways of describing the totality of the unified person. All human beings are totaliter peccatores, 
in their entirety—in the somatic, social, and psychological aspects of being. The human race, as 
a whole, in like manner is a peccatorum communio, in all actualizations of its corporate being.15 
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 Martin H. Franzmann, Romans: A Commentary (St. Louis: Concordia, 1968), 111–12. Franzmann’s 
statement that our old criminal self has been executed and our sinful body is destroyed reflects the new reality of the 
baptized. In actuality sin may, and indeed does, activate within the Christian, a pitiful fact which Paul addresses in 
Romans 7. Nevertheless, when addressing the issues of Christian identity, the new reality of being dead to sin must 
not be lost in the proclamation that the Christian remains simul iustis et peccator in this world until either death of 
the final resurrection. 
15
 More will be said about this later; however, the unity of the human race in Adam, as one sinful race, is a 
unity that is in reality a fragmentation. The unity is a dis-integrated unity. What holds the members of the race 
together, outside their common descent from Adam is that all have sinned (Rom. 3:23) and all are sinners. “Es ist die 
eigenartige Struktur der adamitischen Menschheit, daß sie ebenso in viele isoliere Einzelne zerfällt, wie sie dennoch 
als Meschheit, die als Gnaze gesündigt hat, Eine ist; sie ist, ‘Adam,’ eine Kollektivperson. . . . ‘Die Menschheit der 
Sünde’ is Eine, obwohl sie in lauter Einzelne zerfällt, sie is Kollektivperson und doch in sich unendlich oft zerrissen, 
sie ist Adam, wie jeder Einzelne er selbst und Adam ist. Diese Doppelheit ist ihr Wesen, und sie wird erst durch die 
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Because ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος has been crucified with Christ by means of baptism, τὸ 
σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας has been rendered ineffective. Therefore, the baptized is no longer enslaved 
(μηκέτι δουλεύειν) to sin. Furthermore, having been united with the resurrected Christ, the 
baptized is also no longer under the lordship of death (θάνατος αὐτοῦ οὐκέτι κυριεύει). All of this 
indicates a fundamental and radical change in status, in realität, in ontological reality. Philip 
Melanchthon remarks: 
The comparison of our conversion with the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ is 
most meaningful. . . . [First] sin has been buried in a two-fold way: first, by 
imputation, for although the remnants of sin remain, they are forgiven, and second, as 
far as the effect is concerned, because our sinful nature ceases to be active, or begins 
to be mortified. The rest of life, after mortification has been begun, is burial. The sin 
has indeed been wiped away by imputation, but we have not yet been glorified. 
Although we are righteous, we lie buried, awaiting glorification. Second, so far as the 
effect is concerned, we lie in a tomb, that is, under a cross, in afflictions of all kinds. . 
. . Then he adds a third part. Not only is there mortification, but vivification is also 
begun.”16 
Baptism unites the Christian with the death, burial, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. This 
union results in a major transformation in identity status: life into death into new life; old into 
                                                                                                                                                             
Einheit der neuen Menschheit in Christus aufgehoben.” (It is the peculiar structure of the Adamic community that it 
breaks up into many isolated individuals while still remaining a humanity as a whole. It is Adam, a collective 
person. . . . The humanity of sin is one, though being composed of nothing except individuals; it is a collective 
person, however, infinitely disunited. It is Adam, because each individual is himself and Adam. This duality is its 
essence, and it shall be lifted only by the unity of the new humanity in Christ.) Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio 
(2005), 76. Thus the human race, in Adam, is fragmented. “In the deepest Isolation of sin, we find ourselves in the 
utmost solidarity with all humanity.” Clifford J. Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1999), 51. The virtue, or ego strength, in Stage VIII of Erikson’s model is Integrity. Therefore, a way 
must be found to overcome the dis-integrating effects of sin so that integrity might be achieved. If Bonhoeffer is 
correct, then the solution is to be found, not in any isolated method or manner, but in the social dimensions of 
baptism, which unites “Menschheit” together in Christ as a “Kollektivperson.” Such thinking flies in the face of 
Western, and most especially American, individualism.  
16
 Philip Melanchthon, Commentary on Romans, trans. Fred Kramer (St. Louis: Concordia, 1992), 146. 
Melanchthon continues to hold the tension between the reality of our new status and the actuality of our struggle 
against sin. He does not permit the reality of our new status to blind him to the actual struggle against sin which 
Christians face each day. On the other hand, he does not permit the actuality of our sinful impulses to denigrate the 
reality of the new creation in Christ. The incompatible theologies are the theology of the cross and the theology of 
glory. The theology of the cross, however, does not reject the theology of resurrection. To be resurrected, one first 
must die. The theology of glory bypasses both the cross and the resurrection. Melanchthon, in this quote, maintains 
the proper perspective. 
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new; slavery into freedom from domination by sin and death. It also points to a total status 
change in the way God looks at the baptized person. Since baptism results in this radical change 
of ontological status, resulting in God seeing the Christian “in Christ” and no longer “in Adam,” 
the basis has been established to understand that Paul is connecting baptism to the righteousness 
of faith. This “faith” trusts God’s declarative word, agrees with it, and becomes the ground for 
acting righteously. 
Pauline Baptismal Theology in First Corinthians 
The focus of this exegetical study is on Paul’s letter to the Romans. Nevertheless, Paul’s 
pastoral use of baptism in 1 Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, and Colossians deserves 
consideration before moving on to an in-depth look at the struggle for identity as he presents it in 
Romans, especially in chapter 6–8. 
Paul specifically refers to baptism in 1 Cor. 1:10–31; 10:1–5; 12:12–20; 15:29. In 1 
Corinthians 1, Paul addresses the issue of divisions within the church in Corinth. It has been 
reported to Paul that there is quarreling (ἔρις) among them. This quarreling is about allegiance to 
various teachers. Some identity themselves with Paul, others with Apollos, or with Cephas. Still 
others simply state that their identity with that of “following Christ.” Paul counters this division 
in the church by appealing to baptism. He asks them into whose name they were baptized. The 
rhetorical question is aimed at refocusing them upon Christ, into whose crucifixion and death 
they were baptized. In the verses that follow, specifically 1 Cor. 1:18–25, Paul teaches the unity 
of all Christians in the crucified Christ. Regardless of what either Judeans or Greeks seek after, 
only in Christ is found righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. Therefore, the only grounds 
for boasting in in the Lord (1 Cor. 1:30–31). 
Paul returns to baptism in Romans 10. In this instance, he calls Israel’s crossing of the Red 
123 
Sea a baptism into Moses (ἐις τὸν Μωϋσῆν ἐβαπτίσαντο). His imagery also includes allusions to 
the Lord’s Supper, in that Israel at the manna and drank from “the rock,” which Paul identities as 
Christ. In this instance, Paul is making a point of ethics. Even though the people of Israel all 
participated in these “sacraments,” they were destroyed because of their idolatry, sexual 
immorality, and mistrust in God. In the context of 1 Corinthians 8–10, the issue is eating meat 
sacrificed to idols. Participation in such a meal is participation in the demonic (10:20). Although 
Paul makes only passing reference to baptism in this place, it can be deduced, nonetheless, that 
Paul understood baptism to have ethical implications. This is the same point he makes in Romans 
6. 
Paul once again brings in baptism in relation to Christian unity in 1 Corinthians 12. The 
disunity in the church in Corinth extended to the attitude the members had toward spiritual gifts. 
Rather than understanding the gifts to be for the common good of the church, the gifts were 
prioritized. Those with certain gifts were deemed to be of a superior status. Paul once more turns 
to the implications of baptism. Baptism makes all Christians members of one body, because “by 
one Spirit we were all baptized into one body” (ἐν ἑνὶ πνεῦματι ὑμεῖς πάντες εἰς ἕν σῶμα 
ἐβαπτίσθημεν).17 As members of Christ’s body, no one member is more important than any other. 
Therefore, baptism unites Christians to Christ and to one another. As Paul teaches in Romans, 
lower-level identities must give way to the higher-level identity of being in Christ. Paul is urging 
them, by appealing to baptism, to make the baptismal reality a living actuality. 
Paul’s appeal to baptism in 1 Cor. 15:29 has resulted in many interpretations. It is well 
outside the scope of this dissertation to engage these various views in any depth. What is 
important for this study, however, is the context in which Paul makes his comment. That context 
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 1 Cor. 12:13. 
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is resurrection. Paul has just made the argument that being in Adam results in death for all. Being 
in Christ brings life, resurrection from the dead. It is in fact Christ’s resurrection that is the proof 
that the resurrection of the dead is a future reality. Paul argues that baptism “on behalf of the 
dead” (ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκπῶν) is senseless if the dead are not raised. If they are not, why would this 
practice be in affect among them? Therefore, Paul connects baptism with resurrection, just as he 
does in Romans 6. 
Pauline Baptismal Theology in Galatians, Ephesians, and Colossians 
In Gal. 3:27, Eph. 4:5, and Col. 2:12 Paul specifically mentions baptism; yet baptismal 
language undergirds and permeates these letters. This is especially evident in the paraenetic 
sections of the letters. A. Andrew Das states that many interpreters “have concluded that Paul is 
drawing from a baptismal tradition or creed from the earliest Christian assemblies.”18 Das notes 
that Gal. 3:27–28, 1 Cor. 12:13, and Col. 2:11–12; 3:10–11 have important features in common. 
They all treat baptism. Contrasting pairs are brought into play. These pairs are overcome by the 
Christians union with Christ. Close connection to God in Christ is created by baptism, such as 
becoming sons of God. Being in Christ and faith are closely tied to each other. Although Das 
does not believe the evidence is strong enough to argue for a creedal connection, the baptismal 
basis for the foregoing is indisputable. “Baptism brings about a corporate unity. . . . The new 
corporate community replaces the old, divided realities.”19 What God creates by means of 
baptism is a new reality, a people with a new identity, who are then urged to make this new 
reality an actuality in practice, within the Christian community. 
Paul turns to Hab. 2:4 in Galatians as he does in Romans. He claims that it is evident that 
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 A. Andrew Das, Galatians Concordia Commentary (St. Louis: Concordia, 2014), 380. 
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 Das, Galatians, 381. 
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no one is rectified by keeping the commandments of Torah because “the righteous one shall live 
by faith” (ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται).20 Paul’s opponents have been insisting that circumcision 
is necessary. In addition to destroying the foundation of the Christian faith, the insistence on 
circumcision will tear apart the unity of the church by creating an irreparable division between 
those who are and those who are not circumcised. Paul’s extremely negative view of the 
commandments of Torah in this letter is due to the need to impress upon his hearers the 
impossibility of attaining a righteous standing by keep the commandments. As he does in 
Romans, he points to Abraham as the man of faith, as the faith of those who are righteous.21 
Circumcision is the great mark of division between people. It makes of humanity two groups, 
those who are circumcised and those who are not. By pointing to Abraham, Paul points to the 
man of faith, the man righteous by faith, who was still uncircumcised at the time God 
pronounced his such. He appeals to an aspect the Roman legal system in which a minor child 
would be placed under a guardian who would administer his affairs until “the day set by his 
father” when he would inherit the estate and attain full sonship. Das notes, however, that Paul 
quickly moves from the illustration of a minor child to that of a slave. Being under the demands 
of the law, and in this case willing submitting to its lordship, is slavery.22  
After outlining the purpose of the Torah as a παιδαγωγός (custodian), Paul declares that 
Christians are “all sons of God through faith” (πάντες υἱοὶ θεοῦ ἐστε διά πίστεως ἐν Χριστῷ 
Ἰησοῦ).23 This new reality is the cause of being baptized into Christ. Therefore, the old divisions 
between Judean and Greek, slave and free, and even male and female are erased. The new 
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 Gal. 3:11. 
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 Gal. 3:1–9. 
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 Gal. 4:1–7. See Das, Galatians, 404–5. 
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 Gal. 3:26. 
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primary, higher-level identity is that of being members of Christ and thereby being Abraham’s 
offspring.24 
Paul’s direct reference to baptism, in his letter to the Ephesian Christians, likewise deals 
with Christian unity.25 Paul addresses his hearers as those were once separated from Christ and 
alienated from the commonwealth of Israel, being called “the uncircumcision” by those who 
were circumcised. But now they have been brought near by the blood of Christ (2:11–13). Paul 
then calls Christ “our peace” (ἡ εἰρήνη ἡμῶν). Christ has broken down “the dividing wall of 
hostility” (τὸ μεσότοιχον τοῦ φραγμοῦ) in his flesh, in order to create “one new man” (ἕνα καινὸν 
ἄνθρωπον)26 in place of the two (2:14–15). Now that this new reality has been created, Paul urges 
them to live it out, to actualize it. He does this by turning their attention to the reality. “One body 
and one Spirit, just as also you were called in one hope of your calling, one Lord, one faith, one 
baptism, one God and Father of all, who is over all and through all and in all” (Eph. 4:4–6). 
Winger notes that the phrase “one Lord, one faith, one baptism” (εἱς κύριος, μία πίστις, ἓν 
βάπτισα) contains all three noun genders, poetically emphasizing the all-encompassing unity. 
He, furthermore states, “Eph. 4:5 is perhaps the central line of the entire epistle.”27 If this is so, 
then Christ, faith, and baptism are at the center of Ephesians, as they are at the center of the 
Christian life. Just as there is one Lord and one faith, so the one baptism which Christians 
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 It is the assumption of this dissertation that Paul the Apostle is the human author of Ephesians and that he 
wrote it, as an occasional letter, to the church at Ephesus. This is the same position taken by Thomas M. Winger, 
Ephesians Concordia Commentary (St. Louis: Concordia, 2015), 21–96. 
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undergo is the means by which God creates the new reality of the καινὸν ἄνθρωπον. This is the 
new identity, which supersedes the lower-level identities which separate people from one 
another. 
The status change in Ephesians from death to life, which is similar to Paul’s teaching 
concerning baptism in Romans 6, is coupled with a related identity change in Ephesians 2. Paul 
informs the Ephesians that they once were “children of wrath” and “sons of disobedience.” They 
followed the prince of the power of the air. In a play of words, he writes that they were dead in 
trespasses and sins while yet walking in them. As the walking dead, they lived in the passions of 
the flesh (ἐπιθθμίας τῆς σαρκός).28 However, God in his grace “made us co-alive together with/in 
Christ” (συνεζωοποίησεν τῷ Χριστῷ).29 Winger states, “The prepositional prefix συν-, “together, 
with,” points to the τῷ Χριστῷ: God acts upon us ‘with Christ.’ Yet there remains more than just 
a hint of ‘with one another’—if God included all of us in Christ, then he also united us with one 
another (1 Cor. 15:22).”30 Thus the change in status is from death to life and from separation to 
true unity. 
Although the word βάπτισμα (baptism) is not used in Eph. 5:26, Paul refers to the 
cleansing of the church by Christ as “the washing of water in the spoken-word” (λουτρῷ τοῦ 
ὑδατος ἐν ῥήματι), “a clear and unmistakable reference to Holy Baptism.”31 In his treatment of 
this passage, Winger detects the language of ceremonial cleansing and sanctification. He also 
points to the corporate nature of the effects of baptism. David Scaer, in his book on baptism 
                                                 
28
 Eph. 2:1–3. 
29
 Eph. 2:5. 
30
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concurs that baptism has a clear corporate dimension. He writes: “Baptism is not presented here 
as the rite of individual initiation, but as the act which makes the entire church acceptable to 
God.” 32 The context supports his argument, because Paul is speaking of two overlapping 
realities: first, the union of husband and wife as one body in the bonds of marriage; second, the 
union of Christ and his bride the church in the one body of Christ. These are words of life as a 
corporate reality. Once again, the motif of unity by means of baptism comes to the fore. Paul’s 
emphasis here on the washing with water, when read in conjunction with the “one body” 
metaphor, means that the somatic aspect of baptism is important in his theology.  
Paul’s sole connection between baptism and circumcision is found in Col. 2:12.33 Whereas 
Paul’s words to the Corinthians, other than the concern that the resurrection has already 
occurred, is primarily in regard to their behavior, the Colossian church was in the grips of a faith-
destroying heresy. Paul Deterding notes that this heresy bore a resemblance to what would later 
be called Gnosticism, with the denigration of the physical. “In this scheme, redemption involves 
the escape of the spiritual (πνεῦμα) from the material (σάρξ), in order that there may be 
unification with God, who is pure spirit (πνεῦμα).34 By linking baptism to circumcision, Paul 
emphasizes the somatic dimension and significance of baptism. Even as he describes baptism’s 
effect as “putting off the body of flesh,” he maintains the body as the essential physical aspect of 
being human. He has done this by emphasizing that in Christ the fullness of deity dwells bodily 
(κατοικεῖ πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς), “and you have been filled in him . . . in 
whom also you were circumcised” (Col. 2:9–11). This circumcision, accomplished for all 
Christians by means of baptism, results not only in being buried but also in resurrection. 
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Together with Christ, the baptized person is now made alive (2:13). This union with Christ 
continues in chapter 3, in which Paul moves to the ethical implications of being put to death and 
raised to new life. Deterding comments: “The word ‘therefore’ (οὖν), near the beginning of 3:1, 
is significant, for it helps to ground this section of exhortation in the preceding exposition of the 
Gospel, particularly dealing with Baptism.”35 Deterding notes the key baptismal vocabulary of 
“being raised” and “having died” as consistent with Paul’s baptismal terminology. Thus, Paul’s 
teaching about baptism in Colossians emphasizes not only the ethical life but more importantly 
the bodily life. Christian identity is not found in some form of disembodied existence. Life in the 
body matters because Christ has assumed a true human body, true human nature, and fills it with 
his deity. God has taken identity as a human being, in everything that being a created human 
being means.36 
As in Ephesians, Paul’s baptismal theology pervades the paraenetic section of Colossians.37 
Concerning the second half of Colossians, Deterding states: 
The concepts of “old man” and “new man,” which are unattested outside of Christian 
sources, play an important role in this section. Not only do they occur here in a 
baptismal context, but they are themselves a part of Paul’s baptismal terminology. 
The old man was crucified with Christ in Baptism in order that the body of sin might 
be destroyed (Rom. 6:6). The way in which Paul expresses this in Colossians is that 
the body of flesh was put off in Baptism (Col. 2:11–12; cf. 3:9).38 
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The language of putting off is coupled with that of “putting to death” (Col. 3:5). This is no mere 
undressing. This is violent language, just as violent as in Romans 6. The language of unclothing 
is also found in Ephesians 4 and 5. The presence of the old man in the daily life of the baptized 
runs counter to the reality of being a new creature. Therefore, the Christian lives day-to-day in an 
identity crisis. The Christian’s real identity is as one who is righteous by faith. However, the 
reality of sin, and of being a sinner, remains. Thus the Christian lives in crisis. Yet, it is this crisis 
that focuses the Christian upon Christ, so that one does not return to any attempt at establishing 
one’s one righteousness before God by works of the law. 
Secondary Literature on Pauline Baptismal Theology 
Besides the three ecumenical creeds, the foundational confessional document of the 
Lutheran Church is the Unaltered Augsburg Confession of 1530 (the Augustana/Augsburg 
Confession [AC]).39 Several of the articles of this confession are pertinent for this study. Article 
2 of the AC states: “Item docent, quod post lapsum Adae omnes homines secundum naturam 
propagate, nascentur cum peccato, hoc est, sine metu Dei, sine fiducia erga Deum, et cum 
concupiscentia.”40 The signifance for this study is the basic lack of trust (fiducia) within the 
unregenerate person. While all people may turn to someone or something as an object of trust, 
basic trust in God is absent from conception. Article 2 goes on to say that this is a disease 
(morbus) which is truly sin, which condemns all who are not renascentur per baptismum et 
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spiritum sanctum.41 Therefore, this article acknowledges both that basic trust in God is absent 
and that a rebirth is accomplished by means of the Holy Spirit’s work in and through baptism.  
Augsburg Confession 4 likewise deals with trust. Human beings are declared righteous “as 
a gift on account of Christ through faith.” The phrase used here is per fidem, yet the context 
makes clear that fidem is equivelant to fiducia. The German translation in both places is durch 
Glauben. Thus faith and trust are equivalent terms in the AC. This faith, or trust, God imputes 
(imputat) as righteousness before him (pro iustitia coram ipso). This is derived from Romans 3 
and 4. 
Augsburg Confession 5 upholds the corporate nature of Christian life. The ministry of 
teaching and gospel and administering the sacraments was instituted to create saving trust in the 
promises of the gospel. This teaching ministry (ministerium docendi) is carried out within the 
context of the corporate life of the church, of a congregation. The Anabaptists are condemned 
precisely because they do not believe in the operative power of the external word (verbum 
externo), but look within themselves. In addition to denying the external gospel word as the 
means of grace, each looks within himself, thereby destroying the constitutive function of the 
santorum communio. Articles 7 and 8 go into greater depth about the importance of the 
congregation of saints. The church is the congregatio sanctorum in which the gospel is taught 
purely and the sacraments are administered rightly (AC 7). Even though the actual gathering of 
people around the gospel is not made up solely of those who truly trust in the gospel, the 
sacraments remain “efficacious because of the ordinance and command of Christ” (AC 8).  
Augsburg Confession 9 concerns baptism. “Of baptism they teach that it is necessary for 
salvation, and that through baptism the grace of God is offered, and that children are to be 
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baptized who, being offered to God through baptism, are received into God's grace.”42 The 
Ausgburg Confession clearly teaches that baptism is at the very center of the Christian faith. It is 
inseparable from the gospel. Combined with the teaching of Art. 2, baptism is understood to be 
necessary because it is the means by which a person is reborn. A rebirth indicates a new life, and 
thereby, it is here argued, a new identity, which is found in being a new person who is righteous 
in Christ. 
The connection between baptism, being a new person, and being righteous is found in the 
Small Catechism. Luther, using Rom. 6:4 as his biblical evidence, describes the significance 
(significat) or meaning (Was bedeut den solch Wassertäufen?) of baptism: “It signifies that the 
old Adam in us (alte Adam in uns), through daily contrition and repentance, should be drowned 
and die, with all sins and wicked drives, and in turn a new man (neuer Mensch) should daily 
emerge and resurrect, who in righteousness and purity lives forever before God.”43 The new 
identity forged in the waters of baptism is that of being a “new man,” a righteous person. This 
simply draws out the significance of the previous question in the Catechism as to how water can 
accomplish forgiveness of sins, rescue from death and the devil, and give eternal life to those 
who trust the gospel. Baptism is a “grace-filled (gnadenreich) water of life and a ‘bath of the 
new birth in the Holy Spirit.”44 Luther emphasizes the newness of life, not merely as a picture, 
but as a new reality. The new reality is, then, by daily contrition and repentance, to begin to be 
actualized. However, it is not simply an object lesson. The ‘death of the old man and the 
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resurrection to new life is not only typified by Baptism but actually effected.”45 Reading the 
Small Catechism simply in terms of ethical behavior misses the point that a new identity, a new 
birth and a new beginning, has been accomplished in baptism.46 In baptism, a person is born “a 
second time” (zum zweiten Mal).47 
Luther comments on the right use of baptism, that is in its daily significance, in the Large 
Catechism: 
The old creature (alte Mensch) therefore follows unchecked the inclinations of its 
nature if not restrained and suppressed by the power of baptism. On the other hand, 
when we become Christians, the old creature (alte Mensch) daily decreases until 
finally destroyed. That is what it means truly to plunge into baptism and daily to 
come forth again. So the external sign has been appointed not only so that it may 
work powerfully on us but also so that it may point to something. Where faith is 
present with its fruits, there baptism is no empty symbol, but the effect accompanies 
it; but where faith is lacking, it remains a mere unfruitful sign. . . . Here you see that 
baptism, both by its power and by its signification, comprehends also the third 
sacrament, formerly called penance, which is really nothing else than baptism. What 
is repentance but an earnest attack on the old creature and an entering into a new life? 
If you live in repentance, therefore, you are walking in baptism, which not only 
announces this new life but also produces, begins, and exercises it.48 
Here we detect the way Luther weaves together several of the threads that are important for 
supporting the thesis of this study. Baptism brings the new birth, so that a new person, with a 
new identity, is actually caused to be born. Nevertheless, there remains the daily crisis of dealing 
with the old creature, who is irascible, spiteful, envious, unchaste, greedy, lazy, proud—yes—
and unbelieving.”49 Therefore, the reality of the Christian is the dialectical struggle between trust 
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and mistrust (unbelief).50 The Christian daily faces the situation of identity diffusion, even 
identity confusion. The opposing forces of the old and the new force the believer into a new 
moratorium. For Luther, however, this is no mere moratorium. The old identity is not in need of 
an overhaul. Rather, the old identity must be killed, not simply set aside. Baptism does not profit 
ex opere operado, if it is not apprehended by trust in the word of promise. Luther taught that, for 
the person who has been baptized, and yet who fails to use it daily in contrition and faith, it has 
adverse effects. Jonathan D. Trigg, in his study of Luther’s baptismal theology states: 
The right use of baptism is signified by the sign; Luther brings braucht and bedeutet 
together. A life-long, daily, putting away or killing of the old man, and all the 
hatefulness, wrath and unbelief associated with him, in order that all that belongs to 
the new may come—this is the rechte brauch der Tauffe unter den Christen, durch 
das wasser teuffen bedeut. Conversely, to leave the old man unchecked is to fail to 
use baptism rightly, and represents a resisting (gestrebt) of baptism; and those who 
are thus outside Christ (ausser Christo) grow only worse as the old nature rages 
unchecked by the power of baptism. It is only when we become Christians (wo 
Christen sind worden) that the process of submerging the old man begins. Luther 
presents the case of the baptized individual in whom this process is not really a 
separation of that which belongs together. The power, meaning, and the use of 
baptism all converge in the significatio of this daily dying and resurrection. But 
without faith the bare unfruitful sign (blos unfruchtbar zeichen) remains alone. Where 
faith is present, the signification of baptism stamps its character upon the whole life 
of the Christian, who has to learn, experience, and practice what the slaying of the old 
Adam means.51 
Although the Christian, in Christ, is a new person, a “new man,” the “old Adam” prevents the 
Christian from fully actualizing the new reality in its fullness. He must learn how to actualize the 
new identity. This is a life-long battle. As will be described below in the discussion of Romans 7, 
this struggle has the advantageous effect of forcing the Christian ever to live in, to use Erikson’s 
                                                 
50
 Luther joins together the many threads, themes, or trajectories of baptism. “Paul speaks of baptism as a 
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terminology, the Stage I crisis (Trust vs. Mistrust). This actually works to maintain the Christian 
in faith and develops within the virtue of hope, since the Christian never leaves the foundation of 
faith (trust) in Christ. 
The Formula of Concord clearly delineates between those who have been baptized and 
those who have not. 
Therefore, there is a great difference between baptized and unbaptized people. For 
since (according to St. Paul’s teaching, Gal. 3[:27]) “all those who have been 
baptized have put on Christ,” and are therefore truly reborn, they now have arbitrium 
liberatum [a freed will or freed choice], that is, as Christ says, “they have been made 
free again” [cf. John 8:36]. For this reason, they not only hear the Word but are also 
able to assent to it and accept it—although in great weakness. . . . Because in this life 
we only receive the first fruits of the Spirit and our rebirth is not complete but rather 
only begun in us, the struggle and battle (Streit und Kampf) of the flesh against the 
Spirit continues even in the elect and truly reborn.52 
As certainly as there is a “great difference” between the baptized and the unbaptized, so the 
reality of the rebirth, which is confessed, is also said to be “not complete.” The baptized have 
been “truly reborn” (wahrhaftig wiedergebornen: vere renatis homnibus), yet this reality is not 
fully actualized. Nevertheless, a rebirth does occur, since “it is true that in true conversion there 
must be a change—new impulses and movements of the mind, will, and heart.”53 The new 
impulses and movements are those of the new man (ein neuer Mensch) who is born in the waters 
of baptism. The ethical, inchoately actualized righteous identity of the Christian follows and 
flows from the establishment of the new imputed identity, which is made a reality by the 
Christian’s baptism into Christ. 
The Significance of Baptism for Christian Identity 
Three theories concerning the makeup of human nature have been defended by Christian 
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scholars. Trichotomists teach that humans are comprised of a body, a soul, and a spirit.54 
Dichotomists, also known as dualists, refer to the body and the soul, usually equating the soul 
and the spirit. The soul is the non-material part of the human being in its relation to the created 
order.55 The spirit is the soul in relation to God.56 More recently, scholars such as Ray S. 
Anderson57 and Nancey Murphy58 have taught nonreductive physicalism.59 The human being’s 
nature is understood to be that of an animated body. For purposes of this dissertation, this debate 
will be bypassed. In its place, the human experience of life in the body and of the body, as a 
                                                 
54
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social being, and as a self-reflective being will be explored.60 Therefore, the relation of baptism 
to somatic life, psychological life, and social life is the topic at hand. 
There is an issue which may appear to be slightly tangential. Nonetheless, it must be 
explored. That issue deals with the question, “Who is a person?” Erikson’s epigenetic model 
assumes a continuity of identity from birth until death. The epigenetic model is based upon 
embryology. This, in and of itself, does not require the assignment of personhood to the fetus. 
However, if one does not assign personhood to the fetus, at what point does the human being 
become a person with a personal identity? The British ethics scholar, Oliver O’Donovan writes: 
To speak of a “person” is to speak of “identity,” that which constitutes sameness 
between one appearance and another, and so makes us beings with histories and 
names. It is inevitable that this category should appear more satisfactory to Christian 
thinkers than the purely qualitative categories with which ancient classical 
philosophy had undertaken to analyse man—such categories as “intellect,” “soul,” 
etc., which had no historical dimension. For they found in the Old and New 
Testaments the thought that the identity of human beings had to do with their role in 
history, a role that was assigned them by divine providence. And this was not only 
true of the prophets, of whom it could be said, “Before you were in the womb I knew 
you, and appointed you a prophet” (Jer. 1:5).61 
So, to speak of a person having a beginning as a person after conception is to have a different 
starting point than that which the Bible gives. Yet even outside of specific citations from the 
Bible, the one who wishes to begin later, at some point after birth, is faced with the task of 
setting some criteria for personhood outside of the historical trajectory of the life of the human 
organism. 
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O’Donovan is helpful in that he uses philosophical categories, in support of biblical 
teaching, to argue for personhood beginning at conception. While it is not the purpose of this 
study to argue against abortion, his argument for the personhood of the fetus assists in this study 
of identity, especially because identity includes continuity over the lifespan, even though that 
sense of one’s identity is, at the same time, something to be developed. O’Donovan makes use of 
the Christological categories of “hypostasis” and “nature.” While the Latin-speaking church uses 
the term persona, the Greek-speaking church used hypostasis. A hypostasis (hypo-stasis) is that 
which is a reality which underlies (has a sub-stance, stands under) “all the characteristics and 
qualities, all the variable appearances which one and the same person might present.”62 
Therefore, the person, or hypostasis, is the subject to whom certain qualities are predicated. To 
the person of Christ, two natures are predicated: divine nature and human nature. It is 
meaningless to predicate personhood to a nature. A “type” of nature is, rather, predicated to a 
person, or hypostasis—to that reality which exists. To say this another way, “nature” is merely 
an abstract concept until it is predicated to a concrete hypostasis, to that which actually subsists. 
The significance of this line of reasoning for this study is that the reality of the person, the 
hypostasis, continuing with integrity over the lifespan is thereby supported. A person’s body 
changes over time, it grows, cells are replaced, and then the person’s body degenerates. Physical 
change is part of life in the fallen world. A person’s psychological life, likewise, is in a state of 
flux. One grows more psychologically mature, one can become psychologically disabled, and 
psychological life can also decline. The same is true for the social reality. Nevertheless, even as 
one’s life is in constant change, one remains the same person. Baptism brings a new birth. Yet, 
as we will see in the detailed study of Romans 6–8 below, there remains an “I” which is still 
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“me,” even as a new “I” (or a new sense of “I”) is created. A person develops physically, 
socially, and psychologically, and yet has a personal, hypostatic, continuity over time. The new 
man in Christ is a renewed, not a replaced, person. 
The Significance of Baptism for Somatic Existence 
Two terms, used often in the Bible to describe human somatic life, are body (σῶμα: הָּיִוְּג)63 
and flesh (σάρξ: ר ָּש ָּב). Pauline usage of σῶμα has three different referents. Paul can speak of the 
“body of sin” (τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας) as he does in Rom. 6:6. In a related way, he also calls the 
body, now permeated by sin, to be τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου, “this body of death,” (Rom. 
7:24). He uses the term to describe the human body, which will be resurrected at the Eschaton, as 
he does in Rom.8:11. God will raise our mortal bodies (τὰ θνητὰ σώματα ὑμῶν) through the work 
of the Holy Spirit, through whom God raised the Lord Jesus Christ. He also uses σῶμα to 
describe the church as the body of Christ (1 Cor. 12:27; Eph. 5:30).64 
Paul’s use of the term σάρξ is often opposed to his use of the term πνεῦμα, especially when 
he is speaking in terms of ethical behavior.65 However, he also uses the term in reference to the 
flesh of animals and of man. Stacey writes:  
“However, when discussing the eating of meat, in Romans 14 and 1 Corinthians 8, he 
does not use σάρξ, but κρέας and βρῶμα. This suggests that, for Paul, σάρξ is not 
merely the physical substance. σάρξ without ψυχή is not σάρξ. Σάρξ is living flesh, 
flesh animated and alive.” 66 
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Such a finding lends support to the unity of the human nature, and is in keeping with Gen. 2:7, in 
which it is written that the Lord formed the man from the dust of the ground and then breathed 
into his nostrils (וי ָּפַא ְּב חַפ ִּיַו) the breath of life (  ִּנםי ִּיַח תַמ ְּש ), making the man to be a living being 
(ה ָּיַח ש ֶּפ ֶּנ ְּל).67 Thus, to be a human is to be animated dust from the ground, that is, from physical 
substance, made alive by God’s breath of life.68 “The σάρξ is the material of the (earthly) body, 
but the body σῶμα is the organized form of the concrete person.”69 So, too sharp of a distinction 
between these two terms does not appear to be valid.70 
Obviously, in baptism, water is applied to the human body. Beyond this, what is the 
significance of this physical action? Does it have any effect beyond serving as an ethical lesson? 
The answer to these questions are found in Paul’s connection between baptism and the 
resurrection of the body. In Rom. 6:5, Paul links the Christian’s baptism with the certainty of the 
future resurrection of the body71: εἰ γὰρ σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἐσόμεθα.72 Christ has died; Christ was buried; Christ was raised bodily. 
By means of baptism, the Christian has been baptized into Christ’s death, has been buried, and 
will be raised.73 Middendorf comments: 
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Passages like Eph. 2:6; Col. 2:12; 3:1 assert that our participation in Christ’s 
resurrection is already realized now through Baptism (Col. 2:12). As a result, some 
suggest that the future verb “we will be” (ἐσόμεθα) should be understood in a logical 
sense, as “we will live” (ζήσομεν) is used in 6:2, denoting what now follows Baptism. 
Others propose that it may serve as a moral statement comparable to 6:4. However, in 
this context, Paul is putting our full participation in Christ’s resurrection off into the 
future (as also in 6:8; cf. 5:9, 10, 17, 21). In 6:5, therefore, “we will be” (ἐσόμεθα) 
looks forward to our full eschatological experience of Christ’s resurrection life (as in 
Rom. 8:11; 1 Cor. 15:47–49; 2 Cor. 4:14; Phil. 3:21).74 
Yet, even though the full experience of the resurrection of the body awaits the eschaton, Paul 
links that experience with baptism. If there were no true connection between baptism and the 
resurrection, then the argument for ethical behavior, grounded in the Christian’s participation in 
the death, burial, and resurrection of Jesus would be baseless. In Rom. 8:11, Paul states that it 
will be to the “mortal body” (τὰ θνητὰ σώματα ὑμῶν) that the Spirit of God, who raised Jesus 
from the dead, will give life, thereby pointing to the significance of bodily life into the eschaton. 
The admittedly strange reference to “baptizing the dead” in 1 Cor. 15:29 indicates the 
strong connection between baptism and somatic existence. The entire chapter is dedicated to the 
discussion of the resurrection of the body. If the dead are not raised, the Corinthian’s baptismal 
practice makes no sense at all. The body is baptized because the body will be raised. There is 
also an echo of 1 Cor. 15:57 in Rom. 7:25. In 1 Corinthians, Paul announces that the resurrection 
of the body is death’s final defeat. The resurrected Christ will reappear. On that day, the mortal 
(θνητόν), that is, the body, will put on deathlessness (ἀθανασίαν). “The sting of death is sin and 
the power of sin is the law, but thanks to the one who gives to us the victory through our Lord 
Jesus Christ” (15:57). In Romans 7, Paul describes the effect of Torah’s commandments on the 
sinful self. He describes how it drove him to disobedience. Now, as a Christian, he delights in the 
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commandments in the inner man (τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον), yet within his members (ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν 
μου). Therefore, he describes his condition as that of wretchedness. He asks, “Who will rescue 
me from this body of death?” (ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου) His response: “Thanks to 
God through Jesus Christ our Lord” (χάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν). The 
parallel is unmistakable. In both cases, Paul describes the need for victory of the body which is 
corrupted by sin. In both cases the answer is in the bodily transformation effected by the risen 
Christ. 
Paul’s reference to baptism as a “washing” in Eph. 5:26 is aimed, ethically, at husbands in 
their relationship with their wives. While this section may be read simply as an ethical 
admonition, Paul makes several connections with bodily existence. He calls on husbands to love 
their wives just as Christ loved the church. Christ’s love for the church is found in his sacrificial 
self-offering, giving up his body to death on the cross, so that he might wash the church clean. 
The goal of this washing is to present the church to himself “without spot or wrinkle.” These are 
physical terms. While they have ethical import, they point to the eschatological perfection of the 
church. Thomas Winger notes that Hosea, the prophet commanded to marry an unfaithful 
woman, wrote of the “eschatological restoration” of the Lord’s wayward wife.75 This eschaton 
will bring not merely ethical perfection but physical restoration. Thus, Paul’s reference to 
spotlessness and the removal of wrinkles would appear to imply more than ethical purity. Paul 
combines this command to love the wife as Christ loved the church with the image of the way 
one cares for ones’ own body. His concluding remark is that of reminding his hearers of the one-
flesh union God creates in marriage. This is no mere metaphor. Baptism is linked to the 
eschatological restoration of the fallen human body. 
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The Significance of Baptism for Social Existence 
The social life of the Christian includes the ecclesial aspects of life—life in the sanctorum 
communio. Baptism’s significance for ecclesial life is prominent in 1 Corinthians. Paul’s first 
concern in this letter is the divisions that exist, as members of the church in Corinth coalesce 
around the figures of Paul, Apollos, Cephas, and “Christ.” By finding their group identity in 
these men, they fracture the unity of the sanctorum communio. Paul appeals directly to baptism. 
“Is the Christ divided? Paul was not crucified on your behalf, was he? Or were you baptized into 
the name of Paul?”76 Unity is found in the undivided Christ. Only he was crucified for us. 
Christians are not baptized in the name of Paul, on in the name of anyone other than the Christ. 
The apostle even avers that he is now pleased that he baptized so few of them, so that they might 
not boast in him. Since baptism is the means by which one is united with the death and 
resurrection of Christ, and since Christians share in one common baptism, baptism signifies and 
creates the unity of those in the sanctorum communio. Paul makes the same point in Eph. 4:5. 
There is “one Lord, one faith, one baptism” (εἱς κύριος, μία πίστις, ἓν βάπτισα). Baptism is the 
grounds for maintaining the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace Eph. 4:3). The reality created 
by means of baptism is to be actualized in the communal life shared by all in the congregation. 
The unity-creating significance of baptism in not absent in Romans. By means of baptism, 
all Christians have been united with Christ. Paul’s emphasis is on union with Christ’s death and 
resurrection (Rom. 6:5), yet this is a common reality shared by all the baptized. Paul’s consistent 
use of the first person plural pronoun drives home this unifying aspect of baptism. In fact, he has 
been painstaking in making clarion the common condition of all people as sinners (Rom. 3:23). 
He then makes it equally clear that all people have been rectified (justified) freely by God’s 
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grace in the atoning death of Christ (Rom. 3:24). The old ethnic divisions of Judean and gentile, 
Hellenist and barbarian, are overcome by the common identity as brothers and saints, which is 
created by means of baptism into Christ. 
Perhaps the clearest example of Paul connecting baptism to ecclesial life together is in 1 
Cor. 12:12–20. It is by means of baptism that all Christians are made to be members of one body, 
because “by one Spirit we were all baptized into one body, whether Judean, or Hellenist, or 
slaves, or freemen, and all were made to drink of the one Spirit.”77 Again, the prominent 
divisions within the congregation appear to fall along ethnic lines, as well as on those of social 
status. It is Paul’s claim that all such divisions are overcome in baptism. 
Paul appeals to baptism in Gal. 3:26, when addressing disunity among the Christians of 
Galatia. All Christians are “sons of God through faith” (πάντες υἱοὶ θεοῦ ἐστε διά πίστεως ἐν 
Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ). This is so because “as many as have been baptized into Christ Jesus have been 
clothed with Christ” (ὅσοι γὰρ εἰς χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε, χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε).78 Again, as before, 
Paul declares that, because they are baptized, the distinctions between Judean and Hellenist, 
slave and freeman, and even male and female, are no more because “you are all one in Christ 
Jesus.”79 
Baptism incorporates an individual into one body—the body of Christ—without absorbing 
him into an impersonal collective. Returning to 1 Corinthians 12, as soon as Paul establishes the 
grounds for Christian unity, he emphasizes the importance each individual has for the body as a 
whole. He uses the metaphor of bodily organs to illustrate his point. While the overarching tenor 
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of this section is on the unity, he skillfully maintains the individuating work of the Holy Spirit in 
distributing varied gifts to each individual. All Christians are baptized into the one body, and yet 
individually are members of the body (1 Cor. 12:27). Paul similarly balances the contrasting 
aspects of unity and diversity in Eph. 4:1–16. 
Paul’s teaching of this new social reality, being one in Christ and members of one another, 
has both social and psychological significance. Philip Esler, commenting on the significance of 
the new social identity, which Paul informed the Roman Christians was theirs in Christ by means 
of baptism, remarks: 
Since our sense of who we are is intimately tied up with our group memberships, one 
of the major consequences of becoming a member is a change in the way we see 
ourselves—a redefinition of who we are—which has definite implications for our 
self-esteem. . . . Given the seriousness of the potential pros and cons of membership, 
there can be no doubt of the magnitude of the change in self-concept involved.80 
Part of this change in identity, in a culture which was highly conscious of ethnic and class 
distinctions, was putting away these distinctions within congregational life. Paul’s teaching was 
radical. The apostle obliterated the ethnic, social, and sex distinctions, declaring that all the 
baptized were “sons of God,” with equal access to God the Father. Thus, the social dimensions 
of baptism flow directly into, what we today would call, the psychological. 
The Significance of Baptism for Psychological Existence 
Baptism provides a new identity in Christ. As has been argued above, by means of baptism 
a person becomes a new creation. The “new man” is born. Paul insists, in Romans 6, that 
baptism has effected the crucifixion and burial of “old man.” The result is freedom from slavery 
to sin (Rom. 6:6–8). The Christian is now free to walk in newness of life (Rom. 6:4). Paul then 
urges the baptized to live in light of this new reality. If the Christian is now a new creation and 
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free from the power of sin, it would seem to be a valid question to ask why Paul exhorts them to 
live in this new life. Paul Raabe and James Voelz state that Paul presents his hearers with two 
ways of approaching the paradox. 
One way that Paul speaks of Christians in these chapters is by depicting their present 
condition as radically different from their pre-Christian condition. Thus he makes a 
distinction between the past and the present, before the Christ-event and their 
Baptism, and now after the Christ-event and their Baptism. Whereas they were 
formerly outside of Christ, now they are in Christ. In 6:1–10 Paul uses the language 
of life and death. Formerly Christians were “living” in sin—in reality dead in sin—
and were dead to God, but now they have died to sin and have been made alive to 
God. Paul develops this point with the concept of being “in Christ.” Through Baptism 
the Romans were united with Christ's death and resurrection. “We know that our old 
self was crucified with him, in order that the body dominated by sin might be 
rendered ineffective so that we are no longer enslaved to sin” (6:6). When Christ died 
to sin once for all, they died to sin, and when He was raised to life toward God, they 
were raised to newness of life, and furthermore, they will be raised to life on the last 
day.81 
Thus. Paul first establishes a radical shift in the reality of the life of the baptized. Christians are 
now “in Christ.” They are now united to Christ and to the salvific events of the gospel. Paul 
emphasizes the vast different between the Christian’s pre-faith condition and the current one. He 
extends this by using the metaphor of slavery. Raabe and Voelz continue: 
Here he contrasts two kinds of slavery, the first, a slavery that is abject slavery and 
the second, a slavery that is true freedom. Formerly they were slaves to sin and free 
with a false "freedom" in regard to righteousness, but now they truly have been freed 
from the tyrant of sin and have been enslaved to righteousness/God.82 
Despite the new, radical reality of the baptized, that reality is not fully actualized. To explain 
this, Paul describes the Christian’s life from a second perspective. Raabe and Voelz state: 
In addition to emphasizing the contrast between the past and the present, Paul also 
speaks of Christians as existing in two opposing conditions at the same time. The 
locus classicus for this view of the Christian occurs in 7:14–25. Although a minority 
position among exegetes, the interpretation of this section as referring to Paul’s 
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Christian experience has, in our opinion, strong arguments to support it. Among the 
arguments are these: the shift to the present tense from the past tense used in verses 
7–13; Paul’s assent to and delight in the Law, which he denies for non-Christians in 
8:7; the qualification given in verse 18—“there does not dwell in me, that is, in my 
flesh, anything good”—which is a necessary qualification in light of the indwelling 
Spirit (cf. 8:9, 11); the reference to the “inner self” (cf. 2 Cor. 4:16; Eph. 3:16); the 
similarity between the fervent cry expressed in verse 24 and the statement made in 
8:23; and the presence of the doxology in verse 25a.83 
Thus Paul recognizes both the radical new reality and the struggle to actualize this reality in the 
daily life of the Christian. Paul says that this is his experience as well. 
This leads to a new psychological reality. The first perspective gives the eschatological, 
and therefore the teleological, effect of baptism. The Christian has died to sin and is raised to 
newness of life. Paul makes the reality of the resurrection even more clear in Col. 3:1–4. The 
Christian has been raised with Christ. Yet even in that letter, he immediately urges them to make 
the reality an actuality. Again, as Raabe and Voelz put it in the title of their article, a good tree is 
exhorted to bear good fruit. This exhortation is necessary because a second reality, paradoxically, 
is also in effect. The commandments of Torah still drive the “old man” to rebellion against God. 
“If we only had the first picture, we might be tempted to think of the Christian life as one 
automatic and continual victory. . . . However, the second picture reveals the presence of sin and 
the flesh as active enemies.”84 Each perspective corrects the other. 
A more detailed study of Romans 7 is presented below; however, in describing the 
psychological significance of baptism it should be noted that Paul, in Rom. 7:13–25 never 
identities himself with the “sin” that is within him. Paul presents himself as “Paul the new man in 
Christ,” the “inner man.” He delights in God’s Torah in the inner man (7:22). This “Paul might 
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be labeled the “New I.” Paul is also the man who struggles against sin, and finds himself doing 
the sin he hates (7:15–16). This Paul is the “Experiential I.” However, when he finds himself 
doing the thing he hates, he says it is neither the New I nor the Experiential I but “sin within” 
that does it (7:17). This is psychologically important. Paul presents the Christian as a conflicted 
“I,” as one who delights to do God’s will because the “I” is a “new creation,” but also as an “I” 
who does not fully experience the new reality as an abiding actuality. Therefore, baptism 
inaugurates a life-crisis, or series of crises, which constantly return the baptized to the 
foundational level of trust vs. mistrust as the Christian struggles to actualize the reality of a new 
identity. Middendorf describes this Christians condition in these words: 
Therefore, what Paul means is that the true identity of the Christian, the “inner man” 
as seen by faith together with that which determines his will and governs his mind, is 
free from the domination of sin. Sin no longer rules over a Christian. As a result, his 
existence is no longer determined by the flesh. . . . But this does not mean that 
believers cease to exist in the flesh, that sin no longer plays a role in the Christian’s 
life, or that the prospect of death is eliminated. On the contrary, Paul acknowledges 
that Christians continue to live in “mortal bodies” (ἐν τῷ θνητῷ σώματι) where sin 
continues to work.85 
The Significance of the Struggle against Sin for Christian Identity 
The social and psychological significance of baptism, as described previously, points to the 
on-going struggle to actualize one’s Christian identity, which has been conferred in baptism. 
There are social distinctions of various kind, including ethnicity and social class, which are a 
struggle to overcome in light of the unity-creating effect of baptism. All Christians are saints, all 
are brothers and sisters, children of God. Then there is the personal struggle every Christian 
endures, as he or she daily puts down the “old man” and seeks to make the “new man” operative 
in ethical behavior.  
Before entering into Romans 6–8, where the struggle against sin and the struggle for 
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actualization of one’s Christian identity is a major theme, it will serve us well first to glean from 
Romans 1–5 pertinent themes relating to identity. 
Romans 1–5 and Christian Identity 
Paul states his overarching thesis in Rom. 1:16–17: Οὐ γὰρ ἐπαισχύνομαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, 
δύναμις γὰρ θεοῦ ἐστιν εἰς σωτηρίαν παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι, Ἰουδαίῳ τε πρῶτον καὶ Ἕλληνι. 
δικαιοσύνη γὰρ θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀποκαλύπτεται ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, καθὼς γέγραπται ὁ δὲ δίκαιος 
ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται. Several key words appear in these two sentences. First, Paul brings up the 
issue of shame (ἡ αἰσχύνη). In Rom. 1:27, Paul will speak of the shameful deed (τὴν 
ἀσχημοσύνην) of the homosexual sex act. While Paul may not have intended the connection 
between the two sentences, he nonetheless enters into a description which takes the human race 
from its beginning, as those who have a knowledge of God from the things that have been made 
(τοῖς ποιήμασιν), and ends with the human race in the equivalence of Sodom, devoid of a true 
knowledge of God. Thus, the human race, which begins with a knowledge of God ends in a state, 
first and foremost, of shame. 
Paul’s statement of not being ashamed of the gospel is connected to the gospel being the 
power of God into (εἰς) salvation. While it is clearly stated that the gospel is preached for the 
salvation of all, Philip F. Esler takes note of the tendency among readers of Romans to pass too 
quickly over the couplet Ἰουδαίῳ τε πρῶτον καὶ Ἕλληνι. These two words are not exactly 
equivalent to the terms “Jew” and “Gentile.” Esler argues that the term Ἰουδαίοι refers to those 
whose religious center of consciousness was Ἰουδαία (Judaea) and especially the temple in 
Jerusalem. The term ἔλληνες refers not merely to gentiles in general, but to those who have 
embraced the Greco-Roman culture. “Hellenic” may indeed be a better translation. Furthermore, 
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the term ἔθνη refers, in the mind of the Ἰουδαίοι, to all those who are not Ἰουδαίοι. This means 
that ἔθνη, as a term of ethnic identity, is a term used by Judean-focused people to exclude those 
not in their socio-religious group. In like manner, the ἔλληνες referred to those who did not 
identify with Greco-Roman culture as βάρβαροι (often translated as barbarians).86  
Esler argues that there is a tension among house churches in Rome. He believes that 
in light of the architectural evidence, the Christ-movement in Rome had already 
established a separate community from the “Judeans group” (Ἰουδαῖοι), when Paul 
wrote this letter. That is, the evidence shows that while Judeans gathered in specific 
public places, προσευχαί (“prayer halls”), Christ-followers used a house as a meeting 
place. As a result, it is possible for Christ-followers to have their own identity and 
unity against Judeans. Esler also insists that it is probable that there were some 
conflicts among the groups of the Christ-movement. Since the community of the 
Christ-movement was based on different house churches, the competition or even 
conflict within the Christ-movement was possible in the milieu that houses and 
households played a central role in the pursuit of honor and the interactions between 
families often moved toward a competition or conflict.87 
Assigning proper meanings to these terms is extremely important, especially given the 
timespan and cultural changes since Paul wrote Romans. Today, the term “Jew” means a person 
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who adheres to one of the many branches of Judaism. One need not be ethnically “Jewish” to be 
a Jew. One might be a “Yid” from the eastern countries of Europe, being descended from the 
Ashkenazi. On the other hand, one might be of Irish descent and have converted as an adult to 
Judaism. As for the term “gentile,” it has no use outside of Christian literature. The term 
“barbarian” connotes a lack of social etiquette. While this may be close to the way the ἔλληνες 
thought of the βάρβαροι, it is not an exact parallel. For the purposes of this study, we see in these 
various terms the prevalence of monikers of identity in Paul’s letter. Paul desires to have his 
readers (the hearers of this letter) get beyond these identities which create barriers between 
Christians. One of the effects of baptism is to create in the Christian the higher-level identity of 
being righteous, of being “in Christ.” Once this higher identity is cognitively grasped, the effects 
of “pseudospeciation,” which is the artificial division of human beings into species or at least 
subspecies, can begin to be overcome.88 
If the majority of Paul’s audience are non-Judean-leaning people, including cultural 
Hellenists, then his insistence that the gospel is to the Judean (Jew) first and also to the Hellenist 
(Greek) makes strategic sense.89 Certainly it can be argued that he is simply stating that salvation 
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is first to, and also from, the “Jews”; but that he repeats this refrain seems to point to another 
purpose. It has been pointed out by commentators that Paul wrote Romans for the purpose of 
securing help for a planned future missionary journey to Spain. In Rom. 1:8–15 and even more 
blatantly in Rom. 15:14–33, Paul makes clear his desire to preach the gospel where no one else 
had yet labored. He states his plan to go to Spain (15:28) by way of Rome. Because he has not 
yet been among the Christians in Rome, this letter, he hopes, will pave the way. It is Paul’s 
desire to be “sent on” by the Romans. Being “sent on” implies that they would furnish him with 
the various items he would need for this undertaking.90 Esler suggests that Paul needs to address 
underlying ethic divisions among the Roman Christians before he can expect a united front of 
support for his mission to the far west of the Empire. “Paul is trying in some way to bring 
together Judeans and non-Judeans in the Christ-movement.”91 Therefore, Paul addresses this 
issue by first showing that no distinction exists between ethnic groups. All share together the 
common identity of “sinner” (Rom. 1:18–3:20).92 Then he shows that all Christians are righteous 
in Christ (Rom. 3:21–5:21),93 and thereby share the reality of that imputed identity. Next he 
moves to the struggle for the actualization of this new identity (chapters 6–8).  
Before moving on to indict all people as sinners, Paul states his overarching thesis, that the 
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 It is significant that, in Rom. 1:18–32, Paul consistently uses plural pronouns. The implication of this is that 
sin destroys human communal life just as certainly as it does life between humans and God. In Rom. 2:1–3:20, Paul 
indicts the man (Rom. 2:1: ὦ ἄνθρωπε) who denies that he is one with those who have fallen into sin. By this refusal, 
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in Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 375–77. Although Paul begins the discussion of struggle and suffering in 5:1–5, in 
5:6–21 his argument has to do with the reality of being either “in Adam” or “in Christ,” which are terms which 
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with the struggle for the actualization of identity and more with the Christian’s real identity, it will be included in 
with the preceding chapters. 
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gospel is the δύναμις θεοῦ εἰς σωτηρίαν παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι (power of God into/for salvation 
to/for all the ones who believe), whether they be Judeans or not. Paul bases this on what he reads 
in Habakkuk: ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται (the one who is righteous from out of 
faith/faithfulness shall live).94 The ambiguity of the phrase ἐκ πίστεως may be intentional, driving 
home the reception of righteousness, which is solely by trust, the faithfulness of God in Christ, 
and the faithfulness by which the Christian is called to live before God after baptism.95 It is clear 
from Rom. 1:16–17 that only the one who is righteousness by faith shall live and that this 
righteousness comes to the one who trusts the gospel. Paul moves next to exclude everyone from 
this category. He shows in what follows that the only “righteous one” is God. 
Therefore, his task is to drive home to his hearers their identity as those who are sinners. 
Paul states that it is the wrath of God which is being revealed toward the outward psycho-social 
pathologies of humanity. The gospel reveals the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ (righteousness of God). Human 
psycho-social pathology, to which Paul gives the titles ἀσέβειαν καὶ ἀδικίαν ἀνθρώπων (impiety 
and unrighteousness of humanity) is revealed in humanity’s reaction to and within creation 
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 It is not within the scope of this study to analyze the reasons why Paul modifies the Habakkuk reference 
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LXX reading, emphasizing that “the only reason anyone has a chance to be righteous and, thereby, to live is 
Yahweh’s faithfulness.” Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 108. 
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 Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 108–9. The binyan of וֹת ָּנוּמֱא ֶּב is ןמא which includes meanings such as firm, 
secure, and reliable. The semantic domain of ןמא encompasses meanings such as reliable, faithful, and trustworthy. 
This range of meaning may help to tie together Stage I (Trust vs. Mistrust) and Stage V (Identity vs. Identity 
Diffusion) in Erikson’s theory, in that basic trust and fidelity are translations of the words πίστις and הָּנוּמ ֶּא.  
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(Rom. 1:18–20).96 Creation reveals God’s power and divinity (δύναμις καὶ θειότης) clearly 
enough to render humanity without excuse for rejecting the true God. This rejection of the 
Creator is the move from trust (πίστις) to mistrust (ἀπιστία). This mistrust is demonstrated by the 
turning from the Creator to created things and endowing them with divinity. Paul states that the 
attitude that lies behind this is the inexcusable refusal to glorify God and to render him thanks 
(Rom. 1:21). In place of this proper piety of humility, humanity asserts (φάσκοντες) itself to be 
wise. This assertion, this attempt at autonomy, is a confusion between “illusion and reality.”97 
Humanity’s supposed wisdom is in fact foolishness. This contrast highlights the 
psychopathology of unbelief (lack of trust in God).  
The ritualization of this misplacement of trust is exemplified in pagan worship practices 
(Rom. 1:23). These practices teach. They also feed the passions (τὰς ἐπιθυμίας = passions; 
drives), which lead to the dishonoring of the human body (Rom. 1:24) as the truth of God is 
exchanged for the lie. Middendorf states that the “alpha-privative noun ἀτιμή, ‘dishonor’ . . . is 
the opposite of τιμή, ‘honor.’”98 Within an honor-shame culture dishonoring and shaming are 
qualitatively equivalent. This is precisely the direction of Paul’s argument as he describes the 
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 “This unrighteousness of men is set in contrast to ‘righteousness from God,’ of which the apostle has just 
spoken. By this opposition to δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ the concept of ἀδικία ἀνθρώπων gets its significance and color.” 
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persons. Similarly, the imputation of righteousness (δικαιοσύνη), and the actualization of that imputed, real identity, 
is foundational to the identity imparted by means of baptism. 
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 Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 121. 
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dishonorable lusts (πάθη ἀτιμίας) of bisexual confusion and homosexual behavior (Rom. 1:26–
27).99 The term Paul uses for male homosexual behavior is ἀσχημοσύνη. Although the majority of 
translations render this term in the plural, Paul uses the singular. It is “the shameful deed.”100 
Humanity’s lack of trust in God, and the accompanying willful autonomy, has as its result 
shame. From this point on Paul, having effectively placed humanity in Sodom, moves quickly to 
the just sentence of death which is the wages of sin. Humanity is “filled up with every 
unrighteousness (πεπληρωμένους πάσῃ ἀδικίᾳ), to which Paul appends a catena of nouns to 
describe evil, which function as identifiers as well as descriptions of human behavior. For Paul, it 
is not merely that individuals do evil things. Humanity and each person is unrighteous to the core 
of being. The reality is that humanity is deeply corrupted by sin. It will be made clear in Romans 
5 that another way to state this reality is to be “in Adam.”101  
Paul makes a strategic move in Rom. 2:1. Having set before his hearers a picture of 
perverted humanity, he strikes at those who would pass judgment over others, being unawares 
that they are doing the same things. Middendorf comments that, rather than narrowing the scope 
of the people that Paul is indicting in chapter 2 to Judeans (Jews), it is better to consider the 
target of Paul’s diatribe to be any who condemn others without first acknowledging their own 
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culpability.102 The core idea in this section is that God judges without partiality.103 Whether one 
has the commandments of Torah or not, one will be judged on the basis of the commandments 
one has. Merely having possession of the commandments of Torah is irrelevant; “for not the 
hearers of Torah are righteous before God, but the doers of Torah will be rectified/ justified” (οὐ 
γὰρ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ νόμου δίκαιοι παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται).104 Paul brings 
in, at this point, the function of conscience. The conscience (ἡ συνείδησις) of each person can 
either accuse or excuse one’s behavior. This function of conscience, perhaps paradoxically, 
shows the self-centeredness of humanity. Paul describes the conscience acting, not for the 
welfare of the neighbor, but for one’s own self-justification. Yes, it may condemn. It often, 
however, serves to provide one with excuses for behavior. Self-centeredness characterizes 
humanity’s relation even to the law of God. People try to keep the law, but only for their own 
self and not for the neighbor’s sake.105 The moralism of the people typified in Romans 2 exposes 
humanity’s cor curvatus in se and exemplifies each individual’s isolation from others, in each 
person’s hyper-autonomy. Paul utilizes this self-justifying aspect of conscience to show the 
proper verdict of guilt which humanity deserves. To defend oneself by comparing one’s behavior 
against that of others, without understanding the root cause of sin in unbelief and autonomy, 
requires a degree of initiative. Objective guilt may very well be true for all individuals, even for 
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the law. Therefore, unregenerate humanity cannot keep the law, even partially, even when attempting to the keep the 
law. This view of human inability is far more radical than usually presented. Quite often the contention is that 
people try to keep the law, but fail, either because they do that which is forbidden or they fail to do all that is 
commanded. Green, following Bonhoeffer, argues that human inability lies deeper than that. The only love 
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infants, but the subjective feeling of guilt comes as one becomes cognitively conscious of the 
laws which one has violated. 
Beginning in Rom 2:17, Paul clearly sharpens his focus on the Judeans (Jews) in the 
Roman congregations. He makes overt use of identity language when he writes: “Now if you 
name yourself a Judean and rely upon Torah and boast (find your honor in) God and know the 
will and discern the difference being catechized out of the Torah.” (Εἰ δὲ σὺ Ἰουδαῖος ἐπονομάζῃ 
καὶ ἐπαναπαύῃ νόμῳ καὶ καυχᾶσαι ἐν θεῷ καὶ γινώσκεις τὸ θέλημα καὶ δοκιμάζεις τὰ διαφέροντα 
κατηχούμενος ἐκ τοῦ νόμου).106 The possession of Torah is integral to Israel’s existence and 
identity. It continued as such during and after the Babylonian Captivity. However, possession of 
Torah was not the key to righteousness. 
The entire Law, the Torah, was certainly a gift to Israel. This is true even of the 
commands, the laws within Torah. The problem is that the Law itself apart from faith 
in God’s salvation, was never intended to be the determining basis for Israel’s 
identity. This is never clearer than in the formative exodus-Sinai experience. 
Throughout the plagues and during the actual exodus redemption (Exodus 1–15), 
Israel itself was still “without Law” (ἀνόμος, Rom.2:12), which was not given until 
Exodus 20.107 
Righteousness, as Paul states in Rom. 1:17, which is his appropriation of Hab. 2:4, is based upon 
faith in the Lord.108 Therefore, identity is not found merely in possession of Torah. Torah without 
faith is dead. The Judeans (Jews) indeed had “the form of knowledge” (τὴν μόρφωσιν τῆς 
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 Rom. 2:17, 18. This is the first direct address to a Judean in Romans. Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 198. The 
term is an ethnic as well as a religious identifier. If Paul is indeed seeking to overcome the ethnic divisions among 
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 As is demonstrated below, this is Paul’s major point in Romans 4. The key figure in Torah for Paul is not 
the caricature of Moses the legalist, but of Abraham, the man of faith—who believe the promise of the Lord, who 
alone is faithful. 
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γνώσεως), yet it was not properly formed because it was not formed by faith.109 
Before indicting the whole of humanity under sin, Paul speaks of the advantages the 
Judeans (Jews) enjoyed as those who had possession of Torah. Yet, in the end, only God is true. 
Every man is a liar.110 Indeed, only God is righteous. Paul further argues that humanity’s 
unrighteousness upholds God’s righteousness (Rom. 3:5). He alone is just. He alone is true and 
truthful. All humankind bears the identity of, and is judged as, “sinner” (ὡς ἁμαρτωλὸς 
κρίνομαι).111 As sinners, humanity is altogether worthless (ἅμα ἠχρεώθησαν) and can in no way 
become righteous by works. This means that humanity is judged inferior to its original state of 
righteousness and that human industriousness means nothing coram deo. The identity of fallen 
humanity falls under the broad identity umbrella of unrighteous (ἄδικος). 
Having established the identity of unregenerate humanity as ἄδικος, Paul moves to create a 
new identity for those who believe the gospel. In terms of identity study, the fact that Paul both 
describes the χωρὶς νόμου δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ (apart-from-Torah righteousness of God) as being apart 
from Torah and yet, nevertheless, revealed in both Torah and the Prophets, continues Paul’s 
concern to include both Judeans (Jews) and non-Judeans (gentiles). These lower-level identities 
have no bearing on this gospel-manifested righteousness, which is unto all those who trust (εἰς 
πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας). There is no distinction (διαστολή) between these two groups for two 
reasons. First, “all have sinned and have fallen short of the glory of/from God” (πάντες γὰρ 
ἥμαρτον καὶ ὑστεροῦνται τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ). This he has previously established. Second, all are 
“rectified (being justified) as a gift, by his undeserved favor, through the redemption, which is in 
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 “Let God be true and every man a liar.” (γινέσθω δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἀληθής, πᾶς δὲ ἄνθρωπος ψεύστης) Rom.3:4. 
111
 Rom. 3:7. 
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Christ Jesus” (πάντες . . . δικαιούμενοι δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι διὰ τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως τῆς ἐν 
Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ).112 “Paul’s argument is that God does not discriminate between people in this 
respect: all sinners deserve wrath; righteousness is for all through faith.”113 This rectification 
(justification) is not “legal fiction.”114 God’s declarative word is creative; it creates the new 
reality. That this reality is not fully experienced in actuality does not negate its truth. The full 
actuality of the new reality awaits the eschatological kingdom. Nevertheless, this new reality is 
the gift of a new identity ἐν Χριστῷ (in Christ).115 
Paul continues with his usage of identity language as he writes: λογιζόμεθα γὰρ δικαιοῦσθαι 
πίστει ἄνθρωπον χωρὶς ἔργων νόμου. ἢ Ἰουδαίων ὁ θεὸς μόνον; οὐχὶ καὶ ἐθνῶν; ναὶ καὶ ἐθνῶν, εἴπερ 
εἷς ὁ θεὸς ὃς δικαιώσει περιτομὴν ἐκ πίστεως καὶ ἀκροβυστίαν διὰ τῆς πίστεως (for we reckon 
humanity to be rectified by faith apart from works of Torah. Is God [the God] of Judeans alone? 
Is [he] not of non-Judeans also? Yes, of non-Judeans also, since God is one, who rectifies the 
circumcision from out of faith and the foreskins through faith).116 Arguing from the central 
confession of the faith of Israel, that God is one (Deut. 6:4 ד ָּח ֶּא ה ָּוה ְּי וּניֵהלֱֹא ה ָּוה ְּי), Paul achieves the 
breakthrough of bringing all together under the higher ἐν Χριστῷ identity, which is the 
righteousness of faith. 
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Romans 4 serves as Paul’s litmus test for the orthodoxy of his theology. In many ways, 
Romans 4 is also a recap of all that has been written before. The central figure of Torah, for Paul, 
is Abraham. Abraham is the man of faith, the man rectified by faith apart from doing the 
commands of Torah. This is so, of course, because Abraham lived prior to the giving of Torah 
through Moses. And yet, though Paul does not argue it, it is through Moses that we know of 
Abraham. Therefore, if Moses relates to us that Abraham was rectified through faith, then Moses 
also preaches faith.117 Paul uses the chronology of Abraham’s life to make his point.118 Ben 
Witherington states: “Abraham had faith/trust (in God) and that faith was counted to him as 
righteousness. Paul is speaking of basic trust in God here, not of ‘the faith’ in the sense of a 
specific set of things believed.”119 While Witherington appears to think of Abraham’s faith as a 
general trust in God, Paul, in Rom. 4:18, points out that Abraham’s faith was trust in God’s 
promise of offspring. That it was not specifically in the man Jesus of Nazareth does not weaken 
the argument that it was faith in God’s word of promise concerning a descendant that was 
accounted to Abraham as righteousness. Faith/trust must always have an object.120  
Of great importance is the way in which Paul links the crisis of faith with the development 
of the virtue of hope. Abraham’s trust in the promise of God continued through decades of 
nonfulfillment. The promise that Abraham would become the father of many nations (πατέρα 
πολλῶν ἐθνῶν)121 was rendered less and less likely with the passage of time. Sarah’s womb was 
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 Paul essentially picks up this theme in Rom. 10:5–13. Although Moses “writes about the righteousness 
that is based on Torah, that one who does the commandments shall love by them,” by citing Deut. 30:13–14, Paul 
makes Moses a preacher of faith in the crucified and risen Christ. 
118
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 Witherington, Romans, 123. “Basic trust,” it should be noted is Stage I (Trust vs. Mistrust) in Erikson’s 
developmental model. 
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 Even in Erikson’s developmental theory, the child’s basic sense of trust and basic sense of mistrust is 
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 Whether Paul’s hearers would have understood the word ἐθνῶν with its full ethnic force or not, the 
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dead (τὴν νέκρωσιν τῆς μήτρας Σάρρας = the deadness of Sarah’s womb) and Abraham’s body 
was dead (τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα ἤδη νενεκρωμένον = his own body being already dead).122 Yet, “against 
hope upon hope he trusted” (παρ᾽ ἐλπίδα ἐπ᾽ ἐλπίδι ἐπίστευσεν).123 Abraham did not waiver in 
mistrust (οὐ διεκρίθη τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ).124 Abraham trusted God as the God of resurrection, as is 
evidenced by Paul’s argument that it is this trust in God who raised Jesus our Lord from the dead 
(τοῖς πιστεύουσιν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐγείραντα Ἰησοῦν τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν ἐκ νεκρῶν), which is rectifying 
faith.125 This reference to resurrection points forward to the new reality in baptism of the 
believer’s resurrection to newness of life in Rom. 6:4. 
Romans 5 is significant for this study for several reasons. First, Paul deals with the issue of 
crises (suffering). He also deals with teleology, which is important theologically. Furthermore, 
he presents us with two sources of ultimate identity: Adam and Christ. “Therefore, being 
rectified out of faith (δικαιωθέντες οὖν ἐκ πίστεως) we have peace (εἰρήνην) in the presence of 
God through our Lord Jesus Christ (Rom. 5:1). The term εἰρήνη denotes “the objective state of 
being at peace instead of being enemies.”126 This is not superfluous to our study. Peace (εἰρήνη) is 
                                                                                                                                                             
promise, nonetheless, points to the superseding of the lower-level ethnic identities in the righteousness of faith. 
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God which set them right, so that they have a new or renewed relationship with God as a result of the work of 
Christ. If God were simply to impute to believers his righteousness, then there would be no basis to require 
righteousness after their conversion.” Witherington, Romans, 133. Witherington translates θεοῦ in δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ as 
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a relational word. It is not, as Paul uses it, a psychological term. Rather it denotes a quality in the 
relationship between persons. It is a social term. A person who has been justified by grace 
through faith has his or her relationship with God rectified, set right.127 Therefore, the two are 
now at peace. Knowing one is at peace with God, one can better persevere in hope (ἐλπὶς) when 
crises (θλίψεσιν = tribulations) come. This hope is further strengthened by the knowledge that 
one has access (προσαγωγὴ) to God’s grace as a foundation on which to stand, even in the midst 
of crises. Paul extols the arrival of crises as the grist mill by means of which character is 
developed. Crises (θλίψεσιν) work patient endurance, and patient endurance works tested (or 
proven) character, and tested character works hope.128 Paul’s confidence in the ultimate good of 
crises for the Christian is indicated by his assertion that Christians boast (καυχώμεθα) not only in 
hope of the glory of God but in the crises themselves, because of the hope which is developed in 
the believer. This is true, not because crises in and of themselves are of value, but because of 
what they produce, namely, hope. “And hope does not put one to shame because the love of God 
has been poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us.”129 
Paul points to a specific teleology in these verses, namely in the glory of God (τῆς δόξης 
                                                                                                                                                             
a possessive genitive, meaning that it is God’s inherent righteousness. This righteousness is revealed in the way in 
which God is both just and the justifier of the believer. In contrast, and in accordance with the classic Reformation 
understanding, Middendorf states that δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is the righteousness which God “imputes to us through faith 
in the Good News of his salvation.” Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 92. Nevertheless, Witherington’s emphasis upon the 
relational aspects of δικαιωθέντες fits well with the new status of εἰρήνη between God and the believer in Christ. This 
state of peace continues even as the Christian experiences the crises which Paul begins to outline in the following 
sentences and again in Romans 8. 
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 A clearly relational use of the term, “righteous” is found in Gen. 38:26. Judah declares concerning Tamar, 
“She is more righteous (ה ָּק ְּד ָּצ) than I, since I did not give her to my son Shelah” (ESV). She was faithful to her 
relationship with her first husband, to give him an heir. If Erikson is correct, that the ego strength, or virtue, of Stage 
V, which is the stage at which the development of identity is focused, is fidelity, then a relationship between fidelity 
and righteousness, even the righteousness of faith, could be argued convincingly. 
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 Rom. 5:3–4. ἡ θλῖψις ὑπομονὴν κατεργάζεται, ἡ δὲ ὑπομονὴ δοκιμήν, ἡ δὲ δοκιμὴ ἐλπίδα. 
129
 Rom. 5:5. ἡ δὲ ἐλπὶς οὐ καταισχύνει, ὅτι ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκκέχυται ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν διὰ πνεύματος 
ἁγίου τοῦ δοθέντος ἡμῖν. Paul use of the words οὐ καταισχύνει points back to his theme in Rom. 1:16–17. Paul will 
have more to say about the Spirit’s role in the Christian’s life in Romans 8. 
163 
τοῦ θεοῦ). This phrase again presents the exegete with the challenge of determining how to 
translate the genitive case of the words τοῦ θεοῦ. The context does not support translating it 
merely as if the Christian glorifies God. Rather Paul speaks of the “hope for a fully restored 
experience of [God’s] image and presence.”130 Therefore, character and identity development are 
not without an ultimate goal toward which to Christian presses on.131  
Romans 5:6–11 continues the theme of reconciliation. This section also returns the hearer 
to the contrast between humanity as sinner and humanity rectified by faith. In both the blood of 
Christ (5:9) and the life of Christ (5:10) are the believer’s salvation. Paul next builds upon the 
distinction between being in sin and being under grace, by describing the two grounds of 
identity: In Adam; in Christ. Paul is again reaching back to Torah. Earlier he had brought 
Abraham into view. Now it is the proto-human, Adam. However, he does not at first name him 
Ἀδάμ. He calls him the “one man” (ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου) through whom sin came into the world. That 
ם ָּד ָּא serves as both the proper name for the first man and as the designator for humanity, by using 
ἄνθρωπος to designate him Paul allows “Adam” to stand as the designator for the entirety of 
fallen humanity and not merely as a specific individual. Paul makes double use of Adam in 
Romans 5. Adam stands as a τύπος (type) of Christ, in that his actions affect all humanity. He 
also stands as contrasting τύπος in that the effects stand in contrast. Adam brings death. Christ 
brings life. Witherington argues that Paul’s Adam typology undergirds the entire structure of 
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 Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 393. “The object of hope is the future δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ in which the blessed shall 
share.” H. P. Liddon, Explanatory Analysis of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans (London: Longmans & Green, 1899), 
97. “Paul could be referring here to seeing the glory of God when Christ comes, but more likely he refers to the hope 
of being conformed to Christ’s glorious image at the resurrection (see Romans 8).” Witherington, Romans, 135. 
131
 Similarly, Paul writes in Phil. 3:12–14: “Not that I have already obtained this or am already perfect, but I 
press on to make it my own, because Christ Jesus has made me his own. Brothers, I do not consider that I have made 
it my own. But one thing I do: forgetting what lies behind and straining forward to what lies ahead, I press on 
toward the goal for the prize of the upward call of God in Christ Jesus” (ESV). The Christian life has a telos. 
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Romans 5–8. 
We will then not be surprised to find Paul present a further historical example in his 
next argument, in this case Adam, as a basis for drawing yet further conclusions 
about the Christian life in ch. 6. This argument involves a synkrisis or comparison 
between Adam and Christ, just as the argument in ch. 4. Involved an implied 
comparison between Abraham and Christian believers. What is not generally 
recognized is that the story of Adam not only undergirds but underlies the entire 
discussion from 5:12 to the end of ch. 7, and it is only at that juncture that Paul feels 
free to give a full discussion of the implications of what he has been saying for 
Christian life, which he does in ch. 8, which concludes the probation portion of 
Paul’s arguments.132 
Witherington argues that the “I” of Rom. 7 is not Paul writing autobiographically of himself as a 
Christian struggling with indwelling sin, nor of Paul the pre-Christian Jew, but rather that the “I” 
of Rom. 7:7–13 is Adam, as in humanity ἐν Ἀδάμ.133 Middendorf, on the other hand, dedicates a 
14-page excursus arguing that the “I” is the Christian Paul, and that the experience of the 
Christian Paul is the actual experience suffered by all Christians.134 One does not have to accept 
Witherington’s argument that the “I” of Rom. 7:14–25 is Adam and all those in Adam in order to 
appreciate the argument that Witherington makes. As will be demonstrated in Romans 6, it is ὁ 
παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος (our old man/ Adam) who is crucified with Christ and put to death. 
Similarly, it is Christ who is raised. In this way Paul keeps the Adam-Christ dyad working in his 
argument in chapter 6.135 He argues that through Adam, the “one man” (ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου), sin 
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 Witherington, Romans, 141. 
133
 “But who is the ‘I’ then who is speaking here? In my view the ‘I’ is Adam in vv. 7–13 and all those who 
are currently ‘in Adam’ in vv. 14–35. Adam, it will be remembered is the last historical figure Paul introduced into 
his discourse, at 5.12, and we have contended that the story of Adam undergirds a good deal of the discussion from 
5.12 through ch. 7.20.” Witherington, Romans, 184.  
134
 Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 584–97. The assumption of this dissertation, based in part on Middendorf’s 
argument, is that the “I” in Rom. 7:14–25 is Paul and that his experience is the actual experience all Christians have. 
135
 Luther’s explanation of Rom. 6:3–4, in Der Kleine Katechismus, reads: “Es bedeutet, daß der alte Adam in 
uns durch tägliche Reue und Buße soll ersäuft werden und sterben mit allen Sünden und bösen Lüsten; und 
wiederum täglich herauskommen und auferstehen ein neuer Mensch, der in Gerechtigkeit und Reinheit vor Gott 
ewiglich lebe.” Luther contrasts “the old Adam” with “the new man,” while Paul contrasts the “old man” with 
“Christ.” Luther interprets the “old man” as Adam. He then unites the risen Christ with the baptized Christian. 
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entered the world, and with it, and because of it, death entered and passed to all men (εἰς πάντας 
ἀνθρώπους), because (ἐφ᾽ ᾧ) all sinned.136 The universal reign of death proves that sin has reigned 
since the fall of Adam, whom Paul then calls a type (τύπος) of “the Coming One” (ὅς ἐστιν τύπος 
τοῦ μέλλοντος = Christ). Christ, who is the antitype of Adam, is also, like Adam, ἑνὸς 
ἀνθρώπου— the one man, Jesus Christ (τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ).137 But, whereas 
through the disobedience of Adam death reigns over all, through the obedience of Christ “the 
many” (οἱ πολλοί) are established as righteous (5:19). Thus, in Christ, grace reigns through 
righteousness to eternal life (5:21). The significance of this section is the identity that is 
established and confirmed by the reign of death. Through the disobedience of the one man, the 
many are established as sinners” (διὰ τῆς παρακοῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν 
οἱ πολλοί). In the same way, “through the obedience of the one man, the many are established as 
righteous” (διὰ τῆς ὑπακοῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς δίκαιοι κατασταθήσονται οἱ πολλοί). Thus two sources of 
identity, Adam and Christ, result in two different, contrasting identities: “sinners” (ἁμαρτωλοὶ) 
and “righteous” (δίκαιοι). In Rom. 12:2, Paul will write about the renewal (ἀνακαινώσει) of the 
mind. Paul here presents his hearers with two realities, which are the bases for the actuality of a 
lived identity. If one sets one’s mind on the “in Adam” identity, one will live in the realm of sin 
and death. If one set’s one’s mind on the “in Christ” identity, then one will begin to be 
transformed (μεταμορφοῦσθε) by the renewal of the mind. The baptismal shape of this 
transformation of identity is taken up in Romans 6. 
In Romans 1–5, Paul presents numerous aspects of identity. He acknowledges the various 
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 Rom. 5:12. It lies outside the purpose of this dissertation to argue the meaning of ἐφ᾽ ᾧ. Middendorf 
translates the words in this way: “on this [reason],” which is essentially indistinguishable from “because.” 
Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 409. 
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 Rom. 5:15. 
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ethnic identities of Christians, but works to overcome the negative consequences of 
pseudospeciation by presenting the higher-level identities of being saints and brothers. He first 
indicts all people as sinners, members of a communio peccatorum. This community of sinners 
has misplaced the trust it ought to have in the Creator and instead places its trust in created 
things. This misplaced trust is ritualized in pagan worship practices, which actually are 
destructive both to the individual and to human society as a whole. Human conscience also is 
ruined by sin, in that it is turned inward. The struggle of a guilty conscience is not for the 
neighbor’s good but for self-justification. Paul concludes with the identity label of “sinner,” 
posted over the entirety of humanity. 
Beginning in Rom. 3:21, Paul teaches a new identity, found not in the keeping of the law. 
Rather it is found in the atoning death and in the resurrection of Jesus Christ. This new identity, 
as one who is righteous by faith, is exemplified by Abraham. The patriarch is important, not only 
because of his faith, but because of the struggle of faith which he suffered. In Abraham one sees 
the connection between trust, identity, crisis, and hope. Abraham’s righteousness was a gift from 
God, yet its actualization was hard-won in the daily struggle of trust versus the temptation to 
mistrust. This righteousness is in Christ, not in Adam. Adam stands in for the entirety of 
unfaithful, mistrusting humanity. Christ is the faithful one. The only truly faithful one. Christ is 
the promised descendant, toward whose coming Abraham’s hope was focused. Abraham trusted 
God and it was accounted to him as righteousness. His faith was in God who gives life to the 
dead. Life from death is the theme of Paul’s baptismal theology in Romans. 
Romans 6 and the Struggle for Identity 
Paul’s theology of baptism was outlined earlier in this chapter. The primary task of this 
section is to investigate the struggle for identity in Romans 6, that is, for the actualization of the 
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identity given by means of baptism. That identity is that of being a person who is righteous by 
faith, since the righteous shall live by faith (ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται; Rom. 1:17). Paul has 
established that this righteousness is in Christ, in him who is the faithful one. The Christian’s 
entire life is sourced from the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ and is lived trusting in the 
efficacy of Christ’s vicarious representative action (Stellvertretung).138 Martin Franzmann 
remarks: 
The reality of Christ’s death and resurrection determines our whole existence; the 
controlling reality of our life now is the fact that we shall live. Our present life gets 
its character, direction, and purpose from the fact that we shall live with Him who 
lives a life beyond death, a life lived wholly to God, now that he has died an atoning 
death, once for all to sin.139 
Yet, the experience of every Christian is that of Paul in Rom. 7:14–25, that is, of not perfectly 
living out (or actualizing) this reality of being righteous.140 Indeed, if it were the case that one 
could, with ease, actualize this identity, then Paul’s entire exhortation to become what one is 
would be purposeless. 
Paul’s use of the subjunctive mood of the verb περιπατέω (to walk) in Rom. 6:4 indicates 
how the baptized ought to live, not how they inevitably live. The proclamation of God’s gracious 
favor in Christ, which Paul has been emphasizing since Rom. 3:21, is met by the question as to 
whether the conclusion of his previous argument means that one such “continue in sin.” Paul 
meets this false conclusion head-on by appealing to the nature of baptism, which buries the 
baptized into the death of Christ (6:3). This burial into death, this uniting of the baptized with 
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 Christ is the one who acts as the Stellvertreter (the vicarious representative), acting on behalf of others 
who cannot attain righteousness on their own. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio (2005), 91. 
139
 Franzmann, Romans, 111. 
140
 The actualization of one’s being righteous is connected with the Christian’s proper, or active, 
righteousness, which is coram mundo. 
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Christ in his death, has the ethical purpose of energizing the baptized by Christ’s resurrection.141 
Paul is using the violent language of death. Baptism kills the “old man,” because in baptism the 
Christian is co-crucified (συνεσταυρώθη) with Christ, in order that the “body of sin” might be 
“destroyed” (καταργηθῇ; 6:6).142 Paul understands the struggle to involve the totality of the 
person. For Paul σῶμα includes the physical, although it is not reducible to it alone. Human 
beings are embodied creatures.143 It is impossible today to speak meaningfully of human nature, 
at least in this world, without including the physical body, including the neurological system.144 
Therefore, Paul’s use of the phrase τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας remains valid and important, since the 
physical aspect of human nature is, at a minimum, involved in the cognitive, affective, and 
behavioral aspects of human life, all of which are corrupted by sin. It is while in the body, “in the 
flesh,” that the struggle for the experience of one’s identity as righteous occurs. 
Although, as we shall see in Romans 7, Paul acknowledges that the Christian struggles with 
the urge to sin and that he often finds himself sinning, he, nonetheless, gives the Christian no 
excuse for doing so. The Christian, having been baptized into the death and resurrection of 
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 “This crucifying of the old man, this destroying of the sinful body, is, however, only the negative side of 
baptism. It is that of which Paul says, ‘We have been united with him in a death like his.’ But baptism also has its 
positive side; we are also ‘united with him in a resurrection like his.’” Nygren, Romans, 235. 
142
 “From the level of the theology of the cross, from its very foolishness, we can see that all practice, all 
froms of action, that do not go through death possess no transformative (soteriological) power. Practice itself must 
take on this paradigm (hence the reason baptism and communion remain central for Paul and Luther, as they are 
practices that exists in death-to-life paradigm). . . . The practices of faith can only be a means of grace if they too 
bear the death-to-life, life—out-of-death paradigm (a core sense of transformation from justification) as both 
baptism and communion do.” Andrew Root, Christopraxis: A Practical Theology of the Cross (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 2014), 33, 74. 
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 Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 448. 
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 Psychotherapists are finding it increasingly necessary to incorporate the findings of neuroscience into their 
theory and practice. Louis Cozolino states: “Psychotherapists are applied neuroscientists who create individually 
tailored enriched learning environments designed to enhance brain functioning and mental health.” Cozolino, 
Neuroscience of Psychotherapy, 341. For a Lutheran perspective on the importance of neuroscience discoveries for 
pastoral care, see Nauss, Implications of Brain Research. Nauss shows how the various functions traditionally 
thought of as belonging to the soul at a minimum involve brain functions, thereby strengthening the argument that 
the σῶμα and the ψηχή cannot be separated in this life. 
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Christ, is now to account (λογίζεσθε) himself to be “on the one hand dead to sin and on the other 
hand alive to God in Christ Jesus” (νεκροὺς μὲν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ζῶντας δὲ τῷ θεῷ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ; 
6:11). Looking forward to Romans 7, the one who is “dead to sin and alive to God in Christ 
Jesus” is the “New I” referred to earlier in this chapter. The reason the “Experiential I” can 
reckon or account this to be true is that the “New I” is a recreated reality in Christ. The “New I” 
is dead to “sin” which still dwells within the actualized existence of the “Experiential I.” Paul, 
here, is hammering home the point that this “sin” within the “Experiential I” is a thing to which 
the “New I” has died. The “New I” has been raised from death. The “New I” co-lives 
(συζήσομεν) with Christ in his resurrected life. Therefore, the “Experiential I” is no longer a slave 
to sin (μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ). By means of the killing and regenerating effect of 
baptism, the Christian lives a new reality, even if in great weakness145 because of the indwelling 
sin that remains in the “body of death,” the body of sin.” 
Based upon this reality effected by means of baptism, Paul exhorts his hearers: “Therefore, 
do not go on letting sin reign in your mortal bodies resulting in you obeying its drives.”146 The 
words that follow are highly significant. “Sin shall not exercise lordship over you because you 
are not under law (Torah commandments) but under gracious favor” (6:14). In Romans 7, Paul 
will bring out the effect that commandments have; they excite the indwelling sin to commit sin. 
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 “As soon as the Holy Spirit has begun his work of rebirth and renewal in us through the Word and holy 
sacraments, it is certain that on the basis on his power we can and should be cooperating with him, though still in 
great weakness. This occurs not on the basis of our fleshly, natural powers but on the basis of the new powers and 
gifts which the Holy Spirit initiated in us in conversion.” (FC SD 2:65) Paul. Likewise, speaks of the weakness of 
Christians in Rom. 6:19, although he is speaking more about their inability fully to understand the point he is 
making. 
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 Μὴ οὖν βασιλευέτω ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν τῷ θνητῷ ὑμῶν σώματι εἰς τὸ ὑπακούειν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτοῦ. (Rom. 
6:12). I am purposely translating ἐπιθυμίαις as “drives,” rather than “lusts” or “desires” in order to tease out the 
psychological dimensions of this word. Since “sin” resides in the “body of sin” (τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας), the drives of 
the body are corrupted by sin. In Rom. 7:24, Paul calls the body τὸ σῶμα τοῦ θανάτου. Paul appears to center the 
drive to sin in the body. Yet, the body as physical creation of God is not essentially evil, for he also exhorts the 
baptized to present the bodily members (τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν) to God as instruments of righteousness to God (ὅπλα 
δικαιοσύνης τῷ θεῷ; Rom. 6:13). 
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Two major effects of becoming aware of sin are shame and guilt. Adam and Eve hid themselves 
among the trees of the garden (Gen. 3:8).147 The first reaction to sin’s effects was knowledge of 
nakedness, which led to shame. Once the Lord God confronted them, his sentence upon them 
declared them guilty of violating his command. The act of hiding among the trees was an 
exhibition, an outward sign, of their mistrust in God. They had, instead, trusting the word of the 
serpent. Paul’s refusal to return his hearers to a position under the law, but rather to God’s 
gracious promise that Christians are free from sin in Christ removes both the shaming power and 
the condemning power of the law and frees the baptized to be who they are in Christ, namely, 
“the righteous by faith” who shall live. 
As Paul continues his argument about freedom from slavery, he begins to use the language 
of ritual, specifically the ritual language of Torah. While the baptized are not under Torah 
commandments, they, nevertheless, conduct themselves is a way analogous to the sacrificial 
system within Torah. The key ritual terms used in Rom. 6:19–23 are uncleanness (ἀκαθαρσίᾳ) 
and holiness (ἁγιασμόν).148 The “Experiential I,” prior to regeneration, once presented its 
members in slavery to uncleanness (ἀκαθαρσίᾳ). Now the regenerated person, who has within the 
“New I” is urged to present its members in slavery to righteousness (δοῦλα τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ) 
leading to holiness (εἰς ἁγιασμόν).149 Paul is building his ethical exhortation, which is grounded in 
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 Adam falls by eating of the one tree denied him by God. Adam and Eve hide among the trees of the 
garden, thinking that these trees will deliver them from the Lord who gave them as gracious gifts. It will happen, 
centuries later, that those who are baptized into (are hidden in) the One who was nailed to a tree, that the shame and 
guilt of sin will be removed. 
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 Rom. 6:19.  
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 Middendorf, following James Dunn, prefers to translate ἁγιασμόν as “sanctification, rather than “holiness” 
in concern that “holiness” implies a state while “sanctification” connotes a process. The concern, while perhaps 
valid, is overcome by the present progressive of the word παραστήσατε (be presenting). Middendorf also argues that 
just as Paul writes in verse 19 that presenting the members to righteousness leads to “sanctification” (which he 
understands as a process) so in 6:16 Paul states the “obedience” leads to “righteousness.” His argument appears 
flawed, since “righteousness” is an imputed status. The parallel between the two would imply that both ought to be 
treated as “states.” However, just as things that are holy can be desecrated and defiled, so the Christian, by 
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the Christian’s baptism into Christ, upon the Levitical ritual of cleansing and sanctifying and the 
corresponding process of desecration and defilement. Paul uses this same concept in Eph. 5:25–
27. Paul presents Christ as cleansing the church, which previously was unclean, “with the 
washing of water with the word” (Eph. 5:26). That this language is the language of the sacrificial 
ritual system is betrayed by Paul’s use of the phrase “give himself up for her,” since Christ did 
this as the sacrifice for sin on the cross. Similar to Rom. 6:19–23, in Eph. 5:25–27 Paul uses the 
words “having cleansed” (καθαρίσας), sanctify/ make holy (ἁγιάσῃ), and holy (ἅγια). Thomas 
Winger comments of Eph. 5:26: 
The sacrificial language of the previous verse now intensifies with the explicit 
vocabulary of temple ritual (cf. Rom. 15:16). The verbs ἁγιάζω, “sanctify,” and 
καθαρίσας, “cleanse,” reflect the movement from unclean and common to clean and 
holy (Lev. 10:10) that was necessary before any person or thing could stand in the 
presence of the holy God without being destroyed.150 
Consistent with this line of reasoning, Paul, in Rom. 6:21, 23, states that uncleanness leads to 
death. In the Levitical system, the priests were to distinguish between, and to teach the people to 
distinguish between the holy and the holy and the common, and the clean and the unclean.151 
Winger notes: “The NT does not erase these distinctions, but relocates them from the Jerusalem 
temple to the person of Christ (Jn. 2:21). His priestly work is to cleanse and sanctify . . . by the 
power of his blood . . . and through his word.”152 By means of baptism, the Christian is “in 
Christ,” who is the source of holiness. Thus, the liturgical work of the baptized, is to present as a 
sacrifice one’s members “in slavery to righteousness resulting in holiness.” Paul will echo this 
same language in Rom 12:1–2. 
                                                                                                                                                             
presenting his members to sin desecrates defiles himself. According to Rom. 6:21, persistence in defilement leads to 
death. 
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 Winger, Ephesians, 609–10. 
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 Lev. 10:10; Ezek. 22:26. 
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 Winger, Ephesians, 610. 
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This section presents the multifaceted telos of Paul’s ethical exhortation. The goal of 
baptism is full participation in the life of the resurrected Christ. This is a life free from shame 
and death (6:21), having one’s fruit in holiness (6:22), and enjoying the “free gift of eternal life 
in Christ Jesus the Lord” (6:23). The daily presentation of one’s members to God is the 
ritualization which effects the actualization of the new identity of being righteous, and as Paul 
now declares, being holy.153 More on this daily presentation is given later in Romans 12–15. 
Romans 7 and the Struggle for Identity 
This is a key section, especially in that Paul argues that the “I” wants to do what pleases 
God, but the “sin within” does not, so that the “I” that is Paul is wretchedly wrestling. A major 
challenge is attempting to deal with Paul’s use of the pronoun “I” in a psychological manner is 
determining just who, or what, the “I” is in any given instant.154 There is the “I” who struggles 
against sin. There is the “I” who delights in the Torah commandments of God. There is the “I” 
who does what it does not want to do. Yet there is an “I” who is not the one doing the evil thing; 
rather it is indwelling “sin” which does it. Thus Paul appears to present us with three dramatis 
personae: “Experiential I”: “New I”; “indwelling “sin.”  
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 Throughout Romans, Paul skillfully escapes the accusation that being rectified (justified) by grace through 
faith leads to lawlessness. In Rom. 6:19, he states that it is the presenting of the members to uncleanness (ἀκαθαρσίᾳ) 
and lawlessness (ἀνομίᾳ) that leads to further lawlessness and ultimately to death. Peter Tomson comments: “Neither 
in Rabbinic tradition nor in Qumran, [did] ‘salvation’ or ‘justification by faith’ exclude obeying commandments. 
The same appears to hold true for Paul. Especially remarkable is his mention of ‘those who not only are circumcised 
but also follow the footsteps of Abraham’s faith’ (Rom. 4:12), i.e. Jews who have both the Law and faith, the 
emphasis being that faith and not the commandments are decisive. Tomson, Paul and the Jewish Law, 67. Yet, 
although Paul will show, by means of a marriage metaphor, that the baptized have died to the law, this does not lead 
to lawlessness. As will be shown, coercive law breeds rebellion in the “body of sin.” On the other hand, the “New I” 
delights in the “Law” in the” inner man” and desires, without coercion to follow Torah from out of faith. This is 
consistent with Paul’s declaration that “the righteous shall live by faith.” One who lives by faith, faithfully lives in a 
righteous manner, although still in great weakness and struggle because of indwelling sin within the “body of 
death.” 
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 “Chapters 7 and 8 of the Epistle to the Romans are the most intense presentation in Paul of a 
transformation in human life. If any Pauline texts can be interpreted psychologically, it is these chapters.” Theissen, 
Psychological Aspects, 222. 
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In Rom. 7:13–25, Paul is speaking only of the Christian, the one made new and given the 
new identity of being righteous in Christ. For purposes of this dissertation, “New I” is the 
Christian as he views himself and as he is viewed coram deo, a new person, righteous before 
God. This is the Christian’s “real” identity,” as δίκαιος. It is the identity conferred by God in 
Christ. As “New I,” therefore, he desires to live righteously. “Indwelling sin” is the “old man/ 
Adam,” the Christian as “sinner,” as ἄδικος. This is not his real, nor the identity the Christian 
desires to actualize. “Experiential I” is the Christian as he experiences himself in the world. He 
experiences the daily existential crisis of the pull of “indwelling sin” to commit sin and of the 
“New I,” the “I” who has died to sin and is now alive to God. Describing the situation using 
these three terms helps to clarify the crisis Paul describes. The drama in Romans 7 is intense. 
The outcome of the crises experienced by the “Experiential I” is a matter of life and death. 
However, before dealing with the conflicts that rage within the baptized, Paul describes the 
Christian’s relationship to the commands of Torah and the effect of the law upon the “flesh.” 
While the effect of “law” upon a person may appear to have little to do with the 
actualization of one’s identity, it is pertinent for several reasons. First, the Christian’s 
relationship to the commands of Torah is a factor in how one sees oneself. It indicates a change 
in one’s identity. Second, the effect of these commands, which is sin’s rebellion against the 
commands, uncovers the results of unfettered autonomy. Paul has previously given a nuanced 
view of autonomy. The Christian is free from the law. Yet the Christian is a slave to 
righteousness. This paradox needs to be addressed. To what degree is the baptized free? And 
from what is the Christian free? Freedom to sin leads to bondage in death. Slavery to 
righteousness leads to holiness and eternal life. 
Paul begins this section by stating that “Torah exercises lordship over a man only while he 
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lives” (Rom. 7:1). He then uses the metaphor of marriage to illustrate his point. A woman is 
bound to her husband as long as he lives. If ever the husband should die, the woman is always 
free to remarry. Paul then twists the metaphor slightly. It is not that Torah (the “husband” to 
whom she was once bound) who has died. Rather, it is the baptized person who has died. “You 
died to Torah through the body of Christ, so that you belong to another, to the one who was 
raised from the dead” (Rom. 7:4). Being baptized into the crucified and risen Christ, the 
Christian is now no longer bound to Torah as a lord, rather, the Christian is set free from this 
bondage so as to be married to Christ.155 This contrast between slavery and freedom has appeared 
earlier in Romans 6. Slavery is much more than a state of being. To be enslaved is be a slave, to 
have that as an essential part of one’s identity. Valérie Nicolet-Anderson, in her narrative reading 
of Romans, describes the plot in these words: 
In term of intrigue, it is centered on the end of the rule of sin over human beings; but 
it also establishes the identity of human beings as slaves. In terms of ēthos, human 
beings are marked by a lack of autonomy.156 Being a slave to one’s master involves 
giving obedience to the master (6:16), but Paul also indicates that the master one is 
serving decides the identity of the one who is serving the master. As 7:14–23 will 
make clear, when a person serves sin it is no longer the individual who is responsible 
for what she does or even who she is, because her master seems to inhabit her (7:17). 
In this case it is as if the individual is being possessed by an outside power. Both 
chapter 6 and chapter 7 indicate that slavery is more than obedience; it is a matter of 
identity. The master decides the identity of the slave.157 
Therefore, the plot involves the violent language of death, burial, and even crucifixion. The old 
husband, who is like a cruel master, can only be overcome by death. In Romans 7, it is the 
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 Paul’s interplay between the words “husband” and “lord” reflects Hosea’s contrast between being under a 
lord and having a husband: (Hos. 2:18 Heb. / 2:16 Eng.): םוֹיַב ה ָּי ָּה ְּו-םֻא ְּנ אוּהַה-ה ָּוה ְּי ,י ִּשי ִּא י ִּא ְּר ְּק ִּת ;ֹאל ְּו- ְּר ְּק ִּתי ִּא-דוֹע י ִּל ,
י ִּל ְּעַב: “And it shall be in that day, declares Yahweh, you will call me ‘my husband’ and no longer call me ‘my lord.’” 
In Romans 7, Paul is placing Torah in the position of the husband as lord, much as Peter does in 1 Pet. 3:6. Paul uses 
the term “bound” (δέδεται) in relation to Torah, yet “is set free” (ἐλευθέρα ἐστὶν) in relation to the marriage to Christ. 
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 In Chapter 4 of this dissertation, the issues of “autonomy” will be discussed. Nicolet-Anderson uses the 
term to describe the lack of freedom, indeed the lack of freedom of the will, not to sin. Yet there is also a sinful 
aspect to autonomy, when it is freedom to be the source of one’s own laws. 
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 Nicolet-Anderson, Constructing the Self, 79. 
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“wife,” the slave to Torah, who dies so that she might be set free to be remarried to the risen 
Christ. 
Paul is faced with a theological problem. He could easily be accused of calling Torah evil. 
Therefore, he first must make his argument clear. Although, prior to baptism, a person is bound 
to Torah, it is not Torah which causes the person to rebel, but the passions of sin (τὰ παθήματα 
τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν: the drives, infected by indwelling sin; 7:5). These drives are energized when they 
are met by the “law and order demands” of Torah.158 It is only after being baptized, after being 
set free from slavery to the law and order demands of Torah, that the Christian serves her new 
husband in newness of the Spirit (ἐν καινότητι πνεύματος) and not in the oldness of the letter 
(παλαιότητι γράμματος).159 
In Rom. 7:7–13, Paul describes the Christian’s past identity, prior to baptism. Paul writes 
that he did not know (οὐκ ἔγνων) sin, nor did he perceive or understand (οὐκ ᾔδειν) desire, that is, 
the drives within him, until Torah taught him, “You shall not desire (οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις: you shall 
not covet).”160 Furthermore, when sin “came alive again” (ἀνέζησεν) in Paul through the 
commandments, Paul “died” (ἐγὼ δὲ ἀπέθανον: and I died). Therefore, Paul states that his 
identity prior to baptism was that of being a dead man. Only unfettered desire raged within. This 
means that any sense of autonomy was in fact an illusion. Paul was a slave to the desires of his 
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 This wording is chosen to show a point of convergence between Paul’s teaching and Erikson’s description 
of the issues of Stage II in his theory. Stage II (autonomy vs. shame and doubt) includes the ritualization of law and 
order. The will, desiring autonomy. Rebels. Yet, it appears that this unfettered autonomy is no autonomy at all, 
because the child rebels reflexively. 
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 Rom. 7:6. In this verse Paul describes the unregenerate as being “held fast” (κατειχόμεθα) under Torah. 
After baptism, the Christian, set free from Torah, is paradoxically still “in slavery,” in the newness of the Spirit. 
While this might seem counterintuitive, it maintains the thought that the master, who now is the one who is also the 
loving Savior, still determines the identity of the slave. The identity of the baptized is given by and in Christ. 
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 Rom. 7:7. This is Paul, describing his own experience prior to baptism. “In 7:7 Paul reveals how the Law’s 
commandments led the “I” to identify and acknowledge his own impulse toward evil.” Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 
533. “Anyone who denies to Paul the ego in Romans 7 has to bear the burden of proof for this claim.” Theissen, 
Psychological Aspects, 201. 
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flesh.  
The Adam-Christ dyad from Romans 5 is not absent in Romans 6–8. Although it was not 
the Mosaic Torah that Adam violated in the garden, it was, nonetheless, “the commandment” 
which was used to awaken desire within him. When faced with the question of trusting or 
mistrusting the word of God, the temptation’s force included the physical (good for food), the 
aesthetic or emotional (delight to the eyes), and the psychological (desirable to make one wise). 
The word, desirable (דָמְֶחנ) is translated with ὡραῖον in the Septuagint, and not by ἐπιθυμέω.161 
Nevertheless, the words have similar meanings. The desire for wisdom which had been 
forbidden awaken, or perhaps better said, was formed by the command.162 Paul interprets his 
experience in terms of the story of Adam’s fall into sin.163 The commandment came, desire raged, 
and Paul, just like Adam, died just as God had promised. Thus, autonomous desire leads to 
death, which is the ultimate source of shame, because it strips away all pretentions. In the end, 
death is the greatest existential question. “The question is whether life can be affirmed despite 
death, or whether death erodes all meaning.”164 Torah was intended for life; instead, it, because of 
sin, brings death, which was the threat assigned to the tree in the midst of the garden. 
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 ὡραῖος appears only in Matt. 23:27, where it has the connotation of being attractive. Yet even in this 
reference, “desirable” could be a translation. That it is the woman and not that man to which Gen. 3:6 refers is 
irrelevant to the present discussion. “Eve coveted God’s divinity in Genesis and so was led into unbelief.” John T. 
Pless, Praying Luther’s Small Catechism (St. Louis: Concordia, 2016), 31. The autonomous desire for that which is 
not given as gift leads to mistrust in the giver. Thus, the “law and order” aspect of Torah excites the autonomous 
will to disobedience. Yet this ultimately leads to shame, when the thing desired fails to live up to its promise. The 
tree of the knowledge of good and of evil, in contrast to the tree of life, became the tree of death. 
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 How evil desire and mistrust can be created in one who is righteous is a mystery not to be explored in this 
dissertation. However, the close connection between mistrust of God’s commands and devil desire is unmistakable 
in the biblical narrative of Genesis 3 and in Romans 7. 
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 “Paul interprets the conflict with the law with the aid of two traditions: first, according to the model of the 
story of the Fall; second, by adducing a widespread ancient opinion. Theissen, Psychological Aspects, 202. Theissen 
quotes extensively from ancient nonbiblical sources to show the universality of the knowledge that human beings 
are excited to lawlessness by the demands of law. 
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 Michael Oppenheim, Jewish Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: Narrating the Interhuman (New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 69. 
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Yet, Torah is a “Spirit-filled, holy entity that God intended for life”165 (Rom. 7:14). The 
problem lies not with Torah but with fallen humanity. Paul writes, “But I—I am fleshly, having 
been sold under sin” (Rom. 7:14b). Middendorf notes that this is the language of the “slave 
market”166 Significantly, Paul now shifts to the present tense. “I am fleshly” (σάρκινός εἰμι).167 
The challenge in these verses is to discern what Paul means by the pronoun “I.” It is Paul, but in 
what way is the “I” Paul? Is it a legitimate move to understand the “I” as if one were discussing 
two subjects, as has been hypothesized above? 
Paul is not accusing indwelling sin for his actions so as to relieve himself of responsibility. 
Rather, he is describing as best he can the struggle within the baptized to actualize the new 
identity and the strong force of indwelling sin which hinders at every turn. Paul, however, takes 
the reality of the new man just as seriously as he does the power of sin. So he presents this drama 
to his hearers of a man who has within him, as it were, two strong opponents. On the one hand 
there is the new man. On the other hand, there is indwelling sin. And in the middle, tattered and 
torn, is Paul the Christian, actualizing his new identity against a mighty foe. He will call himself 
the “I” that delights in the Torah. He will call himself the “I” which finds itself doing what it 
does not want to do. But he will not call himself “sin.” Nevertheless, in contrast to Torah, which 
is spiritual, Paul states that he is fleshly. By this he does not simply mean that he lives a bodily 
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 “The first person singular is again used, but now for the first time in this chapter with a present tense. The 
only natural way to understand this ἐγὼ . . . εἰμι is surely the way indicated by Calvin’s comment on the following 
verse: ‘Paul . . . is depicting in his own person the character and extent of the weakness of believers.’ The faithful 
often refuse this natural interpretation on the ground that it involves—so they argue—a gross belittling of the victory 
vouchsafed to the believer, and hanker after an interpretation which regards 7.14–25 and chapter 8 as describing two 
successive stages, before and after conversion.” Cranfield, Romans, 1:356. Douglas Moo is among those who think 
that Rom. 7:14–25 refers to the unregenerate. Moo acknowledges that Christian’s struggle with sin. “I only deny that 
this passage describes that struggle.” Moo, Romans, 449. To deny to the struggling Christian this description of 
Paul’s own struggle not only goes against the plain sense of the passage; it also removes the clearest description of 
the struggle of Christian identity that the baptized endure. 
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life. Rather, he is “sold under sin.” In some way, he is so under the lordship of sin that he cannot 
but sin.168 It is not that Paul does not desire to actualize the new life in Christ. He does not think 
of a divided will or a discord in the soul. He has in mind the tension which exists, in the 
Christian life, between will and action, between intention and performance.”169 Yet he describes 
it in such a way that three actors appear on the stage: “New I,” “indwelling sin,” and in tension in 
the middle, struggling, “Experiential I.” It might be helpful to think about it in this manner: 
“New I” is Paul as fully “new man.” This is the reality into which the baptized is placed. 
“Experiential I” is the way the baptized experiences the baptismal life as daily putting off the old 
man and putting on the new man, of killing the old Adam” so that the new man may daily 
arise.170 
“New I” wills to do what pleases God, agrees with Torah that it is excellent (καλός), and 
delights in it. “New I” is the “inner man” (τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον) of 7:22. Concerning this “inner 
man,” D. G. Stöckhardt comments: 
Doch nach dem Zusammenhang, da hier dem inner Menschen Freude an Gottes 
Gesetz beigelegt wird und als Gegensatz das Fleisch, die Sünde gedacht ist erscheint 
an unserer Stelle der Begriff “ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος” als identitsch mit dem Begriff ὁ καινὸς 
ἄνθρωπος. In der Wiedergeburt wird ja vor Allem das Innere des Menschen, Herz, 
Verstand, Wille erneuert.171 
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 The question of the referent of the “I” in Romans 7, and whether one should distinguish between a “New 
I,” which does not commit sin, and an “Experiential I,” which succumbs to sin’s power even as it struggles against 
it, is significant for any dialogue with Freudian or Neo-Freudian theory, including Erikson. This section provides 
material for discussing the ego (das Ich), the id (das Es), and the superego (das Über-Ich) and their relation to an 
extrapolated Pauline psychology. 
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 D. G. Stöckhardt, Commentar über den Brief Pauli an Die Römer (St. Louis: Concordia, 1907), 342. 
“However, according to the context, since the inner man delights in the law of God, and sin is conceived as being 
opposed to the flesh, the term “ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος” appears in our place as identical to the term ὁ καινὸς ἄνθρωπος. In 
the rebirth the interior of man—heart, intellect, will—is renewed.” 
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Thus the two are to be equated, and in the terms used here, should be considered as the “New I,” 
the reality that is Paul, baptized into Christ, and, by extension, all Christians. 
“Indwelling sin” (ἡ οἰκοῦσα . . . ἁμαρτία; 7:17) is that under which Paul, in 7:14, is sold as a 
slave. It is the “not indwelling any good thing” (οὐκ οἰκεῖ ἐν . . . ἀγαθόν) that dwells within Paul, 
that is in his “flesh” (ἐν τῇ σαρκί; 7:18). Nevertheless, Paul, as one of the baptized, who 
experiences this tension, does not desire to be under sin’s lordship. He calls the crises of his 
experience using terms of a battle. “I (“Experiential I”) delight in God’s Torah according to the 
inner man (“New I”), but I (“Experiential I”) see another Torah in my members waging war 
(ἀντιστρατευόμενον) with the Torah of my mind (“New I”) and taking me (“Experiential I”) 
captive in the Torah of sin, which is in my members” (Rom. 7:22–23). In Rom. 12:2, Paul will 
urge his hearers to be transformed by the renewal of the mind (ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοὸς). This would 
be in accord with the daily actualization of the new identity. The mind, in 12:2, is that of 
“Experiential I,” since it in in need of constant renewing. In Rom. 7:23, however, the mind (νοός) 
is more likely that mind of the “New I,” against which indwelling sin wages its war, since it is 
according to the inner man that Paul delights in God’s Torah.172  
The terms “New I” and “Experiential I” are simply hypothetical constructs to describe the 
drama of the struggle against sin and for Christian identity which occurs within the mind and will 
of the baptized. There is only one “I” who is enduring this struggle.173 However, from the level of 
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 The meaning of the Torah of God is straight forward. But what is meant by “another Torah,” a “Torah of 
sin”? Middendorf describes the double effect of the Torah on the Christian. It is, according to Middendorf, the same 
Torah. The “inner man” (“New I”) delights in it and finds it pleasing. However, “indwelling sin” acts toward it just 
as unregenerate man does. It rebels. It disobeys, commits sins, and incurs shame and guilt. See Middendorf, Romans 
1–8, 567–71. 
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 Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 567. Middendorf appears unwilling to say what Paul says about himself, that he 
actually does the evil he does not will to do. Certainly, there is only one man Paul, but Paul’s psychology—if one 
can call it that—is richer than Middendorf appears willing to describe. He is willing, however, on page 581, to refer 
to the “distraught I.” So the same reality is described using slightly different terminology. 
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experience, there is the deep desire to please God, which is born from the reality of the “new 
man” (ὁ καινὸς ἄνθρωπος), the inner man (ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος), and yet Paul still finds himself 
unwillingly committing sins. Paul will not identify himself with indwelling sin; nevertheless, he 
will say that he (Paul, in some sense being “I”) does not do the good thing he wills to do, but 
rather does the evil he does not desire to be doing. Paul’s true, foundational identity is not to be 
found in either indwelling sin nor in the struggling “Experiential I.” Rather, Paul’s identity in in 
the “new man” (ὁ καινὸς ἄνθρωπος), the inner man (ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος), who has been united with 
the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ, so that he might nor walk in newness of life, as Paul 
describes in Romans 6. 
Still, Paul will not ignore the actual struggle to make this reality his own in practice. He is 
in a war that is a great interior struggle, eine große innere Anfechtung, which he describes as 
being between his mind and his flesh (his members). The severity of this struggle causes him to 
refer to his condition as pure misery. He is a distressed person, ever in the cycle of contrition, 
repentance, faith, and further struggle. Therefore, he cries out: “I, a distressed man (Ταλαίπωρος 
ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπος)! Who will rescue (ῥύσεται) me from out of (ἐκ) this body of death (τοῦ σώματος 
τοῦ θανάτου τούτου)?” The struggling “I” (the “Experiential I”) desires to actualize the reality 
which is the “New I.” Therefore, the baptized does not desire to remain either under sin’s 
lordship or perpetually in this struggle. Always, while in this body, infected with indwelling sin, 
the baptized craves the inner reality to become a fully realized actuality. Therefore, the baptized 
always looks to the Redeemer for rescue. Thus Paul’s answer to the question of “Who?” “Thank 
be to God—through Jesus Christ our Lord (7:25). That this struggle will go on until the body of 
death is buried in the grave, or Christ returns, is acknowledged by the final words of this chapter. 
Until that day, the “I” lives on both sides of the struggle. The “I” that is Paul the new man 
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serves God’s Torah with, or in, his mind, even though sin causes his “flesh” to cave in to the 
temptation of its evil impulses. Paul is not, however, giving an excuse for bad behavior. The 
baptized person himself served God’s Torah in his mind (αὐτὸς ἐγὼ τῷ μὲν νοῒ δουλεύω νόμῳ 
θεοῦ: I myself serve in my mind God’s Torah). The addition of the word “myself” (αὐτός) points 
to Paul’s sense of identity.174 Yes, frustratingly, Paul finds himself doing what he does not desire 
to do, but he will not claim that “person” as the real Paul. Paul has died to sin and has been 
raised to newness of life. In this baptismal reality, Paul finds who he really is. This “New I” 
causes the “Experiential I” to desire rescue from this struggle, and so to cry out to his Lord Jesus 
Christ.175 And because “Experiential I” finds its identity in being the “New I” in Christ, even 
when caught unwillingly sinning, it knows that it will not be under the sentence of condemnation 
spoken in the first three chapters of Romans. The true identity of the Christian is the “inner 
man,” free from the domination of sin and from the condemnation of Torah.176 This is the 
Christian, declared to be righteous in Christ, and thereby made righteous coram deo. 
Romans 8 and the Struggle for Identity 
“There is, therefore, now no condemnation to those who are in Christ Jesus (ἐν Χριστῷ 
Ἰησοῦ), for the Torah of the Spirit of Life in Christ Jesus has set you free from the Torah of sin 
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 Philip Esler, pursuing his topic of the social identities in Romans, concludes that Paul states that he 
delights in Torah in his mind in order to draw the Judean-leaning Roman Christians into the new, higher-level 
identity as brothers of their non-Judean (gentile) Christians. “He does this above all by creating an ‘I’ voice that 
exemplifies Israel in its experience of the law and that incorporates himself and his fellow Judeans.” Esler, Conflict 
and Identity, 242. This does not, however, exclude understanding a Christian “I,” as stated above. 
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self of the regenerate serves with the νοῦς the law of God, but with his σάρξ is in the service of the law of sin. This, 
however, shows the intrinsic holiness of the Law (ver. 12), ver. 25.” Liddon, Romans, 126. 
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 “Therefore, the true identity of the Christian, the ‘inner person’ (7:22) as seen by faith, together with that 
which determines his will and governs his mind, is free from the domination of sin. Baptized believers have been set 
free from slavery to sin (6:17, 18, 20, 22), and Paul assures them that the outcome of the Christian life is eternal life 
(6:22). As a result, their existence is no longer determined by the flesh (6:19; 7:5), and just as death no longer 
exercises lordship over Christ (6:9), so it is for all in Christ.” Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 590. 
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and of death” (Rom. 8:1–2). Paul’s continued use of the phrase ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ supports the 
view that he is continuing to discuss the Christian life in baptismal terms. By bringing the Spirit 
into the discussion, Paul is reaching back to Rom. 7:6, where it is written: “But now, we have 
been set free from the Torah, by dying to that by which we were held fast, so that we might be 
slaves in the newness of the Spirit and not the oldness of the letter.” In both instances, Paul 
describes the newness and the freedom of the baptized. The paradox, of course, is that slavery to 
God in the Spirit (in Christ), is true freedom. He continues to describe the inability of keeping 
Torah to bring about victory over sin and life. Therefore, only because Christ came in the 
“likeness of sinful flesh and for sin” (8:3) is “the righteous requirement of Torah (τὸ δικαίωμα 
τοῦ νόμου) fulfilled (πληρωθῇ) in us (8:4). This is not an expected ending to the sentence. 
However, Paul does not say that the “righteous requirement” is fulfilled by us. He says it is 
fulfilled in us (ἐν ἡμῖν), who walk according to the Spirit (τοῖς . . . περιπατοῦσιν . . . κατὰ 
πνεῦμα). It, therefore, must be determined what Paul means by “walking according to the Spirit.” 
Paul has previously used the metaphor of walking in Rom. 6:4, stating that the baptized 
Christian has been united with the death of Christ so that, just as Christ has been raised anew, so 
the Christian might walk in newness of life.177 Therefore, the life lived according to the Spirit is 
intimately connected to the death and resurrection of Christ. Still, Paul does not appear here 
merely to imply some kind of imputed, fictitious fulfilling of Torah. Otherwise, his statement 
would rightly be met with derision by his detractors. It is the Torah of the Spirit of Life, which is 
in Christ Jesus, which sets the baptized free and causes this Torah to be fulfilled. By immediately 
                                                 
177
 In the opening of this letter, Paul has already linked the resurrection of Christ to the work of the Spirit. The 
gospel is “concerning God’s Son (περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ) who was came out from the seed of David (τοῦ γενομένου ἐκ 
σπέρματος Δαυὶδ) according to the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα), who was declared the Son of God in power (τοῦ ὁρισθέντος 
υἱοῦ θεοῦ ἐν δυνάμει) according to the Spirit of holiness (κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης) by the resurrection from the dead 
(ἐξ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν; Rom. 1:3–4). 
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pointing his hearers to the work of Christ, and by stating that the Torah of the Spirit of Life in in 
Christ, Paul emphasizes, as he has throughout this letter, that the righteous are righteous by faith 
and that they are to live by faith. This faith, which results in the identity of being righteous and a 
saint (Rom. 1:7) calls the baptized to “walk the walk of the Spirit and not that of the flesh.”178 
After discussing the vast difference and fate of those who walk according to the flesh and 
those who walk according to the Spirit (8:5–8), he definitively states that his hearers are not 
among those who “are in the flesh” (ἐν σαρκὶ ὄντες).179 Paul then links the indwelling of the Spirit 
to the death of the body. “The body is dead through sin but the Spirit is life because of 
righteousness” (8:10). Here he clearly links the Spirit and the status of being righteous together. 
He then ties this to the resurrection of Christ: “And if the Spirit of the one who raised Jesus from 
the dead dwells in you, he who raised Christ from the dead will also raise your mortal body 
through the indwelling Spirit in you” (8:11). This links back to Rom. 6:5, where Paul writes of 
the further resurrection of the body in terms of baptism’s effect. Paul views the totality of human 
existence in light of the killing and resurrecting power of baptism. Furthermore, he intimately 
connects the work of the Spirit with baptism as well. Next, having established this link, he moves 
to the practical application of baptism, and the Spirit’s work in baptism, as he exhorts his hearers 
to live it out in the daily crises of faith they endure. 
Paul describes the struggle of the flesh against the Spirit as a matter of life and death. He 
tells his hearers that Christians are debtors (ὀφειλέται), but not to the flesh. However, no sooner 
has he called them “debtors” than he changes his semantic domain to that of family. Christians 
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 ἀρέσαι is the aorist active infinitive of the verb ἀρέσκω, strive to please, accommodate. According to 
BAGD, it can also have the meaning of “having pleasure in” something. Paul uses the dative case, θεῷ, in the phrase 
θεῷ ἀρέσαι οὐ δύνανται. If the phrase is translated as “is not able to be pleasing to God,” it could imply the state of 
not being pleasing God, because being pleasing to God comes by faith and results in rectification (justification). 
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are “sons of God” (υἱοὶ θεοῦ; 8:14) and “children of God” (τέκνα θεοῦ; 8:16). Having received the 
Spirit of adoption (πνεῦμα υἱοθεσίας; 8:15), the baptized now, by the Spirit, called God “Abba, 
Father” (αββα ὁ πατήρ; 8:15).180 These words are of the utmost importance for Christian identity. 
Rather than staying with the theme of slavery and of obligation, Paul shifts the grounds of 
Christian identity to that of membership in God’s family. He has laid the groundwork for this 
much earlier, in Rom. 1:13, by calling his hearers “my brothers,” and in Rom. 4:1, with Israel’s 
forefather Abraham as the father of all those who believe (4:11), and all Christians as Abraham’s 
offspring (4:16), but now this is intensified. The baptized are God’s sons. They are God’s 
children. And because the baptized are God’s children, they are “coheirs with Christ” (8:17). 
Being a child of God is the Christian’s hidden, true identity. Middendorf writes: “Paul then 
makes an astounding statement about identity. As a result of the Spirit’s presence (8:9, 11) and 
direction (8:13), these people are actually ‘sons of God’ (8:14).”181 And because each Christian is 
a member of God’s family, each are, with all others, brothers (and sisters) in Christ. This identity 
is the one identity that overcomes all lower-level, social identities. 
Being heirs with Christ, however, does not mean life without struggle. Rather, the baptized 
are coheirs with Christ, “if indeed we suffer with him in order to be glorified with him” (8:17). 
Paul realistically knows that the baptized will suffer in this world. However, Paul lives with the 
teleology of the final resurrection of the body to glory. Those who suffer with Christ will be 
glorified with him. Therefore, he can say, “I count that the sufferings of the now-time are not 
equivalent to the glory which is about to be revealed in us (εἰς ἡμᾶς)” (8:18). Given the context, 
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Paul intends his hearers to understand “εἰς ἡμᾶς” to mean “in our bodies.”182 However, the 
present time (τοῦ νῦν καιροῦ: the now-time) will be a time of suffering. This suffering is “the 
dominant topic under discussion from here through 8:30.”183 In Rom. 5:1–5, Paul extolled the 
benefits of sufferings for growth in character and hope. Here, the apostle links the suffering of 
the baptized with the sufferings of an anthropomorphized creation, and lists a number of kinds of 
suffering—tribulation, distress, persecution, hunger, nakedness, danger, death—which might 
raise the question as to the value of suffering or even the goodness of God. 
It is to the hope of bodily resurrection that Paul points his hearers. “We ourselves groan 
within ourselves expectantly awaiting the redemption of our body; for in this hope we will be 
saved” (8:23). Therefore, Paul urges them to endure until hope is realized. The significance of 
hope cannot be overemphasized, nor can its linkage with trust versus mistrust. Intense suffering 
can lead the sufferer to doubt, to distrust the message of the gospel. Christ has been raised. The 
Christian has been united with the risen Christ. Nevertheless, the baptized Christian can suffer 
horribly. The promise of bodily deliverance is delayed. Not only must the Christian struggle 
against indwelling sin (Rom. 7:13–25), he must also endure external attacks, up to and including 
threat of death (8:18–25, 35–36). Hope is the virtue that sustains the believer until the promised 
reality is revealed, just as it sustained Abraham (Rom. 4:16–22). The faith that justifies, 
produced hope in the one who endures. In Rom. 4:22, Paul states that enduring in hope is why 
Abraham’s faith was accounted to him as righteousness. But how is this hope sustained? 
Paul points his hearers to the gift of the Holy Spirit, whom they have received in baptism. 
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Even when the believer does not know what to say, the Spirit helps in the Christian’s weakness 
(8:26) by interceding on his behalf. Paul then moves quickly to Christ. The baptized are being 
shaped toward a predetermined future.  
Now we know that to those who love God, all things work together into good, to 
those called (κλητοῖς) according to his purpose (πρόθεσιν); because those whom he 
foreknew (προέγνω) he also predestined (προώρισεν) to be conformed (συμμόρφους) to 
the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brothers. And those 
whom he predestined he also called (ἐκάλεσεν). And those he called, these he also 
rectified (ἐδικαίωσεν; justified; pronounced righteous), and those whom he rectified, 
these he also glorified (ἐδόξασεν).184 
All of the verbs indicated above in the Greek are past tense, even though, temporally, not all 
have come to completion. It appears that Paul intends the Aktionsart of the aorist tense, as herein 
used, to be taken in a punctiliar sense. The action is so certain that it can be spoken of as already 
completed. Paul is working from the perspective of the certainty of the eschatological reality of 
the telos of the baptized. As it is actualized, however, the foreknowing and predestining action is 
before time. The calling and rectifying (justifying; declaring righteous) is in time. The glorifying 
is in the future, as he has already stated. 
Conformation to the image of God’s Son, while a before-time action of God, is 
conformation to the suffering and crucified Jesus in time. Concurrent with being called and 
rectified, the baptized will suffer. Yet, because it is all according to a predetermined plot, the 
believer can live in hope of future glory. The implications of this for Christian identity is that the 
Christian’s identity is determined by God. It is something given. The identity of each Christian is 
found in conformation to Jesus, the first-born brother. Paul will later, in Rom. 12:3–8 and he 
does in 1 Corinthians 12, describe how this conformation is worked out differently in each 
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Christian. However, there is a sense in which autonomy is removed. The Christian is not the 
creator of his or her own identity. That identity is given as a gift. 
Paul assures his hearers that, despite the suffering they will endure, God loved them. God is 
the only one able to bring a charge against his people. Yet God is the justifier! Christ is the one 
who can condemn. Yet it is Christ who died and was raised. Therefore, no one and nothing can 
separate the baptized Christian from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus. Therefore, 
knowing this great love, the Christian’s trust in God can endure in hope, despite the temptation to 
mistrust the promise of future redemption and deliverance. 
The struggle for identity continues through the Christian’s experiential life, even though it 
is a thing given by the Lord in baptism. At the same time, the baptismal life is the means by 
which this identity is bestowed and the means by which, though struggle, it is obtained in one’s 
experience. Throughout Romans 6–8. Paul has indicated that Christians have the source of their 
identity in Christ, into whose death and resurrection they have been baptized. The identity as one 
righteous in Christ is a reality which is, through suffering and the cross, actualized throughout 
life by contrition, repentance, and relying of the work of the Holy Spirit who has been given. 
Romans 9–11 and Christian Identity 
Romans 9–11, is often read as a polemic aimed at defending God’s faithfulness in respect 
to his promises to Israel. Moo suggests that Paul is wrestling with the implications of the gospel 
for Israel.185 Witherington describes how Paul refutes the charge that God has not kept his word 
to Israel.186 Nocolet-Anderson detects the “problem of the particular,” especially in the 
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widespread rejection of the gospel by Israel.187 Franzmann, however, understands Paul’s intent 
from a slightly different perspective. The gospel “creates a new Israel out of Jew and Gentile.”188 
By bringing these divergent views together, these chapters can also be read with an eye 
toward the national identity of Israel and the need for the church in Rome to overcome the ethnic 
and national boundaries that divide Christians from one another. The Judeans in Rome, upon 
hearing that the non-Judeans are their equals, would want to know about God’s promises and 
how they hold up under Paul’s gospel. The non-Judeans, on the other hand, would need to have 
any proclivity to put down unbelieving Judeans negated by being reminded that God would 
pluck them off the olive tree if they moved from the ground of faith (Rom. 11:11–24). 
Middendorf detects three foci in these chapters: God; God’s word; God’s people.189 It is to this 
third focus that this study will attend. 
Paul has been calling all the Christians in Rome his brothers. Now, however, he 
particularizes his relationship with his fellow Judeans. His grief is great concerning his brothers 
(ἀδελφῶν), his relatives (συγγενῶν) according to the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα) who are Israelites 
(Ἰσραηλῖται; Rom. 9:3). Even though they do not share his faith in Jesus as the Messiah, he 
claims them as his kinsman.190 He then lists all the benefits and promises given to the people of 
this national group (9:4–5), thereby demonstrating that becoming righteous is not a matter of 
human knowledge or powers.191 Thus Paul, while earlier extolling the higher-level identity that 
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all Christians share because of their baptism into Christ, does not thereby denigrate other levels 
of identity. Nevertheless, he wants his hearers to understand that the higher-level identity, which 
binds Christians together and that ultimately matters before God, is grounded in God’s promise 
to Abraham and is actualized in the hearer’s lives by faith, just as it was for Abraham (9:7–9). 
Paul appears to be challenging the identity foreclosure of the Judean Christians in Rome who 
thought that their national or ethnic identity resulted in a higher status within the church. Paul 
uses Abraham once again, but this time to differentiate between the two sons of Abraham. Isaac 
was the child whose birth was based on promise and not on the flesh. Similarly, Isaac’s children 
did not both inherit. It was through Jacob, and not by Esau, that God’s promise to Abraham was 
made good. Paul’s argument serves to reduce the importance of ethnic lineage to its proper level. 
“It is not the case that all of the offspring of Abraham are Abraham’s children” (9:7), but only 
those who trust as did Abraham. 
The illustration of God loving Jacob and hating Esau has been used for extreme arguments 
about predestination and election. That is not a topic for this study. Nevertheless, that God’s 
choice of Jacob shows the freedom of God to choose whom God wills to choose is used by Paul 
to argue that God has every right to choose non-Judeans (gentiles) and to make them into vessels 
of mercy (σκεύη ελέοθς; 9:23). Paul’s argument, regardless of any discussion concerning eternal 
election, is aimed at clinching his argument that “the righteous shall live by faith.” Israel—that 
vast number of Paul’s countrymen—did not pursue righteousness by faith, by trust in the 
promises made to Israel (9:31–32). The non-Judeans (gentiles) who did trust in Christ Jesus 
attained (κατέλαβεν: acquired) righteousness only because they did trust the gospel (9:30).192 
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Ultimately, Christian identity, which is found in being declared righteous in Christ, is determined 
by faith (trust) in Christ, and not stumbling over him as a rock of offense.193 Paul continues this 
argument about the righteousness of faith throughout chapter ten. 
In Romans 11, Paul makes a slight shift which is significant for this study of identity. He 
asks whether God has shoved away (ἀπώσατο) his ancient people (Rom. 11:1). Paul then self-
identifies as an Israelite, a descendent of Abraham, and a Benjaminite (11:1). These are 
ethnocentric terms, pinpointing Paul’s pedigree. Paul appeals to the Hebrew Bible’s teaching of a 
faithful remnant (λεῖμμα; 11:5) in order to argue that God always reserves a small number of 
faithful for himself. “I have reserved for myself 700 men who have not bent the knee to Baal” 
(11:4; 1 Kings 19:18). Yet even this remnant is by an election of grace (ἐκλογὴν χάπιτος; 11:5). 
As far as identity is concerned, this unites believing Judeans with the faithful remnant that has 
existed throughout Israel’s history. It was never the many; it was always the few. But because it 
is “by grace,” there is no ground for prideful boasting. This trust (faith) is no human 
achievement. It is God’s gift, God’s work.194 
On the other hand, if the number of non-Judean Christians in Rome substantially 
outnumbered the believing Judeans, Paul then would need to make sure that the non-Judeans do 
not develop a sense of being better than the Judeans. To drive this home, Paul makes use of the 
metaphor of the olive tree and the practice of grafting. Although grafting wild branches into 
cultivated trees might sound counterintuitive, Esler states:  
By far the most plausible view is that Paul and his Greek-speaking audience were 
well aware of the widespread practice in the eastern Mediterranean of grafting wild 
                                                 
193
 Paul’s point is not that Israel held on to Torah, but rather that “after the coming of Christ, they persisted 
with the law route rather than moving to the faith route.” Esler, Conflict and Identity, 283.  
194
 Eph. 2:8–9. See also: AC 5: The Holy Spirit “effects faith where and when it pleases God in those who 
hear the gospel.” 
191 
olive branches into cultivated olive trees and of the reason for the practice—to 
produce more fruit.195 
Ethnic Israel are the “natural branches” of tree. Because of unbelief (mistrust) they have been cut 
off. Non-Judeans are “wild olive shoots” who, solely by faith (trust) have been grafted into the 
tree. Paul warns the non-Judean believers not to become conceited. If they fall from faith, then 
they will also be cut off. Furthermore, even those cut off now can be grafted back in if and when 
they trust the gospel. Such an action would be an act of resurrection from the dead. The point to 
which Paul is driving the entire argument is centered in Rom. 11:18. It is the root that supports 
the branches. Being connected to the root unites all the branches, both natural and wild, in one 
olive tree. Since all were once dead in sin, all, by means of God’s action in baptism, are raised to 
life, being grafted into the root, Jesus Christ, whom God raised from the dead.196 
Paul’s final identity-related teaching in Romans 11 is found in verses 28–32. Unbelieving 
Judeans are “enemies” (ἐχθροὶ δι’ ὑμᾶς) of the Christians “as to the gospel” (κατὰ . . . τὸ 
εὐαγγέλιον), but “as to election” (κατὰ . . . τὴν ἐκλογὴν) they are “beloved” (ἀγαπητοὶ) for the 
sake of the fathers. It follows that if the descendants of Jacob are beloved because of God’s 
promise to the fathers, their status as enemies is mitigated for the church. It is not that the church 
is to look at them as enemies to be hated. Rather, it is their refusal to believe the gospel that 
makes them enemies of the church. Paul is not advocating a quid pro quo response to them. 
Therefore, even the identity of Israel is to be found in the gospel promises made to Abraham. 
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Romans 12–16 and Some Trajectories of Christian Identity 
Paul has woven some ethical implications of being righteous by faith into previous sections 
of his letter. Beginning in Romans 12, this become the major feature.197 A brief overview of ways 
in which a Christian’s baptismal identity is expressed is first presented. The overarching concept 
Paul draws upon reaches back to the ritual sacrificial language he used in Rom. 6:19–23. He will 
again draw on this language in Rom. 15:16, as he describes himself as a cultic minister 
(λειτουργόν) and his ministry as “priestly service” (ἱερουργοῦωτα) to the gospel, offering the non-
Judeans (gentiles) as an offering (ἡ προσφορά), sanctified (ἡγιασμένη) by the Holy Spirit.” In 
Rom. 12:1–2, Paul urges his hearers to present (παραστῆσαι) their bodies (τα σῶμα) as a living 
sacrifice (θυσίαν ζῶσαν), holy (ἁγίου), acceptable (εὐάρεστον) to God, which is their reasonable 
(λογικὴν) divine service (λατρείαν). These words echo his call, in Rom. 6:12–14, to present their 
members as instruments of righteousness to God. Furthermore, the call to offer one’s body as a 
living sacrifice hearkens back to his exhortation, in Rom. 6:11, from them to consider themselves 
dead to sin and alive to God. Now Paul pushes forward, speaking of the transformation made 
possible and effective in baptism. Rather than conformation to the world, the baptized are to be 
transformed by the renewing of the mind. A new way of thinking, generated by the implications 
and effects of the gospel in the baptized, will lead them to put off the old identity, with its 
practices, and to put on the new identity, which will lead to God-pleasing actions. These actions 
are outlined in the closing chapters of Romans.  
Before exploring these trajectories, a look back at the way in which Paul has already 
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instructed his hearers in renewing their minds is in order. In Rom. 6:1–10, Paul answered the 
objection that being righteous by grace through faith, apart from works, would lead to a life of 
sin. Rather than turning to legalism, by invoking the commandments of Torah, Paul points them 
to the effects and implications of baptism. Christ has died and has been raised never to die again 
(6:9), “for in that he died to sin, he died once, but in that he lives, he lives to God” (6:10). This is 
the Christological center of Paul’s argument. Christians are those who have been united with 
Christ in his death to sin, so that they have died to sin in Christ. They also have been united with 
Christ’s resurrection to newness of life. This is the sacramental means by which they have 
experienced, in reality, a transformation to a new life. Paul then exhorts them: “In this way, you 
yourselves, account yourselves to be dead to sin, but alive to God in Christ Jesus. Therefore, do 
not go on letting sin reign in your body to obey its drives” (6:11–12). This is the Christopraxis 
element, which is grounded in the Christological center and made effective by the sacramental 
union with Christ in his death and resurrection. Thus, by keeping the focus of the mind on Christ, 
and his death and resurrection, and accounting his death and resurrection to be theirs, Christians 
actualize this new reality which decreases conformation to the world and increases 
transformation in holiness. The goal is transformation into a godly conformity to that which is 
good (ἀγαθόν), acceptable (εὐάρεστον), and complete (τέλειον). Yet, that this transformation of 
the mind is an ongoing process is described, not only by Paul’s struggle in Romans 7, but in the 
words “so that you may keep testing (εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν: or, keep on proofing) what is the will of 
God” (Rom. 12:2). Paul is calling them to a life of repentance and faith, as they continue the 
struggle to actualize the reality of their new identity in Christ. This repentance is a multifaceted 
turning from their old identity (and a turning from boasting in lesser ethnic identities) to a rich 
experience of the new identity in Christ, grounded ever on, and planted deeply in, the foundation 
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of trusting God in Christ. Paul calls this a “transformation,” or “metamorphosis.”198 
The first instance of transformative thinking is in reference to self-aggrandizement. Paul 
tells them each to think with a right mind rather than thinking more highly of oneself than is right 
(12:3). That Paul uses the preposition γὰρ indicates that this exhortation flows from the previous 
words about mental transformation. The apparent divisions in the Roman church, especially 
between Judeans, who have Torah and the fathers, and non-Judeans, who have obeyed the gospel 
in greater numbers than unbelieving Israel, could create the situation of each group boasting over 
the other. The same could be true for the “cultured” Hellenists versus the “barbarians.” Paul 
urges them to think rightly, “as God has apportioned (ἐμέρισεν) to each a measure (μέτρον) of 
faith” (12:3). He then makes use of the metaphor of the body having multiple members. Each 
member has its unique task, and yet is one with the rest of the body. For the identity of each 
member and the social life of each Christian and well as of the sanctorum communio this has 
significant implications. 
“The body has many members, yet all the members do not have the same task (πρᾶξιν; 
12:4). Πράξις can be understood to mean a task, an activity, or a function.199 As such, it implies 
an office, something given rather than self-generated or self-appointed. It is God who has 
assigned each member a function, or office, within the sanctorum communio for the good of the 
whole body. Paul’s emphasis here seems to be directed more to the concrete congregation than to 
the church catholic, and yet each congregation of saints is the church catholic in that place.200 
This also speaks volumes to the concept of corporate identity. As individuals baptized and now 
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found to be “in one body” (ἐν ἑνὶ σώματι) the church exists as a distinct corporate being, eine 
Kollekivperson, as Bonhoeffer attempts to describe. “Person wird nur im Eingebettetsein in der 
Sozialität, und mit dem Werden der Einzelperson wird zugleich die Kollekivperson.201 Thus the 
individual is not dissolved into the collective. Yet, at the same time, each person is a member of 
all the others and members also of something greater than the sum of the parts. That all 
Christians are members of one another recalls the intimacy that the baptized have with one 
another, and with the three Person of the Holy Trinity. That each member has a task or office in 
the body, recalls the generativity to which all are called by virtue of the gifts bestowed upon 
them. Paul’s constant refrain, “ἐν Χριστῷ,” situates his entire discussion in a baptismal 
framework. He then outlines several offices in the church and how they are to be utilized for the 
good of the body. 
Much as he does in 1 Corinthians, having discussed gifts, Paul emphasizes the love the 
members are to demonstrate toward one another. This love is an active doing of what is best for 
the body. Middendorf translates the opening words of 12:9 as a heading: “Love [is] without 
hypocrisy:” The colon catches the abruptness of Paul’s statement: “The love—genuine:” (Ἠ 
ἀγάπη ἀωυπόκριτος). This love abhors evil and clings to what is good. In brotherly love it 
demonstrates brotherly affection. In honor, it strives to honor others first, before itself. The list of 
these virtues is quite long. To the central purpose of this study, this love rejoices in hope as it 
endured tribulation, being steadfast in prayer (12:12). This echoes Paul’s exhortation in Rom. 
8:18–30, where Paul encourages his hearers to patiently endure suffering in hope, and to know 
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that the Holy Spirit within them prays with and for them, even when they don’t know what to 
pray. Second, he urges them to be busily engaged in meeting the needs of the saints, by 
pursuing202 hospitality. The virtue of love and caring are to characterize the baptized, not only in 
their dealings with one another, but also with their relationships with their enemies. 
In Rom. 13:8–14, Paul returns to the commandments of Torah. In the verse immediately 
preceding this he has written of the relationship the baptized are to have with civil authority. This 
section has little to say in specificity to the topic of identity, other than to indicate that civic 
obligations are not abrogated. The only obligation the baptized actually have is to love one 
another (13:8). This might appear to be an easy road, until Paul describes it as a willing keeping 
of Torah. It should be remembered that he has already said, in Rom. 7:22, that he delights in 
Torah in the inner man. Now he shows that love is the fulfillment of Torah. Paul weaves this 
now into the fabric of the baptismal life, by saying, “Let us take off from ourselves the works of 
darkness and let us clothe ourselves with the instruments of light” (13:12). The “Put off–Put on” 
terminology is used by Paul in his other letters in light of baptism. Furthermore, Paul has the 
resurrection of the body specifically in mind, for he writes, “It is the hour for you to be raised 
from sleep” (13:11). The teleology of the future resurrected body creates the pattern after which 
life ought to be lived now and here. “He who through faith is righteous is to live a life in keeping 
with the new aeon.”203 Esler comments: 
Paul’s point in the passage is that the Roman Christ-followers should be as they will 
one day become. The imagery of future salvation serves to tell who they are or should 
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be in the present, not to warn them that the future is near. Paul contrasts the day that 
is beckoning with the night that they are currently experiencing.204 
Thus, the eschatological reality is their current reality, who they are now, and calls them to live 
consistently with that reality, to be as they should be, as they actualize it now and here. The 
ultimate goal is that of love. Christians, therefore, “live outside themselves in God, freed from 
having to find their own identity or achieve self-fulfillment. For this reason, they can afford to be 
servants not merely of all people but of all things, this caring for them ‘as if there were no 
God.’”205 Having his identity secure in Christ, by means of baptism, the Christian can hazard 
truly loving and caring for others, without fear of losing himself or of being punished for failing 
to be perfect in this age as he attempts to show compassion to others and to work in his vocation 
for the sake of others.206 
In Rom. 14:1–15:7, Paul exhorts his hearers to “welcome each other because of the identity 
God gave” them.207 They are to welcome weaker brothers and to avoid quarreling over superficial 
issues which no longer divide. Paul is clearly showing his concern over the need for unity in the 
Roman church. On the other hand, as he instructs the Corinthian Christians (1 Corinthians 8–10), 
they also should be careful not to cause another to stumble by exercising the “rights” of Christian 
liberty to the detriment of the brothers. Once again, the prime expression of Christian identity in 
one’s relationship with others is the exercise of love. Causing another to stumble is to destroy the 
faith by which the brother lives. The righteous lives by faith. Therefore, since “whatever is not 
from out of faith is sin” (14:23), causing another to stumble attacks the very grounds of 
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salvation. It is destructive to the person one causes to stumble and destructive to the welfare of 
the sanctorum communio. 
In Rom. 15:8–13, Paul returns to his need for support for his missionary work. It is this 
need that caused him to write the Roman Christians. He transitions to his request for help in his 
mission by appealing to Christ as the διάκονον περιτομῆς (bond-slave of the circumcised), on 
behalf of ἀληθείας θεοῦ (the truth of God), for the confirmation of the promises given to the 
patriarchs and that the ἔθνη (gentiles = non-Judeans) might glorify God for his mercy, just as it 
stands written” in the scripture passages Paul then quotes. Again, in terms of the purpose of this 
study, while Paul clearly desires a united church, a sanctorum communio exercising love toward 
one another and at peace with each other, he recognizes the social distinctions that exist in the 
world. These too are real. They have their proper place. They, however, are secondary to the 
unity all the baptized have in Christ Jesus the Lord. Ethnic and social identities as lower-level 
identities which must not be used to fracture the unity of the sanctorum communio, and so 
exclude of denigrate other Christians. All Christians share in this one common identity, that of 
being righteous (ἀδελφοί) by faith, and therefore, brothers and sisters in Christ, who share in one 
common baptism. 
Summary of the Findings 
Paul’s theology of baptism and baptismal identity encompasses the somatic, the social, and 
the psychological dimensions of life. Additionally, his teaching about Christian identity leads to 
a diminishing, albeit not an erasure, of ethnic identity. 
The physical significance and effect of baptism is not merely illustrative. Water is poured 
on the body, or in the case of Romans 6, likely the baptizand is immersed. However, the real 
effect of baptism is uniting the body of the Christian to the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. 
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The resurrection of the body is the teleological element for the exhortation to live a life of 
holiness. The Christian is called to actualize in the now and here what will be clearly true in the 
reality of eternity. It is not that the reality is not also now true. In Col. 3:1–4, Paul states that 
Christians have been raised with Christ. This reality is now hidden from view, “hidden with 
Christ in God.” It is this hidden reality that energizes the struggle to actualize this reality in daily 
life, even if in great weakness. Furthermore, Paul calls his hearers to live lives of love toward 
one another, toward the stranger, and even toward their enemies. The only way this can be done 
in this world is in and through the body. Therefore, the life to which Christians are called does 
not relegate the body to a place of insignificance. It is in the body that the Christian experiences 
the urges to sin and the promptings of the Holy Spirit to love the neighbor and to this fulfill 
Torah’s intent. 
The social dimensions of life are a large part of Paul’s teaching about baptism. There is one 
Lord, one faith, one baptism. This one baptism is the grounds of Christian unity. It also 
incorporates all Christians together into one family. God is the one Father. Christians are all sons 
of God, children of God. All Christians are “brothers,” joint heirs with Christ. Having once been 
“in Adam, a solidarity in sin which paradoxically divided people from each other in existential 
loneliness, the baptized are now “in Christ, becoming a sanctorum communio. The virtue which 
permeates this sanctorum communion is love, loving service to one another, including caring for 
the weak and being concerned for the faith of one another. This new identity as members of 
God’s family causes ethnic and societal identities to be reduced in importance. The identity 
which unites Christians with each other is being brothers (and sisters) of one another and saints 
in the eyes of God. 
The overarching identity of the Christian is being righteous by faith. This is the Christian’s 
200 
given (imputed) identity. The mental life of the Christian, as Paul describes it, especially in Rom. 
12:1–2, is to allow this imputed, real identity to become mentally internalized so that it begins to 
be actualized, transforming the mind to think anew, to think in accordance with reality. This is a 
constant struggle, as the “Experiential I” battles against “indwelling sin.” The transformative 
action of God in the believer is to conform the Christian into the reality of the “New I,” which is 
the new man, the inner man. This new man daily rises to life in the Christian as he contritely 
acknowledges his sin and trusts in the atoning work of Christ’s death, which alone is the ground 
of righteousness. 
 
201 
CHAPTER FOUR 
A THEOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF ERIKSON’S THEORY OF IDENTITY 
DEVELOPMENT 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the validity of the thesis that the utilization of 
Erikson’s developmental theory for pastoral care, in terms of Christian identity, is theologically 
defensible within certain limits. It will be demonstrated that the theory can be used in pastoral 
care in two specific, and seemingly contradictory, areas when dealing with Christian identity. 
First, Erikson’s theory, when viewed through the lens of Paul’s theology of baptism in Romans, 
and especially in the preparatory work Paul does in Romans 1–5, can be used in pastoral care to 
describe and illustrate the effects or fruits of original sin, which have their source in mistrust 
(lack of trust or faith) in God, This mistrust leads to a false identity, built on the foundation of 
narcissistic, rebellious autonomy and the work of self-justification which often follows because 
of shame and guilt. Second, Erikson’s theory can be utilized faithfully in assisting in the pastoral 
care work of identity actualization, if, and only if, the concept of identity construction or 
development is excluded from the foundation of Christian identity. That foundation is the 
conferred identity given in baptism, that is, being righteous (δίκαιος) in Christ. Finally, in order 
to establish this final caveat, while noting the apparent similarity between Paul and Erikson, that 
is, that trust (faith) is foundational to identity, it will be demonstrated that the foundation of 
Christian identity is conferred by God in baptism. The Christian’s foundational identity is in the 
righteousness of faith given in the gospel. In order that these three points might flow in a more 
logical order, Erikson’s theory will be evaluated first in terms of its relation to original sin, 
second in relation to conferred (imputed, alien) righteousness, and only then in relation to the 
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actualization of that identity in the Christian’s life. 
A revised correlational dialogue, controlled under the Lutheran Confessional approach, will 
be utilized.1 For this dialogue to be legitimate, points of convergence between Erikson’s theory 
of psychosocial identity development and Paul’s theology of both conferred and actualized 
identity must be determined. To find these points of convergence, first and second cycle coding 
methods were used to draw correlations between the seemingly divergent writings of the Apostle 
Paul and Erik Erikson. First cycle coding included “In Vivo Coding,” in order to highlight 
related phraseology, so as to determine whether the terms are used the same way by both authors. 
“In Vivo Coding” looks for common terms. It then assigns labels to sections of transcripts, which 
describe the subject being discussed. In doing so, attempts are made to remain as close as 
possible to the actual wording of the source material.2 “Magnitude Codes” were assigned to the 
“In Vivo Codes” to determine the frequency of occurrence and the amplitude of the importance 
of the terms discovered in “In Vivo Coding.” This process was found to be less helpful than 
other coding methods, as the volume of material from Erikson and Paul were unequal.3 “Process 
Codes” were assigned in order to explore conceptual realities generated by the data. Process 
Coding involves turning previous coding, especially “In Vivo Codes,” into gerunds, to highlight 
                                                 
1
 The correlational approach is delineated in the writings of Paul Tillich. In Systematic Theology, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1951), 1:12, 14, Tillich proposes two criteria for theology. The first criterion is that 
theology must deal with that which is of ultimate concern for humanity. The second criterion is that theology must 
be about those things which are a matter of our being or not-being, in the strictest existential sense of those words. 
Theology must set the agenda, because only theology has the “ultimate” as its object of study. In Theology and 
Culture, 49, 51, Tillich insists that the church must use the various cultural artifacts, in this case psychology, as 
subject matter for speaking to culture. “The Church has the function of answering the question implied in man’s 
very existence, the question of the meaning of this existence.” By listening to the culture, the church can thwart the 
“demonic distortions” in culture. This is part of the task. What Tillich implies, but never says, is that in listening to 
culture, and to aspects of culture such as psychology, culture also challenges systematic theology, and, therefore 
also, practical theology. When theology engages culture in a revised correlational dialogue, theology answers 
culture’s questions and culture keeps theology from becoming a calcified history of theology. For this reason, the 
final section of this chapter will consist of questions and challenges from Eriksonian theory for theology to ponder 
and hopefully answer. 
2
 Saldaña, Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers, 73. 
3
 Saldaña, Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers, 86. 
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actions. This was especially helpful in exploring possible connections between Erikson’s stages 
of ritualization and Paul’s ritual language in Romans.4  
Next, second cycle coding correlated codes from the first cycle into larger sets using 
“Pattern Coding,”5 for meaningful correlative analysis. Pattern Coding investigates and seeks to 
identify emergent themes. As part of Pattern Coding, Axial Coding6 reassembled the data into the 
categories of “Reality” and “Actuality.” This allowed for the distinction between the three kinds 
of righteousness,7 so that confusion between apparent righteousness, the alien righteousness8 
imputed to the Christian, and the Christian’s proper righteousness9 might be avoided. Erikson’s 
model addresses neither of these latter two. Since he was a secular psychologist, Erikson’s work 
is treated herein as a cultural artifact and any reference to righteousness in his work is understood 
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 Saldaña, Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers, 78. 
5
 Saldaña, Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers, 236–39. 
6
 Saldaña, Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers, 244–50. Axial Coding reassembles the data taken 
apart in first cycle coding. “The ‘axis’ of Axiel Coding is a category (like the axis of a wooden wheel with extended 
spokes) discerned in first cycle coding.” Analytical memos help bring the distinct pieces of data together and assist 
in reducing first cycle coding to a manageable level for meaningful analysis. The two axes became “Reality” and 
“Actuality.” This allowed for correlation, and then revised correlation, between data from Erikson and data from 
Paul. Imputed identity, foreclosed identity, and alien righteousness were placed under “Reality.” Actualized identity, 
other identity statuses, and active righteousness” were places under the Axial Code, “Actuality.” 
7
 In 1518, Martin Luther delivered a sermon in which he delineated three kinds of sin and three kinds of 
righteousness. See: “Sermo de triplici iustitia,” in D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimar: 
Böhlau, 1883–1929), 2:41–47. Luther distinguished between criminal sin, original sin, and actual sin. The first sin is 
blatant sin, punishable by civic authority. The second kind of sin is the root sin, inherited from Adam. It is the 
source of the third kind of sin, namely, actual sin. While criminal sin is also actual sin, the third kind of sin is not 
necessarily outwardly obvious, not is it punished by civil government. The corresponding three kinds of 
righteousness are apparent righteousness, alien righteousness, and actual righteousness. Apparent righteousness 
includes the civically good works of unbelievers. Alien righteousness is the imputed righteousness which is by 
grace, through faith, in the merits of Christ. From this righteousness flows the works of actual righteousness. In this 
way, Luther’s use of “actual” correlates to the use of that word in this dissertation. They are actual because they are 
actualized acts. The alien righteousness corresponds to the use of to the words “real” and “reality.” That which is 
real, that which is imputed and given, becomes the source for that which is actualized. For a discussion of Luther’s 
three kinds of righteousness and its application to the development of Christian character, see Joel Biermann, Case 
for Character, 122–33. 
8
 That is, righteousness coram deo. 
9
 That is, righteousness coram mundo or coram hominibus. 
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in terms of civic, or apparent, righteousness.10 The Christian, however, has an identity as one 
who is righteous coram deo, which is the conferred alien righteousness of faith. The Christian 
also, because of this conferral, seeks to actualize this identity coram mundo in ways consistent 
with his real, conferred identity. The challenge in this correlational study is to determine whether 
Erikson’s theory of identity development can be meaningfully and appropriately utilized for 
pastoral care in terms of Christian identity. 
The sections that follow demonstrate that it was determined that sufficient correlation 
exists between Erikson’s model and Paul’s teaching about the actualization of a Christian’s 
identity to conduct a legitimate revised-correlational dialogue in order to demonstrate the validity 
of this dissertation’s thesis. Furthermore, while the Eriksonian schema must not be applied to the 
conferred new identity, which is the Christian’s new reality of being righteous in Christ, it has 
been determined that Erikson’s model can be used to show the progression, or, if not the 
progression, then the result of mistrust of God, of his word, and of the gospel.  
A major aspect of the actualization of identity for both Erikson and Paul is crisis or 
struggle. For Erikson, it is the struggle the ego (das Ich) undergoes between the forces of the 
inner drives, that is, the id (das Es), and the socio-historical expectations internalized as the 
superego (das Über-Ich). For Paul, on the other hand, it is the struggle between “Experiential I” 
and “indwelling sin” in the members, which seeks to thwart the desires of the “New I” (the inner 
man, the new man), who is prompted to good works by the indwelling Holy Spirit.11 
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 Civic righteousness (iustitiae civilis) is also a coram mundo kind of righteousness, but, because it does not 
flow from faith, it is not of the same kind as is the Christian’s proper righteousness, which flows from being 
righteous by faith. For a discussion of the Three Kinds of Righteousness, see Biermann, Case for Character, 122–
25. For a discussion of righteousness under two kinds, see Kolb and Arand, The Genius of Luther’s Theology, 25–
31. 
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 An important caveat must be stated at this point. Erikson’s theory is one of affective development over 
time, as one passes through various stages. The syntonic and dystonic elements of each stage must be brought to a 
kind of synthesis. For Paul, it is not a matter of stages; it is not a matter of synthesis. Rather, it is an ongoing 
struggle between two totalities – a struggle to the death of one or the other.  
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Erikson’s theory is concerned with a person’s achievement of an identity. However, 
without a guiding teleology, that identity is only constrained by the physical and sociohistorical 
factors which converge upon that person and his psychological makeup to form his sense of 
identity. For Erikson, a foreclosed identity is merely an identity imposed from without. It is an 
identity that has not been tested, tried, and personally accepted and modified.12 For Paul, identity 
is a more complex issue. Every person comes into this world with the foreclosed identity as a 
sinner, is a slave to sin, and is unrighteous because of mistrust in God. By God’s grace, through 
the atoning work of Christ, and by the calling of the Holy Spirit in the gospel and baptism, every 
Christian is given a new identity. This new conferred identity is that of being one who is 
righteous by faith. From this reality, of being righteous in Christ, flow elements of identity such 
as “son of God,” “heir with Christ,” “child of God,” “saint,” and “brother” (and sister) to all 
other Christians. However, the actualization of this identity involves lifelong struggle against 
indwelling sin (against the identity as sinner and slave to sin). Therefore, as will be discussed 
below, Paul speaks of the practical achievement, or as it is being worded herein, “actualization,” 
of the identity as one who is righteous as a process which is actuated by the struggle against sin. 
This struggle causes the Christian to ever fall back on his conferred identity as the real 
foundation for his sense of identity.  
This constant struggle can be correlated to the MAMA cycle,13 discussed in detail on page 
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 Erikson, Childhood and Society, 155–61. Erikson also refers to a foreclosed identity as a conferred identity. 
It is when the conferred identity goes unchallenged and unmodified that Erikson considers it to be unhealthy. The 
conferred baptismal identity as “righteous by faith,” and therefore also as children of God and saints, is a conferred 
identity. As the attempt is made to integrate Erikson’s theory into a Christian theory of identity development, a 
distinction between a conferred identity as “alien righteousness” and the actualization of that identity in the 
sociohistorical setting in which the Christian lives will need to be delineated. 
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 The MAMA cycle is a term used by Alan Waterman to indicate the lifelong process of moving toward 
identity achievement. A person achieves a sense of identity; however, as events in life challenge that identity, a 
person moves back into a moratorium as the new factors become integrated into a new sense of identity. This can be 
correlated to the Christian life as a life of continual repentance, as the old is “put off” and the new is “put on.” 
Therefore, the Christian is always striving to become what he or she is already “in Christ.” For a discussion of the 
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103 of this dissertation. The concept of the MAMA cycle provides an alternative way of 
describing the constant need the Christian has to move away from the sense of having achieved 
the goal14 and to daily put off the false identity (especially of being righteous by means of one’s 
good works or of being fundamentally a slave to sin) and put on the new, which never looks to 
self as the source of righteousness. One can only “put on the new” if there is a reality to put on 
each day. This is why the conferred identity is essential. It is the concept of an objective, outside-
of-oneself identity, that is missing in Erikson. While Erikson does point to the historical and 
social matrix of a person’s life as a major contributor to identity development, this is not the 
same as the solid foundation for identity found in God the Creator and Redeemer.  
Paul’s Letter to the Romans is an excellent source for investigating Christian baptismal 
identity, In very broad terms, the flow of Romans, after presenting the theme of the righteousness 
of faith (1:16–17), can be read, in terms of identity, according to the following broad outline: the 
identity of being unrighteous because of mistrust or unbelief (1:18–3:20), the reality of one’s 
identity of being righteous by faith (3:21–6:10), and the actualizing of one’s identity as righteous 
by faith (6:11–15:33).  
Points of Convergence and Divergence in the Conversation between Paul’s Baptismal 
Theology of Identity and Erikson’s Theory of Identity Development 
“In Vivo Coding” revealed related terminology in the writings of Erikson and Paul. 
However, whether the terms used hold the same meaning for each author is doubtful. This is a 
constant issue when correlating theology and cultural artifacts. Therefore, while some 
convergence may appear to occur, a hermeneutic of suspicion must be maintained when reading 
the cultural text, which in this case is the work of Erikson. The Magnitude Coding, which 
                                                                                                                                                             
MAMA cycle from an Eriksonian perspective, see Waterman, “Developmental Perspectives,” 50. 
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 Phil. 3:7–16. 
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examined the frequency of the words and their intended significance, was admittedly quite 
subjective. The number of pages of Erikson’s work far exceeds that of the apostle. However, the 
frequency of language in the semantic domain of faith and trust is significant in both authors. 
The concept of identity had to be distilled from Paul’s writings, while it abounds in Erikson.15 It 
was necessary to develop Process and Pattern Codes in order to correlate the two authors and 
their writings. From this work, it was possible to discern points of convergence, if not 
equivalence. Unsurprisingly, points of divergence were easier to uncover. The results of Axial 
Coding are discussed in the section below concerned specifically with the theological evaluation 
of Erikson’s theory for use in practical theology. The two axes used in this study, as distilled 
from the data, are “reality” and “actuality.” 
Points of Convergence 
Identity development is the major emphasis in the vast majority of Erikson’s writings. As 
demonstrated in chapter 2 above, Erikson taught that the achievement of a sense of identity is 
necessary before a person can develop true intimacy, be relatively competent at generativity, and 
ultimately develop a sense of personal integrity. The earlier steps in affective development are 
foundational to the development of a sense of identity. One must have some sense of industry, 
since identity comes in part from competence in some form of work. One must also have a sense 
of initiative in order to have a strong enough will to express oneself. This comes, in part, from a 
sense of autonomy, that one is a distinct and separate person and agent.16 Ultimately, the entire 
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 Paul’s use of terms in the semantic domain of δικαιοσύνη (righteousness) serves as his identity term, 
because it is the new identity given in the gospel. It creates a new relationship with God 
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 Erikson also taught that an appropriate degree of a sense of inferiority, guilt, and shame, respectively, are 
necessary for living in the world with others. No one is perfect at every endeavor. Everyone needs to have a sense of 
guilt and shame so that each might function appropriately in society. A person who is shameless or incapable of 
feeling guilt is a sociopath. “Emotions are influential in the growth of the moral self . . . especially the emergence of 
the self-referential emotions like pride, guilt, shame, and embarrassment.” Ross A. Thompson, “Early Foundations: 
Conscience and the Development of Moral Character,” Darcia Narvaez and Daniel K. Lapsley, eds. Personality, 
208 
edifice is built on the foundation of a sense of trust and mistrust and the virtue of hope. 
Erikson understood basic trust and mistrust to be developed within a person from the social 
interaction of the infant with the mother as she cares for her child, feeding, comforting, and 
nurturing it.17 Basic trust is linked to the trustworthiness of the mother, and later also that of the 
father, as they respond to the child’s needs.18 When needs are not met quickly, a degree of 
mistrust forms. However, ultimate fulfillment of true needs, by having that fulfillment delayed, 
produces the virtue, or ego strength, of hope. Erikson’s concepts of trust and of hope are to be 
understood in psychological terminology. This trust, or faith, is not a theological virtue, although 
Erikson does see trust in terms of the ritualization of the numinous, which he says is socially 
expressed in organized religion.19 Therefore, although Erikson and Paul both use the concept of 
trust, Erikson’s concept of trust belongs to the realm of the righteousness “encountered in the 
civil world that operates without concern or regard for the Triune God,”20 and his numinous 
presence is that of the human parent, rather than God the Creator. Paul’s concept of trust, on the 
other hand, is a gift of God.21 The one before whom a person stands is God, the Creator (Rom. 
1:18–25), the Judge (Rom. 2:1–3:20), and the Justifier (Rom. 3:21–26). Therefore, although we 
may detect a degree of convergence, we do not have equivalence. 
Trust (πίστις = faith) and hope (ἐλπὶς) are prominent and foundational words in Romans. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Identity, and Character: Explorations in Moral Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 171. 
Sociopathology also is linked to neurological abnormalities. See Louis Cozolino, The Neuroscience of Human 
Relationships: Attachment and the Developing Brain, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 2014), 339–41. 
17
 Erikson, Childhood and Society, 249. “This forms the basis in the child for a sense of identity which will 
later combine a sense of being ‘all right,’ of being oneself, and of becoming what other people will trust one will 
become.” 
18
 Erikson, Childhood and Society, 250. 
19
 Erikson, Toys and Reasons, 89. 
20
 Biermann, Case for Character, 123. 
21
 AC 5; SC 2:6. Faith is a gift worked within by the Holy Spirit through the external word of the gospel. 
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Paul, however, does not speak of the development of faith. Faith is gifted by means of the gospel 
word, by means of the identity-changing declaration of righteousness. Faith trusts God, that his 
word is true. Paul also contrasts πίστις with mistrust (ἀπιστία = unbelief). Paul’s great example 
of these is in Abraham, who “against hope upon hope trusted” (παρ᾽ ἐλπίδα ἐπ᾽ ἐλπίδι 
ἐπίστευσεν).22 It may be in the concept of hope that Paul and Erikson correlate more closely. For 
Paul, as well as for Erikson, hope is developed when the end result looked for is not fulfilled in 
the immediate future. This is the first crisis met by a child and continues to be the foundation of 
all crises throughout life. The crisis this: the thing for which one hopes is not quickly 
forthcoming. Mistrust and trust tussle. If trust prevails, the crisis (or suffering) produces 
endurance. Endurance produces proven character. Proven character results in the virtue of hope.23 
Trust and hope rest upon the trustworthiness of the one in whom one trusts. The trustworthy 
mother ultimately appears. Hers is the numinous face which smiles at the child and assures it of 
its existence. Erikson states that the numinous “is the hallowed presence. The numinous assures 
us, ever again, of separateness transcended and yet also of distinctiveness confirmed, and thus of 
the very basis of a sense of ‘I.’”24 The child’s faith is assured. For Paul, hope must be built not 
upon what appears visibly, but upon the record of God’s faithfulness to his people, and most 
especially upon God’s word about the reality of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, into whom the 
Christian has been baptized and with whom he is united. 
Both Erikson and Paul speak about shame.25 Erikson presents shame as the dystonic 
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 Rom. 4:18. 
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 Rom. 5:3–5. 
24
 Erik H. Erikson and Joan Erikson. The Life Cycle Completed, ext. ed. (New York: Norton, 1998), 45. 
25
 Erikson makes the astute observation that shame is insufficiently studied in Western society. Guilt is the 
predominant issue tackled. But shame is a deeper and more destructive emotion in a person. Erikson, Childhood and 
Society, 252. 
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element in relation to the syntonic sense of autonomy. He closely ties shame to self-doubt.26 This 
doubt comes from the knowledge that, although we wish to be autonomous, we are not self-
sufficient individuals.27 For Erikson, a sense of autonomy is an introspective experience of being 
a person who is separate, unique, and individuated from another. However, in that shame results 
from the knowledge that one is not the center of the universe, his concept of autonomy can be 
viewed as the sense that one is one’s one law-maker. At this stage of the child’s development, 
from about 18 months through the first few years of life, the child attempts to exercise her will 
against that of the parents. Erikson admitted that at this stage the child’s self-will must be tamed 
by the laws and rules set down by the parents.28 The first reaction to the restrictions placed on the 
will is not guilt but shame, that sense that one is being watched and is found wanting. At the 
same time, the laws imposed from the outside provide the child with the structure needed to be a 
separate person, a moral agent, within the matrix of the social order.29 
Although guilt and atonement for guilt have been the primary concern of pastoral care in 
the Western church for centuries, Paul, in Romans, has more to say about shame than he does 
about guilt. Passing by Paul’s statement that he is not ashamed of the gospel (Rom. 1:16), the 
accusation that humankind has exchanged the glory of God for the images of created things 
(Rom. 1:23) implies a form of shaming. The result of this exchange is dishonoring (ἀτιμάζεσθαι) 
of the body (Rom. 1:24). A sense of shame is intimately connected with a sense of the bodily 
self. Immediately after the fall, the primordial parents made loincloths of fig leaves and 
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 Erikson, Childhood and Society, 253. “Doubt is the brother of shame.” 
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 Eyer, Pastoral Care, 81. Eyer is following Erikson’s stages as he writes about the developmental stages in 
reference to the elderly. 
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 “The very autonomy gained in the second stage, namely a sense of being a separate person with a will born 
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29
 Erikson, Childhood and Society, 252. 
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attempted to hide themselves from God amid the trees of the garden. Paul also speaks of the 
“shameful deed” (τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην) of homosexual intercourse (Rom. 1:27). It is not until he has 
listed a plethora of shameful deeds that Paul declares the judgment, or decree, of God that 
humankind is worthy of death (Rom. 1:32). 
Paul’s treatment of guilt actually comes to the fore more clearly in Romans 2 than in the 
preceding chapter. Those who pass judgment on others fall under the same judgment because 
they are guilty of doing similar things (τὰ τοιαῦτα πράσσοντας; Rom. 2:1–2). The righteousness 
of God is revealed in the righteousness, the uprightnessness, of his judgment. The Judeans, who 
are in possession of Torah will be judged by the Torah to which they cling. The non-Judeans 
(gentiles) will be judged by the aspects of Torah written in their hearts. God as judge is just, and 
he justly condemns the entirety of humanity. 
Erikson also writes about guilt. For him, a sense of guilt is set in apposition to a sense of 
initiative. These two are held in tension and produce the ego strength of competency. As 
discussed earlier in chapter 2, the influence of Freud on Erikson is evident in his thoughts about 
this stage. The guilt appears linked, in Erikson’s mind, to infantile sexuality and the incest 
taboo.30 The superego rules ruthlessly and creates intense feelings of guilt as id-impulses are 
condemned by the social matrix.31 So as with Paul in Romans, the sense of guilt, or for Paul the 
sentence of guilt pronounced objectively, comes from the outside, condemning the urges and 
drives that reign within. 
It might also be possible to correlate Erikson’s concept of initiative, especially if combined 
with Stage IV industry, with the attempt people make to appease God the judge by works of the 
                                                 
30
 “Infantile sexuality and incest taboo, castration complex and superego unite here to bring about that 
specifically human crisis during which the child must turn from the exclusive, pregenital attachment to his parents to 
the slow process of becoming a parent, a carrier of tradition.” Erikson, Childhood and Society, 256. 
31
 Erikson, Childhood and Society, 257. 
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law. The knowledge that one does not meet the standards of divine righteousness drives those 
who have Torah to double down on Torah and attempt to lean on it for justification, to do what 
Paul calls, “works of Torah” (ἔργων νόμου; Rom. 3:20). But this is an impossible task. Not only 
can no one fulfill all the requirements of Torah, any attempt at self-justification by works flies in 
the face of Torah. “The righteous shall live by faith” (Rom. 1:17 citing Hab. 2:4). Therefore, the 
issue is driven back down, as it were, to the Stage I issue of trust versus mistrust. Torah can only 
be fulfilled by faith in God; but to trust in works is to trust in self. It is the kind of mistrust that 
leads to the narcissistic autonomy that thinks it can initiate its own works (industry) in order to 
achieve a righteous identity. 
The main concept that must be correlated if the thesis of this study is to be upheld is that of 
identity. And it is at this point that the thesis appears to be to be falsified. For Paul, the identity 
of being righteous, and thereby a saint, and a son, and child of God, is not a human achievement. 
This will be highlighted below as the divergences between the two authors are considered. 
However, if the matrix for correlating the two authors includes the concept of three kinds of 
righteousness, then it is possible to correlate Paul and Erikson in the area of the actualization of 
identity, since a move is made in theology from what is an imputed reality to that which is 
actualized as “proper righteousness” during the life cycle.32 In fact, Paul is of great help to a 
Christian use of Eriksonian theory in that he provides the teleology that is missing in Erikson. 
Paul exhorts the Roman Christians to be transformed by the renewing of their minds (12:2). It 
follows then that they are to experience a growing sense of identity, albeit an identity bestowed. 
However, the bestowed identity is individuated by the various roles in each person’s life and the 
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 This move was facilitated by the Axial Coding, which made a distinction between “reality” and “actuality.” 
That is, it distinguished between identity conferred and identity as it is lived out and experienced in the Christian’s 
daily life. 
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gifts given for building up the Christian community. 
The preceding admittedly is quite negative. In the section below concerning Erikson’s 
theory in regards to active righteousness, a discussion of how his theory can be used in a positive 
manner to guide pastoral care work is presented. Erikson considers the ego strength (or virtue) of 
Stage VI (Intimacy vs. Isolation) to be love. In Stage VII (Generativity vs. Stagnation) the virtue 
is care.33 Paul in Rom. 12:1–15:13 describes practical ways in which love and care flow from the 
renewed mind, which has its identity in the conferred righteousness of Christ. As active 
righteousness is discussed below, ways in which autonomy, initiative, and industry can be proper 
appropriated by pastoral care will be presented. These find a proper place within the love and 
caring that flow from the gift of righteousness. 
Points of Divergence 
Major differences remain. Of significance is the lack of an objective teleology in Erik 
Erikson’s theory. Erikson’s stages move toward the goal of “integrity,” but the end is simply 
death. For this reason, in Stage VIII, despair and disgust predominate over a sense of integrity. 
The body disintegrates, independence is compromised, and assistance is required for daily 
existence.34 No hope of resurrection and restoration appears in his writings. Rather, the sense of 
integrity is to be found in looking back over one’s life and deriving some sense that one’s life 
mattered, that one helped others along the way, cared for and loved others, and left behind some 
kind of worthy legacy.35 In other words, one looks to one’s own works for a sense of self-
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 Erikson and Erikson, Life Cycle Completed, 33. 
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 Erikson and Erikson, Life Cycle Completed, 105–6.  
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 Erikson, Erikson, and Kivnick, Vital Involvement, 54–73. Erikson finds a degree of despair to be 
appropriate in light of the degenerative effects of aging. In Vital Involvement, the writers report on interviews with 
informants ranging in age from70 into the 90s. The books is also written with the stages inverted, showing the 
regression through the stages that occur toward the end of life. None of his informants which are reported in the 
book refer to life after death. 
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justification and self-worth.  
Erik and Joan Erikson, along with Helen Kivnick reported on elderly people who had 
strong religious convictions in Vital Involvement in Old Age. Their informants report, not hope in 
resurrection and eternal life, but “concern for existential identity.”36 They indicate a desire to 
look back and find meaningful continuity in their life history. The extended version of The Life 
Cycle Completed includes a chapter penned by Joan Erikson. In it she refers to a ninth stage. The 
genesis of this ninth stage is the extension of life beyond the late 80s and 90s into the 100s. She 
reports: 
Even the best cared-for bodies begin to weaken and do not function as they once did. 
In spite of every effort to maintain strength and control, the body continues to lose its 
autonomy. Despair, which haunts the eighth stage, is a close companion in the ninth 
because it is almost impossible to know what emergencies and losses of physical 
abilities are imminent. As independence and control are challenged, self-esteem and 
confidence weaken. Hope and trust, which once provided firm support, are no longer 
the sturdy props of former days. To face down despair with faith and appropriate 
humility is perhaps the wisest choice.37 
She, therefore, places the dystonic elements of the stages in first position, describing the ninth 
stage essentially as an inversion of the developmental stages. While she, in the citation above, 
refers to “faith and humility” as appropriate orientations for what remains of life, it should be 
noted that this “faith” is nebulous in nature. In what is one to trust? Upon what does one lean? If 
“hope and trust” no longer provide the “firm support” necessary, it would appear that, for the 
Eriksons, trust is a basic life orientation. It does not necessarily have a specific object. It is 
emotional, or affective, not a clinging to a specific something or someone, such as God, who is 
trustworthy. 
Erikson looks death in the face without understanding its existential source. Because he 
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 Erikson, Erikson, and Kivnick, Vital Involvement, 234. 
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 Erikson and Erikson, Life Cycle Completed, 105–6. 
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does not understand original sin, he knows only apparent righteousness, which is based on the 
illusion of human possibility. Thus, the actualization of an identity is the actualization of the fruit 
of original sin, namely, mistrust and narcissistic autonomy, which only lead to shame and guilt. 
Erikson is correct in seeing the various stages of human affective development. What he does not 
comprehend, however, is the root source of the elements and how they cause the dystonic part of 
the pairs. This is the heart of the divergence between Erikson and Paul. It is also the chief reason 
that Erikson’s theory appears fatally flawed. Yet, paradoxically, this may be quite useful in 
pastoral care work, as it provides a unique way of looking at the fruit of original sin and how it 
plays out in people’s sense of identity. 
Paul looks death in the face and understands its existential source.38 Paul understands 
original sin. He therefore can distinguish between apparent righteousness, imputed 
righteousness, and the Christian’s proper righteousness, which is the fruit of imputed 
righteousness. The imputed, alien righteousness is the integrating element of the Christian’s life. 
The Christian’s identity is grounded in this gifted righteousness given in baptism and received by 
faith. However, this faith is not a vague trust. It is not even a human affective response. For Paul, 
and for Christian theology, trust is so utterly trusting that it grows, not out of what can be seen or 
perceived, but out of the ex nihilo reality of human inability. The clearest demonstration of 
human inability is the denuding of life by death. Hope can only be hope when all is utterly 
hopeless. Trust is only trust when the one trusting is nothing and all depends on the 
trustworthiness of the one trusted. Andrew Root, professor of practical theology at Luther 
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 John Zizioulas, and Eastern Orthodox theologian and former professor of systematic theology at the 
University of Glasgow, goes further than original sin in describing the existential nature of death. “Existence is 
relentlessly threatened by death.” It is threatened precisely because existence is contingent upon the fee will of God, 
who created existence without necessity. Therefore, existence exists solely by the will of God. John D. Zizioulas, 
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Seminary, St. Paul, Minnesota uses prelapsarian Adam and Eve to illustrate the nature of this 
kind of trust by reorienting faith toward the concept of creatio ex nihilo: 
Even in the perfection of the garden, before the fall, the ex nihilo remains: the 
nothingness out of which humans were created continues in their being, for they are 
creatures given the possibility of life from the very Word (Christopraxis) that creates 
in and through nothingness. They have come from nothingness and to nothingness 
they shall return if they should dare unlatch themselves from God who comes to them 
“out of nothingness,” if they should dare deny that God is their minister and that they 
received God’s ministering act of possibility out of nothingness.39 
This is the nature of trust as described by Paul in Romans 4. Abraham, “against hope, upon hope, 
trusted” God’s word of promise (Rom. 4:19). Abraham’s trust was truly trust because the 
situation was hopeless. No human possibility existed. All human potential was impotent. Sarah’s 
womb was dead. Abraham’s body was as good as dead. Then, and only then, from the ex nihilo 
reality did God bring forth life (ex nihilo creata) and prove Abraham’s faith to be valid and his 
hope sure. Abraham “did not waver in unbelief but was empowered in trust, giving glory to God, 
and being convinced that the thing promised God is powerful to do” (4:21). 
Therefore, the fundamental divergence, which permeates the entire theory, is the 
discrepancy concerning the nature of trust, or faith. In order for Erikson to be salvaged for 
Christian practical theology and for pastoral care, either his definition of trust must be modified 
or it must be better understood. However, to modify Erikson’s concept of trust would be to 
misrepresent him. It must be assumed that Erikson meant what he wrote. Therefore, the second 
option, that of understanding his meaning and seeing if there is any correlation with Paul’s 
meaning is the only honest way forward toward utilizing Erikson as a dialogue partner in 
practical theology and pastoral care.  
Paul and Erikson are not speaking about the same thing when they write about trust. The 
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 Root, Christopraxis, 127. Root, by his own admission, relies heavily on the writings of Eberhard Jüngel, 
especially God’s Being as Becoming: The Trinitarian Being of God in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2001) and Justification: The Heart of the Christian Faith (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001).  
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following section focuses on a theological evaluation of Erikson’s theory in light of Paul’s 
baptismal theology. In it, by using Luther’s concept of the three kinds of righteousness, a 
rapprochement will be demonstrated, which respects and maintains the distinctions while rending 
Erikson’s theory useful for faithful Christian practical theology. 
As indicated above, teleology is another area of difference. Paul, unlike Erikson, has a 
teleology that is based, not on internal affective sensibilities within a person, but in the will of 
God. Paul’s teleology is based on the foreknowledge and foreordination of God, who, by the 
Holy Spirit, calls people through the means of grace to be conformed to the image of God’s Son, 
Jesus Christ. Of importance for practical theology and pastoral care, Paul links this eternal 
perspective with the sufferings, or crises, Christians suffer. These sufferings are never apart from 
baptismal union with the suffering Jesus.40 Life crises are folded into, and are integral to, 
actualizing the teleological reality of conformity to Christ. One is conformed to the suffering of 
Christ here and now so that one might be conformed to his glory in eternity.41 This ligature unites 
trust, hope, and the realization of that for which once hopes in faith. 
There are significant differences. Erikson’s overly optimistic view of human nature must 
be brought into line with Paul’s understanding of original sin. Erikson is also not dealing with 
the righteousness of faith; he knows only the apparent righteousness, or what can be called “civic 
righteousness.” Paul’s theology in Romans is in line with Luther’s concept of “three kinds of 
righteousness.” Although Paul does not use the terminology, it is demonstrated in what follows 
that the works attempted to earn God’s favor fit into the area of apparent righteousness, along 
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 Rom. 8:16–18. Pieper, Christian Dogmatics, 3:478, writes: “God did not chose His children absolutely, but 
ἐν Χριστῷ (Eph. 1:4) and ‘through sanctification of the Spirit and belief in the truth [ἐν ἁγιασμῷ πνεύματος καὶ πίστει 
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which the actualization of one’s identity in Christ is oriented. 
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with the corresponding evils of criminal sin. The righteousness of faith, which is the alien 
righteousness imputed to the baptized, is the real righteousness of the Christian. The object of 
this faith (trust) is not in the faltering faithfulness of a human mother, as it is in Erikson’ theory, 
but in the sure and certain promise of God who is utterly trustworthy. This righteousness, gifted 
by God in Christ and received by faith, is the answer to the problem of original sin. It is 
grounded in the death to sin and resurrection to life that is ἐν Χριστῷ. The third kind of 
righteousness is the active, or actualized, righteousness that the Christian practices, which has its 
source in the imputed, alien righteousness of Christ.42 Erikson’s virtues can be understood only 
as apparent righteousness. The question that must be asked and answered is whether and how his 
developmental theory might be useful is the actualization of active righteousness in the lived life 
of the baptized.43 
A Theological Evaluation of Erikson’s Theory of Identity Formation in Light of Pauline 
Baptismal Theology 
Areas of convergence and divergence have been discussed above. From the discussion, it 
can be discerned that while both Erikson and Paul are concerned with issues of trust, mistrust, 
and hope, the agreement appears to be superficial. A framework of revised correlational dialogue 
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 Oswald Bayer writes of growth in active righteousness as “ethical progress without metaphysical pressure.” 
Oswald Bayer, Living by Faith, 66. “If the distinction between ethical and metaphysical progress is forgotten, then 
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must be developed before the evaluation can proceed. That framework is based upon the 
presupposition of a distinction between the two axes of “reality” and “actuality.” Within the 
matrix of this schema the Christian categories of original sin and alien righteousness belong to 
“reality.” The concept of “actual,” or “active righteousness” falls under the heading of 
“actuality,” meaning that which is actualized in life and during development.44 “Criminal sin,” 
“actual sin,” and “apparent righteousness” also belong under the heading of “actuality,” since 
they are actions committed. 
Erikson’s Theory in Regard to Original Sin 
Erikson’s theory would appear to belong only under “actuality.” However, there is a sense 
in which his theory can be placed under the heading of what is “real,” albeit only in regards to 
original sin, or perhaps, better said, the fruits of original sin. From this reality of original sin, the 
root of which is mistrust of God, flow the fruits of criminal sin, those punishable by civil 
authority, and actual sin, many of which are hidden from the gaze of others. From this root also 
flow the deeds of “apparent righteousness,” those which appear good but do not flow from faith, 
or trust in God.45 Again, the main question that must be answered is whether Erikson’s theory, 
which deals mostly with “apparent righteousness” can be useful in the discussion of the “active 
righteousness” of the baptized. But first, a discussion of his theory in terms of original sin and its 
fruits is presented in what follows. 
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 Admittedly, the terms “real” and “actual” are easily confused. Hereafter, “actualized” righteousness, or 
“good works,” will be labeled “active righteousness” as well as “good works.” Sins committed will be called “actual 
sins.” 
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 Original sin is defined in the Augsburg Confession as being “without trust in God,” Kolb-Wengert, 37, 39. 
Correlating this with Erikson’s term, “mistrust,” is why his theory is being treated here as having to do with what is 
“real.” The expression of this mistrust, as autonomy and shame and doubt, and the syntonic and dystonic elements, 
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this dissertation, a concern is for the Christian’s sense of identity as much as it is for outward ethical expressions of 
that identity. 
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The theme of Paul’s letter to the Romans is “the righteous person will live from faith,”46 
that is by trust.47 Middendorf points out that verb “to trust,” or “to believe,” in the phrase παντὶ 
τῷ πιστεύοντι (to everyone who believes), while in the active voice, is used by Paul with a 
passive sense. For Paul, “the opposite of ‘faith’ is not so much ‘unbelief,’ as it is ‘works’ and, 
specifically, ‘works of the Law.’” 48 Thus, faith, or trust, in Paul is a receptivity. It is passively 
receiving, rather than getting in some active sense. Middendorf also points out that this trust 
always has an object. It is not merely “faith” or “trust” in some vague emotional sense. Rather, it 
is specifically trust in the gospel of Christ Jesus.49 
Despite the statement above about trust, or faith, being somewhat vague in Joan Erikson’s 
description of the Ninth Stage of life, in Childhood and Society, Erik Erikson understood trust in 
the child to be trust in the mother who comes to care for the infant. He called it “social trust”50 
because it was trust born of an interpersonal relationship. The foundation for this trust, however, 
is not in the child; it is in the “parental faith,” or trustworthiness, which supports the child’s 
trust.51 According to Erikson, this basic sense of trust in the earliest stage of life is the picture of 
the “childlike surrender to a Provider,”52 which is the foundation of religion. It is the mother’s 
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gives (δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ) is revealed as depending on Faith, and as producing the faith on which it depends (ἐκ πίστεως 
εἰς πίστιν).” Liddon, Romans, 15. That Rom. 1:16–17 is the theme of the letter is nearly universally recognized, even 
as other subthemes are recognized. 
47
 According to Erikson, in Childhood and Society, 247, the foundational social interaction of a person is 
trust. The ego strength, or virtue, of Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion) is fidelity. This links Stages I and V 
closely together. For Paul, trust is the reception of the identity of being righteous in Christ. This imputed, given 
identity calls forth the actualization of the righteous identity in righteous living. The person who is righteous by faith 
lives righteously in and by faith, being faithful.  
48
 Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 89. 
49
 Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 90. 
50
 Erikson, Childhood and Society, 247. 
51
 Erikson, Childhood and Society (1950), 219. 
52
 Erikson, Childhood and Society, 250. 
221 
face which communicates with the infant. With her face, she smiles at the child, indicating that 
she acknowledges his existence and loves and will care for him. She assures the child that he is 
her own. With her face, she also speaks, calling the child by name, granting the child a unique 
identity. Therefore, the numinous (to use Erikson’s language of ritualization) does two things: 
the face provides the child with a sense of belonging to a social entity, the family, and it provides 
a sense of individuation, being a unique person. This is the same action that Paul, in 1 
Corinthians 12, says is the work of the Spirit in baptism. By means of baptism, the Holy Spirit 
unites the Christian with the body of Christ, the church. Also by means of baptism, the Holy 
Spirit grants individuated gifts to each one as a unique member of the body. As this sense of 
being a unique person increases, the child begins to develop a sense of autonomy. 
Erikson understands autonomy to be the development of a sense of being oneself. 
However, Erikson also means that the child’s will is in a constant struggle against the will of the 
parents and that the child “must come to feel that basic faith in himself.”53 This drive for trust in 
oneself is met by the principle of “law and order” that restricts the will and causes the will to 
rebel.54 His description echoes Paul’s in Romans 7, where Paul remarks how indwelling sin 
rebels against the demands of Torah and drives him to do what he does not want to do. This also 
appears to parallel his description of humanity in Rom. 1:18–32. Even though people know that 
certain acts are forbidden, the human will rebels. God gives them over to the consequences of 
their acts but they continue in rebellion. 
It is here that Erikson’s model can be helpful in describing the stages or aspects of rebellion 
against God, which has its genesis in trusting in oneself rather than in God. Autonomy is the 
condition of being a law unto oneself. This autonomy is linked to trust, in that, while the 
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numinous “assures us of separateness transcended and yet also a distinction confirmed,” the 
sense of “I” which is developed produces “one all-embracing ‘I Am.’”55 Thus the “I” is set up as 
an idol, the object of one’s trust, which generates the sense of autonomy.56 Thereby the seeds of 
narcissism are planted.57 The outgrowth of narcissism, according to Capps, is not guilt but shame. 
“Narcissists are painfully aware that something is wrong with them.”58 However, shame becomes 
its own undoing. It drives the person to estrangement from self, from others, and from God.59 
Therefore, autonomy, driven by trust in self, becomes the root of a false and diffused identity, as 
one becomes a “divided self.”60 The divided self is a dishonest self. Rather than honesty, the 
autonomous person attempts to cover up, rather than to overcome, the faults. “Saving face” is 
one way this is described.61 The shame and doubt that come from knowing one is not what one 
portrays the “I” to be soon meets the judgment of “the other.” 
Paul presents the emergence of shame, which grows from mistrust (lack of trust) in God, in 
Rom. 1:18–32.62 The righteous person lives by faith. The corollary to this statement is that the 
one who does not live by faith in God is not a righteous person. The person who does not live in 
a receptive relationship, trusting the one by whose free will alone one exists, is attempting to be 
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the source of his or her own existence. All things have been brought into being from nothingness 
by God. God and God alone exists in uncaused reality. This is why the cross of Jesus Christ, or 
rather the dead Jesus on the cross, is the ultimate picture of God. He is the only God there is 
because only God can bring God back from the dead. By attempting to be the source of its own 
existence, that is, foolishly attempting to be autonomous, humanity, while never being 
ontologically autonomous, attempts deification. Andrew Root states, “Adam and Eve never try to 
deny God as much as to become ‘like God.’ They seek to be God by being outside of 
nothingness”63 just as God is. Therefore, original sin is not in the act of disobedience but in the 
autonomous orientation of trust in self and mistrust (lack of trust) in the creator.64 Paul describes 
the results with words such as “dishonorable,” “shameful,” and “shameless.” However, human 
beings remain creatures. They remain dependent, and depleted. Therefore, they turn to trust 
created things rather than trusting the Creator (Rom. 1:25). This depletion of self causes them to 
turn on one another. They become foolish, faithless, heartless, ruthless” (Rom. 1:31) as they 
attempt to draw life from others who are dying along with them. 
Autonomy, as an autonomous trust in self, results in shame. This shame drives humanity 
onward toward judging others. If one is a law unto oneself, then one becomes the judge of others. 
However, as Paul states, “In that you judge another, you condemn yourself” (Rom. 2:1). This 
corresponds to Erikson’s Stage III (Initiative vs. Guilt). Once faced with the voice of God the 
judge, in Genesis 3, Adam immediately began to defend his act by shifting the blame to his wife, 
and to God as well, who gave her to him.65 Much of Rom. 2:1–3:8 has its purpose in convincing 
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 Gen. 3:12. See also: Pieper, Christian Dogmatics, 1:546. Admittedly, the women did the same, passing the 
blame on to the serpent. Her accusation was correct; however, by so doing, she, nevertheless, attended to lessen the 
blame that would attach to her. 
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the Judean-leaning Christians that their proclivity for judging others is merely an attempt to 
cover up their own guilt. This sense of guilt has driven them to initiate an attempt at self-
justification by works. This self-justification is akin to Erikson’s initiative stage. However, 
humankind is incompetent in the things of God. In actuality, that which is in the deep structure of 
works-righteousness is the attempt to maintain sinful autonomy. To lose autonomy is to lose 
oneself as the ground of existence. Autonomy is always traceable back to trust in self and 
mistrust, of lack of trust, in God. The acknowledgement of the identity as sinner is a result of 
trust in God’s word about humanity. Erikson believed he had found evidence for this in the life 
of Martin Luther, who finally gave up striving to achieve righteousness by works and instead 
submitted to God’s word about himself. However, Luther, Erikson believed, came to the 
realization of his sinful identity and of his guilt by honest self-examination rather than by self-
justification. 
Luther . . . made a virtue out of what his superiors had considered a vice in him (and 
we, a symptom), namely, the determined search for the rock bottom of his sinfulness: 
only thus, he says, can man judge himself as God would: Conformis deo est et verax 
et Justus. One could consider such conformity utter passivity in the face of God’s 
judgment, but note that it really is an active self-observation, which scans the frontier 
of conscience for the genuine sense of guilt. Instead of accepting some impersonal 
and mechanical absolution, it insists on dealing with sincere guilt, perceiving as 
“God’s judgment” what in fact is the individual’s own truly meant self-judgment.66 
There is a creedal structure to this lack of trust. In Rom. 1:18–23, Paul connects 
unrighteousness with the denial of God as creator. In Rom. 2:6–8, Paul connects unrighteousness 
with self-seeking. This self-seeking is an attempt at self-justification. Any attempt to be one’s 
own redeemer or savior is a denial of the Second Article of the Creed. Only Christ Jesus is the 
Redeemer. Similarly, the attempt at self-justification is a denial of the Third Article of the Creed, 
in that it is a denial of life lived by faith. The “not-as-a-result-of-works” salvation of which Paul 
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writes in Eph. 2:8–10, although it results in good works, is grounded in the ex nihilo character of 
creation, redemption, and calling to faith. God has created existence ex nihilo. Christ is brought 
back from the deadness of ex nihilo. The Spirit creates faith within the Christian where there was 
only unbelief—likewise, ex nihilo.67 
The result of a lack of trust in God, in autonomous trust in self, and in attempting self-
justification combines to develop in the person a false identity. Paul points to this false identity 
when he speaks of humanity asserting its wisdom yet in reality being fools.68 Additionally, 
human beings seek identity by excluding others. Erikson refers to this as pseudospeciation. The 
Judean-leaning Christians, even though they are Christians, appear to consider themselves to be 
superior to the others. The cultural Hellenists likewise looked down on the others. The party-
spirit Paul attacks in 1 Corinthians 1 is of a similar kind. Rather than finding identity in Christ, 
human beings, sadly Christians are included herein, find identity in the lower-level aspects of 
social life which divide rather than unite. 
Paul is driving his argument toward the goal of achieving the realization that, outside of 
Christ, all human beings have one chief identity. All have sinned, so all are sinners. None are 
righteous, no not one.69 Paul is likely referring to Eccl. 7:20. Similar themes exists in Romans 1–
3 and in Ecclesiastes. Both Paul and Qoheleth are concerned with righteousness, faith, and 
wisdom. Both writers accuse humanity of unrighteousness and foolishness. Furthermore, for both 
Paul and Qoheleth wisdom is built upon trust in God. “The form of righteousness for Qoheleth is 
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on earth, one who does good and does not sin.” (translation mine) 
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the same as for Paul the apostle; the form is faith.”70 Therefore, while not truly a developmental 
pattern, the logical flow of Erikson’s theory is congruent with Paul’s description of human 
unrighteousness.  
Yet, having said that it is not a developmental pattern, there is, nonetheless, a narrative 
sketched out by Paul in Rom. 1:18–32. He describes the descent of humanity into utter 
foolishness as a dramatic narrative. Refusing the image of God, humanity looks into the face of 
creatures to find a reflection to strengthen the depleted, pseudo-autonomous self. What humanity 
finds is the reality of law and order God has built into his creation. This shames and then 
condemns even those who do not have Torah in written form. The dramatic element, which 
Erikson links to the attempt at competence and the alleviation of guilt is in the initiative and 
industry of works-righteous self-justification. The result is the unacceptable identity as a sinner, 
as one unworthy and unacceptable. Therefore, humanity becomes more bestial than the creation 
it worships. Thinking themselves to be wise, they are fools. “There is no fear of God before their 
eyes” (Rom. 3:18). Humanity then attempts to build its own self-chosen identity, which is built 
on a lie. 
Erikson’s model can serve as a lens, “a way of looking at things,”71 to describe the 
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unfolding of the results of a lack of fear and trust in God. Physical death is the ultimate result of 
sin, of not fearing and trusting God. Sin also wreaks havoc on the social structure of society, 
including the church. All the sinful acts Paul lists in Romans 1–3 tear at the fabric of the social 
order. Therefore, sin is not simply a personal matter. It is not a mere psychological illness. Sin 
has a psychosocial, and indeed a biopsychosocial, dimension. Erikson can help us see this 
especially as sin works its fruit in the areas of interpersonal intimacy (Stage VI: Intimacy vs. 
Isolation) and generativity (Stage VII: Generativity vs. Stagnation). If each person is self-
oriented, if autonomy is unchecked by selfless, sacrificial love for others, as Paul describes 
marital love in Eph. 5:22–33, then true intimacy is impossible. Rather, each person lives in 
psychosocial isolation, even if living with another. Generativity also becomes aimed at self-
fulfillment and not at passing on life and life-enhancing things to the next generation. The entire 
structure of Erikson’s developmental model, if read through the lens of mistrust of God, 
enhances the strength of the dystonic elements and perverts the syntonic so that it becomes 
curvatus in se, self-seeking and self-justifying. This only strengthens mistrust until the person 
ends life in despair, when death proves the foolishness of autonomy. 
Erikson’s model proves itself to be useful, when correlated with the theological concept of 
original sin, is describing the effects of mistrust, as one considers Erikson’s dystonic elements 
and the ways in which original sin results in the attempt to build one’s identity on an autonomous 
foundation, which results in a false sense of self. If a person builds his fundamental identity on 
his initiative and industry, the result is the false sense of being righteous coram deo by works. 
Erikson’s Theory in Regard to Alien Righteousness 
“The righteous person shall live by faith.” The person who is righteous by faith shall live. 
When it comes to the reality of being righteous by faith, even though for Erikson one’s sense of 
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identity is bestowed from the outside, his model has little value because it is a model of 
development over time and not of declarative conferral. Therefore, the discussion, which follows 
this section, is built upon the distinction between the three kinds of righteousness. Erikson’s 
model has been helpful in pointing out the reality of human sinfulness. Actually, what has been 
demonstrated is a diagnosis of the disease by its symptoms, the diagnosis of original sin (lack of 
fear and trust in God) by its fruit, the sinful acts of people. This was described less from the 
perspective of the sins committed and more from the angle of the inner motivations, or affects.  
In this section the discussion moves to the reality of alien righteousness. Here again, 
Erikson is of slight use.72 This does not mean that there is nothing of value to be gained from the 
interaction. His theory has already been shown to be helpful in understanding the root and the 
psychosocial dimensions of original sin. Erikson consistently states that trust is the foundation of 
identity. In the realm of human interaction, the infantile trust in the mother becomes the soil in 
which, and from which, identity grows and matures. According to Erikson, basic trust is “the 
cornerstone of a vital personality.”73 This infantile trust is not the same as the conscious decision 
an adult might make to trust someone after thinking through whether or not the person is 
trustworthy. This trust is not conscious confidence in another; it far more subliminal.74 His 
concept of infant faith is closer to that of Jesus’ description in Luke 18:15–17. The pure 
receptivity of the infant argues against this kind of trust being other than passive. It is the 
trustworthiness of the mother that generates trust in the child. It is the trustworthiness of God in 
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Christ that generates trust in the Christian. This is passive, not active faith; thus this kind of 
righteousness is passive rather than active. It is a given reality. It becomes the source of active, or 
actualized, righteousness. It is foundational to the identity of being righteous. The imputed, alien 
righteousness, which creates and forms the Christian’s baptismal identity is liberating. Oswald 
Bayer says of the Christian: 
In faith they live outside themselves in God, freed from having to find their own 
identity or achieve self-fulfillment. For this reason they can afford to be the servants 
not merely of all people but of all things, thus caring for them “as if there were no 
God.”75 
In this way, there is an immediate jump, if it can be said this way, from Stage I (Trust vs. 
Mistrust) to Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion). Human autonomy, initiative, and industry, 
if added to the doctrine of justification (rectification), destroy faith and thereby destroy the 
righteousness of faith. How autonomy, initiative, and industry might still have a place in pastoral 
care and counseling will be discussed next. But it must be clearly understood that they belong 
only to active, or actualized, righteousness if they have any place at all. They have no place when 
discussing the gift of alien righteousness, which is received passively by faith (trust) alone. 
Erikson’s Theory in Regard to Active Righteousness 
Since one purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the validity of the thesis, that Erik H. 
Erikson’s theory provides a helpful schematic for studying the actualization of a person’s sense 
of identity, and that it should be considered in relation to baptismal identity, the way in which his 
theory assists the task of pastoral care in the actualization of active righteousness (the Christian’s 
proper righteousness) and growth in ethical coram mundo living must now be demonstrated. 
First, the nature of righteousness must be described. 
Righteousness is a relational concept. One who is righteous is righteous in relation to 
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another or to others.76 The demonstration of this assertion is first in the scriptural teaching that 
one becomes righteous before God by faith. In fact, that righteousness is spoken of as before God 
(coram deo) or, in terms of civic righteousness and the Christian’s proper righteousness, before 
men (coram hominibus/ coram mundo) demonstrates the relational dimension of righteousness. 
From the reality of being righteous by faith flow the identity of being a child of God, the state of 
being at peace with God, and the new relation of being a brother (or sister) to all other Christians. 
All of these concepts are relational. From this the social dimension of righteousness is clear. The 
foundation for the entire new reality is the new, reconciled relationship with God in Christ. 
Being rectified (justified) by faith, Paul writes, results in peace with God (Rom. 5:1). This 
peace is not initiated by humanity but by God, who sent his Son Jesus Christ. Christ died for us. 
Being now declared by God to be righteous by Jesus’ blood, we are reconciled to God and will 
be saved by his life (Rom. 5:9–11). Therefore, Paul continues, an identity shift has been caused 
by the reconciling work of God in Christ. Once “in Adam,” the baptized are now “in Christ” 
(Rom. 5:12–17). This has been discussed in detail in chapter 3 of this dissertation. The 
Christian’s new identity is multifaceted. It is “in Christ,” it is being declared righteous, it is being 
a child of God, and being a sibling to all other believers. The ground of this new identity of being 
righteous is receiving the gift of the righteousness of Christ, which is the Christian’s by faith in 
Christ. In the area of the reality of the righteousness of faith, it is divine monergism and not any 
kind of developmental theory that must hold sway. In fact, it must be excluded, since it includes 
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a degree of human action. Any human act attached to rectification (justification) would be 
grounds for human boasting before God. This must be excluded.77 
The reality of being righteous by faith in Christ, by being baptized into Christ, is the fount, 
from which flow the deeds of active, or actualized, righteousness. The next question to answer is 
whether Erikson’s developmental theory has any place in pastoral care and in helping a Christian 
actualize that kind of righteousness in his or her life. Having shown how a misuse of the theory 
can lead to works righteousness and the death of faith, a certain degree of caution is in order. A 
correlative question to the first is, how are we to read Paul’s baptismal theology, as presented in 
Romans and the other three letters, and draw from it a sound theology of the development, or 
actualization, of a Christian identity? And how are we, with discernment, to interact with 
Erikson’s developmental theory, remain faithful to Scripture, and form an intelligible Christian 
psychology of identity actualization?78 
The move to the realm of the actualization of Christian identity is the move to the final 
argument of the tripartite thesis of this dissertation. What has preceded has helped to clear the 
table for the following discussion. What follows is not trust, autonomy, initiative, industry, 
identity, intimacy, generativity, and integrity in relation to rectification (justification) by grace 
through faith in Christ, that is, being righteous coram deo. Rather, being righteous by faith is the 
presupposed situation of the baptized person with whom we will be concerned. What a person 
needs more than anything is a new core identity.79 This new core of identity is the imputed, 
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conferred identity of being righteous in Christ. In daily living, what a Christian needs is a solid 
sense of this new identity. Actualization of one’s core Christian identity flows from this reality in 
the practice and habituation of active righteousness. Erikson’s theory can help the field of 
pastoral care think through, not only the developmental stages of human beings and thereby what 
may be legitimately expected of them in this habituation, but also the framework upon which this 
identity is built. According to Erikson, the first four stages, and into the fifth, provided the 
epigenesis80 of identity.  
The first stage to consider is Stage I (Trust vs. Mistrust). Erikson thought that trust 
“becomes the capacity for faith—a vital need for which man must find some institutional 
conformation.”81 This, he said, is found in religion. Paul also shows humanity to be incurably 
homo religionis. Forsaking the Creator, humanity turns to and worships the creature (Rom. 1:25). 
The first issue involves the impossibility within man for total mistrust. Humanity either places 
trust in God or in something or someone other than God, even if that other be self. However, as 
was shown above in the discussion of autonomy and shame, trust in self is self-depleting. It 
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cannot be sustained.82 
The turn from trust in God to trust in “not-God” is the Grundpunkt of sin. William 
Weinrich states: “Sin redefines man. After the fall, man is Sinner, that is, sin places man in 
opposition to his creator and leads to death as judgment.”83 The characteristics of being a sinner 
are lack of fear of God and of trust in God.84 This is ground zero for the struggle against sin. 
Everything hinges on trust in the trustworthiness of God and, therefore, that everything that God 
says is true. In Rom. 6:1, Paul asks a rhetorical question. Ought a Christian continue to sin so 
that God’s grace might increase? His answer is a resounding “No!” The reason for his answer is 
found in the reality of what has happened to the Christian by means of baptism. The Christian 
has been buried with Christ in baptism so that he might walk in newness of life (Rom. 6:3–4). 
Paul proceeds to outline the new reality of the baptized. Then, in 6:11, he says, “In this way also 
you—account yourselves to be dead to sin, but alive to God in Christ Jesus.” While not using the 
word “faith” or “trust,” Paul is calling them to trust the truth of the new reality. He is calling 
them to trust in Christ, and in the benefits given to them in baptism. Erikson wrote about trust as 
“childlike surrender to the Power that creates and re-creates, dispensing earthly fortune as well as 
spiritual well-being.”85 Conversely, childlike trust can be “outgrown” so that the adult no longer 
trusts with the totality of an infant’s faith. When this happens, the person does not become so 
much a person without faith as one who finds other objects in which to trust. Each person needs 
regular and mutual affirmation of his existence.86 When this is not received from the voice of 
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God in his word (which is the smiling countenance, the numinous face of love), then man looks 
to other things for validation, for “other forms of validation.”87 
The crisis of trust versus mistrust comes when that for which one hopes is delayed. In such 
situations, it appears as though the trustworthy one is no longer trustworthy. For the child, the 
crisis is in the possibility that the mother has abandoned the child.88 For the Christian, the 
temptation is that God is not to be trusted. At its core, mistrust is a failure to persevere in faith, a 
failure to hope.89 Paul’s example of persevering faith, of enduring hope, is in the example of 
Abraham in Rom. 4:18–22. “Against hope (παρ᾽ ἐλπίδα) upon hope (ἐπ᾽ ἐλπίδι) he trusted 
(ἐπίστευσεν; 4:18). “And in the promise of God he did not waver in mistrust (τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ; 4:20). 
Thus Paul also links the struggle, or crisis, of trust versus mistrust to the development of hope. 
Hope can truly only be hope when there is the appearance, and humanly speaking the real 
possibility, that the one in whom one trusts may not fulfill the promise. Hope, however, is the 
virtue that allows a person to persevere in trust and to wait out the crisis until the trustworthy 
being returns and fulfills the promise. For the Christian, the declaration of a righteous identity 
cannot be seen in this life by the human eye or by examining the flawlessness of one’s conduct. 
It is received solely by trust in the external word, spoken from the mouth (which is on the face) 
of a fellow believer, in the midst of the sanctorum communio, that declares it to be so. This trust 
is the ground of Christian identity because the righteous person lives by faith.  
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It must be remembered that Erikson’s developmental theory is not a linear progression of 
steps through which a person passes, leaving earlier stages behind as irrelevant in the present. 
The first stage, of trust versus mistrust, if navigated successfully helps to develop the ego 
strength, or virtue, of hope. It also supports identity formation in the fifth stage by providing, 
according to Erikson, a sense of temporal perspective and time diffusion.90 For trust to prevail 
over mistrust, the insistence that fulfillment must occur in the immediate moment must give way 
to hope in God’s timing. Hopeful trust also allows for the apparent absence of God, for the times 
when one feels abandoned and alone. The first stage teaches that needs will be met, even if not 
on one’s own timetable. Abraham serves well as an example. Indeed, Paul’s example of 
Abraham appears to be picture of just such a struggle.91 His hope in the face of hopelessness, his 
endurance in faith, are the epitome of the Christian’s faith (fides qua creditur) in the content of 
God’s promise (fides quae creditur).  
It appears that Erikson’s first stage is valid and useful in regards to active righteousness. 
The Christian continues to trust the word that declares the hidden reality. The baptized, looking 
within, does not see himself as righteous. He also does not see perfect righteousness in his fellow 
Christians. Believers from other ethnic groups do not magically look like his brothers and sisters. 
No one looks like a saint, a holy one. A Christian simply receives by faith, by trust in the 
external word, that he has died to sin, been buried with Christ, and is raised to newness of life. 
By trusting God’s word about him, the Christian accounts it to be true, not because it is seen, but 
solely on the basis of the trustworthiness of God and his word. This trust is constantly under 
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attack by “what is visible.” Tribulation and persecution challenge this trust. And more than 
anything else, death says to him that it is all a lie. The deadness of Sarah’s womb and the 
deadness of Abraham’s body said that the promise of a son was null and void. Death also tempts 
the Christian to mistrust. The Christian stands by trust in God and God’s word alone. Active 
righteousness must grow from this trust, because whatever does not proceed from out of trust is 
sin” (Rom. 14:23). 
Erikson’s Stage II (Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt) has autonomy as the syntonic element 
and shame and doubt comprising the dystonic. It has already been demonstrated above that 
autonomy, understood as the attempt to be the source of one’s own existence, is not only self-
depleting but is at the heart of original sin. It necessarily generates shame and doubt because it is 
grounded in a lie. Is there, then, any sense in which it can be understood in a way that is 
congruent with active righteousness? Richard Eyer treats Erikson’s second stage as “the balance 
between being an individual and having a healthy doubt about our self-sufficiency.”92 Erikson 
described a child’s attempt at autonomy as “guerilla warfare of unequal wills.”93 This is a very 
negative view. Erikson also wrote of the more positive sense of autonomy as the need for the 
child to become a unique “I,” separate from the parents.94 Yet, overall, he paints a picture of a 
will in rebellion. 
As he relates autonomy to the ways in which it supports identity, things get no better. Stage 
II (Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt) supports a sense of self-certainty versus self-consciousness 
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and a sense of “will to be oneself” over against self-doubt.95 Yet, as he discusses the concept he 
has in mind, it appears that his goal is individuation. A child must learn that he is a separate 
unique being. He is, or has, an “I.”96 There is distinction between the child and other people. If 
such a distinction is not made, absolute narcissism takes hold. Unable to distinguish between self 
and others, such a person thinks of self as the entirety of existence. It is the law and order 
element of this stage that creates the shame and doubt Erikson has in mind. One begins to 
question the omnipotence of one’s will. Mother no longer appears on demand with a breast full 
of milk. Diapers are not changed with a whimper. Crying fits are permitted to continue to teach 
the child that his will is not almighty. Therefore, this stage, if taken as a whole, allows for the 
necessity of individuation and for the development of a sense of self-control over urges. It is 
important for identity development to know that one is a person and yet that one is not the center 
of the universe.  
If autonomy is to be redeemed for the development of one’s Christian identity, any sense of 
rebellion and self-centeredness must be excised from it. Every person is a morally responsible 
agent.97 Each person stands before God the Creator and under God’s judgment. Therefore, no 
person is truly autonomous, in the sense of being a law unto himself. Capps describes the 
challenge of using the term autonomy and a way forward that is faithful to Erikson and makes it 
useful for pastoral care. 
Some readers of Erikson’s writings have assumed that when he used the word 
autonomy, he basically meant independence in the sense of relying only or primarily 
on oneself. They associated this with the “individualism” that they considered to be 
rampant in American society. . . . Other readers have suggested that by using the 
word autonomy Erikson revealed his male bias, because a male child is oriented 
toward independence while a female child is oriented toward relationships with 
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others (Gilligan 1982, 11–12). . . . I believe, though, that Erikson actually had the 
other meaning in mind, that of self-governance, and that his readers fail to recognize 
this because the meaning itself is not much in use today.98 
If self-governance means the ability to make ethical choices, then such a term may well serve the 
purpose. Autonomy certainly has a negative meaning in theology. Perhaps a better word, in 
pastoral care, would be the aforementioned term, “individuation.” Of course this term must be 
used with a degree of caution. No person is an “individual” in the sense of having responsibility 
only for “self.” All Christians belong to one another. Baptism incorporates the Christian into the 
church. As a member of the church, each Christian is to act so as to enhance the health of the 
body. The social dimensions of Erikson’s psychosocial theory certainly support the view that 
Erikson was not thinking of narcissistic autonomy. 
In Rom. 12:3–8, Paul warns his readers not to think more highly of themselves than is 
proper, but rather to exercise the gifts given to each one for the good of the congregation. Each 
one, individually (καθ’ εἷς = each one), is a member of the whole (12:5). Therefore, there is 
individuation. Each one, individually has a function within the body. This is not unfettered 
autonomy. Rather it is specification of purpose. The significance of this for identity is found in 
the function of vocation in providing a person a unique way to express his identity within the 
community. Paul makes the same point in 1 Cor. 12:4–11. He then speaks of this as being an 
outgrowth of baptism. The various gifts given by the one Spirit (1 Cor. 12:4) are used for the 
sake of the one body into which each Christian is baptized (1 Cor. 12:12–13). The Spirit’s work 
in baptism is described by Paul as having both a unifying and an individuating effect. Yet the 
individuation is for the sake of others and not for the sake of self. This is the hard lesson of 
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actualized righteousness. On the other hand, “individuation,” if connected to one’s 
responsibilities to the community, whether church, family, or the civic realm, means that one 
does not live for oneself, but sacrificially for the sake of others (Eph. 5:15–6:9) using the gifts 
given by the Spirit for the common good (1 Cor. 12:7). Two ways in which “individuation” 
(autonomy) can become an arena for the struggle for identity is in losing oneself in the collective 
and, conversely, in boasting about one’s importance. This might also approach Capp’s 
suggestion, in the quote above, that “autonomy” might better be thought of as “self-governance,” 
or, even better, as self-control. Such self-control would put restraints on narcissistic autonomy 
and the destructive impulses caused by indwelling sin and make autonomy, in terms of 
individuation and self-control as truly positive contribution to the social life of the church and 
society. 
Paul describes the struggle against indwelling sin in Romans 7. Concupiscence, as part of 
indwelling, original sin, turns the sinner inward (curvatus in se). All actions become self-
centered. Indwelling sin (the old man) that still adheres to the baptized, does not fear God, does 
not trust in God, and is utterly selfish. As long as indwelling sin remains, there will always be the 
temptation to pervert a wholesome individuation into sinful autonomy, causing one to consider 
others as tools to be used for self-aggrandizement. This narcissism, as Capps describes, 
characterizes Western culture, and especially the United States.99 Such a person will also not 
have an appropriate ability to feel shame. According to Erikson, such a person can become a 
legalist, pointing out the failures and faults of others, while blind to his own. Such a person, as 
those Paul describes in Romans 2, will begin to rationalize his own failures while condemning 
others for the very same things. Erikson describes this as “the victory of the letter over the spirit 
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of the word and the law. It is expressed in the vain display of righteousness or empty 
contrition.”100  
On the other hand, a person who has not sufficiently individuated from others will fail to be 
able to contribute to others, but will remain dependent. Erikson does not describe this failure, 
since he assumes autonomy to take place epigenetically. Dependent Personality Disorder is 
defined as “A pervasive and excessive need to be taken care of that leads to submissive and 
clinging behavior and fears of separation, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety 
of contexts.”101 A person’s sense of security, well-being, and the ability to contribute is markedly 
reduced. The inability to individuate causes a person to find his identity in the identification 
imposed on him by others. This results in a foreclosed identity. For the Christian, utter trust and 
reliance upon God in Christ for identity and every good is a virtue. This is in the realm of alien 
righteousness and passive faith. In the arena in which actualization of identity includes 
individuation, especially in the reception of spiritual gifts to be used in love for the sake of 
others, a dependent personality makes true intimacy and generativity an impossibility. One 
remains a taker and never becomes a giver. One is unable to look beyond self and initiate action 
which puts faith in action for the sake of others (industry). Baptism overcomes narcissistic 
autonomy by placing the Christian into a dependent relationship with God, and by incorporating 
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the Christian into the sanctorum communio, the body of Christ. It also results is a healthy 
individuation, as the Holy Spirit by mans of baptism imparts his gifts for the Christian to use for 
the sake of the body. 
Erikson’s stages have a logical flow which becomes clear the more one ponders them. 
From the ground of trust, which gives the foundation for individuation (autonomy in a good 
sense) and self-control, the Christian begins to practice deeds of love. As these deeds become 
habituated, the Christian, by daily renouncing the “old man” and his self-centered way and 
clinging in trust to the reality of the new identity of being righteous in Christ, becomes a 
competent member of the sanctorum communio. He takes his place within the community of 
faith and becomes an actor, rather than a spectator. This coincides with Erikson’s assertion that 
this stage, in terms of ritualization, includes the dramatic. As the Christian lives out his baptism, 
putting to death the deeds of the old man and putting on the new man, he begins to understand 
his purpose, his station in life, in the church, in the family, and in society.102 Daniel Levinson 
labelled Stage III (Initiative vs. Guilt) the “novice phase.” This is the stage when one 
experiments with the various roles one could have in life. Levinson states: “During the novice 
stage of early adulthood a man is exploring the adult world, developing adult interests and 
values, making important choices with regard to work, marriage and family, and forming an 
adult identity.”103 This is not a fully-formed identity. Rather it is the beginning of living out 
possibilities. As one becomes more competent in various roles, various ways of living out one’s 
baptism (what Oswald Bayer calls “ethical progress104), a sense of purpose in one’s life begins to 
take shape. Although all Christians have the purpose of trusting God and loving the neighbor, 
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each person does so utilizing the unique gifts given by the Spirit (1 Corinthians 12) within one’s 
specific vocation.  
Paul does not speak directly to what aligns with Erikson’s Stage IV (Industry vs. 
Inferiority). He does, however, describe the place of vocation in the life of the baptized.105 He 
speaks of the Christian’s responsibility to the Christian congregation in Rom. 12:3–21. Vocation 
in terms of life in society is described in Rom. 13:1–7. Although he does not speak directly to it 
in Romans, in Eph. 5:22–6:9 and in Col. 3:18–4:1, Paul describes vocation in regards to the 
household (and economic) realm. In Colossians, competency and purpose within the family 
structure follows directly after, and is built upon, Paul’s description of the life of the baptized, 
putting to death the old man and putting on the new (Col. 3:1–17).  
Erikson avers that guilt accompanies the initiative of Stage III. Erikson built his theory on a 
Freudian foundation. This is concurrent with Freud’s Phallic Stage, in which the most important 
aspect is the Oedipus complex.106 It is for this reason that Erikson, building on this foundation, 
assigns guilt to this stage. Nevertheless, there is a logic to thinking about guilt in conjunction 
with initiative, regardless of Freud. Both a lack of initiative and reckless initiative can cause 
guilt.107 Capps writes of people “floundering” as they try to individuate and become contributing 
members of their social group.108 A person’s sense of incompetency can bring on a sense of 
inferiority and a sense of guilt. This works for the Christian’s advantage. A healthy sense of 
guilt, that one has failed to do all things well, and a sense of incompetence work together to 
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humble the Christian. Knowing that he is not competent in himself (2 Cor. 3:5), he grows in the 
certainty that Christ’s power is made perfect in the Christian’s weakness and failings (2 Cor. 
12:9). He relies less on himself and more on God’s work in baptism. Paul emphasizes the 
Christian’s inability to be perfect in himself as he describes his own struggle against indwelling 
sin in Rom. 7:13–24. He calls himself a “distressed man,” whose ultimate deliverance is in Christ 
Jesus his Lord (Rom. 7:25). He is in constant need of assistance. This assistance is his in the 
Holy Spirit, whom the Christian receives in baptism, and concerning whose work Paul writes in 
Romans 8. 
Erikson’s pairing of initiative with guilt and industry with inferiority are congruent with 
Paul’s teaching that the Christian is to be active in love toward others and yet is not without the 
taint of sin, even in his good works. A healthy sense of what Erikson calls inferiority contributes 
to a proper humility that constantly looks to Christ’s atoning work to cover the works with his 
righteousness. It also acknowledges the need to be part of the church, that one does not have all 
the necessary gifts and skills to be a Christian without the other members of the sanctorum 
communio. On the other hand, initiative and industry are ways of describing the movement and 
the maturing in one’s vocation which combine to give specific shape to the Christian’s identity in 
the time and place wherein he is. 
One significant argument of this dissertation is that Erik H. Erikson’s theory can 
legitimately utilized in faithful pastoral care in regards to Christian identity actualization, and 
that it should be considered in relation to baptismal identity development. Up to this point, his 
theory appears to be compatible. The most troubling stage, as has been shown, is Stage II 
(Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt), in which autonomy is held up as the syntonic element. By 
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redefining109 autonomy in terms of individuation and self-control, it has been possible to maintain 
his schema and to recommend its constructive utilization. Each of the dystonic elements have 
been shown to be of assistance in impressing upon the Christian the need to rely solely upon God 
in Christ for righteousness. This is a paradoxical effect of indwelling sin in the Christian. It 
drives the believer to Christ and away from self, so long as trust remains alive. In pastoral care, 
these dystonic elements might be highlighted in such a way as to clarify the absolute need to rely 
upon the conferred identity as foundational for Christian living. It is the conferred gift of a 
righteous standing coram deo that is the source of the Christian’s proper, active righteousness, 
which serves the neighbor. 
Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion) is at the core of Erikson’s theory and of this 
dissertation. The syntonic element of Stage V is a sense of identity; the dystonic is identity 
diffusion.110 Erikson postulated a corresponding ego strength, or virtue, of fidelity. In terms of 
ritualization, this stage brings the previous threads of the numinous, the judicious, the dramatic, 
and the formal together to form the ideological. The core of the Christian’s identity is conferred 
righteousness, because the Christian is given his identity in Christ, when he, by means of 
baptism, died to his old identity in Adam and was raised in Christ to newness of life.  
Utilizing the four identity statuses outlined by James Marcia, a person’s sense of identity 
can be understood to be foreclosed, diffused, in moratorium, or achieved.111 It has been 
acknowledged that the imputed, alien identity of being righteous in Christ is a conferred or 
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foreclosed identity for the Christian. It also serves a teleological purpose, as the final cause of the 
Christian’s life. These four statuses can also serve the purposes of pastoral care by providing a 
“way of looking at things” in the actualization of the Christian’s identity coram mundo. Marcia 
states that identity is manifested in the two areas of occupation and ideology. These terms can be 
thought of theologically as vocation and the faith (fides quae creditor). To return to Joel 
Biermann’s statement: “Character describes the matrix of personal traits that define, direct, and 
name the individual,”112 in other words, which gives expression to identity. Conversely, 
following Biermann as he follows Aristotle, a person’s actualization of identity is shaped, 
molded, and changed by one’s habituated actions.113 It would be fair to say that, building on the 
conferred identity, that is, of being righteous by faith, the actualization of identity involves a 
reciprocal relationship between one’s sense of identity and one’s actions in relation to that 
identity. A person’s sense of identity finds its internal expression in his ideology (the content of 
his faith) and its external expression in the way he lives out his vocation. Conversely, the way 
one lives out one’s vocation and the content of one’s ideology circle back to form a inner sense 
of personal identity. All of this happens in the rough and tumble of life and life’s experiences, 
including temptations, faith-crises, and tribulation (Rom. 5:1–5), which continue to shape a 
person’s sense of identity. In terms of what Paul says in Rom. 7:13–25, the sense of identity 
within the “Experiential I” begins to approach the real identity of the Christian (which is that of 
the “New I”) as the identity found in the old man/old Adam (“indwelling sin”) is accounted to be 
dead, killed in the waters of baptism. 
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A Christian with a diffused identity has an uncommitted identity. There is no sense of a 
center to his identity which can provide the core of his sense of self. Therefore, there is no 
unifying center for faith (fides quae creditor), for ideology, or for ethics. The reality of his 
imputed, alien identity has little to no impact on the way he lives in the world. He is more likely 
to be conformed to the world than transformed by renewal of the mind (Rom. 12:2). Perhaps the 
closest example in Paul’s writings are in 1 Cor. 3:1–2 and Eph. 4:14. He is an infant, living 
according “to the flesh,” a childish ego, “tossed here and there by waves and carried along by 
every wind of doctrine.” In both cases Paul is concerned about childishness, the foolishness, in 
his hearers. The reality of who they are, as those baptized into Christ, is not shaping their 
identity. 
Identity achievement is the goal.114 A Christian desires to actualize fully his identity in 
Christ (Rom. 7:18). The achievement of a sense of one’s identity in Christ comes by trust in 
God’s declaration. It is the Christian’s agreement with what God says about the Christian, that he 
is righteous. Yet, it nevertheless involves a struggle to the extent that the old man mistrusts that 
word. The crisis for the Christian is to trust in hope when his senses tell him that God is 
untrustworthy. When trust wins out over the temptation to give in to mistrust, hope is 
strengthened.  
Paul describes the Christian’s identity, in Eph. 4:15, as growing up into the fullness of 
Christ. It is the full actualization of the real identity one has in Christ. It is the goal, it is to be 
striven for, but the full actualization of it will not be fully realized until the eschaton. This is true 
for multiple reasons, which include the psychological, the social, and the physical dimensions of 
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life in this world.115 Physically, full identity achievement must await the resurrection of the body. 
As embodied beings, human somatic life finds its telos in the glorification of the resurrected 
body (Rom. 8:23; Col. 3:4). The body is daily to be offered as a living sacrifice to God (Rom. 
12:1), yet while in the body, the Christian struggles with drives that are deeply embedded in the 
neurological system of the body.116 Socially, Paul describes the impact of ‘the world” in 
conforming people to a mindset that is opposed to God. Every letter Paul wrote to the churches 
addresses problems of sociality. Every congregation of Christians, while being in reality a 
congregation of saints (sanctorum communio), is in actuality a congregation of sinners 
(peccatorum communio). Paul describes the need for striving toward maturity (Eph. 4:11–16), 
but even the apostle says that he has not attained perfection (Rom. 7:25). 
Erikson wrote of the moratorium that characterizes the period covered by Stage V (Identity 
vs. Identity Diffusion). The certainty assumed in the previous two stages is now questioned. The 
work of this stage is to integrate all previous identifications, to test them, to refute those that do 
not fit or work, and to reshape them so they are relevant for the person in the sociohistorical 
moment of his life.117 A moratorium does not translate to a renunciation of one’s sense of 
identity; it does not signal a weakness in character. Rather, it is a vital, necessary aspect of 
achieving identity. What one has thought of as being right may be incorrect, so alternate 
possibilities must be considered. Ways of thinking that are false or ineffective are challenged. 
One may have come to the place of thinking identity has been achieved, only to find the 
foundation of that identity to be unstable. Stanley Grenz has noted that for Erikson, “the task of a 
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mature self involves struggle, crisis, hopelessness, despair, and recovery, all of which participate 
in the movement of the person through inner conflict toward integrity.”118 Therefore, as a process 
of pressing on toward identity achievement, multiple moratoria would appear to be the rule 
rather than the exception. 
Theologically, the moratorium status can be thought of as a process of repentance, 
especially if it is considered as a cycle from Moratorium to Achievement to Moratorium to 
Achievement, what Waterman calls the MAMA Cycle.119 As the Christian hears the word of 
God, that word challenges not only his actions within his vocation but his ideology, or faith 
(fides quae creditur). Additionally, the struggles and crises challenge his faith (fides qua 
creditur) and attack his sense of hope. It may be that what he believes is correct. It may be that 
what he believes is not quite correct. The crisis that comes upon him, at the deepest level, is that 
of trust versus mistrust. It may be that his trust has been misplaced. It may be that he has been 
trusting a false god, as Luther describes in the Large Catechism.120 In that case, a moratorium, a 
time of reevaluation and of turning from this false faith in contrition and repentance may be 
needed. This contrition and repentance is the way in which Luther describes the significance of 
baptism in the Small Catechism.121 
Abraham is Paul’s example of a man whose faith (both fides quae and fides qua creditor) 
was challenged. He also serves as a biblical example of the MAMA cycle described on page 103. 
Abraham was given a righteous identity through his faith in the promise of a son. Paul claims 
that “no mistrust made him waver” (Rom. 4:20). Yet a close reading of Genesis suggests 
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something else. Discounting the conception and birth of Ishmael, after his first son was born, the 
Lord appeared to Abram and gave him the name Abraham. The Lord told him that the son of 
promise would come from Sarah’s womb. Abraham laughed and questioned how this could be 
(Gen. 17:17–18). It appears as though he thought the promise had already been fulfilled through 
Ishmael. Abraham had a son, albeit through Hagar as Sarah’s surrogate. The promise that he had 
believed had not been fulfilled. Abraham had to change the orientation of his faith from Ishmael 
to the as-yet-to-be-born son. Paul will not say that Abraham’s faith (fides qua) wavered. He 
continued as a believer. Yet even he had to enter a moratorium of sorts so that his faith (fides 
quae) might be closer to the truth. 
The idea of a moratorium can also be used to read Romans 6. Paul answers his 
interlocutor’s accusation that his gospel of the free grace of God in Christ implies that 
continuance in sinning results in increased grace from God. Therefore, it would appear that one 
should continue a life of sin in order to experience increased grace. Paul’s abrupt negation of this 
line of reasoning is based on the nature and effects of baptism, which have been described 
earlier. Paul points his hearers to the new identity they have as those baptized into Christ. Rom. 
6:1–10 is concerned with this new reality. His interlocutor, while correct about the abounding 
grace of God toward sinners, has not yet grasped the new reality in Christ. Paul first destroys the 
grounds of this false identity, that of a forgiven sinner free to live in sin because sins are freely 
forgiven, and points to the new, true reality. The Christian has died to sin. While a Christian will 
fall into temptation, something Paul acknowledges in chapter 7, “sinner” is not the true identity 
of a Christian.122 Christians are “saints” (Rom. 1:7). Therefore, they account this new reality to be 
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true in their daily lives. This is actualized by the act of presenting their members daily to God as 
those who have been (in reality) brought from death to life (6:13–14). The persistence of sin 
tempting the believer may result in the false conclusion that one remains a slave to sin, even 
though one is forgiven. This also is the acceptance of a faulty identity. The baptized are no 
longer slaves to sin; rather, they are now “slaves to righteousness” (Rom. 6:18). Since 
righteousness is a relational word, this means that the Christian is bound to another. The baptized 
are now in a relationship which has set them right with their Creator. Therefore, paradoxically, 
this slavery is true freedom from sin and death. 
Paul uses terms, in Rom. 6:19–23, which are suggestive of ritualistic elements in Torah. 
The old status of being a slave was that of slavery to uncleanness, to impurity, and to 
“lawlessness,” which could be read as anti-Torah living. Paul has already introduced this kind of 
language in Rom. 3:25. He calls the redeeming death of Jesus a ἱλαστήριον . . . ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ 
αἵματι (a sacrifice of atonement . . . in his blood).123 Now that the Christian has been reconciled 
to God and redeemed by Christ’s atoning sacrifice, ritually he is to present his members, that 
means his entire embodied self, to righteousness—to that to which he is “enslaved” in freedom. 
The result of this presentation is to be holy. In addition to inferences of atonement, Paul appears 
to be pointing to the burnt offering of Leviticus 1. When offering the burnt offering, the Israelite 
was to lay his hands on the head of the animal. This action was a ritual act of self-identifying 
with the sacrificial animal. Then the sacrificial animal was offered in its entirety to God. The 
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sacrificial animal was offered to make atonement for the Israelite who offered it (Lev. 1:4). In 
Romans 12, Paul picks up on this ritual imagery. The Christian presents his members as 
instruments of righteousness to God (Rom. 6:19), as a living sacrifice acceptable to God (Rom. 
12:1). This acceptance echoes the pleasing aroma of the burnt sacrifice in Lev. 1:9, 13, 17. The 
atonement, on the other hand, has already taken place in Christ’s sacrifice, with whom and in 
whom the Christian has died to sin by means of baptism. Since the realm of the unclean and the 
unholy is the realm of death, the baptized, being united to Christ in his resurrection, is now, not 
merely ritually transferred, but in reality transferred into the realm of purity and holiness, which 
leads to life.  
Paul does not specifically speak of the face of God in Romans. He does, however, speak of 
God’s love. In Rom.1:7, Paul calls his hearers “beloved of God.” In Rom. 5:8, he states that 
God’s love is demonstrated in the sacrifice of the Son of God. Furthermore, God’s love is poured 
out in the Christians’ hearts by the Holy Spirit (Rom. 5:5). What can be known of God has been 
declared in the things that have been made (Rom. 1:19); therefore, a degree of revelation is 
available to everyone. But this hardly qualifies as a numinous revelation. God remains hidden 
behind his creation and does not speak an audible word. Only his “eternal power and divine 
nature” are revealed in the things he made (Rom. 1:20). Admittedly, in Romans, Paul does not 
make great use of what Erikson referred to as “the numinous.”  
Nonetheless, it must be admitted that Paul does speak of “pleasing God.” This implies that 
God looks benevolently,124 favorably and with love into the face of his people. This can be 
conceived as a numinous element. Nonetheless, the judicious ritual element is certainly more 
pronounced. It is present in Rom. 1:18–3:20, in which section the demands of law and order 
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condemn humanity. It establishes the “objective legal guilt”125 of fallen humanity. The dramatic 
is found abundantly in both the story of the gospel and in the struggle which Paul outlines in 
Romans 6 and brings to a head in the next chapter. 
The struggle for actualizing one’s identity as righteous in Christ is dramatically told in 
Rom. 7:7–8:39. Paul tells his story in three acts.126 Rom 7:7–12 is Act One, in which Sin seizes 
its opportunity through Torah’s commandments and produces all manner of concupiscence (7:8). 
Two dramatis personae appear: Paul and Sin. Paul is slain by the commandment which 
condemns his action (a judicious element). This brings Paul to recognize a formal element, that 
Torah obedience cannot give life. Therefore, the ideological element of Romans, that the 
righteous person lives by faith, finds another support in Paul’s experience. 
Act Two begins at Rom. 7:13 and goes to the end of the chapter. Three dramatis personae 
appear in this section. Paul is now, as it were, a divided person, consisting of “New I” and 
“Experiential I.” “Indwelling in,” once again, is the antagonist. In many ways, “Experiential I” is 
the battleground between the other two. “Experiential I” (Paul) is in distress over the actuality of 
his life. He is on the side of “New I” but finds himself succumbing to “Sin.” This battle, which 
he is most definitely waging, is occurring in his members, the very members he is to be 
presenting as an offering to God. Erikson describes the dramatic stage as one in which there is a 
“killing off of weak and evil ‘others.’”127 While Paul does not portray “sin” as weak, he does say 
that it has been killed, put to death in baptism. Therefore, the Christian, in practice, kills “sin” by 
accounting it to be dead in the death of Christ. He is now a new man. Torah informs his mind, 
and he delights in its teaching. 
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The formal element in this act is that the Christian is in a life-long struggle to actualize the 
new identity. “New I” has its grip on the mind, but Sin still grasps the members (7:25b). 
Deliverance will not come by human effort. Rather, deliverance comes through Jesus Christ the 
Lord (7:25a). This also supports the ideological element of the righteousness of faith and not of 
works. It also communicates, in a dramatic fashion, the truth that the real identity of the Christian 
is the “inner man,” who is free from the dominion of sin, even though, in the actualization of this 
identity, “Sin” constantly opposes the renewed will of the Christian.128 Erikson states that the 
formal element involves “methodical performance.”129 While Paul does not give detailed 
directions, the methodical performance, if it can be called that, is the daily presentation of one’s 
members to God as instruments of righteousness (Rom. 6:12–14) and the presenting of oneself as 
a “living sacrifice” to God (Rom. 12:1). 
That the baptized never shakes off “indwelling sin” in this life may be a source of shame, 
doubt, and even great fear. Since unrighteousness leads to death, will not the failure to actualize 
a righteous identity lead to condemnation? Act Three, Rom 8:1–39, brings in a new dramatis 
persona, namely, the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is the “Spirit of Life,” whose Torah teaches 
that life is in Christ Jesus (8:1). His Torah is opposed to “the Torah of Sin and of Death.” It is not 
that there are two Torahs; rather, the “Torah of Sin and of Death” is a way of speaking of the 
negative impact of the commandments when they are used in an attempt at self-justification.130 
Paul frames Act Three by stating the formal element in the beginning and at the end. 
“There is no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus” (8:1) and, since the only one who 
can condemn anyone is Christ Jesus, nothing can separate the baptized from the love of God 
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(8:33–39).131 The return to the love of God brings back the numinous element. In Christ Jesus the 
Christian experiences the love of God, despite every evil that can be thrown against him. This 
solidifies the ideological core of Romans. In the center of this act, the Holy Spirit teaches Christ 
(8:2). He gives life, not only spiritually, but will also resurrect the body (8:9–11), and he assures 
the Christian that he is a son and child of God, despite experiencing suffering (8:12–25). He also 
prays for and in the believer (8:26–30). The affiliative element of Stage VI is found in the new 
familial relationship the believer has as a child of God. 
Erikson’s concept of the ritualization of experience, especially the judicious, dramatic, 
formal, and ideological elements, is a useful way of looking at Paul’s letter. It rescues the 
reading from being dry dogma and enlivens it with the dramatic, an element inherent in the letter 
itself. Romans 9–11 have an affiliative element, especially as Paul dramatizes his formal point by 
speaking of the pruning of the olive tree (11:11–24). Romans 12–15 can be read as expanding 
upon the generative element, as each Christian exercises his gifts for the good of the whole body. 
However, by this point in the letter, the dramatic element seems to fade, as Paul presses on to the 
end. 
Once again, the greatest concern with Erikson’s theory is in the definition of autonomy. 
Autonomy must be redefined or reframed as individuation and self-control to be positive term in 
identity actualization. His emphasis on trust versus mistrust form the foundation of this 
developmental theory. It is also the central concern of Paul in Romans. The dystonic elements 
correlate with Paul’s description of sinful man. The syntonic elements of initiative and industry, 
if coupled with mistrust (lack of trust) and narcissistic autonomy are unacceptable for Christian 
practical theology. If autonomy can be salvaged as individuation worked within the Christian by 
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the Holy Spirit, especially as a way of reducing any sense of unhealthy “clinginess,” then it can 
become a useful term. However, as stated earlier, great caution must be used at this stage. 
Initiative and industry, if tied to a motivated desire to serve others, are also of value. When the 
baptized person knows that his real identity is that of being righteous in Christ, and that this 
righteousness is his only by faith (trust), then being individuated, and being motivated to initiate 
and to do good works, help to form the Christian’s unique actualized identity, as he puts his God-
given gifts to work in service to others within his vocation. This increases his sense of affiliation 
with others, in church, in the family, and in society, and gives expression to generativity. At the 
end of his life, he can look back and appreciate, even if only partially, a degree of integrity.  
Questions for Pastoral Theology from an Eriksonian Perspective 
Up to this point, most of the conversation has been a correlative discussion of Erikson’s 
theory. While Erikson’s theory has been a lens through which Paul’s theology in his letter to the 
Romans has been viewed, Paul’s baptismal theology has been the controlling norm for the 
discussion. In this section, while impossible to know exactly what Erikson would ask, an attempt 
will be made let Erikson challenge a Pauline theology of identity development. This will follow a 
somewhat fanciful format. Erikson and a Practical Theologian will be involved in a fictional 
conversation.132 
Practical Theologian: Erik, in your discussions with Huey Newton you expressed concern 
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that too wide a sense of identity might make people “formless, ineffective, and lost.”133 Despite 
your concern for “pseudospeciation,” it appears that you would put a limit on the size of a social 
group so that it still maintains its integrity. Paul makes a great distinction between the baptized 
and the unbaptized. Yet, he avers that all the baptized, regardless their ethnic group, are one 
family. How do you respond to this? 
Erikson: Paul, in a sense, does create a situation of pseudospeciation, by dividing people 
between the baptized and those outside the Christian faith. I am certain that he would not 
consider this division to be a false one, so the” pseudo-” in my term would be objectionable. 
What he does, if I understand him correctly, is create the sense of a new family. This family is 
joined together by faith in the Father, who gave his Son. Therefore, he calls Christians 
“brothers.” My concern is not for the narrowing of the “species” to Christians. Rather, I would 
ask the church in America which identity is of greater importance. “What does American identity 
stand for? As you know, for the longest time this country has prided itself, beside technical 
know-how, on having a ‘way of life.’”134 This identity was more important than the identities 
immigrants brought with them to this land. 
Practical Theologian: Yes, please stay on this train of thought for a while. Paul understood 
baptismal identity to be a higher-level identity than the identities believers brought with them 
into the church. In Romans, he drove this identity home to combat, among other things, the 
tendency of Judean-leaning Christians (Jews) and Hellenists to exult in their ethnic or cultural 
identities to the detriment of Christian unity. 
Erikson: Yes, and he had his own motives for doing this, as I understand it. He needed a 
united church in Rome in order to have a base of operations and support for his mission to 
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Spain.135 
Practical Theologian: So it would appear. The church desires to reach out to people in 
different cultures. This requires us to be sensitive to lower-level identities. 
Erikson: This may be so. That is your realm, not mine. But I would ask you to consider 
whether, in the church in America, identity as an “American” is, in actuality, a higher-level 
identity than that of “Christian.” I was very happy to assume a new identity as an American. In 
1929 became a citizen. Nevertheless, as one who came here as an immigrant, I believe I can see 
things that the typical American is blind to, such as the desire to throw off all manner of 
autocracy.136 Americans want to be masters of everything. To what degree does this desire, which 
you might understand to be reflected in my use of the term autonomy, make the American 
Christian unwilling to submit to divine authority? If, as you say, God determines a Christian’s 
identity, and not the individual, then might clinging to the moniker of “American” as the highest 
identity be a way of rebelling against God? 
Practical Theologian: And this would be detrimental to attempts to reach out to immigrants 
from other cultures. I see where you are going. So, you would have us subsume our national 
identity under our baptismal identity so that it becomes primary. This would then elevate the 
unifying aspect of the gospel. 
Erikson: It very well might. As I wrote in Young Man Luther, “All religions assume that a 
Higher Identity inhabits the great unknown.”137 What I said in general about all religions appears 
to hold true for Christianity as it joins all peoples, regardless of social status or ethnicity, into one 
                                                 
135
 Rom. 15:28. 
136
 Erikson, Childhood and Society, 304. Erikson writes of the ideal American as a freeman who has escaped 
the feudalism of Europe. 
137
 Erikson, Young Man Luther, 177. 
258 
family. In fact, Paul states in Galatians that there is no distinction between the sexes either.138 
That is a radical thought! 
Practical Theologian: Erik, you speak often of “positive and negative” identities. You 
appear to believe that they must both exist for a strong, lasting identity to hold together in a 
person.139 How do you view Paul’s struggle between the “New I” and “Sin”? Are these parallel in 
any way? 
Erikson: “It should be clear that these concepts are always both personal and communal.”140 
Identity is never individualistic. I appreciate Paul’s sense of communal identity as members of 
the church. However, it appears to me that the Lutheran view of righteousness is too often just 
that, individualistic, especially in the American context. Perhaps this comes from Martin Luther. 
In Young Man Luther, I pointed out Luther’s struggle for an identity. His struggle was as one 
who was an individual. Rather than accepting the identifications given him by his father and later 
by the church, he stepped out on his own.141 
Practical Theologian: Your statement seems to work against you. If Luther’s striving for 
independence from father and pope creates rampant individualism, does it not work counter to a 
desire for sociality? 
Erikson: It certainly could. However, I believe that “the original faith which Luther tried to 
restore goes back to the basic trust of early infancy.” He found in the gospel of the grace of God 
in Christ, the “smiling face” of God, which he had not found in the Law.142 This certainly seems 
to agree with Paul’s words in Romans.  
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Practical Theologian: Since this smiling God is the Father, this opened the way for a sense 
of true family! Yes, this would make sense. But back to the concept of the positive and negative 
identities. 
Erikson: “Human nature can best be studied in the state of conflict.”143 An essential conflict 
in my theory is the conflict between the parents and the child, which is not merely the 
establishment of independence, but “defiance, stubbornness, and self-insistence.”144 Without this 
the child cannot develop a trust sense of “I.” Paul appears to be very negative about autonomy. 
He labels as “sin” any stubbornness against the commandments of God. I truly question whether 
any attempt to moderate my theory to reduce autonomy to individuation is faithful to my intent. 
Practical Theologian: You, Erik, point to Luther and appear to see him shift the object of 
his defiance from his father to the pope. I wonder whether Paul would not approve the idea of 
autonomy as defiance if the object of the Christian’s defiance was not God but “Sin.” Trust is to 
be placed in God. The Christian is to mistrust everything that sets itself up, or that is set up, as an 
alternative god. Might not the same virtue of will be exercised in defiance against all that is 
counter to God and his truth? 
Erikson: You might make that change to my theory, but you are modifying what I said. 
Then again, mine is but “a way of looking at things.” 
Practical Theologian: One of the most intriguing parts of your theory is in ritualization. 
Might you expand on that for us? 
Erikson: In Young Man Luther, I outlined the ritualization of monastic life which Luther 
endured, the aim of which was to indoctrinate him in its ideology. Since Lutheranism, as a 
whole, eschews monasticism, I would ask how Lutherans utilize the baptism liturgy to teach a 
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Christian ideology. It appears that the ritualization power of the liturgy is attenuated to a large 
degree by the manner in which it is conducted. 
Practical Theologian: I would agree. In the next chapter this is one of the tasks that will be 
attempted, to point to the ritual structure and suggest ways to improve its performance. 
Nevertheless, please remember that the true power of baptism is not in the ritual but in the power 
of the word attached to the water. 
Erikson: Yes, I understand that is your theology. However, you are concerned, if I 
understand your purpose, with the actualization of identity. You say that a Christian’s real 
identity is given in baptism. It is a foreclosed identity in that it is imputed to the Christian by 
God. I would like to see how you use the ritual of baptism to give a Christian a sense of identity. 
Practical Theologian: As you may be aware, your theory has been welcomed by many 
Christians who practice and teach pastoral care. However, your ideas have not been subjected to 
a rigorous theological review. Since baptism is integral to Christian identity, it has been the 
purpose of this study to do just that. The main objection, from a theological perspective, is in 
applying your stages of development to the Christian’s real, imputed identity. 
Erikson: That does not surprise me. As I said earlier, all religions claim that a person’s 
higher identity is given by the divine. 
Practical Theologian: Yet, interestingly, this study has found that your developmental 
model, once “mistrust” (lack of faith) is one’s orientation toward God, aligns fairly well with 
Paul’s description of the results of sin. 
Erikson: That is something I never explored. 
Practical Theologian: Nor did practical theologians such as Donald Capps and James 
261 
Fowler, or Pastoral Counselors, such as Gary Collins145 or Richard Eyer. However, Eyer did 
provide a way of understanding Stage II (Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt) in a way usable for 
Christian pastoral care.146 Your developmental theory does provide a way of looking at the 
actualization of Christian identity. The task remains, in the next chapter, to consider the theory in 
light of experiential identity development and in its implications for ecclesiastical rituals, 
especially the baptismal rite. 
Erikson: As my son Kai said, after the final session with Huey Newton, “I guess that’s it. 
Let’s close by agreeing that we’ve all earned a drink.”147 
Summary of the Evaluation 
Before exploring some implications of this study for the work of pastoral care, a summary 
of the evaluation of Erikson’s theory in light of Pauline baptismal theology in Romans is in 
order. This will highlight the major findings in order to solidify the validity of the thesis that the 
utilization of Erikson’s developmental theory in pastoral care is theologically defensible, in two 
specific, and seemingly contradictory, areas when dealing with Christian identity. First, 
Erikson’s theory, when viewed through the lens of Paul’s theology of baptism in Romans, and 
especially in the preparatory work Paul does in Romans 1–5, can be used in pastoral care to 
describe and illustrate the effects, or fruits, of original sin. Second, it can be utilized faithfully in 
assisting in the pastoral care work of identity actualization, if, and only if, the concept of identity 
construction or development is excluded from the foundation of Christian identity, which 
identity is conferred by means of baptism and based upon the finished work of Christ, in his 
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death and resurrection.  
The first part of the thesis is concerned with the possibility of legitimately using Erikson’s 
theory to assist the task of pastoral care is describing the fruits, or effects, of original sin. Paul 
demonstrates, in Rom. 1:18–3:20 that no one is righteous other than God. His gospel is about the 
righteousness of God. All of humanity falls short of God’s glory and is designated as ἄδικος 
(unrighteous). This is humanity’s identity in Adam (Rom. 5:12–21). At the core of this 
unrighteousness is humanity’s mistrust of God. But since creatures cannot exist on their own, but 
are dependent beings, this mistrust of God has along with it trust in “that-which-is-not-God.” 
Humanity turns to creation and worships and serves it (Rom. 1:22–23). In other words, the 
attempt to be truly autonomous is a foolish impossibility. This kind of autonomy produces shame 
and doubt and leads to deeds of shameful behavior. Rom. 2:1–3:20 provide a narrative which, in 
many ways, parallels Erikson’s model, even if not exactly. Shame leads to the attempt at self-
justification, which ends up with the decree of universal guilt. Any attempt at initiative and 
industry to build an autonomous identity results to guilt and inferiority. Humanity is incompetent 
in the things related to its relationship to God, and even in the social interactions with one 
another. In the end, the only identity which is true is that of ἄδικος. All self-chosen, self-created 
identities are false identities. In this way, Erikson’s model can be legitimately used in pastoral 
care to guide people away from a false identity and to the acknowledgment of being, apart from 
Christ, ἄδικος. 
The second important part of the thesis grows from this first part. Any attempt to interject 
human effort or works into the Christian concept of identity as one being righteous (δίκαιος) must 
be rejected. Paul makes it abundantly clear that righteousness (δικαιοσύνη) is passively received 
by faith alone. In no way is any human initiative involved; it is by pure divine monergism. In no 
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way is human industry involved; it is Christ’s work of atonement (his propitiatory sacrifice: 
Rom. 3:25) which has accomplished it. Human autonomy is excluded because it is the antithesis 
of trust, of receiving from one’s Creator the redeeming work of his Son. The Christian’s identity 
is certain because it was given to him by God when he was baptized into Christ and received the 
Holy Spirit. 
The third part of this thesis asks the question, “Can Erikson’s theory help the work of 
pastoral care in the realm of identity actualization?” The answer given is in the affirmative, if the 
caveat of part two of the thesis is remembered. The thorny issue of Erikson’s term, “autonomy,” 
has been addressed by redefining or reframing it in terms of two important concepts. First, the 
Holy Spirit not only joins all Christians together as members of the sanctorum communio, he 
also gifts every baptized person with individuating gifts to be used in service to the sanctorum 
communio. If autonomy is understood in terms of being a contributing member of the church, 
serving and not merely being served, then the concept can find a place in pastoral care work. 
Second, if Capp’s suggestion that the term be reframed as self-mastery, a term further changed in 
this dissertation to self-control, is accepted, then autonomy finds an alternate way of being 
expressed. What Capps apparently had in mind was the control that the infant must learn over his 
bowels in toilet training. This sense of bodily control leads to the sense of self-control in other 
areas of life. Self-control is the final virtue Paul lists in Gal. 5:23, as he describes “the fruit of the 
Spirit.” Individuation and self-control, understood in these ways, are effects of the righteousness 
of faith and are consistent with a life lived out of trust in God. 
Furthermore, having received gifts from the Spirit in baptism, the Christian is now free to 
exercise his gifts for the common good. Looking back to the righteousness of faith, this 
conferred righteousness frees the Christian from fear of being condemned for incompetence. 
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Paul declares, in Rom. 8:1, that “nothing is condemnation” for the one who is in Christ. Will the 
Christian fail? Yes, that is certain. However, because there is no condemnation, even if (and 
there is truly no “if” about it) the Christian falls short in deeds of service, his identity, his true 
identity, is certain because it is not in his works but in Christ, into whom he has been baptized. 
As far as identity actualization is concerned, the Christian does not look primarily to his works 
for his ultimate identity. That identity is conferred and secure. On the other hand, the vocation to 
which the baptized is called by God gives specificity and shape to that identity as he learns to be 
Christ to his neighbor. 
Aside from the three major parts of the thesis, a few closing remarks are in order before 
endeavoring to give some practical shape to the findings of this dissertation in chapter 5. 
Erikson’s theory spans the entire life cycle. His unique contribution has been to place ego 
development, including the experiential development of a sense of identity within the human life 
span and to call it a life cycle. By labeling it a cycle, rather than simply the life span, he 
highlights the way each stage relates to the others. Erikson’s theory, as further developed by 
Marcia and Waterman, provides the language to discuss statuses of identity and of changes in the 
status. This preserves the richness of human experience and allows for a thick description of a 
person’s current experience of identity. A major contribution of Erikson’s theory is that it leans 
toward identity achievement as being socially influenced. Its chief weakness is that it is without 
any objective teleology. A person achieves a sense of ego identity which works for that person in 
the social context in which she lives. Stages II (Autonomy vs. Shame and Guilt) and Stage III 
(Initiative vs. Guilt) appear to be Erikson’s attempt to remain faithful to Freud’s stages of 
psychosexual development. In this dissertation, the distinction between these two stages has been 
intentionally blurred. Erikson’s theory on the ritualization of life is extremely useful for 
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analyzing the ritual elements of the baptismal rites. It has been shown how this analysis provides 
material that can be of help in pastoral care. 
As with Erikson, Paul’s theology of baptism, and of baptismal identity, encompasses the 
physical, social, and psychological dimensions of life. Additionally, his teaching about Christian 
identity leads to a diminishing, albeit not an erasure, of ethnic identity. This correlates well with 
Erikson’s concern about pseudospeciation. Both Paul and Erikson understand the divisiveness of 
overemphasizing these distinctives between people. Both Paul and Erikson view life as social. 
For Erikson, the social dimensions of life are necessary for human affective development. Paul 
cannot conceive of the Christian life apart from incorporation into the body of Christ, which is 
the family of God. 
Although Erikson does not approach identity development from a theological perspective, 
it has been shown that using Erikson’s theory when providing pastoral care in terms of Christian 
identity and identity actualization is theologically defensible. Although it is of limited value in 
discussing the gift of a conferred righteous identity in baptism, it should be considered in relation 
to baptismal identity actualization. A unique use of his theory has been found in modifying his 
early stages to point out the detrimental effects of mistrust of God, which leads to narcissistic 
autonomy. Once this path is chosen, each of the syntonic elements become deadly to faith. By 
using his theory in this way, pastoral care can uncover mistrust by its fruits. On the positive side, 
if a person is grounded in the righteousness of faith, Erikson’s model can be used to guide the 
task of pastoral care so that the person learns to live out, to actualize, the new identity in the 
community, the family, and the church by caring for others in love. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF ERIKSON’S THEORY FOR PASTORAL CARE 
In the previous chapter, it has been demonstrated that the utilization of Erikson’s 
developmental theory in pastoral care is theologically defensible when describing the effects of 
original sin and how people attempt to build a self-chosen, autonomous identity. It also can be 
used with care when discussing the actualization, or coram mundo, expression of one’s identity, 
so long as “autonomy” is reframed to mean individuation and self-control over sinful impulses. 
Other than agreeing with Erikson that trust is fundamental to life, Erikson’s theory ought to be 
excluded from any discussion of the Christian’s conferred identity, which is grounded in the gift 
of the alien righteousness of Christ, received by faith (trust). Essentially, the only contribution 
Eriksonian theory has to the Christian’s real identity in Christ is understanding that identity, the 
conferred identity, as a “foreclosed” identity. In terms of pastoral care use, “foreclosed” should 
be viewed as a positive term. Being foreclosed, the identity is firm and certain, since it is not 
based on the imperfection of a person’s work in initiative, industry, or even in vocation. 
This is not a “how-to” chapter. Issues of pragmatics in pastoral care work are beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. This chapter has as its purpose three modest goals. First, some 
implications of Erikson’s theory in light of imputed baptismal identity will be discussed, with the 
hope that it will spur research on pragmatic applications in the future. The Christian’s conferred, 
imputed identity as being righteous in Christ is foundational to any understanding of Christian 
identity. That this imputed identity is a foreclosed identity has been, and will continue to be, 
described as a positive concept and not as an essentially negative one, as developmental theory 
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tends portrays it. The second task is to point out some implications for research in experiential 
identity actualization, drawing on Paul’s baptismal theology and the writings of Erikson, Marcia, 
and Waterman. The third task is the exploration of the implications and possibilities of using the 
baptismal rites of The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, in pastoral care issues involving 
Christian identity. This will be done by examining them through the lens of Erikson’s theory of 
ritualization. How do the rites function ritualistically? How might they assist the Christian in 
actualizing the imputed, real identity? 
There are certainly numerous trajectories which could be examined. One important one 
which, while tempting to tackle, is too complicated to deal with herein is the issue of sexual 
identity. Erikson’s terminology for Stage V, in the second edition of Childhood and Society and 
subsequent books, was “Identity vs. Role Confusion.”1 This dissertation follows Erikson’s earlier 
term, “Identity Diffusion,” a terminology recommended by Marcia and Waterman. Erikson wrote 
of “bisexual confusion” in Identity: Youth and Crisis.2 So there may be much in Erikson which 
will assist pastoral care work in this area. That, however, must be set aside for now. Instead, the 
implications outlined below parallel the three concerns addressed in the theological evaluation of 
chapter 4. 
Implications of Imputed Baptismal Identity for Pastoral Care 
Erikson’s theory is a theory of affective development over the life cycle. A significant 
critique leveled against his theory is that it has no objective teleology. It has been argued above 
that this does not make his theory fatally flawed if such a goal is supplied by theology. From a 
Lutheran perspective, one way in which a biblically sound teleology can be described is found in 
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 Erikson, Childhood and Society, 261–63. 
2
 Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, 27, 186–87, 254. 
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Luther’s Small Catechism: “That I may belong to him [Christ], live under him in his kingdom, 
and serve him in eternal righteousness, innocence, and blessedness, just as he is risen from the 
dead and lives and reigns eternally.”3 This description includes several important aspects of 
Christian identity. The words highlight the shift in ownership from being a slave to sin and the 
devil to now being under Christ’s lordship. Service to the Lord is done in righteousness, that is, 
in a right relationship to God, a restored relationship based on the redemption that is in Christ 
Jesus.4 This righteousness, as argued above, is the core of the Christian’s identity. The term, 
“innocence,” implies, among other things, the simplicity of child-like faith. The righteousness of 
faith is just such a trust. The three terms combine to point to the integrity that will be enjoyed in 
the eschatological kingdom. This teleology is grounded in the resurrection of Jesus, who lives 
and reigns forever. Furthermore, the concept of the kingdom implies sociality, in that the king 
reigns over a multitude of subjects. By incorporating this teleology into a pastoral care usage of 
Erikson’s theory, one can help the person seeking help to orient his actualization of identity away 
from self-chosen ideals and toward the conferred identity given in Christ. 
The baptized person is declared righteous by the joyous exchange, for Jesus took 
humanity’s unrighteousness upon himself and gifts his righteousness to humanity by faith.5 This 
imputed or conferred identity is foundational to the actualization of identity, which will be 
discussed below. Without an identity conferred by God, there is no objective foundation for 
Christian identity, let alone for actualizing one. The Christian’s real identity is the imputed 
identity of being righteous in Christ. It is the righteousness of faith. This imputation, or conferral, 
is not, however, a legal fiction. There “is no conflict between being declared righteous and being 
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 Rom. 3:24; Eph. 1:7; Col. 1:14. 
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 Kolb and Arand, Genius of Luther’s Theology, 45. 
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made righteous.”6 God’s word accomplishes what he speaks. This is true for the externally 
proclaimed word of God, and for the sacraments. As Wolfhart Pannenberg writes, “Baptism and 
the Supper are significatory acts, ‘signs of the nearness of God,’ Both, as signs, effect what they 
signify.”7 What Christ accomplished on the cross and by his resurrection is given to the Christian 
in baptism.8 Thus, whether by preaching or by sacrament, God creates a new reality, a reality he 
declares to be true. 
Eriksonian theory would describe the baptismal identity of being righteous by faith as a 
foreclosed identity. As stated earlier, this is nothing to argue against; these correlate quite well. 
In fact, the very foreclosed nature of this identity guarantees its ultimate actualization in the 
eschaton. In Eriksonian theory, identity, while strongly socially influenced, is also self-
constructed. Erikson states that it “arises from the selective repudiation and mutual assimilation 
of childhood identifications and their absorption in a new configuration, which, in turn is 
dependent on the process by which society (often through subsocieties) identifies the young 
individual.”9 There is therefore an interplay between the individual and the social matrix in 
which he is reared. Yet, the individual’s attainment of a sense of self has “a self-aspect and an 
ego aspect”10 which involves him in the process of synthesizing his own self-identity. Stanley 
Grenz traces the genesis for the “self-focused self” back to Augustine’s “turn toward the 
individual.” While it is not the purpose to argue for or against Grenz’s hypothesis, it is hard to 
refute the assertion that modern anthropology “elevates mastery as the key to the construction of 
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the self.”11 This self-mastery permeates Erikson’s description of affective development. Even in 
describing Luther’s identity development in Young Man Luther, Erikson links it to the world-
mastery that was occurring at the time when navies were opening water routes to new 
continents.12 
The imputation of righteousness as the core of the Christian’s new identity in Christ gives a 
sure foundation for life and for the actualization of this identity in daily living. Again, this is not 
a legal fiction. Kolb and Arand explain the importance of this new identity being a reality. 
Thus justification is not a legal fiction. The word does what it says. When God 
declares a person to be righteous, that person is actually righteous. The Word has 
brought about a new reality. A new relationship has been established. Luther did not 
define the status of the believer “as if” one were righteous. The believer was not 
fundamentally a sinner for whom God “has purchased a ticket for heaven,” where the 
sinner will finally lose that sinful identity while in this life the sinful identity remains 
primary.13 
This statement agrees with Paul’s assertion in Rom. 6:22 that the baptized person is no longer a 
slave to sin. Even though there remains a struggle against indwelling sin (Rom. 7:19), “sinner” is 
not the Christian’s true identity. Rather, the Christian delight’s in God’s Torah (Rom. 7:22), 
because he is a new creation (2 Cor. 5:17), who has been brought from death to life (Rom. 6:13). 
Faithful pastoral care does not point a person to himself so that he builds a self-focused 
identity. Rather, by focusing a person’s attention on the identity given in baptism, the pastor 
assists the person to actualize the specificity of that identity in the vocation into which God has 
called him. Kolb and Arand describe the pastor’s work as urging Christians to help their 
neighbor, not in order to earn salvation but “because it is good for your neighbor, and because it 
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is the way in which God intends humanity to be enjoyed.”14 This points to the actualization of 
identity in terms of relationships and work. In Eriksonian terminology, a Christian’s identity is 
developed and expressed in the affiliative and generative stages of development. These are the 
stages within which are the virtues of love and caring.15 A Christian is given his identity, he 
receives it by faith, then he expresses it by loving and caring for others. This is what it means to 
live in integrity, that is, in accordance with the identity of being righteous. Righteousness before 
God (alien righteousness), understood as identity, as being in a right relationship with God in 
Christ, becomes a powerful motivation to live righteously before others, that is, in a right 
relationship with the neighbor, because it is reality and not a legal fiction. “You have died and 
your life is now hidden with Christ in God” (Col. 3:3), therefore, live as a living sacrifice ((Rom. 
12:1) serving as Christ has served you. 
Implications of Baptismal Identity Actualization for Pastoral Care 
Building on the conferred, objective (real) identity given in baptism, how might Erikson’s 
developmental theory be used faithfully in pastoral care? In this section, four implications will be 
discussed. First, the importance of attending to the developmental stage of the parishioner will be 
considered, including how he or she has negotiated earlier stages which serve as the foundation 
for the current stage of development. Second, the utilization of Erikson’s theory for pastoral care 
assessment will be examined. Next, the importance of struggle, or crises, for growth in active 
righteousness will be revisited. It has been discussed at length in chapter 4. Finally, the 
importance of sociality for identity development will close this section. In the section that 
follows, the two baptismal rites approved for use in The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod will 
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be examined in detail in order to understand how they can provide material for pastoral care of 
identity actualization. 
Erik Erikson divides the life cycle into eight stages. His developmental stages are linked to 
the lifecycle stages of infancy, early childhood, the play age, the school age, adolescence, young 
adulthood, adulthood, and the mature age.16 Capps generally followed Erikson, whom he had 
met, except that, in The Decades of Life,17 he attempted to arrange the stages according to the 
decades from birth to 100 years old. Robert Fuller also followed Erikson as he tried to describe 
human fulfillment in terms of religious development.18 Fuller also incorporated Fowler’s stages 
of faith, which is admittedly more cognitive than affective.19 Daniel Levinson reduced the stages 
of life to four, namely, childhood and adolescence (age 0–22), early adulthood (age 17–45), 
middle adulthood (40–65), and late adulthood (60–?).20 He allows for overlap, which reflects the 
reality of the arbitrary divisions between the stages. However, his combination of childhood with 
adolescence does not do justice to the massive changes that take place in the first two decades of 
life. Gail Sheehy concerns herself with aspects of the life cycle after age 18. She writes about 
“provisional adulthood,” which is essentially equivalent to early adulthood, “first adulthood,” 
ages 30–45, and “second adulthood,” ages 45 and above.21 Each of these writers understand that 
people develop over the lifespan and that each stage along the way has its own unique 
challenges. Therefore, in pastoral care, one must be cognizant of the crises each stage brings with 
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it. This would appear to be especially important for one-on-one pastoral care work, couple 
counseling, and even youth work and instruction. Knowing the stage of affective development, 
as well as cognitive development, can assist in highlighting to what degree identity actualization 
can be expressed at that stage in life. 
Marcia and Josselson report: “Empirical research aimed at validating Erikson’s theory has 
been ongoing for close to fifty years.”22 Using an identity status approach, their research has not 
only verified Erikson’s theory;23 they have expanded it to test the areas of intimacy, generativity, 
and integrity. These, they have found, are grounded in the work of actualizing one’s identity, 
what they call the “identity achievement status.” With solid research to back up Erikson’s theory, 
it would appear wise to incorporate it into the practice pastoral care, given the results of this 
study showing how it might be used faithfully with certain caveats mentioned above. For 
example, it would appear to be helpful for couple counseling to know which “identity status” 
each member of the couple is at before dealing with the couple as a unit. 
Eyer, who authored Pastoral Care Under the Cross, while director of pastoral care at 
Columbia Hospital, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, gives an example of how Erikson’s stages might 
apply at each stage of development. Specifically, Eyer is writing about the developmental needs 
of the elderly.24 For the goal of each stage to be met, the preceding stages must have been 
negotiated adequately. Additionally, each stage cycles back on every other, forming more a web 
than a sequence. Although it would not be expected that a play-age child would have a fully 
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formed identity in all areas of life, a certain sense of identity is still to be there, even if only 
nascently. What is missing in Eyer’s description is the expression of one’s baptismal identity at 
each stage. Wise pastoral care can assist an elderly person, who may be troubled by a sense of 
worthlessness or even disgust and despair, by reorienting the elder’s mind (renewing of the 
mind: Rom. 12:2) from grounding his worth in his works to the conferred status of being 
righteous by faith, and, therefore, being a beloved child of God and heir with Christ. 
Since a Christian is given his identity at baptism, every Christian has the identity as one 
who is righteous by faith. How this identity is actualized at each stage in life will vary. 
Nevertheless, to put off identity development until adolescence or later is foolish, and is not even 
faithful to Erikson’s theory. Certainly, the expression of a righteous identity will be different in 
middle school than it will be in college, or in marriage, or in a retirement home. Righteousness is 
to be actualized at each stage. Pastoral care involves guiding people in such a way that they 
might find faithful ways of expressing that identity in all stages of development. In early 
adulthood, the Christian may be asking whether the roles expected of him are truly valid or 
faithful to God’s will for his life.25 Such a question would move a person into an appropriate 
moratorium, as he tries to figure out in what way his identity as one righteous by faith is to be 
expressed. But to cast off that identity, given in baptism, would be to assume a false identity, 
more consistent with the old man than with the new creature he is in Christ. Similarly, to struggle 
with vocational choices is part of maturation.26 Taking time to find out how to serve one’s 
neighbor is wise. Pastoral care and counseling can guide a person by providing direction. By 
keeping baptismal identity in the forefront, the pastor can assist the person in finding a vocation 
that is consistent with the core identity given in Christ. 
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A second implication of Erikson’s theory is in pastoral care assessment. Each stage along 
life’s way has its own unique crises. However, a major concern of pastoral care is repentance and 
faith, that of putting off the old man and putting on the new man in the concrete setting of that 
person’s life.27 Foundational to any concern of pastoral care is trust in Christ. In chapter 4, it was 
described how autonomy grows from mistrust in God and from trust in “that-which-is-not-God.” 
From this desire for autonomy from God, the desire to be God for oneself, develop the initiative 
to attempt self-justification. However, since no one is God except God, the attempt at autonomy 
produces a depleted self. The depleted self is a shamed self.28 Since shame drives a person to 
cover up, the self that is presented to the world is a false self, even a hypocritical self. In the 
work of pastoral care, it is wise to consider the reasons for boasting in his accomplishments. 
Such boasting may be an ego defense mechanism, an attempt to hide the failure to truly be 
autonomous. Such a disclosure would reveal a lack of trust in God, in that the person’s true 
nexus of trust in the narcissistic, yet depleted, self. 
On the other hand, as also discussed at length in chapter 4, if a person is attempting to 
actualize his righteous identity from the fount of the alien righteousness given in baptism, then 
paying attention to the various developmental stages can be of help in guiding the person in 
maturity. By emphasizing the identity given in baptism, the pastor can help the person to gain an 
understanding about how that identity can be faithfully expressed in love toward those within his 
social circle, including family, work, neighborhood, and church. The Christian’s identity is 
secure in Christ. The declarative word of God in Christ has created a new reality, not merely a 
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possibility. Therefore, the pastor first proclaims what God has proclaimed. “You are righteous.” 
Then, he can assist the parishioner in exploring what that identity looks like and acts like in that 
person’s unique station in life. This also includes speaking with the person about ways to care for 
others by understanding his vocation to be a calling in which he becomes Christ to his neighbor. 
In both intimacy and in generativity, the sociality of the Christian life is to be expressed. 
A third implication of experiential identity development involves the place crisis has in 
identity actualization. From a biblical perspective, learning to actualize one’s identity as 
righteous in Christ involves struggle against indwelling sin. Indwelling sin is the Christian’s 
great existential crisis. Paul expresses this spiritual crisis poignantly in Rom. 7:13–25. Paul’s 
description of his struggle against sin is closely connected to his teaching about baptism and its 
effects. Middendorf notes that only one imperative occurs in Romans outside of Rom. 6:11–19. 
Within that range of verses are five imperatives. “They exhort those who ‘have become new 
men’ by virtue of the one-time aorist act of baptism to resist sin and, instead, to walk in the 
renewal of life which only now is possible (6:4).”29 Therefore, while baptism bestows a new 
identity, making one to be a “new man,” it also calls the baptized to actualize the new reality.30 
Indwelling sin, however, remains “in one’s members,” even though it is not one’s true identity. 
This compounds the crisis. 
In Rom. 8:1, Paul assures the baptized person that even though sinful impulses result in 
sinful actions, the person who has been baptized into Christ Jesus will not be condemned. Paul 
concludes his description of being a distressed man, because of indwelling sin, by rejoicing in 
Christ who will deliver him from “this body of death” (Rom. 7:24–25). This points to one of the 
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surprisingly felicitous results of sin remaining in the members this side of the grave or the 
eschaton. The law points out the sins the Christian unintentionally commits. Lex semper accusat 
(the law always accuses).31 Since it always accuses, the Christian is constantly pointed back to 
trust in Christ. Any initiative, industry, or generativity on the part of the Christian will only be 
partial and therefore incapable of providing the grounds for self-justification.32 Therefore, even 
sin, paradoxically, works in the believer’s favor, if he hears the accusation of the law and trusts 
in Christ’s atoning work. By so doing, even struggle with and against sin strengthens the 
Christian’s identity as one who is righteous by, and only by, faith in Jesus. Then, once a person 
knows that the core of Christian identity is the righteousness of faith given in baptism, and that 
the power of baptism for actualization of active righteousness is in the death and resurrection of 
Christ (which is the Christian’s in baptism), then the initiative to actualize that identity, that is, to 
put it into practice, by industrious generativity done in love for neighbor can be pursued. 
A fourth implication of experiential identity development involves the concept of sociality. 
Love for neighbor, and generative care for him, points to the sociality of baptism and baptismal 
identity. In Rom. 12:3–21, Paul intends his hearers to live out their baptism in sacrificial service 
to one another. Each person has received a gift with which he is to serve the Christian 
community. The social aspect of the baptismal life is highlighted by his description of the church 
as a body with various member. Paul makes a similar point in 1 Cor. 12:12–13. Baptism forms 
the basis for the corporate life of the church, for the sociality of the Christian community. Paul is 
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not arguing in this letter for the practice of baptism; rather he assumes it to be normative. 
Richard DeMaris writes about these words to the Corinthian church: 
Paul’s claim in these verses that all Christians have undergone baptism and his 
introduction of it to argue for unity is instructive. Paul does not argue for baptism but 
from it. That is, he depends on it as a premise from which to address a problem 
current among the recipients of his letter.33 
This sociality expands Christian identity beyond the individual, a concept Paul likely would not 
have understood in the way it is today, to the community of faith. The church, as mentioned 
repeatedly above, is the sanctorum communio. The corporate nature of the church is greater than 
the individuals who comprise its membership.  
The implications of sociality extend to the manner in which incorporation into the body of 
Christ creates a higher-level identity, which supersedes the socioeconomic and ethnic identities 
one has by birth or historical accident. In Gal. 3:14, as in Romans 4, Paul states that all 
Christians are now heirs of the promise made to Abraham. J. Daniel Hays writes:  
The equation of gospel and Abrahamic promise is significant for our study of race 
because we have found the Abrahamic promise running like a scarlet thread 
throughout the Scriptures, surfacing especially when the biblical authors are stressing 
the universality of God’s plan, his call, or his people.34 
Erikson wrote about pseudospeciation. The gospel overcomes this by uniting all Christians 
together into the one body of Christ, into which all Christians are baptized. The gospel creates a 
unique social identity and cohesion, not simply by membership into an organization, but by a 
mystical union, an ontological unity of the Spirit, as Paul describes it in Eph. 4:3. This unity is 
reality; it is a true identity. It too, however, must be actualized. This is done as each member, 
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intimately connected to every other member, does its part to build up the body in love (Eph. 
4:15–16). 
The Rites of Holy Baptism and Christian Identity 
Since Christian identity is linked to baptism, it would appear valid to explore implications 
of the rites of baptism for Christian identity. Christians are given their identity by God when they 
are baptized. By means of baptism, they are united with Christ in his death, burial, and 
resurrection, declared to be righteous, made to be saints and children of God, and joined to all 
other Christians as fellow siblings under one Father. How strange it is, then, that when pastoral 
care involves issues of identity, little more is said other than, “Live out your baptism.” William 
H. Willimon takes notice of this discrepancy in pastoral care when he states that “an examination 
of present baptismal theology and practice indicates that the baptismal font would be the last 
place in the church for one to expect help on questions of identity.”35 This is not as it should be. 
Therefore, the task of this section is to consider how the baptismal rites used within The 
Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod might be utilized effectively as material for pastoral care of 
identity actualization, using Eriksonian ritualization as one way to view the elements of the rites. 
To accomplish this task, the baptismal rites will be view through the stages of ritualization 
outlined by Erikson. The two rites which are examined are the rite of “Holy Baptism” and “Holy 
Baptism—Alternate Form,” in Lutheran Service Book Pastoral Care Companion,36 since these 
are the current rituals used by a great number of LCMS congregations. Before examining them in 
terms of ritualization, a description of the elements and the three-act structure of the rites is 
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 William H. Willimon, Worship as Pastoral Care (Nashville: Abingdon, 1979), 148. 
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 The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod Commission on Worship, Lutheran Service Book Pastoral Care 
Companion (St. Louis: Concordia, 2007), 3–20. Lutheran Service Book Pastoral Care Companion will hereafter be 
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presented in order to orient the study in the flow of the ritual. 
The general notes which precede the rite of “Holy Baptism” state: “The rite of Holy 
Baptism is a public rite of the Church that is usually administered in the presence of the 
congregation.”37 The rite is usually situated within the wider divine service, replacing the 
confession of sins and absolution. The Creed is usually omitted in the divine service because it is 
contained within the rite. Several nonobligatory rubrics include: warm water in the font, 
baptismal napkins and towels, a baptismal shell, and the use of olive oil during the post-
baptismal blessing. The enrollment of sponsors is expected, although several options are given. It 
is of special interest that one item mandated by the rubrics is the lighted paschal candle. “The 
paschal candle is lighted for all baptisms. It remains lighted for the entire service or office.”38 
The rite does allow for pouring, sprinkling, and immersion. 
The rite may begin with a baptismal hymn.39 In pastoral care and counseling, these hymns 
can provide texts for meditating on aspects of Christian identity. The hymns should be used to 
point out both the gift of alien righteousness and the outworking of active righteousness. Familial 
terms can also be mined in order to enhance the affiliative aspects of baptism. 
The rite assumes the gathering of the candidate for baptism with the sponsors and the 
                                                 
37
 Companion, 3. 
38
 Companion, 4. 
39
 Lutheran Service Book (St. Louis: Concordia, 2006), has four hymns under the “Holy Baptism” heading 
(590–93) and twelve under the heading of “Baptismal Life” (594–605). Hymns 592 “Dearest Jesus, We are Here” 
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baptism with the unseen. Stanza 2 connects regeneration with the death of Jesus. “Our life comes through Christ’s 
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stanza 4 requests of the Holy Spirit that he wash not only the candidate but also all those present for the baptism. 
This aspect of sociality incorporates the entire congregation into the ritual, as they actualize their baptism along with 
the baptismal candidate. 
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family. This demonstrates the sociality of the rite. This could be used in pastoral care to highlight 
a transference from the biological family of origin into the larger family of the sanctorum 
communio. While family membership is important to everyone, people without close family, or 
who for various reasons are estranged from family, may find the familial aspects of the 
sanctorum communio comforting and reassuring. They have a family. This same emphasis on 
community is found in the use of sponsors, who, in this rite, are addressed and make promises to 
be examples of faith and holy living. The rubrics appear to prefer the rite to begin at the entrance 
to the nave, since this is given as the first option. 
Act One of the rite beings with the invocation of the triune name. The candidate for 
baptism is then addressed directly. In practice, especially in cases of infant baptism, it might 
appear that the adults present are addressed. The term, “Dearly beloved,” could be taken in either 
the singular or the plural. However, the rubric that precedes the rite indicates that the addressee is 
the one, or ones, to be baptized. The address begins by citing Matt.28:18b–19,40 Mark 16:16a, 
and 1 Pet. 3:21 as scriptural texts which command baptism and which give promises of salvation 
in baptism. The address continues, teaching about original sin and the deliverance that is for all 
in the atoning death of Jesus Christ. The resurrection of Jesus, which is essential to the gospel 
and to baptism, is not mentioned in the address. 
The first question asked of the candidate is, “How are you named?” The officiant then uses 
this name as he marks the candidate’s forehead and heart with the sign of the cross, which 
signifies redemption by the crucified Christ. What follows is a prayer, known as “the Flood 
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 In Matt. 28:18–20, Jesus includes the “keeping” of everything he commanded his disciples as part of 
“making disciples.” The cutting short of the citation, while emphasizing baptism, can give the impression that the 
making of disciples is completed by baptism. This works against the need for ongoing life in the teaching of Christ. 
It may also contribute to the near magical understanding of baptism expressed by parents and grandparents who 
want their child baptized but then fail to attend worship services thereafter. 
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Prayer” (Sintflutgebet).41 This prayer reaches back to the worldwide flood which destroyed the 
world in the days of Noah. By being in the ark, he and his family were saved. It brings to 
memory the drowning of Pharaoh and his army, when Israel passed safely through the Red Sea. 
In each of these accounts, the water slayed the wicked. The righteous were saved by God’s 
power. Then the baptism of Jesus is recalled. It is claimed in the rite that Jesus’ baptism in the 
water of the Jordan River “sanctified and instituted all waters to be a saving flood and a lavish 
washing away of sin.”42 In the prayer, the celebrant then asks God to make the water of the rite to 
be a saving flood as well. The request includes asking faith (trust) for the candidate so that all 
inherited sin would be “drowned and die”43 The prayer also asks that the candidate be “kept safe 
and secure in the holy ark of the Christian Church, being separated from the multitude of 
unbelievers.”44 It is also asked that he serve God’s name with fervor and joy and be declared 
worthy of eternal life. 
The Gospel reading for the rite is always Mark 10:13–16. This emphasizes the infant faith, 
or basic passive trust which is saving faith. The reading drives home the theological lesson that 
the saving effects of baptism are the work of God in Christ. It is Jesus who blesses. The Lord’s 
Prayer (the “Our Father”) follows. This prayer is used in every rite and liturgy in Lutheran 
Service Book. It has, therefore, numerous functions. In the rite, it is prayed while the celebrant 
lays his hands on the head of the candidate, thereby including tactile elements to the ritual.  
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If the foregoing has occurred at the entrance to the nave, then the baptismal party moves to 
the font. Upon arrival at the font, the pastor says, as he makes the sign of the cross, “The Lord 
preserve your coming in and your going out from this time and forevermore.” This is the third 
time the sign of the cross has been made. The first was at the invocation. The pastor may have 
made the sign upon himself along with the congregation. The rubrics do not indicate which 
action it is to be. The second signing with the cross is at the naming. Now, having come to the 
baptismal waters, the cross once more is made upon the candidate. The blessing upon the 
candidate concerning his coming in and going out appears to make little sense if the movement 
toward the font (coming in) has not occurred. It would appear that the better practice then would 
be to begin the baptismal rite at the entrance to the nave.45 
The arrival at the font signals the beginning of Act Two. The dramatic element of the rite 
intensifies as the pastor asks the candidate to renounce the devil, his works, and his ways. He 
then asks the candidate to confess the faith (fides quae creditur) into which the candidate will be 
baptized. The baptismal creed is put into an interrogatory form. The final question is, “Do you 
desire to be baptized?” The response is, “Yes, I do.” The pastor then pours water three times on 
the head of the candidate while saying, “[Name], I baptize you in the name of the Father and of 
the Son and of the Holy Spirit.” This creates an inclusio, bracketing everything between the 
invocation and the baptism proper. Immediately after the baptism, the pastor again lays his hands 
on the person, now no longer a candidate but a baptized Christian, and says, “The almighty God 
and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has given you the new birth of water and the Spirit and 
has forgiven you all your sins, strengthen you with his grace to life everlasting.” The rubric 
indicates a fourth signing with the cross to accompany the blessing. The detailed notes of the rite, 
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the service at the baptismal font.” Kolb-Wengert, 374n159. 
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indicating the option of olive oil with this blessing, refer to Eph. 1:13–14.46 The use of olive oil 
carries with it the implication of the giving of the Spirit in baptism. The signing with the cross, 
along with the “sealing” indicated in the rubrics points again to the baptized being the possession 
of God, who has given the person new birth and the Spirit.47 
With the baptizing in water and the marking completed, the formal aspects of the rite are 
completed. Nevertheless, a few items remain in the ritual. These can be understood as 
comprising Act Three, especially since they are elements that include physical gifts of 
remembrance and words spoken by an assistant. Each of these elements of the ritual as optional 
according to the rubrics. The first is the gift of a white garment, to picture the gift of Christ’s 
righteousness. The words that accompany the gift speak of the imputed, real identity the baptized 
Christian has in Christ. No exhortation to actualize this identity is given. This is pure gift. The 
second gift is that of a lighted candle. The candle has been lighted from the flame of the paschal 
candle, linking it to the resurrection of Christ. This gift does include an exhortation. The 
Christian has received Christ, who is the Light of the world. Therefore, the Christian is “always 
to live in the light of Christ and be ever watchful for his coming.” This appears to tie back to the 
parable of the wise and foolish virgins in Matt. 25:1–13. If so, this could be utilized in pastoral 
care and counseling to highlight the goal of wisdom in Stage VIII development. 
Next, an assisting minister welcomes the newly baptized into the “one holy Christian and 
apostolic Church.” These words echo those of the Third Article of the Nicene Creed. The words 
are rich in affiliative language as they declare to the newly baptized that he is now a member of 
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God’s Son, an heir along with all other Christians of the treasures of heaven, and is received as 
“our brother” (or sister) in Christ. This emphasizes the sociality of the gospel and of baptism in 
particular. The rite concludes with a prayer of thanksgiving, offered by the pastor, asking for 
perseverance and steadfastness on behalf of the newly baptized.  
The rite of “Holy Baptism—Alternate Form” in based on, although not exactly the same as, 
Martin Luther’s baptism rite. The general notes indicate that the basis for the rite is the 
“Baptismal Booklet as appended to Luther’s Small Catechism (The Book of Concord, Kolb 
Wengert, pages 371–375).”48 Given the similarities of this rite with the one reviewed above, only 
significant divergences will be addressed.  
The rite begins at the entrance to the nave or at the font. Unlike the previous rite, this rite 
does not begin with the invocation, rather the pastor addresses the candidate, speaking the words 
of Matt. 28:18b–19, Mark 16:16a, and 1 Pet. 3:21, as before. Then he says, “The Word of God 
also teaches that we are conceived and born sinful and are under the power of the devil until 
Christ claims us as His own.” Then the pastor performs the exorcism saying, “Therefore, depart, 
you unclean spirit, and make room for the Holy Spirit in the name of the Father and of the Son 
and of the Holy Spirit.” Normal Nagel, referring to Luther’s rite, notes that the exorcism was 
historically understood by Lutherans as “a touchstone of sound doctrine,” along with the 
Sintflutgebet.49 Following, for the most part, Luther’s order, is a prayer imploring God’s gifts 
upon the candidate to be baptized. Immediately following this prayer is the Sintflutgebet. Nagel 
draws his readers’ attention to the accounts of Noah and the flood and to Moses and the crossing 
of the Red Sea. These are two of the readings that appear in the Easter Vigil, the service in which 
catechumens historically were baptized. Writing about the Sintflutgebet, he states: “The matrix of 
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this prayer are the blessing of the water and the readings contained in the Easter Vigil. Cut off 
from these, the prayer is difficult to use with understanding as witness the many efforts to rework 
it.”50 This remark points to the benefit of baptism during the Easter Vigil, since the ritual 
elements of that rite are thick and rich with symbolism, far beyond the stripped-down rite of 
either of these services. 
The rite of “Holy Baptism—Alternate Form” can be divided into two acts. It does not 
provide for the enriched Act Three. The rubric notes the giving of a white garment as an optional 
matter. The rite simply ends with the laying on of hands in the giving of the post-baptism 
blessing, followed by, “Peace be with you.” 
Analyzing the rites from the perspective of Erikson’s scheme for ritualization yields many 
things about the rites which can be incorporated into pastoral care of those in need of actualizing 
their identity, which has been given to them by means of baptism. While the goal of this study is 
the actualization of identity, it has been made clear earlier that identity includes the social matrix 
of one’s life setting and the vocation one has been called to in service to others. Therefore, all 
eight ritual elements will be discussed in what follows. 
The first ritual element to consider is the numinous. The numinous is grounded in the 
smiling face of the mother and the naming of the child, which she does as she looks into the 
child’s face. Erikson refers to the daily appearance of the mother as the “’greeting ceremonial’ 
marking the beginning of the infant’s day.”51 In the baptismal rite, “Holy Baptism,” the 
invocation, at the beginning, and the “welcome,” at the close of the rite have a similar ritual 
function. In the former, the name of God is spoken, setting the rite apart as a sacred ritual in 
which God is present with his grace and love. The “welcome” is the congregation’s “greeting 
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ceremonial,” informing the newly baptized that he is now a member of the group, and a brother 
in Christ. The implications of the “greeting ceremonial” provides ritual material from which to 
counsel a person concerning his place in the congregation. God has placed his name upon him, 
the congregation has acknowledged this fact, he is now a member of a new family. This socially 
incorporating aspect of baptism needs greater emphasis in the Lutheran Church—Missouri 
Synod than it is often given. Baptism does not merely save an individual; it makes him a member 
of the family. The invocation is solely God’s work, claiming the candidate by marking him with 
the Triune name. The welcome is the obedient response of the congregation giving their “Amen” 
to God’s work in the rite.  
The “greeting ceremonial” is intensified in “Holy Baptism–Alternate Form.” Although the 
rite does not begin with the invocation, but rather with the scripture verses instituting baptism 
and the proclamation of original sin with the result of slavery to Satan, the invocation in this rite 
follows the exorcism. This implies a change in status. The candidate has been possessed by an 
unclean spirit; he has been a slave of the devil. Now God’s name is pronounced over him, and 
the demon is driven away. The sign of the holy cross is made on his forehead and his heart. He 
now belongs to Christ the crucified. Solid pastoral care of a Christian, who is deeply troubled by 
temptation, should include reference to the exorcistic power of baptism. If the “Alternate Form” 
is not practiced in the congregation, or was not used for that person in the congregation in which 
he was baptized, the exorcistic elements of the rite, such as the teaching on deliverance from the 
power of the devil in the section about original sin, the picture of Pharaoh as a type of Satan, and 
entrance into the kingdom of God, as described in the baptism Gospel, should be emphasized. 
Before baptism, all people are members of the devil’s realm. By means of baptism, the Christian 
is rescued from slavery to the devil and made to be a child of God.  
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Another numinous element in the rite is the naming. In “Holy Baptism,” the candidate is 
asked how he is named. In “Alternate Form,” the question is not asked. Rather, the pastor first 
uses the person’s name in the prayer requesting God’s blessing and power in baptism. The next 
time the person’s name is used is when he is asked if he renounces the devil. In both rites, the 
most significant use of the name is in the act of baptizing. In this one single act the person’s 
name and the Triune name are joined as the water is poured three times, or as the person is triple 
immersed in the water. This joining of the person by name with the name of God has great 
significance. Nagel states:  
Name and identity go together. So we have the designation of a particular person by 
name, and upon that particular person the triune name of God is put with the water in 
the very act of baptizing. Through all the variations of liturgy this has always been 
there. Who and whose we are is given with the name and the water.52 
The baptismal Gospel, Mark 10:13–16, includes reference to Jesus taking the little children 
up in his arms and putting his hands on them, blessing them. In both rites, this reading is 
immediately followed by the pastor placing his hands on the candidate and blessing him by 
praying over him and for him the Lord’s Prayer. While this certainly includes a dramatic element 
as does the entire ritual, the numinous element is akin to the mother reaching out to lovingly 
touch her child, to speak his name, and to assure the child that he is hers. In the baptismal rite, 
the pastor personifies Christ, reaching out to bless the candidate for baptism. Nagel remarks: 
“The blessing bestowed is that of being drawn by Jesus into the company of those who, with and 
because of him, call God Abba, baby talk for Father, which no one ever dared before Jesus.”53 
This ties the numinous element to the affiliative, which provides the pastor with a ritual picture 
to assist a counselee who feels estranged from God and the church. 
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The numinous element includes not only the smiling countenance of the mother, but her 
voice speaking to her child, naming him and claiming him as her own. When a mother calls her 
child by name she acknowledges him as hers and grants him his place in the family. A father 
similarly does this when he claims the child. There is never a doubt about who a child’s mother 
is, but, in a sense, every father adopts his child by claiming him as his own, by saying, “You are 
mine.” In baptism, “Christ claims us as his own.”54 God’s word is his voice, his numinous voice, 
making a person to be his and granting that person his true identity. God’s Word is the re-
creative agent or tool of his reality-changing action by making a person righteous in Christ. 
The numinous element of ritualization is coterminous with Stage I (Trust vs. Mistrust). 
Erikson connected this stage with religion. He wrote of the confession of dependence and 
“childlike faith” which seeks and finds the security of being in “the very bosom of the divine.”55 
The numinous elements of the rite provide the ground for trust in God who loves, who reaches 
out to save, and who names the candidate and claims her as his own child. Erikson, however, 
also acknowledges that the numinous has a seemingly darker side. Just as the mother withdraws 
her smiling face from time to time, and yet reappears to meet real needs, so God often hides his 
smiling face. He appears to be an inaccessible “Other.” In Rom. 5:1–5, Paul writes of times of 
suffering or trial. Yet he quickly reminds his readers, in 5:6–11, of God’s love in Christ. Erikson 
describes the mother’s increasing number of “series of estrangements” which are designed to 
exercise and strengthen the child’s trust and to develop the virtue of hope.56 Paul writes about the 
teleological purpose of suffering. Suffering is designed to produce hope in the Christian. By 
drawing the Christian’s attention to the numinous elements of the rite, pastoral care can provide 
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the assurance that God has not maliciously withdrawn his presence from the believer. God 
withdraws only in order to, and for as long as it is necessary to, create and strengthen hope.57 
Although the numinous might appear to be without a dangerous extreme, Erikson warns of 
idolism, “which distorts the reverence for the truly numinous.”58 A magical view of baptism, or 
assigning superstitious power to the water itself, are ways the numinous element of baptism can 
be perverted. Similarly, the sign of the cross, while a symbol interpreted by the word of the cross 
in the gospel, is not a good-luck charm. The power of baptism is in the word of Christ and in the 
proclamation of the Triune name. Baptism is a washing of water in the word (Eph. 5:26). Of 
concern for many pastors is the parishioner who wants her child or grandchild baptized, but 
makes no commitment to regular attendance at the divine service, within which the child will be 
catechized in the faith. Nagel notes the catechetical nature of the renunciation and the creed.59 
This is, however, but the beginning. An improvement to the rite might include the full citation of 
Matt. 28:18–20, rather than the truncated citation currently in use. 
The rite of baptism, while predominantly a bestowal of the gift of Christ’s alien 
righteousness, has judicious elements as well. In Erikson’s theory, the judicious begins when the 
mother sets boundaries on the infant’s behavior, which begin to give the child a sense of 
separation or individuation from the mother. This stage intensifies as the principles of law and 
order increase and increasing numbers of previously tolerated behaviors are prohibited.60 The 
opening words of both rites emphasize the fallen condition of the candidate. He has been 
conceived and born sinful, he is under the power of the devil, and he would be lost forever were 
                                                 
57
 Erikson describes mature hope as “the most childlike of all ego-qualities.” Erikson, Insight and 
Responsibility, 116. Thus, the Christian is constantly returned to the status of being a child, trusting in God to appear 
with his smiling, loving countenance. 
58
 Erikson, Toys and Reasons, 90. 
59
 Nagel, “Holy Baptism,” 275. 
60
 Erikson, Toys and Reasons, 580. 
291 
it not for Christ. This gives a fatal blow to sinful human autonomy, as well as to human initiative 
and industry in terms of works-righteousness. The sinfulness of the unbelieving world and the 
obduracy of the human heart are highlighted in the Sintflutgebet. The candidate’s own sinfulness, 
inherited from Adam, and his sinful deeds are also a topic of that prayer. The mention of Adam 
in the Sintflutgebet reaches back to Genesis 3, but also can be used in pastoral care and 
counseling as an entry point for discussing Romans 5, and then the themes of the old man and 
new man in Romans 6–8. A final section on the judicious appears in the living of the lighted 
candle. As pointed out above, the light comes from the paschal candle, which is a ritual 
representative of Christ resurrected from the dead. Now the newly baptized Christ is given light 
from that light so that he might walk in that light. The judicious is here a gentle urging to 
actualize the light given in baptism. 
In “Holy Baptism—Alternate Form,” the judicious, namely the teaching about original sin, 
precedes the numinous greeting, the proclamation of the Triune name and the signing of the 
candidate with the cross. It should be remembered that the various elements of ritualization, in 
Erikson’s theory, though usually highlighted at various stages in the life cycle, are present in one 
form or another at each stage. That the judicious precedes the numinous in this rite is of no real 
consequence. From the perspective of proclamation, it would appear to follow more closely the 
Luther proclivity for preaching law before gospel. The first proclamation of then gospel, in 
“Holy Baptism—Alternate Form,” is the exorcism. Nagel remarks: 
By Baptism the Lord saves and makes us his own. The only alternative to belonging 
to him is to belong to the devil. Hence Satan must be banished and renounced. This is 
done with words of God and prayer. This is Jesus’ work (Matt. 8:16; 12:28) and is 
done in his name (Mark 9:38). The dominion of Satan is the dominion of sin. Baptism 
frees us from this.61 
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The purpose of baptism is to put to death the old identity of being a slave to sin and Satan 
and effecting the rebirth of the candidate, so as to confer upon him the righteousness of Christ, 
which is the foundation of his new identity. Erikson warns of the judicious element becoming so 
heightened that it transforms into legalism.62 The two baptismal liturgies do not create such a 
result. In fact, the only judicious elements are the statement of original sin and, in the giving of 
the candle, a gentle urging to live in the light of Christ. It has been shown above, in the 
discussion of Romans 6–8, that Paul eschews legalism. The Christian has died to the 
commandments of Torah, to the law as a lord. Rather than legalism, the urging to live in the light 
of Christ comes from the new reality of being dead to sin and alive to God in Christ Jesus. 
The judicious elements of ritual are connected to Stage II (Autonomy vs. Shame and 
Doubt). Erikson writes:  
The very autonomy gained in the second stage, namely, a sense of being a separate 
person with a will born of self-will and tamed by self-control—that autonomy soon 
finds its limits in our sensitive awareness of being watched by superior persons and of 
being called names, even bestial ones.63 
Erikson therefore points to the development of the superego, which stands watch over the person 
accusing and excusing. This certainly parallels Paul’s description of the conscience in Rom. 
2:15, the very section in which he writes of the judicious. In Rom 8:1–9, Paul writes about the 
work of the Holy Spirit, who is given in baptism, and how Christians are to walk in the Spirit. In 
Gal. 5:16–26, he uses the same language and states that one aspect of the “fruit of the Spirit” is 
self-control. By submitting to the Spirit’s guidance, the Christian begins follow the law’s 
guidance without being under its crushing, condemning weight. Erikson states that the ego-
strength of this stage is “will.” He writes: “To will does not mean to be willful, but rather to gain 
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gradually the power of increased judgment and decision in the application of the drive. A man 
must learn to will what can be, to renounce as not worth willing what cannot be, and to believe 
he willed what is inevitable.”64 Paul, in Rom. 12:1–2, writes of the result of having one’s mind 
transformed by the truth. The baptized learns to discern the will of God. Paraphrasing Erikson: 
The Christian must learn to will what in conformity with God’s will, to renounce what is not, and 
to view all things from the perspective of his reality in Christ. This is the point of the giving of 
the candle. The Christian now lives in conformity with the light he has received in Christ. 
Stage III (Initiative vs. Guilt) is ritualized in the dramatic. The ego-strength of this stage is 
“purpose.”65 Erikson wrote that the dramatic elements include “a coherent plot with dramatic 
turns and some form of climatic conclusion.”66 The plot of the baptismal ritual is the movement 
from being in sin and under Satan’s power to being a member of God’s family. This is th 
purpose of the rite. It includes a change in identity from being a sinner to the identity of being 
one of the saints, who “obtain the promised inheritance in heaven.”67 The drama of the ritual is 
the strongest in the Sintflutgebet and in the Creed. In the Sintflutgebet the passing through the 
waters pictures death and resurrection, which is the motif Paul uses in Romans 6. The prayer 
begins with the story of the flood, which annihilated the sinful inhabitants of the world. Noah 
and his family were saved by means of the ark. The picture of the ark serves as the inclusio of 
the prayer. The pastor asks God to keep the baptized “safe and secure in the holy ark of the 
Christian Church.”68 Just as Noah’s family was saved, so the Christian family is saved in the ark 
of the church. In the center of the prayer, following the story of the exodus from Egypt, is the 
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request that the candidate be granted true faith by the Holy Spirit. The foundation of identity is 
therefore acknowledged to be in trust in God who has given these promises in baptism. God 
speaks these words of promise in the theo-drama of Christ’s work, communicated by means of 
baptism. 
This theo-drama is recited in the confession of the baptismal creed, which is given as an 
interrogation. The creed forms the center of catechesis. It is at the center because in it the drama 
of God’s work in creation, redemption, and sanctification is narrated. In terms of pastoral care, 
the creed should be taught, not as a dry recitation, but as a dramatic reading of God’s work. In 
the rite, following the renunciation, the contrast between the realm of sin and death and the 
kingdom of God can be highlighted. That which is renounced is one’s old identity in Adam and 
under the devil. That which is confessed is the source of one’s new identity in Christ. 
Kevin Vanhoozer describes the roles various players, or actors, have in the drama of 
doctrine, which can also be helpful in thinking through the dramatic elements in baptism.69 One 
set of actors is Adam and his children. This is reflected in the words of the Sintflutgebet, which 
mentions Adam as the one from whom the candidate for baptism has inherited original sin. All 
those present also are part of this set of actors, since the congregation and the baptismal party all 
participate in parts of the rite. Each has his own script. Another set of actors Vanhoozer refers to 
is Christ and his holy angels. While the holy angels are not mentioned in the rite, Christ is the 
prominent figure, along with the Father and the Holy Spirit. So instead of Vanhoozer’s cast, it 
would be better to consider the three divine Persons as dramatis personae in baptism. The third 
set of actors Vanhoozer mentions is comprised of Satan and the demons. The exorcism in “Holy 
Baptism—Alternate Form” names the demon as an unclean spirit, commanding it to depart. 
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Satan is specifically mentioned, when the candidate is called upon to renounce the devil, his 
works, and his ways. 
This climatic movement from the kingdom of darkness to God’s kingdom can be 
emphasized by the movement recommended in the rubrics from the entrance to the nave to the 
font. Additionally, the rubric that directs all to return to their places, which comes at the end of 
the rite, can also be used to communicate that the baptized is now a full member of the 
sanctorum communio. Having been snatched from the devil’s clutches, having passed safely 
through the waters, the newly baptized now takes his seat among the other disciples of Jesus. 
Erikson warns of a detrimental tendency to overly dramatize. He warns of impersonation, of 
simply playing dramatically, without any conviction. This becomes mere role-playing.70 
But this is not mere role-playing. The virtue, or ego-strength, of Stage III (Initiative vs. 
Guilt) and the corresponding ritual element of the dramatic is “purpose.” Erikson states that 
purpose is “the courage to envisage and pursue valued goals uninhibited by the defeat of infantile 
fantasies, by guilt and by the foiling fear of punishment.”71 The dramatic elements of the rite 
teach that the Christian has moved into a new realm, that he is no longer under the realm of 
Satan. The Christian is in Christ Jesus. “Therefore, there is now no condemnation” for the one 
who is baptized into Christ.72 Guilt and “the foiling fear of punishment” are removed. Led by the 
Spirit, the Christian is set free to attempt ways of actualizing her baptismal identity, free from the 
fear of getting it wrong and being rejected by God because of failure. While Erikson connects 
this sage with the play age, it should not be restricted to childhood. The crushing weight of being 
judged for every failure to be perfect is entirely removed. This is the liberating joy of being 
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righteous in Christ. “Safe and secure in the ark of the Christian church” the Christian is released 
from the law so that she can follow the lead of the Spirit in true freedom. The words of the 
prayer which accompany the giving of the white garment speak about the judgment seat of 
Christ. Rather than being words which create fear, they remind the newly baptize and all in 
attendance that the reason for paralyzing fear is removed. “So you shall stand before the 
judgment seat of Christ to receive the inheritance prepared for you from the foundation of the 
world.”73 In this is true freedom. 
This freedom, however, is not merely freedom from, but freedom to. It is freedom to follow 
the Spirit’s lead. This freedom is not chaotic, it has form. Erikson links the formal elements of 
ritual to Stage IV (Industry vs. Inferiority). The ego-strength of this stage is “competence.” 
“Competence, then, is the free exercise of dexterity and intelligence in the completion of tasks, 
unimpaired by infantile inferiority.”74 It becomes the basis for cooperative work as part of a 
group. 
The formal aspect of ritual also gives structure to the numinous, the judicious, and the 
dramatic elements. It tames the chaotic. Catherine Bell has noted: 
Formality is one of the most frequently cited characteristics of ritual, even though it is 
certainly not restricted to ritual per se. In fact, as a quality, formality is routinely 
understood in terms of contrast and degree. That is, formal activities set up an explicit 
contrast with informal or casual ones; and activities can be formalized to different 
extents. In general, the more formal a series of movements and activities, the more 
ritual-like they are apt to seem to us.75 
This is certainly true of the baptismal rites. Vanhoozer refers to pastors as “dramaturges (workers 
of drama) charged with preparing the company of the baptized to put feet on their doctrine, 
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walking the way of Jesus Christ with not only theoretical but also practical understanding.”76 The 
rubrics function as stage directions, guiding the drama, giving it form and structure. However, 
the “may” rubrics allow for improvisation, as does the governing principle of the adiaphora. 
However, if everything is an adiaphoron, then the entire rite degenerates into chaos. The formal 
structure of the rite causes the impression which words of the rite have upon the participants to 
be multiplied. Franz Rosenzweig, a German Jewish theologian and philosopher stated: 
Liturgy frees gesture from the fetters of helpless servitude to speech, and makes of it 
something more than speech. Only the liturgical gesture anticipates that “purified lip” 
which is promised for “that day” to the peoples ever divided as to language. In it the 
impoverished muteness of the disbelieving members becomes eloquent, the voluble 
loquacity of the believing heart becomes silent. Disbelief and belief unite their 
prayer.77 
Nevertheless, the elements of the rite exist to serve the purpose of the rite, and not the other way 
around. Too fastidious concern for perfection in performance can degenerate into mere 
showmanship. Erikson reminds us that the numinous, the judicious, the dramatic, and the formal 
all combine to teach the ideological. On the other hand, “we also perceive the danger of 
overformalization, perfectionism, and empty ceremonialism.”78 This is a helpful warning for 
pastors not to become overly fastidious in liturgy. Ritual is not a thing unto itself. It exists in 
service to the gospel. In the baptismal rites, ritual serves the sacrament. 
As stated above, the ego-strength, or virtue, of this stage is “competence.” While the 
baptismal rites do not expressly mention it, within the Sintflutgebet are the words: “serving Your 
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name at all times with a fervent spirit and a joyful hope.”79 The renunciation includes the 
rejection of the works, or industries, of the devil. The welcome into the congregation, spoken by 
the assisting minister or elder, encourage the newly baptized to join in the work the Lord has 
given the congregation to do. The free exercise of dexterity and intelligence in the completion of 
tasks, unimpaired by infantile inferiority”80 is certainly needed for such communal activity. 
The foregoing ritual elements combine to teach, what Erikson calls, “the ideological,” and 
what the church might call, “the theological,” or the fides quae creditur.81 The biblical references 
which are specifically cited in the rite are Matt. 28:18b–19, Mark 16:16a, 1 Pet. 3:21, and Mark 
10:13–16. The first three are the references used in the Small Catechism to describe what 
baptism is, what benefits it gives, and how water can be salvific. What is missing in the rite is the 
reference that supports the significance of baptism for daily life, namely, Rom. 6:4. Rather than 
citing this verse, the Sintflutgebet dramatizes it in the stories of the flood and the exodus. The 
drowning of sin and dying to sin are specifically mentioned in the prayer in the request for God 
to accomplish this in the candidate’s life.  
Erikson links Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion) with the ego-strength of “fidelity.” 
Fidelity, or faithfulness, is “the ability to sustain loyalties freely pledged in spite of inevitable 
contradiction in value systems.”82 The social milieu certainly presents value systems which 
contradict the word of God. Indwelling sin likewise is contrary to the will of God. In baptism, the 
Christian is immersed into a new value system and given a counter-cultural ideology. 
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Overarching ideological themes in the baptismal rites are being cleansed from the demonic, 
being marked with the cross of Christ, with the name of God, and with the seal of the Holy 
Spirit. Dying to sin is taught in the Sintflutgebet and renouncing the devil and his works and 
ways and being turned to God in Christ are taught in the renunciation and the creed. The gift of 
the white garment, with which comes no exhortation, communicates the gift of the righteousness 
of Christ, which is the Christian’s new identity. This righteousness covers all sin and removes all 
fear of judgment, which is intimately connected to Paul’s statement in Rom. 8:1, that nothing is 
condemnation for the Christian. As noted above, an exhortation does accompany the giving of 
the lighted candle. Yet it is an urging to live in accordance with reality, to actualize that which is 
true by imputation. These aspects of doctrine are taught by act more so than by words. 
Vanhoozer states concerning the sacraments: “Baptism, along with the Lord’s Supper, is less a 
speech-act and more an act that speaks.”83 The elements of ritual come together to give a rich and 
thick experience of the faith (fides quae creditur). This can provide the pastor with a lived text 
from which to provide pastoral care as he teaches the meaning of Christian identity and the way 
in which it is actualized in daily life. 
Erikson’s concern at this stage is that the communication of an ideology not metamorphize 
into unhealthy fanaticism. Rather, the purpose of the ritual is to create a solidarity of conviction, 
which forms a coherent identity and then leads a person to become a participating, contributing, 
loving member of the social group, caring for others, especially for those in other generations.84 
This is evident in the affiliative and generative elements in the baptismal rites. The virtues 
of Stage VI (Intimacy vs. Isolation) and Stage VII (Generativity vs. Stagnation) are “love” and 
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“care” respectively.85 Returning to the Sintflutgebet, the prayer teaches the affiliative effect of 
baptism by reminding the congregation of the salvation of Noah’s family and the rescue of the 
people of Israel. The prayer also asks that the candidate be separated from the multitude of 
unbelievers and joined to the company of those who believe. This includes, to a degree, what 
Erikson might call “speciation.” The prayer clearly delineates between those who belong to God 
and those who don’t, between the righteous and the unrighteous, between the believers and the 
unbelievers. This “speciation” is essential to forming a unique identity as a Christian, so long as 
it does not result in a lack of love and care toward others or to a sense of being better than others. 
As Paul points out in Romans 2, and in Romans 9–11, that would be antithetical to the gospel, 
which is to go out to all. 
Another affiliative aspect in “Holy Baptism” is the welcoming spoken by the assisting 
minister. If this is spoken by a lay member of the congregation, the impact could be heightened. 
The welcome includes reception into the fellowship and the invitation to participate fully in the 
life of the congregation. 
The baptismal ritual also includes generative elements. Erikson thought of this as the 
ritualization work or passing the values of the group on to the next generation.86 In his 
developmental scheme, this is the stage in which one works in one’s vocation. Baptism gives the 
Christian a new identity, a new family, and a new vocation. The Sintflutgebet points to the 
Christian’s vocation by asking that the candidate be blessed in baptism so that he might serve 
God’s “name at all times with a fervent spirit and a joyful hope.”87 The welcome also includes 
generative elements. The assisting minister invites the newly baptized to join the congregation in 
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proclaiming “the praises of Him who called us out of darkness into His marvelous light.”88 
The final stage of ritualization is “the integrative.” This stage is connected to Stage VIII 
(Integrity vs. Despair and Disgust). The ego-strength of this stage is “wisdom,” which is the 
“detached concern with life itself, in the face of death.”89 For Erikson, the person who achieves a 
sense of integrity has a hope which outweighs any sense of despair or disgust. The baptismal rite 
teaches true wisdom, not by ignoring death, but by embracing it in the death and resurrection of 
Christ. The Sintflutgebet reminds those who hear and pray it that baptism unites the Christian 
with Christ who has won eternal life for the believer.90 The creed points the hearer to “the 
resurrection of the body and the life of the world to come.”91 The words which accompany the 
giving of the lighted candle remind the newly baptized of the “marriage feast of the Lamb,”92 
which she will attend. This teaches the newly baptized who she is. She is Christ’s. She is 
righteous in him. She is a new person with a new identity. 
The baptismal rites are a rich source for pastoral care, including the actualization of the 
Christian’s real identity. E. Byron Anderson, describes worship as “doing our life together as 
Christian people,” and not merely talking about it.93 The rite of baptism moves the participants 
beyond a mere lex orandi and lex credenda to lex agenda (the law of action) and to lex vivendi 
(law of living).94 It is the ritual elements of the rite, not the mere words, which combine with the 
words to impact the participants. Merely studying the words on the page is insufficient. The 
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whole is greater than the sum of the parts. The prayers, the words, and the actions combine to 
communicate the reality of baptism so that it becomes a means for the actualization of Christian 
identity. Erikson’s stages of ritualization provide a framework for examining the baptismal rites, 
and for connecting these elements to the work of pastoral care, as the pastor seeks to help people 
actualize the identity given to them in baptism. 
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